2022 IL App (1st) 210911-U No. 1-21-0911 Order filed August 18, 2022 Fourth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 13 CR 1628 ) LAVELL BLANCHARD, ) Honorable ) James B. Linn, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in resentencing defendant to 28 years’ imprisonment for first-degree murder.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Lavell Blanchard was found guilty of first-degree
murder while armed with a firearm and attempted armed robbery. Defendant was 17 years old
when he committed the offenses. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 50 years in
prison, which included a 25-year firearm sentencing enhancement for personally discharging a No. 1-21-0911
firearm during the commission of the offense. Defendant appealed his sentence. This court
reversed his sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. People v. Blanchard, 2020 IL
App (1st) 162394-U. We held that the trial court failed to adequately consider defendant’s youth
and its attendant characteristics before imposing a de facto life sentence and reminded the court it
may, in its discretion, decline to impose the 25-year firearm sentencing enhancement. Id. ¶¶ 14,
15.
¶3 On remand, the trial court imposed a sentence of 28 years in prison for first-degree murder
and 4 years for attempted armed robbery, to be served consecutively. Defendant now appeals,
contending his 28-year sentence for first-degree murder is excessive because it is disproportionate
to his rehabilitative potential, and the relevant mitigating and aggravating factors did not warrant
such a severe sentence. We affirm.1
¶4 As reflected in our prior order addressing defendant’s direct appeal of his initial sentence,
the trial evidence established that 17-year-old defendant and Britany Watson planned to rob
Sherman Horton. Horton was lured into his vehicle by Watson, who then notified defendant of
their location via text message. Defendant, while armed with a gun, approached Horton on the
driver’s side of the vehicle and told him not to move. Defendant fired a shot into the vehicle as
Horton started to drive away and then a second shot, striking and killing Horton.
¶5 The trial court found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 46 years in prison for first-degree murder, including a 25-
year firearm sentencing enhancement under the erroneous impression that the sentencing
1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
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enhancement was mandatory, and 4 years in prison for attempted armed robbery, to be served
consecutively. Defendant appealed his sentence, and this court reversed his sentence and remanded
for a new sentencing hearing, finding that the trial court failed to adequately consider defendant’s
youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing a de facto life sentence. Id. ¶ 14. We
reminded the trial court that, on remand, it may exercise its discretion and decline to impose the
firearm sentencing enhancement. Id.
¶6 On remand, a new presentence investigative (PSI) report was presented at the resentencing
hearing. Defendant was 26 years old at the time of resentencing. The PSI reflected that defendant
had been adjudicated delinquent for unlawful use of a weapon (2011), electronic monitoring
violation (2010), burglary (2010), criminal trespass to vehicles (2009), possession of cannabis
(2008), and aggravated battery of a school employee (2008).
¶7 The PSI stated that defendant was adopted at the age of three, never had a relationship with
his biological mother, and had no information about his biological father. He expressed a close
familial relationship with his adoptive mother and spoke to her on the phone weekly. Defendant
stated he was “very close” to his older siblings from his adoptive mother and had regular phone
contact with his four biological brothers, who were also adopted by his adoptive mother. He
received “very strong support” from his family, who provided financial and emotional support.
Defendant reported he had a good childhood, stable home, and his basic needs were met. Defendant
indicated he “ ‘felt alone and suffered with anger,’ ” revealing he did not really understand why
his biological parents were not involved in his life.
¶8 The PSI noted that defendant was expelled from grammar school for committing a battery
against a teacher but graduated high school while in the Juvenile Department of Corrections.
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Defendant had future plans to pursue a bachelor’s degree in business and a real estate license. He
also worked as a janitor for two years in prison.
¶9 According to the PSI, defendant admitted prior gang involvement from about the age of 12
until the age of 19 and was influenced by the other gang members in the neighborhood. Defendant
denied any diagnosis of a learning or behavior disorder and had never been on psychotropic
medication. He reported no alcohol or illegal drug use, though he attended a substance abuse
treatment program as part of his juvenile sentence for “ ‘ selling weed.’ ”
¶ 10 At age 17, when defendant committed the instant offenses, he did not understand risks and
consequences and was very “misled by the streets.” He described his maturity level at that time as
“very low.” He took “no pride in any criminal behavior” and hoped “the victims” could forgive
him. Although defendant participated in his defense, “he did not understand everything.” He had
been very involved in his defense more recently, “because he has matured and understands so
much more.”
