People v. Bias

2024 IL App (4th) 230553-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 26, 2024
• Docket: 4-23-0553
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 230553-U FILED This Order was filed under November 26, 2024 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-23-0553 Carla Bender not precedent except in the th 4 District Appellate limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County KAMYJAH A. BIAS, ) No. 22CF332 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Dwayne Gab, ) Ryan M. Cadagin, ) Judges Presiding.

JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The juvenile court abused its discretion by transferring defendant to the criminal court without sufficient evidence on all of the statutory and nonstatutory factors it was required to consider. Therefore, this court must vacate the juvenile court’s transfer order, reverse the circuit court’s judgment in this case, and remand this matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings.

¶2 On November 18, 2021, the State brought a petition against defendant, Kamyjah

A. Bias, alleging she was a delinquent minor under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705

ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)). The petition charged her with first degree murder (720 ILCS

5/9-1 (West 2020)), unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-1(a)(2)), aggravated battery causing great

bodily harm (id. § 12-3.05(a)(1)), aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (id. § 12-3.05(f)(1)),

aggravated battery in a public place (id. § 12-3.05(c)), and unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-

1(a)(2)). The State later added an attempt (first degree murder) charge (id. § 8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1). ¶3 On November 30, 2021, the State petitioned the juvenile court to transfer defendant

from juvenile court to criminal court to allow for her prosecution under Illinois criminal law. On

April 12, 2022, Judge Dwayne Gab granted the State’s petition. The next day, a grand jury indicted

defendant on three counts of first degree murder (id. § 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2)), one count of unlawful use

of a weapon (id. § 24-1(a)(2)), three counts of aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(a)(1), (c), (f)(1)),

one count of unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-1(a)(2)), and one count of attempt (first degree

murder) (id. § 8-4, 9-1(a)(1)). After a bench trial before Judge Ryan Cadagin in February 2023,

the trial court found defendant guilty on all counts. On April 19, 2023, the court sentenced

defendant to consecutive sentences in the aggregate of 43 years in prison.

¶4 On appeal, defendant makes the following arguments: (1) the juvenile court

improperly transferred her to criminal court because the State presented insufficient evidence on

factors the court was required to consider; (2) (a) her first degree murder and attempt (first degree

murder) convictions should be reversed because the State failed to negate any element of

self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt; (b) in the alternative, this court should reduce her first

degree murder conviction to either (i) second degree murder because she established by a

preponderance of the evidence that this was mistaken belief self-defense or (ii) involuntary

manslaughter because she acted recklessly; (3) (a) the criminal court erred when it barred Dr. Joel

Eckert’s testimony because Eckert could have provided support to defendant’s mistaken belief

self-defense claim; (b) defendant’s attorney was ineffective for failing to renew defendant’s

motion in limine seeking to admit Eckert’s testimony after defendant waived her right to a jury

trial; and (4) the criminal court imposed an excessive sentence where it failed to adequately

consider defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances.

¶5 Based on our review of the record, we hold the juvenile court abused its discretion

-2- in transferring defendant to criminal court for prosecution under Illinois criminal law. The juvenile

court did not have sufficient evidence and/or information regarding several statutory and

nonstatutory factors it was required to consider before transferring defendant. As a result, we must

reverse the judgment of the Sangamon County circuit court, vacate the juvenile court’s transfer

order, and remand this case for further proceedings in the juvenile court.

¶6 I. BACKGROUND

¶7 A. Juvenile Court

¶8 On November 18, 2021, the State filed a petition alleging defendant was a

delinquent minor under the Act, charging her as previously stated. On November 30, 2021,

defendant entered a not guilty plea. That same day, the State filed a juvenile transfer petition. On

December 21, 2021, the juvenile court entered an order for a mental health evaluation of defendant.

¶9 On April 11, 2022, the juvenile court held a hearing on the State’s transfer petition.

Dr. Eckert, a clinical psychologist who had performed defendant’s mental health evaluation,

testified he reviewed police reports from the charged incident, police reports from another incident

at Washington Middle School in Springfield, Illinois, which did not involve defendant, and

defendant’s school records, which included an individualized education plan (IEP), before meeting

with defendant. Defendant’s school records showed (1) she had accumulated 66.71 absences as of

December 2021; (2) she had significant deficits in reading comprehension, oral fluency, and

general writing skills as of May 2019; (3) she had refused—at some point—to attend or participate

in class, complete assignments, and attend speech and language therapy; and (4) her IQ was scored

at 79 when she was seven years old. Eckert indicated the records showed school personnel later

wanted to reevaluate defendant, but defendant’s mother would not consent.

¶ 10 Eckert testified he interviewed defendant for approximately 90 minutes at a juvenile

-3- detention center on December 31, 2021. When asked why she was incarcerated, defendant

indicated Eckert should talk to her lawyer. However, defendant described her arrest in considerable

detail. When asked about her schooling before she was arrested, defendant said she attended the

Douglas Alternative School (Douglas) in the morning and Lanphier High School (Lanphier) in the

afternoon. While receiving nothing lower than a “B” at Douglas, she was failing her classes at

Lanphier. Defendant indicated she only had one real friend at school, hung out with cousins outside

of school, and had no history of fights at either Lanphier or Douglas. Defendant told Eckert she

lived with her mother, two sisters, and two brothers, denying significant problems with her family.

¶ 11 In addition, Eckert told the juvenile court he spoke with Kaneisha Mahr,

defendant’s mother, on the phone for 45 minutes and confirmed the familial information defendant

had provided. Mahr said she was a single mother and worked full-time and resisted providing

information about defendant’s home life. However, she described defendant as quiet and isolated

with occasional outbursts. Other than an occasional conversation about basketball, Mahr indicated

she and defendant did not talk much. Mahr gave Eckert the impression she did not know about any

conflicts defendant might have had with other people. Mahr indicated defendant had a difficult

time after her grandmother died three or four years earlier.

¶ 12 Turning back to his interview with defendant, Eckert testified defendant said she

had never received mental health services and did not have any family history of mental illness.

However, Mahr said defendant had seen a therapist through the Urban League when she was five

or six years old due to her behavior, but she may have been too young to participate in therapy at

that time. While defendant had been medicated at some point, the medicine was discontinued

because it made her ill. In addition, Mahr said defendant had been taken to the hospital for a

possible overdose in September 2021.

-4- ¶ 13 While defendant was oriented to time, place, person, and situation and her

presentation matched her chronological age, Eckert testified it appeared defendant had been late

in reaching most of her developmental milestones, which he believed was critical to her

understanding of her situation. The psychologist indicated defendant made adequate eye contact

and had adequate memory and concentration. However, her general cognitive ability and verbal

comprehension were both extremely low. Further, her nonverbal reasoning was in the low-average

range. Eckert determined defendant’s verbal IQ was 67, her nonverbal IQ was 82, she read at a

fourth-grade level, and she scored lower than a typical seven-year-old child on a picture vocabulary

test.

¶ 14 Eckert testified he subjected defendant to three personality assessment inventories,

which indicated defendant had significant thinking and concentration problems and most likely

would be withdrawn and isolated. The results of the assessment inventories consistently

hypothesized defendant would experience significant difficulties creating and maintaining any

type of reasonable social support network. Eckert found no evidence defendant had a formal

thought disorder or psychosis, but defendant did indicate difficulties consistent with a significant

depressive experience, with a moderate feeling of sadness, and borderline normal stress and

anxiety. The inventory results indicated defendant was likely to be impatient and easily irritated

but posed no risk of harming herself.

¶ 15 In addition, Eckert noted the results of the personality assessment inventories

suggested defendant would be motivated to engage in treatment and would need treatment.

However, Eckert testified treatment could be challenging for defendant because she tended to be

distrustful and would have difficulty establishing a trusting and viable working relationship with

an adult, particularly someone she would see as an authority figure. When Eckert asked defendant

-5- to assess herself, she was generally negative, harshly critical, and had self-doubt. Eckert described

defendant’s current clinical profile as characteristic of an adolescent who struggles with numerous

inner conflicts evident through unpredictable behavior and impulsive tendencies that could

contribute to poor decision-making and acting out. One of the inventory assessments indicated

defendant had a significant underlying disposition to break social rules and to have significant

generalized delinquent tendencies. According to Eckert, defendant also seemed to lack insight and

empathy in conjunction with significant social and inner personal immaturity and saw the world

in a “very immature, self-centered manner.”

¶ 16 Eckert diagnosed defendant as mildly intellectually disabled, with an adjustment

disorder mixed with anxiety, depressed mood, moderate oppositional defiant disorder, persistent

depressive disorder, borderline features, and academic and educational problems. According to

Eckert, defendant needed an experienced and skillful therapist who could work with her on a long-

term basis because her suspicion of adult authority figures was far greater than the average teen.

Eckert asserted defendant would need several years of therapy continuing into her adult years.

¶ 17 On cross-examination, Eckert testified defendant later provided him with her

version of events regarding the charged offense. Defendant said she encountered some older and

larger males and was afraid she would be attacked. Eckert believed defendant could benefit from

“relatively long-term individual therapy” and “group therapy would be both appropriate and

necessary” when she was ready. Eckert also believed defendant had the potential to make progress

with treatment. According to Eckert, “her history as I understand it does not reveal any significant

behavioral problems in spite of the fact that she’s been dealing with a lot of environmental

difficulties.” This opinion was based in part on defendant’s lack of a prior criminal history and her

pleasant demeanor during her 90-minute interview with Eckert. While Eckert said many of his

-6- interactions with delinquent minors are difficult, his interaction with defendant was easy and she

was very cooperative. When defense counsel asked Eckert whether defendant could have assessed

the appropriate way to deal with the confrontation she faced at Lanphier, Eckert stated defendant

would experience difficulty in that type of situation because of her limited cognitive abilities and

her poorly developed social and interpersonal skills. Eckert thought defendant would find it

difficult to get help from a trusted adult in that type of situation. Further, Eckert testified he would

not expect defendant to be able to find an adult she would ask for help.

¶ 18 As for the effect adult prison would have on defendant, Eckert said being housed

with adult inmates in an adult prison would be very difficult for defendant because she could easily

be taken advantage of and manipulated. Eckert suspected defendant would be a hardened

individual, emotionally and otherwise, after serving an adult prison sentence. He also told the

juvenile court it was not his impression defendant was the type of individual who sought conflict

or looked for trouble and was far less mature than her average peer of the same age.

¶ 19 The State’s next witness was Natasha Melcher, who worked for Sangamon County

court services, was defendant’s assigned court services officer, and conducted a social history

investigation on defendant. Her report was admitted as evidence. Melcher interviewed defendant

during her investigation, but defendant’s mother refused to be interviewed. Melcher also indicated

she obtained defendant’s school records and Eckert’s psychological assessment, “called and

checked in” with the juvenile detention center in Peoria, Illinois, reviewed defendant’s Sangamon

County history, reviewed the circumstances surrounding defendant’s arrest and detention, and

administered a detention screener, which indicated defendant was a moderate to high risk to

reoffend. Melcher indicated defendant received an informal station adjustment after two prior

referrals for aggravated battery on February 4, 2019, and for battery on February 28, 2019, with

-7- Sangamon County court services but provided the court with no factual information regarding

either of the incidents leading to the referrals. Defendant was supervised by court services for an

informal period of time.

