People v. Blan

2025 IL App (4th) 241317-U

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241317-U FILED This Order was filed under January 6, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-1317 Carla Bender th 4 District Appellate not precedent except in the IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Winnebago County CORDERO BLAN, ) Nos. 22CF490, Defendant-Appellant. ) 23MT322, ) 23CM607, ) 23CM1261, ) 24CF2063 ) ) Honorable ) Debra D. Schafer, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Vancil concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: By denying defendant’s motion for relief from pretrial detention, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.

¶2 Defendant, Cordero Blan, moved for relief from pretrial detention. The circuit

court of Winnebago County denied the motion. Defendant appeals pursuant to the Code of

Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), hereinafter as amended by

Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). Because we find no abuse of discretion in this ruling (see

People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11), we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 A. The Charges ¶5 On August 21, 2024, in Winnebago County case No. 24-CF-2063, a criminal

complaint was filed against defendant. The complaint was made up of five counts.

¶6 Count I charged him with being an armed habitual criminal in that on August 21,

2024, he knowingly possessed a firearm after having been convicted two or more times of

aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. See 720 ILCS

5/24-1.7(a)(2) (West 2022).

¶7 Count II charged him with committing unlawful possession of a weapon by a

felon after he previously was convicted of that offense. See id. § 24-1.1(a), (d).

¶8 Count III charged him with possession of a firearm without a firearm owner’s

identification (FOID) card. See 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 2022).

¶9 Count IV charged him with resisting a peace officer. See 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)(1)

(West 2022).

¶ 10 Count V charged him with walking on a highway. See 625 ILCS 5/11-1007(a)

(West 2024).

¶ 11 B. The Hearing on the Petition to Deny Pretrial Release

¶ 12 On August 22, 2024, in case No. 24-CF-2063, the State petitioned for the denial

of pretrial release. The petition alleged that defendant was charged with three detainable

offenses, namely, counts I, II, and III of the criminal complaint.

¶ 13 That same day, the circuit court held a hearing on the petition. Without objection

by the defense, the court granted the prosecutor’s request to take judicial notice of the factual

summary accompanying the criminal complaint.

¶ 14 The factual summary was signed by Officer Ivy of the Rockford Police

Department. He reported as follows:

-2- “On August 21, 2024[,] at 0151:00 hours[,] while working in a 2-man

squad, in squad car 317, Officer VanVleet and I observe[d] two males walking in

the roadway on Kishwaukee and Pope St. [T]he males, later identified as

[defendant] and Domanque Williams, turned onto Pope St. as they continued to

walk in the roadway.

Officers turned onto roadway[,] where I observed [defendant] look back

while his hand was at his waistband area. [Defendant] started to walk towards the

sidewalk as Officers activated their emergency lights and exit[ed] the squad car.

Once out the squad [car,] I instructed [defendant] to come to me[.] [H]owever[,]

he refused and started running towards the driveway of 949 Kishwaukee. I

pursued after [defendant] as he ran behind a vehicle. As [defendant] ran past the

vehicle[,] I heard a metal like sound hit the ground which based on my training

and experience I believed to be an unknown type handgun. I pursued past the

vehicle and briefly lost sight of [defendant] but was able to hear him running back

towards Pope St. l ran back to the rear of the vehicle[,] where I observed

[defendant] emerge from the other side of the vehicle. I instructed [defendant] to

get on the ground[,] which he did. I placed handcuffs on [defendant] and detained

him at 015l:35 hours.

Once in the squad [car,] I returned to the area where I heard the metal like

noise and observed a silver and black Smith and Wesson Springfield (14 rounds

in the magazine) laying on the driveway next to the vehicle.

I ran [defendant’s] personal information via Control 5[,] which returned

with an active warrant and no valid [firearm owner’s identification card FOID

-3- [card] or [concealed carry license]. It was later founded [sic] [defendant] has been

found guilty on 9 weapons charges and several other charges.

Found guilty of: 2/21/2018 Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon

(UUW) 2007CF-0003124, 8/20/14 Unlawful Use of a Weapon by a felon

2013CF-0002338 and 2015-CF-1206, and 9/8/2/21 [sic] Reckless Discharge

2020CF-0001367.”

