People v. Black

CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedJune 27, 2000
Docket4-99-0045
StatusPublished

This text of People v. Black (People v. Black) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Black, (Ill. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

27 June 2000

NO. 4-99-0045

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of

) McLean County

JAMES T. BLACK, ) No. 96CF83

Defendant-Appellant. )

) Honorable

) Ronald C. Dozier,

) Judge Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the

court:

A jury convicted defendant James Black on March 21, 1996, of four counts of aggravated stalking.  The trial court sentenced him to four concurrent eight-year terms in prison.  On direct appeal, this court affirmed.   People v. Black , No. 4-96-

0419 (January 24, 1997) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).  The case comes to us upon denial of Black's petition for postconviction relief (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1998)), wherein Black alleges the ineffectiveness of both his trial counsel and his counsel on direct appeal.

Black's trial garnered a considerable amount of public

ity in the McLean County area.  On March 21, 1996, a jury was empaneled and opening arguments were heard.  On the morning of March 22, an article regarding the trial appeared on page A2 of a Bloomington-Normal newspaper, the Pantagraph.   The article contained several items that Black alleges would have prejudiced any juror who read them.  For instance, the article stated that Black was being held without bond, "a measure usually restricted to murder suspects."  The article also alleged that Black's trial counsel, Mark Messman, "agree[d] with most of the information outlined by [the State]."  The article noted that Black and the complaining witness, Jeri Leenders, had gotten engaged despite Black's incarceration and a court order barring the two from having any contact.  It was the stated opinion of the prosecutor that the two had "dodge[d]" the order.  The entire article is reproduced as an appendix to this decision.

Therefore, on the same morning, before the beginning of the State's case in chief, the following conversation was had outside the presence of the jury:

"MR. MESSMAN [(Defense counsel)]: I would

note for the record, at least to my recollec-

tion, the jury was not admonished not to read

the paper, listen to the radio, watch TV; and

media coverage was more extensive then [ sic ]

what I thought it would be.

THE COURT: Me too.

MR. MESSMAN: Maybe the court would want

to explore with the jurors if they saw that.

THE COURT: Why would I want to do that.  

I might get the wrong answers.  I will ad-

monish them.

MR. MESSMAN: Okay.  All right.

(The jury was brought in.)

THE COURT: *** [T]he media coverage in

this case has been more than what I anticipated

or I would have warned you about it and I sus-

pect that some of you seen [ sic ] or read

things about the case and [I] want to reem-

phasize your verdicts must be based solely on

the evidence presented in open court and not

on anything from any other sources.  Those

sources are not subject to the same strict

standard that we are in terms of admissibility

and reliability and so on.  I am going to ask

you throughout course of this trial to avoid

listening to radio accounts or television

accounts or anything about this case.  I can't

help it if you already have, if you had I

would ask you to put that aside and base your

decision, as a juror, solely on the evidence

presented in court."

Following his convictions, Black apparently retained different counsel to pursue a direct appeal.  Black's appellate counsel raised neither the trial court's refusal to poll the jury nor Messman's incompetence as part of that appeal.  Black then retained further counsel to represent him at his postconviction hearing, where he alleged the incompetence of both prior attor

neys for failing to raise or follow through with the issue.  At the postconviction hearing, the trial court stated that the article "is not as prejudicial as I thought at the time.  There are some things in there that are mildly prejudicial."  Black is represented by the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) before this court.

We first consider whether some aspects of Black's claims are forfeited (sometimes referred to as "waived").  Where an alleged forfeiture stems from ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, the weight of authority holds that the strict applica

tion of the doctrine will be relaxed ( People v. Stencil , 306 Ill. App. 3d 273, 276, 713 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (1999)), although some courts have noted in passing the ease with which forfeiture may then be avoided (see People v. Turner , 187 Ill. 2d 406, 412-13, 719 N.E.2d 725, 729 (1999)), thereby leading in extreme cases to "ineffective-assistance claims *** resembl[ing] an intricate puzzle of boxes, each but the largest nestled one within the others"  ( People v. Stewart , 141 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 565 N.E.2d 968, 971 (1990)).  Black's case is fairly straightforward, however.  He claims that his appellate counsel should have raised the publicity issue.  Because he could not have raised appellate counsel's effectiveness at any time prior to the instant proceed

ing (which is technically not an appeal, but a collateral attack on the judgment ( People v. Whitehead , 169 Ill. 2d 355, 370, 662 N.E.2d 1304, 1311 (1996))), we address the merits.  

Ineffective assistance claims are decided under the familiar standard of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).  A defendant such as Black, who maintains that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a particular issue, must show that the failure to raise the issue was objectively unreasonable and that, but for this failure, his sentence or conviction would have been reversed.   Stewart , 141 Ill. 2d at 119, 565 N.E.2d at 973.  We do not find Black's appellate counsel to have been ineffec

tive.

Not every newspaper article published requires the court to poll a jury.

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Related

Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984)
People v. Whitehead
662 N.E.2d 1304 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1996)
People v. Flores
538 N.E.2d 481 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1989)
People v. Turner
719 N.E.2d 725 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1999)
People v. Stewart
565 N.E.2d 968 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1990)
People v. Stencil
713 N.E.2d 1228 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1999)
People v. Hamilton
427 N.E.2d 388 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1981)
People v. Crowder
425 N.E.2d 994 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1981)
People v. Cordova
403 N.E.2d 788 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1980)
People v. Sundaresh
506 N.E.2d 672 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1987)
People v. Barrow
549 N.E.2d 240 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1989)
People v. Cox
220 N.E.2d 7 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1966)

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