¶ 20 According to Melcher, when defendant entered juvenile detention on November

19, 2021, she tested positive for both cannabis and methamphetamine. Defendant admitted using

cannabis on the day of her arrest. Defendant’s school records showed she had a 39% attendance

rate, an IEP, no disciplinary referrals in high school, and 52 office referrals in middle school for

disrespect. Eleven percent of defendant’s referrals were for aggression and bullying. Melcher

failed to provide any details about any of defendant’s referrals. Melcher testified defendant had

been splitting her school day between Douglas and Lanphier but was working toward attending

Lanphier on a full-time basis.

¶ 21 Defendant told Melcher she got along with her siblings, had a close relationship

with her mother, and was working on a relationship with her father. As for her involvement with

outside agencies, defendant claimed no prior treatment or involvement. Melcher informed the

juvenile court defendant had been involved in two fights at the Peoria County Juvenile Detention

Center on January 10, 2022, and January 11, 2022, but provided no other details regarding either

incident.

¶ 22 Melcher testified she was aware of services offered to juveniles by the Illinois

Department of Juvenile Justice (DOJJ) and indicated DOJJ had a facility for females at Warrenville

with multiple services, including educational, substance abuse, vocational, mental health, and

medical services. She believed the facility offered parenting classes and leisure activities.

However, she provided no details regarding any of these services or information regarding how

defendant would benefit from the services.

-8- ¶ 23 On cross-examination, Melcher provided no real explanation for how she

determined defendant was at a high risk to reoffend. Her only explanation was that she used a

disposition tool that had a series of six questions, defendant answered the questions, and then the

risk level was generated based on the answers to the questions. However, Melcher acknowledged

defendant had no prior adjudications, had never been arrested, had no criminal history, and was

cooperative and had no issues at the Sangamon County Juvenile Detention Center. While Melcher

indicated defendant was involved in two fights at the Peoria County juvenile detention facility and

received a 35-minute “time out,” Melcher offered no details regarding the fights other than to say

they involved another peer or peers.

¶ 24 According to Melcher, because of defendant’s good behavior, she was ranked at

the highest level at the Peoria County juvenile detention facility, was offered educational services,

and took advantage of those services. Melcher was unaware of what other services, like counseling,

defendant was receiving or whether she was taking advantage of any other services she was

offered. As for the services defendant would have available to her at the Warrenville DOJJ facility,

Melcher indicated defendant would be able to participate in schooling, substance abuse programs,

and mental health treatment. However, once again, Melcher provided no information as to what

those programs or services would entail and stated she had no information indicating defendant

would not be a willing participant in the programs offered at Warrenville.

¶ 25 The State next called Detective Charles Redpath of the Springfield Police

Department, who was the lead detective in the investigation. According to Redpath, on November

17, 2021, he learned a stabbing had occurred after school on the west side of Lanphier’s campus.

Assistant principals Chris Barham and Brian Caton were advised of or observed a fight happening.

Both men saw Pierre Scott coming back toward the school but were unaware he had been stabbed.

-9- Barham told the police he observed defendant with a knife and heard her yell she did not “give a

fuck, call who you want.” Caton told the police defendant’s last name and said students were

pointing at her, saying she stabbed Pierre. Redpath testified Lanphier Principal Curtis “Artie” Doss

told the police he saw the tip of a knife in defendant’s hand, told her he had called the police, and

told her to come with him. Doss overheard defendant say, “[C]all whoever you want, I hope he

dies.”

¶ 26 Redpath testified the police learned B.P., a Lanphier student, might have relevant

information regarding what occurred. B.P. consented to a recorded interview with the police just

hours after the incident. B.P. told the police he had been in “in-house” that day with Pierre and

heard Pierre make statements that he was going to get in a fight. According to B.P., he was in the

same area as Pierre after school. According to Redpath, B.P. told the police defendant only swung

one time towards Pierre’s chest, then he held his ribs and ran away. B.P. told the police defendant

was a female who looked like a male, attended Washington Middle School at the same time as

him, had the nickname “Tink,” and was wearing a blue and white jacket.

¶ 27 Redpath also testified Michael Washington, who was supervising Pierre’s

“in-house” on the day Pierre was stabbed, also sat for a recorded interview with the police. In

summarizing the interview, Redpath said Washington told the police Pierre was his normal, happy

self that morning but went ballistic during the fourth period of the school day. Washington told

Pierre to calm down and asked what was wrong. Pierre told Washington he did not want to say

because Washington would try to talk him out of doing something. Washington told Pierre he must

be planning on doing something he knew was wrong. Pierre agreed. Washington told the police

Pierre was acting normally later that afternoon.

¶ 28 According to Redpath’s testimony, Detective Jennifer Mack went to the hospital

- 10 - when the police learned D.D. was also a victim. After Mack located D.D. and his mother,

Krishawna A., D.D. told Mack he had been stabbed near the buses by a light-skinned girl wearing

a coat and jeans. D.D. said Pierre was having an issue with a girl and he was with Pierre to make

sure he was alright. D.D. said defendant swung first at Pierre, Pierre then swung back at defendant,

and then defendant swung at D.D. According to D.D., he did not know why he was stabbed. D.D.

also indicated the fight had something to do with defendant saying something about Pierre’s

deceased uncle.

¶ 29 Redpath testified the police acquired surveillance video from Lanphier and a school

bus parked near the fight’s location. According to Redpath, he had reviewed the video found in

People’s exhibit No. 4, which fairly and accurately depicted the surveillance video he saw during

his investigation. The detective indicated video Nos. 16 through 20 were from Lanphier’s

surveillance cameras and then described what parts of the videos were relevant to the investigation.

Redpath stated video No. 17 showed Pierre and D.D. come into view inside of the school’s main

lobby around the 1:54 mark and then exit the building 2 minutes into the video. Pierre was wearing

dark pants and a dark jacket, and D.D. was wearing a white or light colored hoodie. Video No. 16

showed defendant exit the school around the 0:15 mark and then move to the middle of the screen.

About 13 seconds later, defendant and another student begin walking toward 11th Street while

defendant frequently looked back toward the school. A little over one minute into the video,

defendant walked back toward the school.

¶ 30 The State then directed Redpath’s attention to video No. 18, which was the same

camera angle contained in video No. 16. Redpath testified defendant walked into view around the

0:07 mark. Approximately 17 seconds into the video, Pierre and D.D., who are visible on the video,

moved toward defendant. Then, 34 seconds into the video, Pierre and D.D. were talking to

- 11 - defendant, who was mostly off-screen. Redpath testified Pierre’s and D.D.’s respective hands were

down along their sides during the conversation. According to the detective, Pierre and D.D. then

began walking toward 11th Street.

¶ 31 Redpath then testified video No. 19, which was from an exterior surveillance

camera pointed toward Lanphier’s main entrance, encompassed what happened in video No. 18

and what occurred after defendant, Pierre, and D.D. moved out of frame in video No. 18. Video

No. 19 included a partial view of what happened both before and after the stabbings occurred but

did not show defendant stab either Pierre or D.D. Redpath indicated his time frame of concern in

video No. 19 started around the four-minute mark, which is where the State started the video for

the juvenile court. Redpath testified defendant was on the video, walking backward between Pierre

and D.D. Then, at some point, defendant broke away from Pierre and D.D.

¶ 32 According to Redpath, after defendant separated from Pierre and D.D., defendant

was walking in one direction, and Pierre and D.D. were walking in another direction. By the 4:30

mark, defendant, Pierre, and D.D. could no longer be seen. Approximately 24 seconds later, Pierre

came back into view, running toward the school, fell, got up and removed his jacket, then fell a

final time.

¶ 33 The State then directed Redpath’s attention to surveillance video from a school bus

parked along 11th Street, just west of the location where defendant stabbed Pierre and D.D.

Redpath testified the time frame of his investigative concern in the video was a 22-second period

from 1:26 to 1:48. Although the bus surveillance video included three different camera angles,

Redpath directed the juvenile court’s attention to the parts of the screen labeled “STEP” and

“REAR.” According to Redpath, the video labeled “STEP” would show defendant walking into

the frame in the grass between the sidewalk and road wearing dark pants and a black and white

- 12 - jacket at the 1:26 mark. Then, at the 1:31 mark, defendant would walk into the paths of Pierre and

D.D.—who Redpath said were walking in the same direction as defendant—and then turn and face

the young men. Redpath testified, “[Defendant] was walking at a faster pace, got in front of them[,]

*** and cut them off.”

¶ 34 The State then started the bus surveillance video at the 1:20 mark and asked

Redpath to indicate when he saw defendant, Pierre, or D.D. Redpath testified defendant could be

seen before Pierre and D.D. Moments later, defendant turned to face Pierre and then struck him in

the chest while his hands were down. According to Redpath, after defendant struck Pierre, they

separated. Then, after D.D. ran toward defendant, she struck D.D. The State and Redpath then had

the following exchange:

“Q. Okay. So as far as you are concerned with this video in particular, you

are most concerned of approximately a ten to twenty second period of time?

A. Yes.

Q. Starting at approximately a minute thirty and ending around a minute

forty, a minute forty-five?

A. Correct.”

The State then played the video again. Thereafter, at the juvenile court’s request, the State played

the video frame-by-frame, through a different video player, starting at the 1:28 mark.

¶ 35 Next, the State asked Redpath about video No. 20, which was from an exterior

surveillance camera at Lanphier showing both 11th Street and North Grand Avenue. Redpath

testified the area of his investigative concern started around the 7:53 mark and ended just under 3

minutes later. He identified a white vehicle in a parking lot across North Grand Avenue that

belonged to and was driven by Krishawna A., D.D.’s mother. Krishawna told the police she

- 13 - normally parked there to pick up D.D. after school. Around the 8:30 mark of the video, a large

group of students ran north toward the fight. Around the 8:49 mark, Redpath said defendant could

be seen on the west side of 11th Street, running south toward North Grand and then southwest at

the intersection. Defendant ran in front of Krishawna’s vehicle. Around the nine-minute mark,

another young man runs across the intersection and taps on the window of Krishawna’s vehicle.

Defendant had stopped along North Grand Avenue but then continued out of view. Redpath

indicated D.D. could later be seen in the parking lot with his mother. According to the detective,

after D.D. left with his mother, the scene was still chaotic, and the video shows students running

after defendant.

¶ 36 During defense counsel’s cross-examination of Redpath, the detective testified B.P.

told the police he was in the same “in-house” with Pierre, Pierre was upset during the “in-house,”

and Pierre’s comments and mannerisms indicated Pierre was going to get into a fight with

someone. However, B.P. did not know who Pierre planned to fight. According to B.P., Pierre was

very angry about a social media post that mentioned Pierre’s deceased uncle.

¶ 37 Defense counsel then turned Redpath’s attention to video No. 18, which showed

defendant standing on the left side of the screen, Pierre and D.D. exiting the building, and D.D.

pointing at defendant. Defense counsel asked Redpath if it was fair to say the young men were

pursuing defendant at that point. Redpath answered, “I would say it’s fair to say that they were

going to have a conversation between each other. Both parties were going to meet up.” When

defense counsel asked the detective why he thought defendant was looking for Pierre and D.D.,

Redpath said defendant kept looking over her shoulder toward the school. Defense counsel then

asked if defendant could have been looking for her sister. Redpath indicated defendant’s sister was

on the surveillance video.