¶ 15 The prosecutor argued that defendant “pose[d] a real and present threat of harm”

because he had “an extensive criminal history[,] including crimes of violence.” The prosecutor

pointed out:

“In 2006 and 2008, he was sentenced to 2 and a half years in the Illinois

Department of Corrections [(DOC)] for an aggravated unlawful use of weapons

by a felon [conviction]. And then concurrently with that was also found guilty for

possession of firearm with a revoked FOID [card] and an aggravated assault with

a deadly weapon. Then in 2014, he was sentenced to 2 years in the [DOC] for a

Class 3 possession of a weapon by a felon. And then in 2017, [he] was sentenced

to 7 years for unlawful use of weapons by a felon charge. And then lastly, in

2021, [he] was sentenced to 3 years for a reckless discharge of a firearm. So, by

my count, he has been to the [DOC] 5 times, with another, with another stint in

the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice with 4 of his adult trips *** to DOC

being for firearms related offenses.”

¶ 16 In the prosecutor’s view, there would be no danger-mitigating potential in any

conditions of pretrial release:

“With regards to no condition or combination of conditions that can

-4- mitigate his risk of harm, I again point primarily to his criminal history. He’s been

sent to DOC 4 times for firearms offenses. He’s on pretrial release for another

firearms offense. I think it should be painfully clear to this defendant that he is not

supposed to have firearms and yet here he is being charged yet again with another

armed habitual criminal charge because he cannot not possess firearms. So, based

on all of that, Judge, I am asking that you grant the State’s petition to deny pretrial

release.”

¶ 17 Judge Peterman granted the petition.

¶ 18 C. Defendant’s Motion for Relief

¶ 19 On September 18, 2024, defendant filed a motion for relief from the pretrial

detention order. For two reasons, he contended that the State’s petition should have been denied:

(1) the State failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the proof was evident or the

presumption great that defendant committed the charged offenses (see 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1)

(West 2022)), and (2) the State failed to failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that

no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety

of persons or the community (see id. § 110-6.1(e)(3)).

¶ 20 At a hearing on October 1, 2024, with Judge Schafer presiding, the circuit court

denied the motion for relief. The court told defense counsel, “I will take you at your word that[,]

[at the hearing of August 22, 2024,] that they didn’t particularly address those [potential]

conditions [of pretrial release].” Even so, the court reaffirmed the decision to deny pretrial

release. Judge Schafer explained:

“It is circumstantial. It’s hearing a noise. But it’s traveling along the path

that the defendant had run, hearing the noise and then finding a handgun in that

-5- area.

It is clear from looking at the pretrial report that [defendant] is not

supposed to have firearms. He has several prior convictions and sentences to the

[DOC] for unlawful use of a weapon, unlawful possession by a felon and one for

reckless discharge. And so, given those particular convictions, he can’t possess a

firearm.

And so I do agree with Judge Peterman’s assessment concerning the

summary of the allegations, which, if supported by credible evidence at trial,

could support a finding that the defendant committed a detainable offense.

The Court went on whether the State had made these arguments at the

time or not and had looked at whether there were conditions or not, some of

which the State has articulated today. Judge Peterman noted at the time that

[defendant] was on pretrial release and was noncompliant.

***

And so given his noncompliance while on pretrial release with reporting to

Pretrial Services; his risk assessment at five out of six, which is in the high-risk

category; his prior history of multiple convictions and weapon offenses, I do find

that that burden has been met that there are no conditions or combination of

conditions.

Simply telling [defendant] to do something isn’t achieving the response

that we want. We don’t have electronic monitoring.

You know, in terms of a curfew, somebody can get a phone call, but it

doesn’t prevent them from possessing a firearm. It also doesn’t prevent them from

-6- leaving the house; and we have no indication, unless there’s another phone call

made, that the person has left.

You suggested reporting to Pretrial Services. He’s already been ordered to

do that and wasn’t. And so I don’t—and it’s not an issue related to something for

which some type of treatment could be ordered.

So I do find that the judge made the appropriate decision, perhaps with

this additional argument by the State; but for those reasons I am going to deny the

motion for relief under the Pretrial Fairness Act that the defense filed on 9/18 of

‘24.”

¶ 21 This appeal followed.

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 A. Circumstantial Evidence of the Offense

¶ 24 In defendant’s motion for relief (he has filed no memorandum), he contends that

in case No. 24-CF-2063, “[t]he State failed to meet its burden by clear and convincing evidence

that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed the offense(s)

charged.” See id. § 110-6.1(e)(1).

¶ 25 As we said, the criminal complaint in that case has five counts. Let us consider

one of those counts, count II, which charges defendant with violating section 24-1.1(a) of the

Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)): unlawful possession of a firearm by

a felon, a detainable offense (see 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(6)(O) (West 2022)). In his motion for

relief, defendant argues that the evidence that he committed that offense “is highly

circumstantial.”

