NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 220746-U This Order was filed under FILED NO. 4-22-0746 June 5, 2023 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Adams County KAREN D. BLACKLEDGE, ) No. 21CF714 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Amy Christine Lannerd, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: (1) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
(2) Postplea counsel strictly complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶2 Defendant, Karen D. Blackledge, appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying
her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. On appeal, defendant argues (1) the court erred in
denying her motion where the record shows her jury waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily
made and (2) the record refutes postplea counsel’s certification that she strictly complied with
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 In November 2021, the State charged defendant with two counts of home invasion
(720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(1), (6) (West 2020)) (counts I and II) and one count each of aggravated
kidnapping (id. § 10-2(a)(5)) (count III), aggravated vehicular hijacking (id. § 18-4(a)(1)) (count
IV), aggravated criminal sexual assault (id. § 11-1.30(a)(1)) (count V), and residential burglary
(id. § 19-3) (count VI).
¶5 On November 16, 2021, the State filed a “Pretrial Services Bond Report”
concerning defendant. According to the report, in addition to numerous traffic-related offenses,
defendant had been convicted of four felonies and five misdemeanors prior to this case.
¶6 On February 25, 2022, defense counsel informed the trial court at a pretrial
hearing that although the parties were still in the process of negotiating a plea agreement, they
had agreed upon “a general framework” and defendant “wishes to waive her right to [a] jury
trial.” The parties and the court then had the following discussion:
“THE COURT: All right. So, [defendant], is that all correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You don’t have a fully negotiated plea yet, but you’re
working towards that; correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes and no. I would like to have a plea today.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, it doesn’t sound like there may be a plea
today. But they indicate your willingness to waive your right to jury trial; is that
correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, something like that.
MR. JONES [(ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY)]: Judge, so the
Court’s aware, I’ll make a record of it. We are working on a number. There have
-2- been some proposals back and forth. They’re waiving with the understanding that
we can work towards a number that they suggest, and I’m not agreeing to the
number that [defense counsel] has suggested to my office, but I’m certainly
willing to continue the negotiations. And we’re waiting for some DNA evidence
that may—that may get us closer to one way or the other on the number. So
that’s—
THE COURT: But there’s not a fully negotiated plea?
MR. JONES: There is not a fully negotiated plea at this point.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PRATT [(DEFENSE COUNSEL)]: What I can tell the Court is we
have essentially an agreement on what charges she’d be pleading to.
MR. PRATT: And we have a range of what the potential sentence would
be that we’re working on narrowing down even further.
MR. PRATT: As Mr. Jones has said, we’ve had continuing conversations.
Those DNA results may affect that. But my client is eager to have this removed
from the jury docket and have the case resolved.
THE COURT: All right. So, [defendant], if I understand that, there’s
going to be an agreement on the charges you’re going to plead to. There’s just not
a full agreement on what potential—or what the sentence may be; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that’s what I’m guessing.
THE COURT: Okay. I didn’t hear her. I’m guessing?
-3- THE DEFENDANT: I’m—yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Let’s try this again. Okay. So if I understand counsel
correctly, there’s not an agreement on the specific sentence, but there is an
agreement on what you are going to plead to; is that correct?
THE COURT: And so based on that, you’re willing to waive your right to
jury trial today; is that correct?
THE COURT: Anyone make any threats or promises to get you to do that
other than what’s been stated in court?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: You’re doing this of your own free will?
THE COURT: To this point, you’re satisfied with Mr. Pratt’s
representation of you in this matter?
THE COURT: Okay. Court will find the waiver to be knowingly and
voluntarily made ***.”
Defendant also signed a “Waiver of Jury” form, which was filed the same day the pretrial
hearing was conducted. It provides as follows:
“AND now on this 24th day of February 2022, the said Karen Blackledge,
the defendant, herein, and in open court, and of [her] own free will, and in
-4- writing, waives [her] right to a jury trial, in the above entitled cause, and consents
to a trial by the Court, without a Jury.
THE ABOVE WAIVER of a trial by Jury was acknowledged and
subscribed to before me by the above named defendant.”