- 14 - ¶ 38 With regard to video No. 19, Redpath acknowledged defendant was walking

backward and Pierre and D.D. were walking towards her. Further, defense counsel played video

No. 18 and pointed out someone other than Pierre and D.D. walked at a fast pace toward defendant.

Redpath acknowledged B.P. told him that Pierre and two other young men had pursued defendant

after she walked away from them. Further, Redpath acknowledged defendant was 15 years old

when she stabbed Pierre and D.D., who were both either 17 or 18 at the time.

¶ 39 When defense counsel questioned Redpath about his interview with Washington,

Redpath acknowledged Washington said he was supervising Pierre’s “in-house” classroom, Pierre

went “ballistic,” and Pierre refused to tell Washington what he planned to do because Washington

would try to talk him out of it. After defense counsel asked Redpath if he believed Pierre intended

to fight, hurt, or confront defendant in some way, Redpath testified, “I think it’s fair to say that

they were going to have a conversation.” After Redpath acknowledged B.P. thought Pierre

intended to fight a girl after school, B.P.’s recorded interview with the police was played for the

juvenile court. However, it is not clear from the record if anything other than the first five minutes

of the recording was published.

¶ 40 Based on this court’s review of the first five minutes of the audio recording, B.P.

said he was a sophomore at Lanphier and had been in “in-house” with Pierre that day when the

fire alarms were going off. Like Pierre, B.P. said he went outside during the fire alarm and then

went back to “in-house.” B.P. told Redpath and Detective Howard that Pierre was talking about

fighting a person—presumably a female—at the end of the school day because of something that

happened with Pierre’s deceased uncle. When school dismissed for the day, B.P. was outside and

saw Pierre and “two other dudes” walk up to defendant. When defendant walked away, Pierre and

the two other young men followed her. B.P. said he saw defendant swing and then saw Pierre run

- 15 - away holding his ribs, saying he had been stabbed. According to B.P., defendant had on a blue and

white coat and blue and white “Air Max 95” shoes.

¶ 41 Redpath also acknowledged D.D. said Pierre and a girl were “beefing” and D.D.

was present to make sure Pierre was alright. According to Redpath, both B.P. and D.D. said the

fight involved mutual combat. In addition, Redpath admitted video evidence showed Pierre and

D.D. walk out of school and then walk directly toward defendant. The detective also agreed the

altercation involved a 15-year old female against a 17-year old young man and an 18-year old

young man. Redpath also acknowledged defendant had no criminal history to his knowledge and

turned herself in to the police.

¶ 42 On redirect examination, the State asked Redpath about B.P.’s and Washington’s

respective interviews with the police. As for B.P.’s claim Pierre was with two other young men

outside the school, Redpath said in the following exchange he only saw one person with Pierre and

implied no one followed defendant when she walked away:

“Q. And in regards to [B.P.] as we have heard on this recording, he indicated

that there were—that it was Pierre and two other dudes that walked up to

[defendant]; is that what he said?

Q. You have been able to review now all of the outside surveillance videos

of Lanphier *** relating to this incident; is that correct?

Q. And in that video, do you ever see Pierre and two other individuals

approach [defendant]?

A. No.

- 16 - Q. And in that same reporting, [B.P.] indicates that [defendant] walks away

and they follow her; is that what he indicated?

A. That is correct.

Q. And on the surveillance video that you have been able to personally

review, do you see Pierre Scott and [D.D.] following [defendant]?

A. All three of them were walking off campus and then eventually

separated.”

Redpath also testified B.P. said defendant was the only person who swung during the encounter.

According to Redpath, the video evidence showed B.P.’s statement was not accurate because

Pierre tried to swing back at defendant after he was stabbed and then defendant stabbed D.D.

¶ 43 Then, the State asked if Redpath recalled asking Washington if B.P. was in the

“in-house” he was supervising on November 17, 2021. Redpath said he did not recall doing so.

However, Redpath said he had reviewed Detective Howard’s supplemental police report prior to

his testimony. The State marked the report for identification as People’s exhibit No. 5 and showed

it to Redpath. Thereafter, the State and Redpath had the following exchange:

“Q. Could I have you turn to page number four, please. And I’ll direct your

attention towards the middle paragraph of number four. And if you could just read

that to yourself for just a moment.

A. Okay.

Q. Detective, based on your—is—is your memory now refreshed in regards

to the conversation that you had with Mr. Washington, along with Detective

Howard?

- 17 - Q. In that conversation, did you have an opportunity to discuss whether

[B.P.] was present in in-house?

A. Yes, I asked him and he said he was in in-house yesterday.

Q. Being November 16th and not November 17th?

A. That’s what was said.”

According to Redpath, Washington said it was during fourth period that Pierre went “ballistic.”

The State and defense counsel both indicated neither had any further questions for Redpath. The

juvenile court allowed defense counsel to admit B.P.’s interview.

¶ 44 After the State rested and the defense called no witnesses, the parties made their

respective arguments on the transfer petition. According to the State, while not everything

regarding why the stabbings occurred was known, defendant clearly stabbed both Pierre and D.D.

Further, while acknowledging Pierre was “ballistic” during fourth period, the State argued Pierre

had calmed down and was acting normally later in the school day.

¶ 45 According to the State, defendant was waiting after school to meet Pierre and D.D.

After defendant, Pierre, and D.D. found each other and exchanged words, the State suggested they

all walked away. The State argued Pierre and D.D. were acting like the other students trying to

leave the school grounds. However, according to the State, defendant was acting differently,

moving backward while continuing to converse with Pierre and D.D. Then, defendant separated

from Pierre and D.D., and they were all moving toward 11th Street adjacent to one another. Relying

on the school bus’s surveillance video, the State argued defendant closed off the gap between

herself and Pierre and D.D., walking faster and parallel to Pierre and D.D. Defendant then turned

and stepped in front of D.D. and Pierre and stabbed Pierre in the heart, causing his death.

¶ 46 The State then argued defendant committed the charged offenses, her acts were

- 18 - aggressive even if not premeditated, and she was not charged through an accountability theory.

According to the State, the evidence established probable cause for the charged offenses. Further,

while defendant did not have any prior juvenile adjudications, the State noted she had been referred

to Sangamon County court services for two different batteries in February 2019, both of which

concluded with an informal station adjustment.

¶ 47 In addition, the State noted the evidence established defendant had a fairly good

relationship with her family without abuse or neglect. While the State acknowledged defendant

had cognitive issues, the State argued Eckert’s report did not indicate defendant’s cognitive delays

contributed to the charged offenses. Further, according to the State, the results of defendant’s

personality assessments showed she was withdrawn, isolated, had a negative view of herself, and

had “significant generalized delinquent tendencies and an underlying predisposition to break social

rules and act out antisocially.” The State noted Eckert diagnosed defendant with persistent

depressive disorder and oppositional defiant disorder and recommended defendant have a skilled

and experienced therapist to work with her on a long-term basis. Eckert also recommended

defendant be monitored during her treatment to make sure she understood what was happening.

According to the State, while Eckert indicated defendant believed she needed therapy, the State

argued the therapy would proceed well into defendant’s adult years.

¶ 48 With regard to the advantages of treatment within the juvenile justice system, the

State contended defendant would not be eligible for probation even if she remained in the juvenile

justice system and her sentence would run until she turned 21. While she would have access to

mental health, substance abuse, clinical, and educational services if her case remained in the

juvenile justice system, those services would stop when she was 21. The State argued the public

would not be safe if defendant’s sentence ended on her twenty-first birthday. As for the possible

- 19 - sentence defendant faced if transferred to the criminal court, the State told the juvenile court the

sentencing range for first degree murder was “20 to 60 years served at one hundred percent.” The

State then asked the juvenile court to transfer defendant to criminal court.

¶ 49 Defense counsel argued the transfer petition should be denied. According to

defense counsel, defendant had no prior adjudications or prior arrests, Eckert indicated defendant

would not seek out conflict, and this was not a situation where defendant ambushed Pierre and

D.D. Instead, Pierre and D.D. came out of the school, pointed at defendant, and then approached

her. Counsel also pointed out that Pierre had gone ballistic in “in-house,” saying he was going to

get into a fight and refusing to tell Washington what he planned to do because he knew it was

wrong. Counsel also pointed out defendant was walking backward after she was confronted by

multiple young men.

¶ 50 According to defense counsel’s argument, the juvenile court did not know what was

said on those videos between defendant and the young men, and counsel noted, “There’s a gap

between when everybody disappears and then the bus video.” Further, defense counsel pointed out

the court was presented with evidence this situation involved mutual combat. Finally, defense

counsel argued defendant acted without premeditation, had significant mental limitations, was a

candidate for rehabilitation, would take advantage of services offered to her, and did not pose a

threat to the community. Counsel further contended defendant’s aggression in this case was a

reaction to real aggression toward her or aggression she perceived by older young men.

¶ 51 In rebuttal, the State argued B.P.’s statement to the police that Pierre and two other

young men “were coming at” defendant was contradicted by the video evidence. The State also

maintained this was not the only issue with B.P.’s police interview. According to the State, Pierre

and defendant had an issue, and they were going to address it outside the school. In addition, the

- 20 - State asserted defendant was the person acting aggressively and in an unreasonable manner and

the treatment she needed would last long past the day she turned 21.

¶ 52 When explaining its decision, the juvenile court recognized it needed to consider

numerous factors and give the greatest weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the

minor’s history of delinquency. The court noted Eckert’s report was “illuminating” with regard to

the issues it needed to consider. As for defendant’s educational history, the court noted defendant’s

many failing grades and poor attendance dating back to the 2018-19 school year. The court also

stated the evidence showed defendant often put her head down and refused to work on assignments

in class and attend language therapy multiple times during the 2018-19 school year.

¶ 53 The juvenile court further noted Eckert testified defendant’s attendance issues

affected her capabilities. However, the court also stated defendant was oriented to person, place,

time, and situation; her presentation matched her chronological age; the evidence did not indicate

she had a formal thought disorder; and her ability to sustain her attention, concentrate, and exert

mental control was better developed than her reasoning skills.

¶ 54 As to whether DOJJ could adequately deal with defendant’s issues, the juvenile

court noted Eckert’s report stated defendant’s therapy would likely be challenging and

characterized by frequent therapeutic reversals. According to the court, in addition to defendant’s

receptive language skills being very poorly developed, she had oppositional defiant disorder,

problems with authority, trust issues and would need “several years of work to facilitate integration

and stabilization of her behavior.” Further, the court noted defendant had a moderate level of social

immaturity, simplistic and naïve coping skills and social judgment, and appeared to lack insight

and empathy. According to the court, defendant’s mistrust of authority figures would likely lead

to hostility. Further, defendant had failed to take advantage of opportunities presented through the

- 21 - school district with regard to her mental health, educational health, and language comprehension

in the past.

¶ 55 The juvenile court recognized it needed to consider the advantages of treatment

within the juvenile justice system and defendant’s history of delinquency. As to the advantages of

treatment within DOJJ, the court stated as follows:

“There was limited testimony about this but in regards to the advantages within the

juvenile justice system, I think there was one time that if there is an adult sentence

in this case where [defendant] will be able to take care of the advantages, if there

are any, in the juvenile justice system.”

