People v. Berkowitz

67 A.D.2d 601, 411 N.Y.S.2d 896, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10134
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJanuary 4, 1979
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 67 A.D.2d 601 (People v. Berkowitz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Berkowitz, 67 A.D.2d 601, 411 N.Y.S.2d 896, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10134 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinions

— Judgment of conviction of conspiracy, first degree, rendered May 19, 1977, Supreme Court, New York County, reversed, on the law, and the indictment dismissed. This case is reminiscent of People v Salko (60 AD2d 307), in that, although there is a great deal of smoke in the form of surmise, suspicion and speculation, there is no solid evidence connecting defendant with the conspiracy of which he stands convicted. The evidence against defendant was entirely circumstantial, which factor is not in itself an obstacle to its use as a basis for operative fact. It did not, however, comply with standard tests for its use. "Although conspiracy can be proven by circumstantial evidence, the inference to be drawn from such evidence must he conclusive. There are numerous authorities to support the proposition. 'In such circumstances, the facts from which the inferences are to be drawn must be established by direct proof: the inferences may not be based upon conjecture, supposition, suggestion, speculation or upon other inferences; the conclusion sought must flow naturally from the proven facts and be consistent with them all; the proven facts must exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis except that of guilt or of the offense charged and not alone must all the proven facts be consistent with and point to guilt, but they must be inconsistent with innocence [citing cases].’ (People v Weiss, 290 NY 160, 163.)” (Salko, supra, p 312, Lupiano, J.) "Generally, an admission by one defendant is not admissible against a codefendant. (People v Payne, 35 NY2d 22, 27; Richardson Evidence [10th ed], § 232, p 206.) However, it has long been the law in New York that the acts and declarations of one coconspirator which occur while the conspiracy is in progress and which are in furtherance of the common scheme are admissible and are provable as to all other coconspirators as part of the res gestae and as a recognized' exception to the hearsay rule. (People v Rastelli, 37 NY2d 240, 244.) A party, seeking to fall within this coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, must come forward with prima facie evidence that there is a conspiracy and that a particular defendant is a coconspirator. (Voisin v Commercial Mut. Ins. Co., 60 App Div 139, 149.) A conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence (People v Van Tassel, 156 NY 561, 564), but the declarations of an alleged coconspirator cannot be received for the purpose of proving the conspiracy (Lent v Shear, 160 NY 462, 468).” (Salko, supra, pp 309-310, Murphy, P. J.) Thus, in this case, the statements of alleged coconspirator Alvarez are not to be used against this defendant-appellant. It [602]*602was never established that a conspiracy existed between defendant and his "girl friend” Alvarez to engage in traffic in contraband. Unfortunately, respondent’s presentation on this score consists of a "bootstrap” argument to the effect that Alvarez made statements implicating defendant in a conspiracy with her; since they were coconspirators, the statements made by her and the acts performed by her were in furtherance of the conspiracy and binding on him. The most solid pieces of nonhearsay evidence linking the two were his presence in her apartment on December 13 and the fact that, when arrested, they gave the same address. Both these pieces of evidence were equivocal. And, unless one swallows whole the police officer’s "interpretation” of his recorded phone conversation with defendant, there is no other connecting evidence. Of the six overt acts stated in the indictment to have been in furtherance of the conspiracy, four were alleged to have been performed by Alvarez; as to the other two, said to have been performed by defendant, the evidence is at best equivocal. The evidence involving defendant, given by an undercover policeman, stated briefly, was that defendant was introduced to the officer by an informant, never produced as a witness,

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Related

People v. Berkowitz
78 A.D.2d 621 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1980)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
67 A.D.2d 601, 411 N.Y.S.2d 896, 1979 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-berkowitz-nyappdiv-1979.