¶ 26 It is unclear, though, why “highly circumstantial” must be regarded as a pejorative

-7- term. Circumstantial evidence is not an inherently inferior type of evidence. Often, it is more

convincing than direct evidence would be. Assume, for instance, a police officer testified that as

he was chasing the defendant, he saw a pistol in the defendant’s hand. Such testimony would be

direct evidence. The police officer, however, might be mistaken. Instead of holding a pistol, the

defendant might have been holding something else—say, a cell phone—which the police officer

mistook for a pistol.

¶ 27 If, by contrast, the police officer, as he was running after the defendant, saw the

defendant reach toward his waistband where a pistol would be thrust, heard a metallic clink as of

a pistol striking the pavement, and then found a pistol lying on the area of the pavement where

the defendant was running when he heard the metallic clink, those facts—together with the

defendant’s flight, which suggests a consciousness of guilt—might be more compelling, in their

combination, than a mere sighting of the pistol in the defendant’s hand would be. In other words,

this circumstantial evidence might be regarded as superior to direct evidence.

¶ 28 In People v. Peete, 318 Ill. App. 3d 961, 965-66 (2001), the circumstantial

evidence was sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant’s possession of a

pistol. In that case, the defendant, a convicted felon, took off running when a uniformed police

officer ordered him to stop. In the foot chase, another police officer saw the defendant “ ‘start to

dig’ on the right side of his waistband in what looked to be an attempt to remove something from

his waistband or pocket.” Id. at 965. Soon afterward, an owner of a house by which the

defendant ran saw a pistol behind some hedges. Id. at 964.

¶ 29 Presumably, in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant in Peete

argued that pretty much anyone could have thrown the pistol into the hedges. The Fourth District

responded, “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require the exclusion of every possible

-8- doubt, and a conviction may be sustained wholly upon circumstantial evidence where the entire

chain of circumstances leads to a reasonable and moral certainty that the defendant committed

the crime.” Id. at 965. Given the circumstantial evidence in Peete, the Fourth District held that “a

rational trier of fact could have found [the] defendant guilty[,] beyond a reasonable doubt,” of

unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Id. at 966.

¶ 30 Because the facts in this case do not differ significantly from those in Peete, we

conclude that the lower evidentiary standard—proof by clear and convincing evidence (see 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2024))—could be found to be satisfied in this pretrial detention

proceeding.

¶ 31 B. Mitigating Conditions of Pretrial Release

¶ 32 Defendant asserts that the State “effectively ignored” the third factor in section

110-6.1(e), namely, that “no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of

Section 110-10 of this Article [(id. § 110-10(b)) could] mitigate *** the real and present threat to

the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of

the case.” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(3). Specifically, according to defendant, “the State failed to address

the defense’s suggestion that, in addition to the standard release conditions, a combination of the

following” court orders “would be sufficient”:

“(a) Not to possess any firearms or dangerous weapons;

(b) Not to leave the State without permission of the Court;

(c) To be on ‘house arrest’ or a curfew where he could only leave for

work, medical or legal reasons;

(d) To be on electronic monitoring[;]

(e) To report to pretrial services when and as directed by them; [and]

-9- (f) To engage in any services recommended by pretrial services.”

¶ 33 It is true that, at the hearing of August 22, 2024, the prosecutor did not itemize

those proposed conditions and respond to them one by one. Even so, the prosecutor discussed the

third factor in section 110-6.1(e)(3) and argued, in so many words, that conditions of pretrial

release would be futile, considering that (1) defendant had been sent to prison four times for

firearms offenses and (2) he was currently on pretrial release and “the supervising [probation

officer] ha[d] yet to see [him] as all forms of contact *** ha[d] been unsuccessful thus far.” The

implication of the prosecutor’s argument was that defendant had repeatedly disregarded judicial

commands and prohibitions and there was no reason to suppose that this time would be different.

If the threat of a fifth prison term did not deter defendant from unlawfully possessing a firearm,

then electronic monitoring (even if available), a stay-at-home order, and pretrial services would

not do so. This implication was clear enough from the prosecutor’s argument.

¶ 34 In any event, this implication was spelled out subsequently, at the hearing of

October 1, 2024, on defendant’s motion for relief. At that hearing, the State and the circuit court

responded more specifically to defendant’s suggested pretrial conditions. We find no abuse of

discretion in the court’s conclusion that only pretrial detention would prevent defendant from

again coming into possession of a gun.

¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 37 Affirmed.

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