However, the court then also noted defendant’s treatment is “likely to take more time than

[defendant] would be under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in a purely juvenile court

situation.”

¶ 56 As for defendant’s history of delinquency, the juvenile court stated it looked at

nonadjudicated offenses “at a different level than adjudicated offenses and history.” However, the

court then stated:

“I can’t completely ignore the factors involved and all the factors involved in

regards to the non-court intervention in relationship to the battery and the

aggravated battery. At the very least, those should have been a wake-up call where

she should have taken advantage of the services that were offered through the

school district and I imagine through court services, as well. And that didn’t

happen. That is a previous history. And it fits in not only in regards to delinquent

behavior but it fits with the findings in regards to the defiance and lack of empathy

and unwillingness to engage in services, as do the more recent activity while she

- 22 - was in the detention center on this charge itself.”

¶ 57 The juvenile court then turned its attention to the circumstances of the events in this

case, stating:

“[W]e have advantages now with video and I do not find for the video reasons, as

well as the inconsistencies in regards to B.P.’s testimony, or at least his statements

to the police, that they’re that credible. I did watch the videos. I didn’t see three

people. I saw the two victims approach [defendant]. I saw [defendant] at the front

of the building go and walk away with a friend and then come back and wait. Yes,

I agree the two victims pointed at [defendant] and then approached her. I was

surprised at such a low level of confrontation at that point. I don’t find that the

victims followed her. They walked up on somewhat divergent paths. And I—there

was some period of time where you can’t see where the individuals go. I don’t

gather it to be very long. But I can see the reaction and what everyone is doing as

we then recapture what’s going on at Lanphier High School. And clearly the two

victims are walking in a casual manner without any hostility to anyone.

I think that if they didn’t have their hands in their pocket, that they certainly

had their hands by the side. No one was agitated.

And the video clearly shows [defendant] coming up against and striking the

victim without any provocation at all.

[D.D.], then, in this Court’s opinion, tries to defend his friend and he gets

stabbed and all that happened within, I don’t know, five seconds, three seconds. It

was very quick. And that’s why this Court looked at that.

So who was aggressive, no doubt [defendant] was aggressive. And I’m

- 23 - relying on that video. And I don’t know how to interpret it any other way.”

¶ 58 Later, when discussing probable cause and premeditation, the juvenile court found

that, as defendant approached the two young men, she had the intent to stab one of them and it

happened quickly and without confrontation. According to the court, “There [was] no escalation.

There [were] no comments made to each other[,] it’s bang.” The court noted Pierre’s reaction to

getting stabbed was defensive in nature. As for D.D., the court said he was “a little more

aggressive,” but he had just seen Pierre get stabbed. The court found D.D. was trying to help and

protect Pierre and was also stabbed. Defendant then walked off without remorse.

¶ 59 The juvenile court also explained the charged offenses occurred on school grounds

and upset the community. Given Eckert’s report and conclusions, the court found it was not

reasonably likely defendant could be rehabilitated before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expired.

In addition, the court found punishment through the juvenile court system would be “wholly

inadequate” because of the circumstances and severity of the offenses. The court indicated

defendant was charged with the most serious offense that can be brought before a court, defendant

was not charged through an accountability theory, and defendant clearly caused Pierre’s death and

D.D.’s serious bodily injuries with a deadly weapon. As to the possible sentence defendant faced

in criminal court, the court stated it was aware defendant could be sentenced to between 20 and 60

years in prison for first degree murder. The court then entered an order allowing defendant to be

transferred out of juvenile court and prosecuted under the criminal law.

¶ 60 B. Criminal Court

¶ 61 On April 13, 2022, a grand jury indicted defendant on three counts of first degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2020)), two counts of unlawful use of a weapon (id.

§ 24-1(a)(2)), three counts of aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(a)(1), (c), (f)(1)), and one count of

- 24 - attempt (first degree murder) (id. § 8-4, 9-1(a)(1)). On December 20, 2022, defendant filed a notice

she might raise self-defense as an affirmative defense. On January 18, 2023, defendant filed

another notice, indicating she might also raise “imperfect self defense/second degree murder—

belief in justification” as an affirmative defense. On February 9, 2023, defendant signed a written

waiver of her right to a jury trial, and the trial court accepted her waiver.

¶ 62 Defendant’s bench trial began on February 14, 2023. Defendant was still

represented by the same attorney. The State was represented by First Assistant State’s Attorney

Derek Dion and Assistant State’s Attorney Kendra Hansel. Hansel had handled the hearing on the

State’s petition to transfer defendant to criminal court. The fact defendant stabbed Pierre and D.D.,

causing Pierre’s death and D.D.’s serious injuries, was not subject to any real dispute. For that and

other reasons, we need not specifically describe the entirety of the events at defendant’s trial and

will only provide a summary of the facts relevant to the disposition.

¶ 63 D.D. testified he was 17 years old and attended Lanphier High School from 2019

until he graduated in December 2022. On November 17, 2021, when he and Pierre were stabbed

by defendant, he stated he was approximately 5 feet, 9 inches tall and weighed between 120 to 125

pounds. We note his testimony is difficult to understand, as he frequently contradicted himself and

claimed he remembered very little of what happened.

¶ 64 When asked if he and Pierre talked to anyone outside, D.D. said he and Pierre talked

to defendant. When asked why they talked, D.D. said Pierre “was telling me something, I don’t

remember.” When D.D. was asked how Pierre was emotionally at that time, D.D. responded, “I

don’t know he was like quiet, I knew something was wrong with him.” When asked if Pierre

indicated what was upsetting him, D.D. replied it was “[s]omething about a video, I don’t know.”

Pierre said he saw about a second of the video but did not remember what he saw. From our review

- 25 - of the record, although it is not entirely clear, it appears D.D. was referring to what happened

during one of the fire alarms.

¶ 65 Later, D.D. testified that when he and Pierre left the school building at the end of

the school day, he pointed out defendant to tell Pierre that defendant “was right there.” The

following exchange between the State and D.D. followed:

“[The State]: Where did you guys go from there?

[D.D.]: Down the sidewalk.

Q. Okay. Do you remember having another conversation with her at that

point?

A. No, not really. It wasn’t a conversation that I could hear. I wasn’t talking.

Q. Okay. Who was talking?

A. I wasn’t talking. Pierre and her was probably talking. I wasn’t talking.”

D.D. said he did not see anyone with a weapon. When asked what happened after that point, D.D.

replied, “I don’t remember for real after that.” However, when D.D. was then asked what happened

before he was stabbed, he testified he was walking and then Pierre and defendant were fighting.

D.D. indicated he did not see defendant with a knife. When asked what happened next, D.D. said

defendant and Pierre separated for a second. D.D. indicated he “came up” because he saw Pierre

“go back.” D.D. testified he was then stabbed in the chest. According to D.D., he did not think he

hit the person who stabbed him.

¶ 66 On cross-examination, D.D. said he and Pierre exited Lanphier on the Converse

Street side of the building during one of the fire alarms before school dismissed for the day. At

that time, Pierre and defendant talked. D.D. said he “was in the distance” and denied hearing what

was said. D.D. indicated that after the fire alarm, he saw about one second of the video that angered

- 26 - Pierre. D.D. testified defendant had no reason to be upset with him that day.

¶ 67 While D.D. did not remember if he was in “in-house” with Pierre during fourth

hour, he did remember his mother was waiting for him after school south of North Grand Avenue.

Additionally, D.D. claimed he did not remember much of what happened between the time he

pointed defendant out to Pierre until defendant and Pierre had their fight.

¶ 68 D.D. said he did remember telling the police he did not know how he got stabbed

and saying he must not have been paying attention. He also remembered moving toward defendant

and swinging at her after she and Pierre separated. However, he denied defendant was moving

backward and away from him when he moved towards her. With regard to why he was with Pierre,

D.D. said Pierre was his friend and they were all walking in the same direction. Pierre lived south

of Lanphier, down 11th Street, and D.D.’s mother was parked south of North Grand Avenue, at

the intersection of North Grand Avenue and 11th Street.

¶ 69 After D.D. testified, the parties stipulated People’s exhibit No. 11, which was the

Lanphier surveillance videos, and People’s exhibit No. 12, which was the First Student bus

surveillance video, fairly and accurately depicted the events that occurred on November 17, 2021.

¶ 70 Redpath also testified at defendant’s criminal trial. Some of his testimony was

similar to the testimony he provided at the transfer hearing. However, parts of his testimony were

also significantly different. As a result, we need not repeat all of the information Redpath provided

at the transfer hearing.

¶ 71 During Redpath’s direct examination, the State questioned Redpath about multiple

surveillance videos in People’s exhibit No. 11, which were admitted into evidence without

objection. The State indicated it intended to publish a portion of the videos, which it did. We have

already described Redpath’s testimony regarding some of these videos at the transfer hearing and

- 27 - only discuss them as necessary.

¶ 72 Although Redpath claimed he did not know when defendant came into possession

of the knife she used to stab Pierre and D.D., Redpath testified he believed defendant was in

possession of a knife inside the school in video No. 11, around 2:06 p.m., based on her behavior,

the positioning of her hands, and her constant checking of the right side of her body. At the criminal

trial, contrary to his testimony at the transfer hearing, Redpath testified J.W., who was wearing red

pants, was with Pierre and D.D. in video No. 17 when they left the school building and video No.

18 when they were outside the building.

¶ 73 The State then turned its attention to video No. 19, which was from an exterior

camera facing northeast toward Lanphier’s main entrance. It appears the State played video No.

19 from the 2:14 mark when questioning Redpath. When asked where defendant was in the video,

Redpath testified she paused “right here” (without describing for the record where “right here”

was at) and then moved behind a tree where she could not be seen at the 2:36 mark. When the

State stopped the video at the 3:30 mark, Redpath indicated Pierre and D.D. were “right here in

almost the middle [of the screen], just off to the left of the sidewalk by the benches.” At that point,

according to Redpath’s testimony, defendant, Pierre, and D.D. were having some sort of

conversation. The State then continued playing the video. Redpath testified that at the 4:02 mark,

defendant, Pierre, and D.D. started to move toward the camera. Redpath identified D.D. on the

video by his white hoodie. Then at the 4:19 mark, Redpath indicated defendant was in the grass to

the left of the sidewalk, Pierre was “[j]ust to the right of her,” D.D. was “[j]ust to the right of

Pierre,” and J.W. was on the sidewalk. Redpath noted all the relevant parties were off the screen

at the 4:35 mark. He then identified Pierre running back toward the school around the 4:57 mark.

¶ 74 Because Redpath’s testimony regarding what video No. 19 showed from the 2:14

- 28 - mark was very sparse, we deem it necessary to provide a fuller description of what the trial court

would have seen on the video starting at the 2:14 mark. At that point in the video, defendant turns

away from the student she had been walking with toward 11th Street and starts walking back

toward the school, hangs around near the left side of video, then starts walking back toward the

school building at the 2:56 mark. Around the 3:19 mark, defendant has stopped by a tree and

cannot be seen.

¶ 75 Shortly thereafter, D.D. can be seen outside the main entrance, pointing toward

defendant’s location. Around the 3:35 mark, D.D. and Pierre can be seen near defendant. It appears

D.D.’s right hand is up by his head. Around the 3:52 mark, J.W., who is wearing red pants, can be

seen a few feet to the right of the tree that was blocking the camera’s view of defendant. Around

the 3:54 mark, Pierre and D.D. can be seen to the left of the tree, and J.W. is walking on the camera

side of the tree toward Pierre and D.D.

