People v. Benoit
This text of People v. Benoit (People v. Benoit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
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Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter
People v Benoit
2026 NY Slip Op 04426
July 15, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
The People of the State of New York, respondent,
v
Kendel Benoit, appellant.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on July 15, 2026
2024-00688, (Ind. No. 8158/18)
Mark C. Dillon, J.P.
Colleen D. Duffy
Carl J. Landicino
Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.
Rosenberg Law Firm, Brooklyn, NY (Jonathan Rosenberg of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Ruth E. Ross, and David Cao of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Joanne D. Quinones, J.), rendered April 27, 2022, convicting him of assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree arising out of the defendant's stabbing of the victim with a dangerous instrument during a verbal dispute between the defendant and the victim.
The defendant's contention that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial by the improper admission into evidence of an edited surveillance video is without merit (see People v Anderson, 235 AD3d 993, 993). Although the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motion in limine to preclude the edited surveillance video since its probative value did not outweigh the potential for prejudice, the error was harmless (see People v Gordon, 222 AD3d 994, 995; People v Huertas, 186 AD3d 731, 733, affd 38 NY3d 1129). Since the raw footage of the video was properly admitted into evidence, the jury was able to compare the two versions and the court also instructed the jury on the limited use of the edited video as a demonstrative aid (see People v Anderson, 235 AD3d at 993; People v Yanez, 180 AD3d 816, 816-817). Under these circumstances, the error was harmless since the evidence supporting the defendant's guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the error (see People v Hernandez, 28 NY3d 1056; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not deprive him of the right to present a defense by denying his request to recall a certain witness for further cross-examination (see People v Bell, 136 AD3d 838, 838; People v Flowers, 102 AD3d 885, 885-886).
Although the defendant's contention that the Supreme Court failed to conduct a probing and tactful inquiry of a particular sworn juror, as required by People v Buford (69 NY2d [*2]290), was preserved for appellate review, the contention is without merit.
"If at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and before the rendition of its verdict . . . the court finds, from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve in the case . . . the court must discharge such juror" (CPL 270.35[1]). Each case must be evaluated on its unique facts to determine whether a particular juror must be disqualified under CPL 270.35 (see People v Buford, 69 NY2d at 299). The grossly unqualified standard is satisfied only when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict (see People v Perez, 169 AD3d 720, 720; People v Holder, 150 AD3d 886, 886). The court must question each allegedly unqualified juror individually in camera in the presence of the attorneys and the defendant, conducting a probing and tactful inquiry into the unique facts of each case, including a careful consideration of the juror's answers and demeanor (see People v Cowan, 243 AD3d 674, 675; People v Lau, 148 AD3d 932, 933).
Here, the Supreme Court conducted a sufficiently probing and tactful inquiry of the sworn juror and, based upon that juror's responses, correctly determined that the sworn juror was not grossly unqualified to serve, and properly denied the application to discharge the juror (see People v Cowan, 243 AD3d at 675-676; People v Williams, 127 AD3d 792, 793).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit (see People v Loncke, 244 AD3d 1245, 1246; People v Moron, 237 AD3d 973, 974).
DILLON, J.P., DUFFY, LANDICINO and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court
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