People v. Betka

45 Misc. 3d 883, 992 N.Y.S.2d 634
CourtCriminal Court of the City of New York
DecidedSeptember 16, 2014
StatusPublished

This text of 45 Misc. 3d 883 (People v. Betka) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Criminal Court of the City of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Betka, 45 Misc. 3d 883, 992 N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2014).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

David M. Hawkins, J.

Defendant is charged with, inter alia, making an apparently-sworn false statement in the second degree (Penal Law § 210.35), a class A misdemeanor. By motion dated July 28, 2014, defendant moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]; 170.30 [1] [e]). The People have submitted papers in opposition to defendant’s motion. The court finds that the People are charged with 135 days, and defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.

A motion to dismiss a criminal court information must be granted when a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor, punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months, and the People are not ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). In order to be ready for trial pursuant to CPL 30.30, the statement of readiness must appear on the record, and it must declare a present readiness to proceed to trial (People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 [1985]). Since defendant is alleging a delay of more than 90 days, the People have the burden of demonstrating certain time is excluded pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859 [1986]; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 [1980]).

The only issue before the court concerns the 47-day delay between June 11, 2014 and July 28, 2014. The People have conceded that 86 days from defendant’s arraignment on October 22, 2012 to June 11, 2014 and two days from July 28, 2014 to July 30, 2014 are chargeable to the People; thus, the People have conceded 88 days.

Defendant avers that on June 11, 2014 the People answered not ready for trial, and they did not request a specific adjourn date. The court adjourned the case to July 28, 2014, instructing [885]*885the People to serve and file a certificate of readiness if they were to become ready. The People did not file a certificate of readiness. On July 28, 2014, the People announced not ready for trial. The 47-day delay is not excludable; thus, 135 days are chargeable to the People.

The People maintain that on June 11, 2014 they announced not ready for trial, claiming their witness was in the custody of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The People contend that they requested a good cause adjournment, and the court reserved decision. The case was adjourned to July 28, 2014. The witness was released from ICE custody shortly before July 28, 2014. On July 28, 2014, the People announced not ready for trial. The 47-day delay should be excluded due to “exceptional circumstances” (CPL 30.30 [4] [g]); thus, 88 days are chargeable to the People.

CPL 30.30 (4) (g) states that the court must exclude:

“[D]elay occasioned by exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to, the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of a district attorney if (i) the continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the people’s case, when the district attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period.”

The People reason:

“The complaining witness’s appearance and testimony certainly constitutes evidence material to the People’s case, and because the People only discovered that the complaining witness was in immigration custody three days prior to the trial date there was not a sufficient amount of time for the People to exercise due diligence in locating the complaining witness and obtaining his appearance through the federal government. In the end, such a process was not necessary as the complainant was released from immigration custody shortly before the next date.”

The People must exercise due diligence to render a witness available to testify before claiming an exclusion (CPL 30.30 [4] [g]). The unavailability of a prosecution witness could be grounds for a delay due to exceptional circumstances if the People attempted with due diligence to render that witness procurable. The People have the burden of proving that their [886]*886witness was in fact unavailable at any time, and that they endeavored to make their witness available. If a witness becomes available, the People must exercise due diligence in obtaining the presence of that witness for trial. (People v Zirpola, 57 NY2d 706 [1982].)

In the case at bar, the witness was alleged to have been in ICE custody on June 11, 2014 and the court did not grant the People a good cause adjournment. A witness in ICE custody is available to the People, and the People must attempt to secure the witness’s presence for trial before claiming an exclusion (CPL 30.30 [4] [g]). The People do not claim to have pursued any statutorily prescribed methods of obtaining their witness from ICE custody.

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Related

People v. Berkowitz
406 N.E.2d 783 (New York Court of Appeals, 1980)
People v. Zirpola
440 N.E.2d 787 (New York Court of Appeals, 1982)
People v. Kendzia
476 N.E.2d 287 (New York Court of Appeals, 1985)
People v. Santos
501 N.E.2d 19 (New York Court of Appeals, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
45 Misc. 3d 883, 992 N.Y.S.2d 634, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-betka-nycrimct-2014.