¶ 76 At the 3:55 mark, defendant comes into view, walking backward and away from

the three young men. Initially, defendant took a couple of steps backward, moving southeast. Pierre

and D.D. then moved toward her and the school building, not 11th Street, as they walked around

the northeast side of the tree. Defendant then started moving to the southwest, still walking

backward and away from Pierre and D.D. The two young men then changed their direction of

travel and followed after defendant. D.D. can be seen making movements with his hands toward

defendant and makes a quick step or flinch toward her at the 4:05 mark of the video.

¶ 77 In the next few moments, J.W. walked behind defendant as she continued walking

backward. It does not appear defendant was watching J.W.’s movements. Instead, she was looking

toward Pierre and D.D., who continued to walk toward her as she walked backward. At the 4:15

mark of the video, after defendant had been walking backward for nearly 20 seconds, away from

- 29 - Pierre and D.D., defendant moved forward between the two young men while continuing to look

at Pierre. Pierre stopped and turned toward defendant as she went between him and D.D. Then,

D.D. moved toward defendant before he and Pierre started walking to the west/southwest while

still looking at defendant. Defendant then made a little movement with her left hand, and Pierre

and D.D. started walking away from defendant while still looking at her.

¶ 78 In the video, defendant’s right hand was in her coat pocket while she was walking

backward and away from Pierre and D.D. and while she was in close proximity to the young men.

However, after Pierre and D.D. began walking to the southwest and defendant was north of them,

defendant removed her right hand from her pocket as she was moving off the left side of the video

screen.

¶ 79 Later, the State turned to the school bus’s surveillance video (People’s exhibit No.

12), which was admitted into evidence without objection. The State directed the trial court’s

attention to the portion of the video labeled “STEP” and started the video one minute into the

footage. Unlike at the transfer hearing, Redpath testified D.D. could first be seen in the first

window of the bus wearing a white sweatshirt and J.W. could be seen behind D.D. Although not

noted by Redpath, Pierre can also be seen in the video with J.W. and D.D. when they turn and start

walking north toward defendant’s location when she could no longer be seen in video No. 19.

Redpath testified defendant can be seen in the grass on the video at the 1:31 mark. The State then

played the video and stopped it at the 1:53 mark. Redpath said the video showed defendant

stabbing both Pierre and D.D. According to Redpath, Pierre’s hands were down when defendant

stabbed him. The State also introduced two cell phone videos that captured part of the incident or

its aftermath. One video appears to start when defendant stabs D.D. The other video does not

capture either stabbing but does show multiple school buses lined up along 11th Street.

- 30 - ¶ 80 On cross-examination, Redpath acknowledged the State had no evidence defendant

knew or was familiar with Pierre or D.D. before the day in question. Further, according to Redpath,

Pierre was upset about the video that defendant and her younger brother posted online, although

the video was not directed at Pierre but instead at his younger brother and uncle. Redpath testified

Pierre was aware of the video based on his outburst during the fourth period of the school day

while in “in-house.” According to Redpath, Washington told the police Pierre would not tell him

what he was upset about. However, Redpath testified B.P. told the police Pierre said a girl had him

“fucked up” because of something involving Pierre’s deceased uncle.

¶ 81 Redpath also testified D.D.’s mother was parked in a lot at the southwest corner of

the intersection of 11th Street and North Grand Avenue. According to the detective, defendant

lived on North 8th Street and would have walked south down 11th Street from the school toward

North Grand Avenue to walk home. He explained J.W., who was a senior at Lanphier, was in close

proximity to everything that happened after school between defendant, Pierre, and D.D. but refused

to be interviewed by the police about the incident.

¶ 82 The detective also indicated that after Pierre, D.D., and J.W. exited the school

building and walked over to where defendant was standing, defendant took a step backward and

put her hands out and her palms up. Redpath said he saw no evidence at that point that defendant

knew either Pierre or D.D. According to Redpath, the young men and defendant then had a

conversation. Then, defendant started to move backward, and the boys were walking in the same

direction. The detective also testified defendant never turned her back to either Pierre or D.D. In

addition, Redpath acknowledged D.D. lunged or flinched at defendant while she was walking

backward. Defendant reacted by taking a step away from D.D.

¶ 83 Redpath conceded defendant was not being the aggressor at that point, but he did

- 31 - not characterize D.D.’s lunging or flinching movement at defendant as aggressive, either. Instead,

according to Redpath, D.D.’s “action was to get [defendant] away from him.” However, Redpath

admitted the lunging or flinching move could be seen as an act of aggression. When defendant

continued to walk backward, Redpath acknowledged Pierre began to walk to defendant’s left, and

D.D. began to walk to her right before defendant moved forward between the two young men

while facing Pierre the entire time. Pierre also turned so he was facing defendant during her

movement. According to Redpath, defendant had been walking backward for around 20 steps

before she moved forward between Pierre and D.D.

¶ 84 Redpath acknowledged defendant then removed her left hand from her pocket and

made a motion that could be perceived as dismissing the two young men. The detective testified

D.D. and Pierre were still looking toward defendant and things were being said. Redpath conceded

defendant was not following D.D., Pierre, and J.W.

¶ 85 Defense counsel also questioned Redpath about the school bus’s surveillance video

and asked Redpath if he could think of any reason why D.D., Pierre, and J.W. would have turned

north back toward defendant’s position instead of walking south on the sidewalk toward D.D.’s

ride and Pierre’s home. Redpath said the only reason he could think of was because someone might

have said something. Redpath acknowledged defendant had a reason to be walking south on the

sidewalk along 11th Street because she lived in that direction. He also testified after defendant—

who was walking south—passed Pierre and D.D.—who were walking north—the young men then

turned and started walking south, following defendant in close proximity.

¶ 86 Defense counsel then asked Redpath what happened when defendant struck Pierre.

Redpath said Pierre was walking toward her and his hands came up to his chest, but he did not

strike her back. Redpath did not know what was being said at that time. D.D. provided the police

- 32 - no information about anything that was said, and J.W. refused to talk to the police. Redpath

indicated he did not know if the young men were threatening her or saying they were going to

harm her. When defense counsel asked Redpath why the three boys would have turned north on

the sidewalk and then turned south after defendant passed them, Redpath said it was his opinion

they did not want to turn their backs on defendant. However, he acknowledged the young men

could have avoided the situation entirely if they had not turned north toward defendant.

¶ 87 Further, Redpath conceded D.D. sprinted at and took a swing at defendant after

defendant struck Pierre. Redpath characterized this as an aggressive action. Redpath also

acknowledged defendant was moving backward after striking Pierre. Further, Redpath testified he

assumed D.D. did not know Pierre had been stabbed or defendant had a knife when he sprinted at

defendant. Redpath also admitted a fourth young man wearing bright red pants and a black hoodie,

who Redpath could not identify, also appeared to be pursuing defendant before realizing she had

a knife. According to Redpath, people only started retreating away from defendant when they

realized she had a knife.

¶ 88 Redpath also explained the area where defendant lived could be dangerous for a

15-year-old girl to walk by herself. Further, the detective also stated it would be dangerous for a

15-year-old girl to walk by herself from Douglas to Lanphier. As for whether defendant had a

motive to kill Pierre and seriously injure D.D., Redpath testified the police had no evidence of a

motive. Finally, the detective noted the police also found a knife in defendant’s sister’s bag, which

was dropped at the scene that day.

¶ 89 On redirect examination, Redpath testified he was not able to talk to Pierre about

whether defendant had a motive to harm him. Further, he declined to say defendant was retreating

by walking backward because of her prior action of walking back toward the school building after

- 33 - walking toward 11th Street with another student. Redpath also noted that defendant was keeping

pace with Pierre and D.D. while walking backward. According to the detective, other than D.D.

flinching at defendant, he did not see D.D., Pierre, or J.W. take any aggressive action in the

surveillance videos prior to defendant stabbing Pierre. Redpath noted no one had hit or kicked

anyone before defendant stabbed Pierre. He also testified defendant swung at D.D. before D.D.

swung at her. However, on re-cross examination, Redpath agreed D.D. running at defendant was

an aggressive act.

¶ 90 The State rested after the detective’s testimony.

¶ 91 B.P. was called as a defense witness and testified he was a sophomore at Lanphier

on November 17, 2021. He did not know if he was in “in-house” with Pierre during fourth hour

on the day in question, which was when Washington said Pierre had gone ballistic. However, B.P.

said he was in “in-house” with Pierre at the end of that school day. B.P. testified he sat for an

interview with the police on November 17, 2021, and provided accurate information to the police.

According to B.P., his memory of what occurred that day would have been better the night he

spoke to the police as opposed to the day of his testimony. B.P. told the police Pierre was very

mad and loudly talking about fighting someone after class—shouting “this bitch got me fucked

up”—because of something that happened with Pierre’s uncle. Further, B.P. said this was unusual

behavior for Pierre. While B.P. did not know who Pierre planned to fight, he testified he thought

Pierre was talking about fighting a female whenever he saw her.

¶ 92 With regard to what B.P. saw outside the school building, defense counsel and B.P.

had the following exchange:

“Q. And did you see Pierre and two other individuals with him exit that

same exit?

- 34 - A. No, I seen him walking when I got out with one of his friends.

Q. Okay. You didn’t tell Detective Redpath that you saw Pierre and two

other dudes walk up to the Defendant ***?

A. No. It wasn’t two other people. He was with one other people and they,

like, walked up to each other.

Q. Okay. Do you recall telling Detective Redpath that—well, let me ask you

this: When you say; she walks away and they follow her. Do you recall saying those

statements?

A. Huh-uh.

Q. Are you denying that you said those statements?

A. No, because I don’t remember if I said it or not.

***

Q. Okay. Can you tell me what you witnessed from where you were at?

A. I had walked—there is like three sections when you walk out those 11th

Street doors. I walked down the middle section and I was looking back because

there was, like—you could tell there was an argument. They were arguing. And

they were walking up to each other and they were, like, just sitting there talking, so

I kept walking. And that’s when I saw her swing and Pierre yelling out that he was

stabbed and running back and forth.”

B.P. indicated he had been interviewed before trial by the state’s attorney’s office on February 8,

2023. The State did not play B.P.’s recorded interview for him, and he did not know if his February

interview was recorded. B.P. again agreed his interview with Detective Redpath on the day of the

incident would be more accurate as to what he observed that day.

- 35 - ¶ 93 On cross-examination, B.P. said he saw defendant swing and Pierre run away.

When asked if he saw anyone else swing, B.P. said it looked like Pierre’s friend had swung, but

he could not tell for sure. B.P. also said he was not completely sure if defendant swung first or if

Pierre’s friend swung first.

¶ 94 Defense counsel noted the parties had stipulated Defendant’s exhibit No. 1, which

was Michael Washington’s recorded interview on November 18, 2021, would be admitted as his

testimony. The recording of the interview was then played for the trial court.

¶ 95 Afterwards, defendant testified on her own behalf. According to defendant, she was

attending Douglas in the morning and Lanphier in the afternoon and lived on 8th Street on

November 17, 2021. To get from Douglas to Lanphier, she either rode a bus or walked if necessary.