¶7 On April 1, 2022, the parties presented a proposed plea agreement to the trial
court. Based on the terms of the agreement, defendant would plead guilty to home invasion and
aggravated criminal sexual assault, counts I and V, respectively, and the State would cap its
sentencing recommendation at 20 years’ imprisonment for each count and dismiss the remaining
charges. The court admonished defendant as follows:
“THE COURT: You have certain constitutional rights. You have a right to
an attorney. You have a right to a speedy, public trial, either a jury trial, and in
this case, you’ve waived your right to a jury trial previously but there still remains
a trial before a judge. You’re presumed to be innocent of the charges against you
and it is the prosecution who has the burden of proving your guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. You don’t have to prove anything. You have a right to be
present at all times. You have a right to remain silent. Whether you testify or not
is your decision. You have a right to confront witnesses and your attorney may
cross-examine the State’s witnesses. And you have a right to plead guilty or not
guilty.
Do you understand these constitutional rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Do you understand that if you plead guilty to these
offenses, you would be waiving or giving up all of your trial rights?
-5- THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.”
Following the court’s admonishments, defendant pleaded guilty to counts I and V. As a factual
basis for count I, the State indicated it would present evidence that defendant and “a charged
co-defendant in a different case” entered a residence they knew to be occupied while armed with
a dangerous weapon and “used force upon a person in that residence.” With respect to count V,
the State indicated it would present evidence that defendant, “charged under an accountability
theory for the actions of a charged co-defendant, committed an act of sexual penetration through
the use of force, and in that process, displayed or threatened to use a deadly weapon.” The court
found defendant’s guilty pleas were “knowingly, voluntarily, and understandably made and
supported by a factual basis.” It then continued the proceedings for sentencing.
¶8 On May 5, 2022, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. The court stated
it was accepting the terms of the negotiated plea agreement and sentenced defendant to 20 years’
imprisonment on each count, with the sentences to be served consecutively.
¶9 On June 3, 2022, the circuit clerk’s office filed a pro se letter from defendant to
the trial court and the circuit clerk’s office seeking, in pertinent part, to withdraw her guilty plea.
She alleged defense counsel “really didn’t explain my case [and] charges to me or what would
happen if and when I withdrew my right to a trial.” The court set the matter for a June 7 status
hearing. At the hearing, defendant informed the court that she wished to withdraw her guilty plea
and have counsel appointed to assist her in filing an amended motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
The court indicated it would treat defendant’s pro se letter as a timely-filed motion to withdraw
her guilty plea and appointed counsel to assist her in amending the motion.
¶ 10 On July 27, 2022, defendant, through appointed postplea counsel, filed an
amended motion to withdraw her guilty plea, alleging, “The February 25, 2022[,] transcript
-6- where [defendant] waived jury, showed that she did not have a full understanding at the time
***.” Postplea counsel attached a facially-compliant Rule 604(d) certificate to the motion. See
Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). She did not attach any affidavits or additional
documentation to the motion.
¶ 11 On August 19, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion.
No evidence was presented at the hearing. Postplea counsel argued that defendant gave “very
vague answers when she was asked if it was her wish to waive her jury trial right,” and “[i]t does
not seem that she understood the consequences of waiving her jury trial.” The State argued
defendant was “playing games” and was simply “asking this Court to let her change her mind.”
Following the arguments of the parties, the court denied the motion. The court found the record
confirmed defendant’s jury waiver “was her free and voluntary act as well.” It further noted that,
“while some of her statements may have been manners of speech or could be construed as to
using the phrase ‘guess,’ it was ultimately clarified by the Court with regards to that waiver and
found it to be knowingly and voluntarily made.”
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to
withdraw her guilty plea where the record shows her jury waiver was not knowingly and
voluntarily made and (2) the record refutes postplea counsel’s certification that she strictly
complied with Rule 604(d).
¶ 15 A. The Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
¶ 16 First, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to withdraw her
guilty plea because “the record does not establish that [she] knowingly and intelligently waived
-7- her right to a jury trial.” Specifically, defendant contends that “[b]y not explaining to [her] about
her right to a jury trial and what that meant before accepting her guilty plea ***, the trial court
failed to fulfill its duty to ensure [she] waived her right to a jury trial ‘expressly and
understandingly.’ ” (quoting People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 66 (2008)). Defendant further
asserts, relying on People v. Gaston, 132 Ill. App. 2d 900, 901 (1971), that her signed jury
waiver form, standing alone, was insufficient to constitute a valid jury waiver.