¶ 11 At the resentencing hearing, the State published Horton’s mother’s updated victim-impact
statement in aggravation, which the State read in court. In her statement, Horton’s mother stated
he was her only child, and they “stuck together like glue.” She described Horton as “a good person
who loved and cared for his family.” Horton left behind five children and two grandchildren, whom
he never had a chance to meet. She never wanted to be in the courtroom under these circumstances
and had hoped “this chapter of [her] life was closed five years ago but once the system has failed
[her] and many others yet again.” She “[did] not agree with some of the new laws that the Illinois
legislature makes” and “fear[ed] for [her] life because they keep letting this criminal out of jail
early and into our communities.”
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¶ 12 In arguing aggravation, the State recounted defendant’s juvenile background, noting he
was previously adjudicated delinquent for aggravated battery against a schoolteacher, burglary for
breaking into a daycare and stealing the keys to one of the daycare’s vehicles, unlawful use of a
weapon, resisting arrest, criminal trespass to a vehicle, and possession of cannabis. The State also
recounted that defendant violated his prior probation sentence on more than one occasion and also
violated his electronic monitoring. The State argued that defendant was a danger to the community
and caused serious bodily harm in the instant case when he “pulled the trigger at virtually point-
blank range” and killed Horton. The State further argued that there was no evidence demonstrating
defendant’s capability for rehabilitation. The State noted defendant was a “few weeks shy of his
18th birthday” when he committed the offenses and asked the court to impose the original sentence
of 50 years in prison.
¶ 13 In mitigation, defense counsel argued that a 50-year sentence would be inappropriate under
People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 42, where our supreme court set a bright line rule that a de
facto life sentence for a juvenile is any sentence greater than 40 years. Defense counsel emphasized
that defendant’s age of 17 years old when he committed the offenses was a mitigating, not an
aggravating, factor. Defense counsel argued defendant’s juvenile criminal background resulted
from his immaturity, impetuousness, and failure to appreciate the risks and consequences of his
actions.
¶ 14 Defense counsel explained that defendant was subjected to peer pressure and negative
influences, including previous gang involvement, which led him down the wrong path. Counsel
argued that, because of his age, defendant was not able to fully understand the court proceedings
and help his attorney in his defense. Defense counsel further argued that defendant’s potential for
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rehabilitation was strong, given there were no further criminal cases against him since his
incarceration, and he received his high school diploma while in juvenile detention.
¶ 15 Defense counsel additionally argued the original sentence imposed for first-degree murder
was one year more than the minimum, which was before “all of these extra mitigating factors that
the legislature put into place” that should be considered when sentencing a juvenile under section
5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2020)). Counsel then
addressed the section 5-4.5-105(a) factors in turn, arguing the evidence supporting each factor. He
requested the minimum sentence of 20 years for first-degree murder, without imposing the
discretionary firearm sentencing enhancement, and the minimum 4 years for attempted armed
robbery, to be served concurrently. Defendant declined to speak in allocution.
¶ 16 In resentencing defendant, the court noted that juveniles are to be treated differently than
adults, and defendant was a “very young man” when he committed the offenses. The court stated
that Watson “was more likely than not more of a moving party and influencer in setting the stage
for a crime to be committed” and “recruited [defendant] to be her partner in crime.” The court
recounted defendant’s participation in the crime, stating it was intended and planned. Watson lured
Horton to a “secluded spot in the car” and texted back and forth with defendant when he was to
appear. Defendant did appear, “following his part in the scheme.” Defendant, the only armed
individual on the scene, shot Horton and then shot again as Horton attempted to drive away.
¶ 17 The court recognized it was “looking at this case anew” and had to review “who
[defendant] was going into this case.” The court agreed with defense counsel that defendant’s
family circumstances were challenging. His biological parents were not there for him, and his
adoptive mother did the best she could with limited resources. The court recounted defendant’s
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juvenile delinquency adjudications and violation of probation and electronic monitoring, stating
“[i]t was just a litany of trouble after trouble after trouble,” “[a]nd then he met Ms. Watson and
here we are today.”