After leaving Lanphier at the end of the school day, she would either walk home or someone would

pick her up. On the day of the incident at issue, she rode the bus from Douglas to Lanphier, but no

one was available to pick her up after school.

¶ 96 While she was at Lanphier, a fire alarm went off and she exited the north side of

the building. While outside, she heard someone yelling. She looked and saw a young man she later

learned was Pierre staring at her. She looked to see if Pierre was looking at someone behind her.

Pierre then yelled he was talking to her. After he stood there for a second, she walked off and

started talking to someone else. Defendant claimed she did not know D.D., Pierre, or J.W. prior to

November 17, 2021.

¶ 97 According to defendant, her younger brother had been having problems with

another boy before November 17, 2021. Defendant’s brother and the other boy attended

Washington Middle School together, the boy had been bullying her brother, and they had an

altercation at the YMCA. Defendant admitted she and her brother made a Snapchat video directed

- 36 - at the alleged bully prior to November 17, 2021. According to defendant, she did not know the

alleged bully was Pierre’s brother or that the boy even had an older brother.

¶ 98 According to defendant, when school dismissed shortly after the fire alarm on

November 17, defendant left the school and was waiting for her sister but never saw her. While

defendant was standing outside, Pierre and D.D., who she did not know at the time, confronted

her. Defendant testified Pierre accused her of disrespecting his uncle. She said she did not know

what he was talking about. She took a step back, and Pierre told her not to move like that. D.D.

told her she knew what Pierre was talking about and to stop “being stupid.” Defendant testified

she did not know Pierre was talking about the Snapchat video she and her brother had made. When

she stepped back and away from the young men, Pierre said, “[D]on’t move I got that bitch on

me.” She thought this meant Pierre had a weapon. Defendant continued to move backward and

away from Pierre and D.D., who both appeared angry.

¶ 99 Pierre and D.D. then started walking toward her. Pierre then said, “[S]o I’m going

to ask you one more time, did you diss my uncle.” Defendant said she responded yes “just to get

it over with.” Pierre then said, “[S]o what you trying to do. Let’s take it to the street.” Defendant

said this meant Pierre wanted to beat her up away from the school. Defendant believed Pierre and

D.D. wanted to inflict great bodily harm on her. Defendant continued to walk backward and then

went forward between Pierre and D.D. and walked toward 11th Street while trying to create

distance between herself and the two young men—who were also walking toward 11th Street—to

avoid getting beaten up. Pierre and D.D. were telling defendant they were going “to fuck [her] up”

and “beat [her] ass” and “shit like that.” Defendant denied making any threatening statements to

Pierre and D.D. She did not think she could successfully fight both young men at the same time.

¶ 100 When defense counsel asked what happened when she got to the 11th Street

- 37 - sidewalk, she responded:

“They just—they was walking this way and they turned towards me and

they started—they started walking towards me. And I went to move out the way so

I was in the grass part by the bus. And they got behind me. And I didn’t want—I

didn’t want to feel like I couldn’t turned [sic] around because I got scared.

And then I heard [D.D.] say; we might as well just do it right now. And

somebody, I don’t know who said it, but somebody said; let’s get her. Let’s get

her.”

She testified she turned at that point to defend herself because she thought Pierre and D.D. were

going to “[p]unch and jump and all that, like stomp me out and stuff like that.” She said she did

not have any ill will toward D.D. or Pierre and was carrying a knife because she lived in and had

to walk through dangerous neighborhoods.

¶ 101 On cross-examination, defendant said she was looking for opportunities to escape

because Pierre said he had a weapon. The State pointed out defendant did not run from the young

men, yell for help, get on one of the school buses, or go back toward the building where the adults

were and wait for her sister. Defendant said she did not think she could outrun Pierre and D.D. and

thought running would have made the situation worse. She also said she was having trouble

thinking and did not see her sister.

¶ 102 When the State asked about her knife, defendant said it was a folding knife, which

she had open in her pocket before she stabbed Pierre. Defendant testified she kept the knife in her

possession at school and had it open when she was not in the school building. On the day in

question, defendant testified she opened the knife outside the school while standing by the benches

waiting for her sister. When asked what she thought Pierre and D.D. were going to do to her,

- 38 - defendant said she was afraid they were going to punch and kick her and maybe use a weapon on

her. As for J.W., defendant said she was not paying much attention to him.

¶ 103 Defendant admitted pulling her open knife out of her coat pocket and stabbing

Pierre in the chest one time while his hands were down. She did not know if Pierre hit her back.

After stabbing Pierre, she then stabbed D.D. when he ran and swung at her. She did not remember

making a big circle outside the gym and walking north after she stabbed D.D. However, she

remembered seeing Doss and telling him to call whoever he wanted after someone mentioned

calling the police. She denied saying she hoped someone died. Defendant claimed she put the knife

in her pocket but lost it while running from the school.

¶ 104 Defense counsel did not ask defendant any questions on redirect examination.

¶ 105 In closing, defense counsel argued defendant acted in self-defense. In the

alternative, if the trial court found defendant did not act in self-defense, defendant argued she

should only be found guilty of second degree murder because she believed her actions were

justified. Further, defendant argued the undisputed evidence showed Pierre and D.D. were

planning to confront defendant after school, and defendant did nothing wrong by waiting for her

sister. Pierre, D.D., and J.W. approached and confronted defendant, not the other way around.

¶ 106 Defense counsel pointed out the State’s failure to call J.W., who was present for

everything outside the school, to testify about what was being said between Pierre, D.D., and

defendant. Defendant asked the trial court to infer J.W. did not testify because Pierre, D.D., and

J.W. planned to harm defendant. Defendant noted the evidence established Pierre and D.D. were

angry when they approached defendant. Pierre had gone ballistic earlier in the day and indicated

he planned to do something he knew was wrong, was still angry at the end of the day, and was

making comments he was going to fight a female at the end of the school day. Further, Redpath

- 39 - conceded the State had no evidence defendant had a motive to hurt either Pierre or D.D. Defense

counsel argued that even after defendant had achieved some separation from Pierre and D.D. and

was north of the two young men, they were still saying things to her and then turned and walked

north toward her. After defendant passed the young men in the grass, they then turned and started

walking south right behind her and making comments she believed meant an attack was imminent.

Only at that point did she resort to self-defense.

¶ 107 Defense counsel argued this was not going to be a fair fight. The fact D.D. rushed

at defendant when he did not know she had stabbed defendant establishes the young men were all

going to attack defendant. Counsel maintained even a fourth unidentified man rushed at defendant

before realizing she had a knife. Defense counsel argued defendant’s belief she was going to get

jumped and hurt badly by multiple young men was both objectively and subjectively reasonable.

Counsel noted the State’s refusal to admit defendant had been retreating and trying to avoid a fight

with the young men from the moment they first approached her. Further, counsel argued the State

failed to rebut defendant’s testimony she carried a knife because of the dangerous neighborhood

she had to walk through on her way home. Finally, counsel argued defendant’s use of the knife

was justified because she was about to get beaten up by four young men.

¶ 108 The State responded it did not need to rebut what it categorized as defendant’s

incredible and self-serving testimony. Further, the trial court did not need to consider whether

defendant acted in self-defense because she only claimed she used “deadly force in the face of a

beat down.” The State argued that reason was insufficient as a matter of law to establish defendant

acted in self-defense. Further, the State told the court it had heard no credible evidence Pierre

intended to fight defendant. In the alternative, even if Pierre intended to fight defendant,

defendant’s act of stabbing Pierre in the heart was not justified. According to the State, defendant

- 40 - was the initial aggressor because she was the first person to strike a blow, she could have run away

from the young men, she did not subjectively believe her life was in danger, and, even assuming,

arguendo, D.D. was the initial aggressor, D.D. had abandoned his course of conduct when he

walked away after flinching at defendant.

¶ 109 After the trial court stated it had carefully considered all the evidence in the case,

including the exhibits, testimony, the credibility of the witnesses based on its observations of their

demeanor, and considering all applicable Illinois law, it found defendant guilty on all counts. The

court did not provide any factual findings, legal reasoning, or other explanation for its decision.

¶ 110 On March 7, 2023, defendant filed a motion for a new trial. On April 19, 2023, the

trial court denied defendant’s posttrial motion and sentenced her to the following consecutive

sentences: 30 years for first degree murder, to be served at 100% ; 10 years for attempt (first degree

murder), to be served at 85%; and 3 years for unlawful use of a weapon. On June 15, 2023, the

trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider her sentence.

¶ 111 This appeal followed.

¶ 112 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 113 A. Defendant’s Transfer to the Criminal Court

¶ 114 Defendant asks this court to reverse her conviction and vacate the juvenile court’s

transfer order. According to defendant, the juvenile court abused its discretion when it granted the

State’s petition, which was filed pursuant to section 5-805(3) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)

(West 2020)), because the State failed to present sufficient evidence on all the statutory and

nonstatutory factors the juvenile court was required to consider before allowing the discretionary

transfer.

¶ 115 Section 5-805(3)(a) of the Act states:

- 41 - “(a) If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13 years of age or over of

an act that constitutes a crime under the laws of this State and, on motion of the

State’s Attorney to permit prosecution of the minor under the criminal laws, a

Juvenile Judge assigned by the Chief Judge of the Circuit to hear and determine

those motions, after hearing but before commencement of the trial, finds that there

is probable cause to believe that the allegations in the motion are true and that it is

not in the best interests of the public to proceed under this Act, the court may enter

an order permitting prosecution under the criminal laws.” Id. § 5-805(3)(a).

However, in making that determination, section 5-805(b) lists certain factors the juvenile court

“shall consider among other matters,” including the following: (1) the age of the minor; (2) the

minor’s history (including the minor’s previous delinquent or criminal history; the minor’s history

of previous abuse or neglect; and “any mental health, physical, or educational history of the minor

or combination of these factors”); (3) the circumstances of the offense (including “the seriousness

of the offense”; “whether the minor is charged through accountability”; whether evidence exists

the offense was (a) “committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner” and/or (b) “caused

serious bodily harm”; and “whether there is evidence the minor possessed a deadly weapon”);

(4) “the advantages of treatment within the juvenile justice system including whether there are

facilities or programs, or both, particularly available in the juvenile system”; and (5) whether the

security of the public requires the minor to be sentenced as an adult considering “the minor’s

history of services, including the minor’s willingness to participate meaningfully in available

services”; “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the minor can be rehabilitated before the

expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”; and “the adequacy of the punishment or services.”

705 ILCS 405/5-805(3)(b) (West 2020).

- 42 - ¶ 116 The statute also makes clear the juvenile court is to give “greater weight to the

seriousness of the alleged offense [and] the minor’s prior record of delinquency,” as opposed to

the other factors. Id. § 5-805(3)(b). In addition to the statutory factors, “[o]ur supreme court has

stated that the minimum sentence or term of years defendant would have to serve under the

Criminal Code [of 2012 (Criminal Code)] should be considered as a factor in addressing and

weighing the competing interests.” People v. Moore, 2011 IL App (3d) 090993, ¶ 27 (citing People

v. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1987)).