¶ 17 “A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea
[citation], but a defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea where his plea was not
constitutionally entered.” People v. Manning, 227 Ill. 2d 403, 412 (2008). “A defendant may
challenge the constitutionality of his guilty plea *** by alleging that the plea of guilty was not
made voluntarily or with full knowledge of the consequences.” Id. We will not disturb a trial
court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 411-12.
“A trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable or
where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) People v. Santos, 211 Ill. 2d 395, 401 (2004).
¶ 18 The right to a jury trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States
Constitution and the Illinois Constitution of 1970. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13. The right to a jury trial
also includes the right to waive a jury trial. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 65. For a jury waiver to be
valid, it must be made knowingly and voluntarily. Id. Section 103-6 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 provides: “Every person accused of an offense shall have the right to a trial by
jury unless [it is] understandingly waived by defendant in open court ***.” 725 ILCS 5/103-6
(West 2020). Pursuant to these constitutional and statutory requirements, our supreme court has
-8- “imposed on a trial court the duty of ensuring that a defendant waives the right to a jury trial
expressly and understandingly.” Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66; see also Gaston, 132 Ill. App. 2d at
901 (“To constitute a proper jury waiver, the record must affirmatively show (1) an expression
on the part of the defendant that he desires to reject his right to be tried by a jury and (2) that he
do[es] so understandingly and voluntarily after interrogation by the court.”). “[A] trial court need
not give any specific admonition or advice for a defendant to make an effective jury waiver.”
Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66. “The determination of whether a jury waiver is valid cannot rest on
any precise formula, but rather depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”
Id. “Although a signed jury waiver alone does not prove a defendant’s understanding, it is
evidence that a waiver was knowingly made.” People v. Reed, 2016 IL App (1st) 140498, ¶ 7.
“Reviewing courts may also consider a defendant’s prior interactions with the justice system in
determining whether a jury waiver was made knowingly.” Id.
¶ 19 We find the analyses in Reed and People v. Winters, 2020 IL App (2d) 180784, to
be instructive, as the facts in those cases are similar to those now before us. In Reed, like in this
case, the defendant argued the trial court had failed to ensure his jury waiver was knowing and
voluntary, asserting “the court did not question him on his understanding of that right or the
ramifications of waiving it” or “advise him of the nature of a jury trial, the difference between a
bench and a jury trial, or that a judge would decide the facts rather than a jury.” Reed, 2016 IL
App (1st) 140498, ¶ 4. The Reed court rejected the defendant’s argument, concluding instead that
the facts and circumstances supported the trial court’s finding that the jury waiver was
knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. ¶ 8. Specifically, the Reed court held that the following
facts and circumstances supported the trial court’s finding: (1) defense counsel indicated his
desire to proceed by way of a bench trial in the defendant’s presence, and the defendant did not
-9- object or ask any questions; (2) the defendant submitted a signed waiver, and the court asked him
if he had in fact signed the waiver; (3) the court asked the defendant if he had been threatened or
promised anything in exchange for waiving his right to a jury trial or whether the waiver was
voluntary; and (4) the defendant’s criminal history—including eight felony convictions and
multiple misdemeanor convictions—“indicate[d] a familiarity with the criminal justice system,
and a familiarity with his right to a trial by jury.” Id.
¶ 20 In Winters, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument “that his jury
waiver was unknowing and involuntary, where it was made in exchange for the State’s
agreement to a 20-year sentencing cap.” Winters, 2020 IL App (2d) 180784, ¶ 10. After
addressing and rejecting the defendant’s argument, the Winters court concluded by additionally
finding the “defendant’s colloquy with the trial court and the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding [the] case” demonstrated the jury waiver was knowing and voluntary:
“[T]he record shows that the trial court specifically asked defendant whether, after
consulting with his attorney, he desired to give up his right to a jury trial, and
defendant stated on the record that it was his desire. Defendant acknowledged that
he was not threatened by anyone or promised anything other than the sentencing
cap of 20 years to convince him to waive his right to a jury trial. Defendant
acknowledged that he understood that, once he waived his right to a jury trial, he
could not ‘come back tomorrow or the next day and say, I changed my mind, I
want to have a jury trial after all.’ He acknowledged that it was an ‘irrevocable
decision.’ Thus, the record before us clearly shows that defendant was well aware
his case would be decided by a judge rather than a jury.” Id. ¶¶ 21, 23.