¶ 18 The court expressed it “never enjoyed” “all these mandatory sentences where discretion
isn’t allowed,” “was grateful for the chance to exercise some discretion, and [would] do so now.”
The court stated it was “trying to take into account all of the factors” and was “mindful that
[defendant was] looking at still serving more than 20 years of actual time in prison from today’s
date.” It had heard no evidence that defendant had violations or tickets while in the penitentiary,
only that he worked as a janitor. The court “look[ed] at [defendant’s] age and consider[ed] the fact
that the murder sentence will still be served at 100 percent.” The court resentenced defendant to
28 years in prison for first-degree murder and a consecutive sentence of 4 years in prison for
attempted armed robbery, for a total sentence of 32 years in prison.
¶ 19 Defendant filed a posttrial motion to reconsider the sentence, arguing the sentence was
excessive, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and his sentence for first-degree murder
should have been limited to 21 years, which was the original sentence imposed, exclusive of the
firearm sentencing enhancement. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant timely appealed.
¶ 20 On appeal, defendant contends his 28-year sentence for first-degree murder, 8 years above
the minimum, is excessive. 2 He argues the sentence is disproportionate to his rehabilitative
potential, considering his juvenile age when he committed the offense, and the evidence in
aggravation and mitigation did not justify a sentence of that severity.
2 Defendant does not raise any contentions on appeal regarding his individual sentence for attempted armed robbery, which was imposed at the minimum four years in prison.
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¶ 21 The Illinois Constitution provides that a trial court shall impose a sentence reflecting both
“the seriousness of the offense” and “the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The trial court is afforded broad discretion when sentencing a
defendant, and great deference is given to the imposed sentence. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203,
209 (2000); People v. Cruz, 2019 IL App (1st) 170886, ¶ 50. The trial court is in the superior
position to evaluate factors such as the defendant's credibility, habits, age, demeanor, and general
moral character. Cruz, 2019 IL App (1st) 170886, ¶ 50. Therefore, a reviewing court will not
substitute its own judgment merely because it would have weighed the factors differently. Id.
¶ 22 Where a defendant challenges a sentence within the statutory limitations for the offense,
the reviewing court will not disturb the sentence absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Abrams,
2015 IL App (1st) 133746, ¶ 32. In the sentencing context, we will find an abuse of discretion
where the imposed sentence “varies greatly from the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 50.
¶ 23 Here, the trial court found defendant guilty of first-degree murder, subjecting him to a term
of not less than 20 years and no more than 60 years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2020).
On resentencing, the court imposed a 28-year sentence, which was toward the lower end of the
sentencing range for first-degree murder. The court recognized the firearm sentencing
enhancement was not mandatory for juvenile offenders and exercised its discretion by declining
to impose it. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2020); People v. Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 54.
Defendant was also found guilty of attempted armed robbery, which carried a sentencing range
from 4 years to 15 years in prison. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(2) (West 2020). The court imposed the 4-
year minimum sentence, to be served consecutively. Defendant’s sentences fell within the statutory
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sentencing range and are, therefore, presumed proper unless defendant affirmatively shows
otherwise. People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46.
¶ 24 To make this showing, defendant argues his rehabilitative potential and other mitigating
factors did not support the 28-year sentence for first-degree murder, which was above the statutory
minimum by 8 years and greater than the originally imposed sentence of 21 years. Defendant cites
inter alia the “mitigating facts” of the offense and defendant’s young age and juvenile background.