¶ 117 “The decision to permit prosecution of a juvenile under the criminal law is a matter

of judicial discretion.” Id. ¶ 21. However, the juvenile court’s “discretion is limited and controlled

by the Act.” Id. “In Clark, the [supreme] court observed that the juvenile court’s discretion to

waive jurisdiction must be exercised within the limits of due process and must comport with the

applicable statutory guidelines.” Id. ¶ 27 (citing Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 12). Before an appellate court

affirms an order transferring a minor to criminal court, the appellate court must determine if the

record contains sufficient evidence on each of the factors the juvenile court is required to consider

before allowing a minor to be prosecuted under the criminal law. Id. ¶ 21. “The mere recitation in

the record that all statutory factors have been considered is not enough to affirm a discretionary

transfer order.” Id.

¶ 118 “The purpose of a transfer proceeding is to balance the best interests of the juvenile

offender, particularly as his interests relate to his potential for rehabilitation, against the public’s

interest in being protected from crime.” Id. ¶ 19 (citing People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404 (2001);

Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 1). Further, when weighing the relevant statutory and nonstatutory factors, the

juvenile judge considering a transfer petition must balance the needs of society and the minor. Id.

According to our supreme court, the transfer statute is “rooted in the constitutional requirement of

- 43 - procedural due process.” Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 8. The standard for determining compliance with due

process is whether the transfer proceeding was fundamentally fair. People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289,

302 (1979).

¶ 119 In Clark, the supreme court indicated neither the State, defense counsel, nor the

juvenile judge indicated any awareness the defendant would be given a natural life sentence if

convicted of the two murders with which he had been charged. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 15. Further,

the court held the record made it abundantly clear the juvenile court judge did not consider whether

a natural life sentence was in the defendant’s best interests or was required by society. Id. at 16.

As a result, the court concluded the transfer hearing was inadequate because the juvenile court

judge failed to weigh defendant’s potential eligibility for a mandatory natural life sentence if he

was tried and convicted in criminal court of the two murders for which he was charged. Id.

¶ 120 In addition, the supreme court also held the Clark minor’s transfer hearing was

inadequate for two other reasons. According to the court, the record showed a failure to investigate

the defendant’s history, especially as it related to his potential for rehabilitation, and a failure to

investigate the availability of rehabilitative services available to the minor if he was not transferred

out of the juvenile court. Id. Specifically, the record showed the juvenile court judge basically gave

no consideration to the defendant’s history, the existence of treatment or rehabilitation facilities,

or the defendant’s amenability to rehabilitation or treatment. Id. at 18.

¶ 121 With regard to the defendant’s history of delinquency, the juvenile court judge in

Clark was only provided information about three minor encounters the defendant had with juvenile

authorities. Only one of those instances was supported by facts the defendant engaged in criminal

conduct. Id. at 19. That incident involved an attempt to shoplift toy cars when the defendant was

10 years old. Id. The second alleged incident was a theft under $150, for which the State provided

- 44 - no details to the court. Id. The third alleged incident was for disorderly conduct, but the State’s

witnesses established the defendant was merely present and not involved. Id.

¶ 122 As for the availability of rehabilitation and treatment services for the defendant, the

supreme court in Clark noted the juvenile court only heard the opinion of a juvenile probation

officer, who testified he was unaware of any facilities where the minor could receive treatment

without providing any basis for this assertion. Further, in Clark, the juvenile court indicated this

same probation officer also testified he thought it was in the best interests of the minor and society

that he be prosecuted under the criminal laws, giving as his only reason “ ‘the allegations against

the minor.’ ” Id. The supreme court noted the juvenile court judge did not ask the probation officer

any questions about either of his assertions.

¶ 123 In Clark, our supreme court then offered the following explanation and guidance:

“Viewing the record of the transfer hearing in the instant case in its entirety

in light of the language and purpose of the transfer provision and in light of People

v. M.D. and People v. Taylor, supra, we conclude that defendant’s transfer hearing

was inadequate. In reaching this conclusion, we do not minimize the seriousness of

the offenses for which defendant was charged and, after two trials, ultimately

convicted. However, we are unable to ignore the fact that this defendant had no

history of violent criminal conduct and, in fact, apparently had virtually no criminal

history whatsoever. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that the legislature has

given certain protections to minors of the age of the defendant who are alleged to

have committed serious offenses. It is our constitutional responsibility to insure that

these protections are afforded by enforcing the language and spirit of the transfer

provision.” Id. at 20-21.

- 45 - Our supreme court then vacated the juvenile court’s order transferring the defendant for trial as an

adult and remanded the case for a new trial, starting with a new transfer hearing.

¶ 124 In the instant case, defendant argues the record did not contain sufficient evidence

as to several of the statutory and nonstatutory factors the juvenile court was required to consider

before transferring defendant for prosecution under the criminal law. According to defendant’s

brief, the juvenile court (1) failed to properly consider the importance of defendant’s age and

intellectual ability; (2) did not have sufficient information regarding defendant’s history of

delinquency; (3) did not have sufficient information with regard to the types of facilities and

services available in DOJJ or the Illinois Department of Corrections; (4) did not have sufficient

information about defendant’s history of services or her willingness to participate in services; and

(5) did not know defendant faced a 27-year minimum sentence if she was convicted in criminal

court.

¶ 125 We need not address defendant’s arguments with regard to each of these factors

because it is clear the juvenile court did not have sufficient information before it to adequately

consider defendant’s history of delinquency. As noted earlier, section 5-805(3)(b) of the Act states

the juvenile court “shall give greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense [and] the

minor’s prior record of delinquency than to the other factors listed in this subsection.” 705 ILCS

405/5-805(2)(b) (West 2020).

¶ 126 Here, Nancy Melcher testified defendant had two prior referrals with Sangamon

County court services involving allegations of aggravated battery and battery. She indicated both

allegations resulted in defendant receiving an informal station adjustment, not an adjudication.

Melcher also testified defendant had not received any office referrals while in high school but had

52 office referrals while in middle school, stating 77% of the referrals were for disrespect and 11%

- 46 - were for aggression and bullying. In addition, Melcher testified defendant had been in two fights

while being housed at the Peoria County Juvenile Detention Center.

¶ 127 However, neither Melcher nor anyone else provided any specific factual

information regarding the circumstances for the referrals that led to the informal station

adjustments, the middle school office referrals, or the two “fights” at the juvenile detention center.

Considering the importance the legislature intended a juvenile court to place on a minor’s prior

record of delinquency, the State’s reliance on broad, generic information about alleged bad acts

was not sufficient for the juvenile court to adequately consider this factor in determining whether

the State should be able to prosecute defendant under the criminal law.

¶ 128 The State suggests, “although little evidence existed of a significant bad history

from defendant, the court’s assessment appears to accurately reflect that fact.” According to the

State, “The court did not unduly focus on this portion of defendant’s history in coming to its

conclusion[ ]” to transfer defendant. We disagree. Because the juvenile court was given no factual

information about any of these prior incidents, the juvenile court was left to assume what occurred

and then made unsupported assumptions regarding what defendant should have learned from those

incidents and what services were made available through the school district and court services.

¶ 129 When explaining its ruling to transfer defendant, the juvenile court correctly stated

the law required it “to give the greatest weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the

minor’s history of delinquency.” The juvenile court then made the following statement regarding

defendant’s history of delinquency:

“[T]his Court does look at non-adjudicated offenses at a different level than

adjudicated offenses and history. I can’t completely ignore the factors involved and

all the factors involved in regards to the non-court intervention in relationship to

- 47 - the battery and the aggravated battery. At the very least, those should have been a

wake-up call where she should have taken advantage of the services that were

offered through the school district and I imagine through court services, as well.

And that didn’t happen. That is a previous history. And it fits in not only in regards

to delinquent behavior but it fits with the findings in regards to the defiance and

lack of empathy and unwillingness to engage in services, as do the more recent

activity while she was in the detention center on this charge itself.”

Contrary to the State’s assertion, based on the court’s statements, it appears the court gave

defendant’s juvenile referrals, station adjustments, and the two fights in which defendant was

involved in the juvenile detention facility considerable weight, which the statute clearly instructs

it to do. However, because the juvenile court was not provided any specific factual information

regarding the juvenile referrals, the station adjustments, or the two fights at the juvenile detention

center, the court did not have sufficient information to properly consider defendant’s history of

delinquency.

¶ 130 Before the juvenile court could properly consider defendant’s history of

delinquency, it needed to know specifically what defendant had done and the context in which she

had done it. The State simply presented very vague information and invited the juvenile court to

assume defendant had a propensity for violence. Because the juvenile court did not have adequate

evidence to consider defendant’s history of delinquency based on the facts in this case, we

conclude the trial court abused its discretion in allowing defendant to be prosecuted under the

criminal law. In arriving at our decision, we understand defendant was charged, and after a bench

trial, convicted of serious offenses. However, as our supreme court explained in Clark,

“we cannot ignore the fact that the legislature has given certain protections to

- 48 - minors of the age of the defendant who are alleged to have committed serious

offenses. It is our constitutional responsibility to insure that these protections are

afforded by enforcing the language and spirit of the transfer provision.” Clark, 119

Ill. 2d at 21.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Sangamon County circuit court, vacate the juvenile

court’s transfer order and remand this case to the juvenile court for further proceedings.

¶ 131 B. Other Issues Regarding the Transfer Hearing

¶ 132 Although we need not consider any of defendant’s other arguments regarding the

transfer hearing, the record also establishes the juvenile court did not have sufficient information

to properly consider the “advantages of treatment within the juvenile justice system.” Further, the

record establishes a strong probability the trial court misunderstood the minimum sentence

defendant faced in criminal court if convicted of all the offenses for which she was charged.

¶ 133 1. Advantages of Treatment in DOJJ

¶ 134 Defendant cited Moore for the proposition “[a] juvenile judge must evaluate

information concerning the type of facilities available for the treatment or rehabilitation of the

minor and must evaluate the likely effectiveness of those facilities in light of the history and present

circumstances of the minor.” Moore, 2011 IL App (3d) 090993, ¶ 20 (citing Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d

at 428-29). In this case, the juvenile court correctly noted there was limited evidence regarding the

advantages of treatment for defendant within DOJJ.

¶ 135 From our review of the record, sufficient evidence was not presented regarding the

advantages of treatment of the minor within DOJJ. Instead, Melcher only testified DOJJ had a

facility for females in Warrenville and the facility provided school, substance abuse, mental health,

and medical services. However, the State offered no evidence regarding what those services

- 49 - entailed, whether the services were mandatory, how they would or would not benefit defendant,

or how those services differed from services provided in the Illinois Department of Corrections.

Further, the juvenile court was not provided any information regarding whether defendant could

receive the treatment in DOJJ Eckert opined defendant needed.

¶ 136 2. Possible Minimum Sentence

¶ 137 In addition, the record establishes a strong probability the juvenile court did not

know the correct minimum sentence defendant faced if convicted of the charged offenses in

criminal court. On appeal, the parties do not dispute that defendant faced a mandatory minimum

sentence of 27 years if she was transferred to the criminal court and convicted of first degree

murder, attempt (first degree murder), and unlawful use of a weapon. “Our supreme court has

stated that the minimum sentence or term of years defendant would have to serve under the

Criminal Code should be considered as a factor in addressing and weighing the competing

interests” of the juvenile offender and the public’s interest in being protected from crime. Id. ¶ 27

(citing Clark, 119 Ill. 2d at 14).