- 10 - ¶ 21 Here, the record shows defendant’s jury waiver was knowing and voluntary. In
defendant’s presence, defense counsel indicated defendant wished to waive her right to a jury
trial. Defendant did not object or ask any questions in response to counsel’s assertion. The trial
court asked defendant if she wished to waive her right to a jury trial, and she stated she did. The
court also asked if she had been threatened or promised anything in exchange for her waiver, and
she stated she had not. Additionally, defendant signed a jury waiver form. While it is true the
court did not specifically explain to defendant what a jury trial involved, it does not follow that
she did not understand what a jury trial was or the right she was waiving. As was the case in
Reed, defendant “has an extensive history with the criminal court system.” Reed, 2016 IL App
(1st) 140498, ¶ 8. According to the “Pretrial Services Bond Report,” in addition to numerous
traffic-related offenses, defendant had been convicted of four felonies and five misdemeanors
prior to this case. This extensive criminal history “indicates a familiarity with the criminal justice
system” (id.), and it would not be unreasonable to conclude defendant had gained an
understanding of what a jury trial entailed through her prior involvement with the criminal
justice system. Given defendant’s colloquy with the court, the signed jury waiver form, and her
extensive history with the criminal court, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in
rejecting defendant’s argument and denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
¶ 22 We find defendant’s reliance on Gaston unpersuasive. In Gaston, the appellate
court held that a signed jury waiver, “in and by itself,” was insufficient to constitute a valid
waiver. Gaston, 132 Ill. App. 2d at 901. In that case, “[e]xcept for a written waiver of jury signed
by the defendant, the record [was] [c]ompletely silent with respect to the defendant’s right to a
jury trial.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. The Gaston court noted that, “[t]o constitute a proper jury
waiver, the record must affirmatively show (1) an expression on the part of the defendant that he
- 11 - desires to reject his right to be tried by a jury and (2) that he do[es] so understandingly and
voluntarily after interrogation by the court.” Id. The Gaston court found that the written waiver
satisfied the first provision. Id. “However, the record being totally silent on the issue of waiver of
jury, the second essential requirement was not met.” Id. Here, defendant argues that, like in
Gaston, “the record *** is silent on ‘the second essential requirement’ of a proper jury waiver.”
We disagree. As discussed above, the trial court asked defendant if she wished to waive her jury
right and whether she had been threatened or promised anything in exchange for the waiver.
Defendant indicated she wished to waive her right and that no one had threatened her or
promised her anything. Thus, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the record in this case is not
totally silent on the issue of the jury waiver, and we find her reliance on Gaston misplaced.
¶ 23 B. Rule 604(d)
¶ 24 Next, defendant argues that although postplea counsel filed a facially-compliant
Rule 604(d) certificate, she nonetheless failed to strictly comply with Rule 604(d) by failing to
attach an affidavit or other evidence to the motion to withdraw guilty plea in support of the
allegations raised therein. Specifically, defendant asserts the record refutes counsel’s certification
that she made any amendments necessary to adequately present the claim to the trial court
because “counsel included no affidavit from [defendant] as to her understanding, or lack thereof,
as to what a jury trial entailed nor any other affidavits from potential pertinent witnesses
including trial counsel.” “The question of whether defense counsel complied with Rule 604(d) is
subject to de novo review.” People v. Neal, 403 Ill. App. 757, 760 (2010).
¶ 25 Rule 604(d) governs appeals from convictions entered on pleas of guilty. It
provides a defendant must file the appropriate postplea motion within 30 days of the imposition
of sentence and, in conjunction with the motion, the defendant’s attorney must:
- 12 - “file with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has
consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic
means or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in
the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the
trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea of
guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and
has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate
presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R.