He acknowledges that both the court and the PSI noted many of the section 5-4.5-105(a) factors to
be considered in sentencing a juvenile, but contends the court failed to balance the retributive and
rehabilitative purpose of its punishment. Defendant argues the sentence imposed demonstrates the
court did not craft a sentence with the objective of restoring him to useful citizenship as required
by the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 25 In fashioning a sentence, the trial court must consider all relevant factors in mitigation and
aggravation (People v. McWilliams, 2015 IL App (1st) 130913, ¶ 27), along with the particular
circumstances of each case (People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999)). Section 5-4.5-105(a)
provides that, when sentencing a juvenile, the court must also consider the following factors in
mitigation:
“(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time
of the offense, including the ability to consider risks and
consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive or
developmental disability, or both, if any;
(2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including
peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences;
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(3) the person's family, home environment, educational and social
background, including any history of parental neglect, physical
abuse, or other childhood trauma;
(4) the person's potential for rehabilitation or evidence of
rehabilitation, or both;
(5) the circumstances of the offense;
(6) the person's degree of participation and specific role in the
offense, including the level of planning by the defendant before the
offense;
(7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or
her defense;
(8) the person's prior juvenile or criminal history; and
(9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable,
including an expression of remorse, if appropriate. However, if the
person, on advice of counsel chooses not to make a statement, the
court shall not consider a lack of an expression of remorse as an
aggravating factor.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020).
¶ 26 After reviewing the record, we conclude defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial
court improperly balanced his rehabilitative potential and all relevant mitigating and aggravating
juvenile sentencing factors in fashioning the 28-year sentence for first-degree murder.
¶ 27 As an initial matter, although the court must consider all relevant factors and any evidence
presented in mitigation, the court need not recite and assign a value to each factor. People v.
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Williams, 2019 IL App (1st) 173131, ¶ 21. Further, the new PSI set forth the mitigating evidence
defendant raises here, and defense counsel extensively argued that evidence, including the section
5-4.5-105(a) factors, at the resentencing hearing. The law is well-established that “[w]here
mitigating evidence is presented to the trial court, it is presumed, absent some indication to the
contrary, other than the sentence itself, that the court considered it.” People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL
App (1st) 140134, ¶ 19. In fact, the record shows that the trial court considered that mitigating
evidence and the section 5-4.5-105(a) factors, balancing this evidence against the evidence in
aggravation. The court specifically considered defendant’s age at the time of the offense, stating
defendant was “a very young man” when he committed the offenses. It found Watson “recruited
[defendant] to be her partner in crime” and was the “moving party” in the scheme, reflecting the
court’s consideration of outside influence and peer pressure. The court discussed defendant’s
challenging family circumstances resulting from being given up for adoption and acknowledged
that he had the love and support of his adoptive family. The court further noted there was no
evidence defendant received any disciplinary violations, tickets, or additional cases since his
incarceration, reflecting his efforts at rehabilitation.
¶ 28 In aggravation, the court recounted defendant’s juvenile delinquency background, the
planned nature of the robbery, and how defendant, who was the only armed individual, shot Horton
twice as Horton tried to flee. The court expressly stated it was “trying to take into account all of
the factors here" and was mindful that defendant was “looking at still serving more than 20 years
of actual time in prison from today’s date.”
¶ 29 A minimum sentence is not warranted simply because mitigating evidence exists. People
v. Flores, 404 Ill. App. 3d 155, 158 (2010). Likewise, defendant’s rehabilitative potential is not
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entitled to more weight than the seriousness of the offense, which is the most important factor.
People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141063, ¶ 11. Here, defendant is essentially asking this court
to reweigh the sentencing factors presented to the trial court and substitute our judgment for that
of the trial court, which we cannot do. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209 (2000). This court will not reverse
the sentencing court just because the relevant factors in mitigation and aggravation could have
been weighed differently. McWilliams, 2015 IL App (1st) 130913, ¶ 28; People v. Burton, 2015
IL App (1st) 131600, ¶¶ 36, 38 (defendant failed to make any affirmative showing that the trial
court did not consider the relevant mitigation factors).
¶ 30 On this record, where defendant had an extensive delinquent background, he and Watson
set up Horton for an armed robbery, and defendant then shot Horton as he tried to drive away, we
do not find the 28-year sentence for first-degree murder at variance with the spirit and purpose of
the law or manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. See Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at
210; Burton, 2015 IL App (1st) 131600, ¶ 36. Accordingly, defendant’s 28-year sentence for first-
degree murder and consecutive 4-year sentence for attempted armed robbery are affirmed.
¶ 31 The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
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