¶ 138 In response, the State asserted a court is presumed to know the law regarding a

potential sentence. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 431. Further, the State argued its motion to transfer

defendant to criminal court indicated defendant could be sentenced to 20 to 60 years for first degree

murder, 6 to 30 years for attempt (first degree murder), and 1 to 3 years for unlawful use of a

weapon, with a conviction for first degree murder being mandatorily consecutive to the other

counts.

¶ 139 However, despite the language in the motion to transfer, the State argued at the

transfer hearing that defendant could only be kept in custody until she was 21 years old if she was

kept in juvenile court but could be sentenced to between 20 to 60 years, served at 100%, if

- 50 - transferred to criminal court. Further, when explaining its decision to transfer defendant to criminal

court, the juvenile court did not make any indication it understood defendant would face a

minimum 27-year sentence if she was convicted of first degree murder, attempt (first degree

murder), and unlawful use of a weapon. Instead, the court stated it was cognizant defendant could

be sentenced to 20 to 60 years in prison if she was convicted of first degree murder. As a result,

we will not presume based on the facts before us that the juvenile court understood defendant could

face a mandatory minimum sentence of 27 years in criminal court.

¶ 140 C. Defenses and Lesser Offenses

¶ 141 1. Self-Defense

¶ 142 Even though we have determined the juvenile court abused its discretion in

transferring defendant to criminal court, we must still address defendant’s argument this court

should reverse her first degree murder and attempt (first degree murder) convictions because the

State failed to negate beyond a reasonable doubt any element of her self-defense claim. Assuming,

arguendo, this court might determine the State did negate defendant’s self-defense claim, she

argued her first degree murder conviction should be reduced to either (1) second degree murder

because she established by a preponderance of the evidence her mistaken belief she was acting in

self-defense or (2) involuntary manslaughter because she acted recklessly.

¶ 143 Defendant’s arguments constitute a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in

this case. As a result, we must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt when the evidence is viewed in a light

most favorable to the prosecution. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (2007).

Unfortunately, the trial judge at defendant’s bench trial offered no factual findings, credibility

determinations, or legal reasoning to explain his judgment in this case.

- 51 - ¶ 144 In a case like this, when a defendant is charged with murder but asserts she acted

in self-defense, “the State must prove more than the three elements of first degree murder.”

(Emphasis in original.) People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 128 (1995). According to our supreme

court, “The State must also prove that the murder was not carried out in self-defense, and that the

defendant’s use of force was not legally justified.” Id.

“The elements of self-defense are: (1) that unlawful force was threatened against a

person; (2) that the person threatened was not the aggressor; (3) that the danger of

harm was imminent; (4) that the use of force was necessary; (5) that the person

threatened actually and subjectively believed a danger existed that required the use

of the force applied; and (6) the beliefs of the person threatened were objectively

reasonable.” People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 225 (2004).

“If the State negates any one of these elements, the defendant’s claim of self-defense must fail.”

Id.

¶ 145 While other trial judges and juries might have determined defendant acted in

self-defense, we cannot say no reasonable trier of fact could have determined defendant did not

act in self-defense based on the evidence before the trial court. While it seems arguable that Pierre

and D.D. were both initially acting aggressively toward defendant and it is possible defendant did

nothing aggressive before she stabbed Pierre, a reasonable trier of fact could have determined the

surveillance videos established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not in imminent

danger of harm and that defendant’s use of force (stabbing Pierre and then D.D.) was not necessary

based on the situation. This incident took place outside a school with multiple students and adults

present. A trier of fact could reasonably determine Pierre, D.D., and J.W. posed no imminent

physical threat to defendant before she stabbed Pierre. Further, even if a trier of fact concluded

- 52 - defendant faced an imminent danger, a reasonable trier of fact could have also determined stabbing

Pierre and then D.D. was not justified because Pierre, D.D., and J.W. were unarmed, and defendant

could have screamed for help, ran from the young men to get help, or even jumped on one of the

school buses right by where she stabbed Pierre and D.D. In other words, this was not a situation

where defendant was alone and without any means of escaping a potential attacker or attackers.

¶ 146 2. Mistaken Belief Self-Defense

¶ 147 We next turn to defendant’s argument that this court should reduce her first degree

murder conviction to second degree murder. At a minimum, relying on People v. Hawkins, 296

Ill. App. 3d 830, 836-38 (1998), defendant argues she proved by a preponderance of the evidence

that she believed that the circumstances justified her use of force to defend herself, even if her

belief was mistaken. Unlike the trial court, this court was not able to observe defendant when she

testified. As a result, the trial court was in a better position to judge defendant’s credibility.

Although the trial court made no findings regarding the credibility of any witnesses, we can

reasonably infer the trial court did not find defendant’s testimony credible. Based on the record,

we are not in a position to hold no reasonable trier of fact could have reached this same decision.

¶ 148 3. Involuntary Manslaughter

¶ 149 Finally, defendant argues her first degree murder conviction should be reduced to

involuntary manslaughter. Section 9-3(a) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2020))

states, “A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits

involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as

are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly.”

Based on the facts in this case, we see no merit in defendant’s argument on this issue. The evidence

established defendant intentionally, not recklessly, stabbed Pierre in the heart with a knife. We

- 53 - address this argument no further.

¶ 150 D. Relief for Defendant

¶ 151 Although we have determined an outright reversal of the trial court’s judgment in

this case based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented at defendant’s criminal trial would not

be appropriate, the trial court’s judgment still must be reversed and the case remanded to the

juvenile court for further proceedings because the juvenile court abused its discretion by

transferring defendant from the juvenile court to the criminal court without having sufficient

information on all the factors the juvenile court was required to consider before making the transfer

decision.

¶ 152 E. Other Issues Raised by Defendant

¶ 153 Because we have reversed the circuit court’s judgment in this case and are

remanding this case for further proceedings in the juvenile court, we need not address defendant’s

arguments regarding the expert testimony of Dr. Eckert or the sentence imposed by the circuit

¶ 154 F. Inaccurate Information Provided to the Juvenile Court at the Transfer Hearing

¶ 155 Although we have already held the trial court’s judgment must be reversed, the

juvenile court’s order transferring defendant from juvenile court to criminal court must be vacated,

and the case must be remanded for further proceedings in the juvenile court, this court would be

remiss and would do a disservice to the juvenile court on remand if we did not comment on

inaccurate testimony provided to the juvenile court by Detective Redpath, the State’s conduct in

eliciting this inaccurate testimony, the State’s arguments based on Redpath’s inaccurate testimony,

defense counsel’s failure to impeach Redpath’s inaccurate testimony, and the juvenile court’s

acceptance and reliance on this inaccurate testimony and argument when transferring defendant to

- 54 - criminal court.

¶ 156 While it seems defendant’s appellate counsel recognized Redpath provided the

juvenile court with inaccurate information at the juvenile transfer hearing that was inconsistent

with his trial testimony, defendant’s appellate counsel did not argue defendant’s trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to effectively challenge Redpath’s testimony. Further, appellate counsel did

not argue the juvenile court’s transfer decision should be reversed because the juvenile court’s

findings and reasoning showed it failed to understand the circumstances of the charged offenses

in this case.

¶ 157 Because these issues were not raised on appeal, the State did not address these

issues. As a result, while this court can discuss the discrepancies and inaccuracies, we are not in a

position to determine why those events occurred.

¶ 158 We will briefly discuss two of the noted discrepancies. First, at the juvenile transfer

hearing, Redpath testified he had reviewed the surveillance video acquired by the police during

the investigation. Yet, at the juvenile transfer hearing, Redpath provided inaccurate testimony

regarding the surveillance videos. For example, Redpath testified B.P.’s statement that two young

men were with Pierre when he approached defendant was not correct. According to Redpath, when

he reviewed the surveillance video, he did not see two people with Pierre, only one. Defendant’s

attorney at the transfer hearing failed to challenge Redpath’s testimony. We note the surveillance

videos clearly showed two people, D.D. and J.W., were both in close proximity to Pierre from the

moment he left the school building until he was stabbed by defendant. Then, despite his prior

testimony at the transfer hearing, during his testimony at defendant’s criminal trial Redpath

admitted the surveillance video established there were two people in addition to Pierre just as B.P.

had indicated and was shown in the surveillance video.

- 55 - ¶ 159 During its rebuttal argument at the transfer hearing, the State relied on Detective

Redpath’s testimony there was only one other person with Pierre to discredit B.P.’s voluntary

statement to the police and challenge the claim defendant was followed when it argued:

“I know that [defense counsel] would like this Court to put a lot of stock into the

interview of [B.P.] who very clearly and very confidently stated that there were

three people that were coming at [defendant] after that school let out; however, that

is directly contrary to the surveillance video that this Court has seen.

There are a lot of issues with [B.P.’s] statements and I think that that is

something that the Court should consider that once again while all signs point to,

yes, Pierre and [defendant] had an issue and they were going to address it in some

way. That surveillance video shows exactly how they were going to address it and

it was—there was a conversation that occurred in the very beginning of that video

and everybody starts walking away.”

¶ 160 Our review of the record provides no explanation of the change between Detective

Redpath’s transfer hearing testimony and his testimony at the criminal trial regarding the

surveillance video.

¶ 161 Second, we note the State and Redpath’s representation of what the school bus’s

surveillance video showed varied between the juvenile court’s transfer hearing and the criminal

trial. Redpath’s trial testimony about this evidence contradicted his testimony at the juvenile

transfer hearing. At defendant’s criminal trial, Redpath testified Pierre, D.D., and J.W. were visible

on the bus surveillance video moving north toward defendant’s location before defendant can be

seen moving south. However, at the juvenile transfer hearing, when the State questioned Redpath

about the bus video, he testified the time frame of his investigative concern was only the 22 seconds

- 56 - from the 1:26 mark of the video after defendant walked into view until after she had stabbed both

Pierre and D.D. To the State’s credit in this instance, it played the bus surveillance video from the

1:20 mark—instead of the 1:26 mark Redpath identified—and asked Redpath to indicate when he

saw defendant, Pierre, or D.D. in the video. Although Pierre and D.D. can clearly be seen walking

north toward defendant’s location, Redpath failed to identify either of these young men. Instead,

Redpath testified defendant was the first of the three to be seen on the bus video. According to

Redpath’s testimony at the transfer hearing, defendant walked into the video in front of (south of)

Pierre and D.D. Neither the State nor defense counsel corrected Redpath’s inaccurate testimony

about the surveillance video at the transfer hearing.

¶ 162 We have noted two of these discrepancies in the effort to aid the juvenile court

because the case is being remanded on other grounds. We are not suggesting these are the only

discrepancies in Redpath’s testimony that occurred. On remand, if the juvenile court conducts

another transfer hearing, we urge the juvenile court to carefully consider the evidence presented,

especially the surveillance video.

¶ 163 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 164 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon County is

reversed, the juvenile court’s order transferring defendant for trial as an adult under the Criminal

Code is vacated, and the cause is remanded to juvenile court for further proceedings. Further, we

find that the interests of the parties and the administration of justice would be most efficiently

served by assigning the case to a different judge on remand. On remand, we direct a judge other

than Judge Gab to preside over the juvenile proceedings and, if the case is ultimately transferred

back to the criminal court, the criminal proceedings.

¶ 165 Reversed and vacated; cause remanded with directions.

- 57 -