604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 26 “Rule 604(d) is designed to ensure that any potential errors in the entry of a guilty
plea are brought to the trial court’s attention prior to the filing of an appeal.” People v. Easton,
2018 IL 122187, ¶ 29. “[T]he rule’s certificate requirement is meant to enable the trial court to
ensure that counsel has reviewed the defendant’s claim and considered all relevant bases for the
motion to withdraw the guilty plea or to reconsider the sentence.” (Emphasis in original.) People
v. Tousignant, 2014 IL 115329, ¶ 16. “It is firmly established that the certificate filed by counsel
must strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 604(d). [Citation.] If the certificate fails to
meet this standard, a reviewing court must remand the case to the trial court for proceedings that
strictly comply with Rule 604(d).” Easton, 2018 IL 122187, ¶ 26.
¶ 27 Generally, to determine compliance with the rule, a court need only look to the
face of the certificate itself. See, e.g., Neal, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 760. However, a
facially-compliant certificate may be found in violation of the rule where it is undermined by the
record. See id. (“[W]e may consider the record where it undermines the certificate filed.”); see
also People v. Herrera, 2012 IL App (2d) 110009, ¶ 13 (“Unless the record undermines the
- 13 - certificate, *** the only thing we consider in determining compliance with Rule 604(d) is the
certificate itself.”); People v. Love, 385 Ill. App. 3d 736, 739 (2008) (“Where *** the record
impeaches the Rule 604(d) certificate, a remand for further proceedings is necessary.”). “When
the motion is based on facts that do not appear of record it shall be supported by affidavit ***.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017); see also People v. Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, ¶ 9
(“As seen, under Rule 604(d), facts that do not appear of record must be supported by an
affidavit. Thus, to fulfill her duty to amend defendant’s motion, counsel had to attach an affidavit
substantiating the new allegations.”).
¶ 28 Defendant cites People v. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, in support of her
contention that the allegations in her motion were based on facts outside of the record and
therefore needed to be supported by affidavit or other evidence. In Winston, the defendant
alleged that “there were some questions as to whether or not [defendant’s guilt could] be proved
based on all of the evidence that’s been tendered by the State’s Attorney’s Office.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 3. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion to withdraw the
guilty plea, the defendant sought to admit four exhibits in the form of written statements made by
individuals with information that supported the defendant’s claim. Id. ¶ 8. The trial court denied
the request, stating, “[W]e should have a witness here or at least someone to substantiate those
documents and statements as well.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 9. The trial court
ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that, “[m]ost, if not all of the evidence testified at the
hearing was available to the defendant, and she has failed to present any other witnesses or
affidavits to show that there was favorable testimony supporting a reasonable doubt as to her
guilt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 10. On appeal, the Winston court found the
record refuted counsel’s facially-compliant certificate. Id. ¶ 21. It stated that “counsel was
- 14 - obligated to advance [the defendant’s] argument in an amended motion supported by affidavits
from the witnesses whose testimony supposedly would have exonerated defendant.” Id. ¶ 15.
¶ 29 We find Winston distinguishable from the instant case. In Winston, the
defendant’s claim was based on allegations that specifically referred to individuals who
possessed exculpatory information, and that information did not appear in the record. Thus, the
only way the defendant could have proven her claim was by locating the relevant individuals and
presenting the new information to the trial court. Because defense counsel failed to do so, she
failed to adequately present the claim to the court, in violation of Rule 604(d). Here, on the other
hand, defendant’s claim is based entirely on facts that appear in the record. Unlike the defendant
in Winston, defendant does not identify an occurrence outside of the record or a specific
individual with information outside of the record that would support her claim. Instead,
defendant asserted only that she was not adequately admonished about her right to a jury trial
before waiving the right. The only evidence defendant could have pointed to in support of her
claim was the transcript of the report of proceedings for the hearing at which the court
admonished defendant about her right to a jury trial and defendant waived her right. Counsel
properly cited this transcript in the amended motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Because none of
the allegations in defendant’s motion were based on facts outside of the record, counsel was not
required to attach any affidavits or other evidence to the motion. Thus, we find the record does
not refute counsel’s Rule 604(d) certificate.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
- 15 -