People v. Beamon

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Beamon

215 A.D.2d 571, 627 N.Y.S.2d 939, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5085

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 15, 1995

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 215 A.D.2d 571 (People v. Beamon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Beamon, 215 A.D.2d 571, 627 N.Y.S.2d 939, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5085 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

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Opinion

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of attempted rape in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621; People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 302; People v Johnson, 181 AD2d 914). The evidence was such that the jury could infer the defendant’s intent to rape from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances, and it could find that he acted to carry his objective forward within dangerous proximity to the [572]*572criminal end to be attained (see, People v Peterkin, 195 AD2d 1015; People v Pereau, 99 AD2d 591, affd 64 NY2d 1055). Furthermore, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions, including that his sentence was excessive, are either unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v Grega, 72 NY2d 489, 497, n 2; People v Sage, 204 AD2d 746) or without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Ritter, Santucci and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of attempted rape in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621; People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 302; People v Johnson, 181 AD2d 914). The evidence was such that the jury could infer the defendant’s intent to rape from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances, and it could find that he acted to carry his objective forward within dangerous proximity to the [572]*572criminal end to be attained (see, People v Peterkin, 195 AD2d 1015; People v Pereau, 99 AD2d 591, affd 64 NY2d 1055). Furthermore, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions, including that his sentence was excessive, are either unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v Grega, 72 NY2d 489, 497, n 2; People v Sage, 204 AD2d 746) or without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Ritter, Santucci and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

215 A.D.2d 571, 627 N.Y.S.2d 939, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5085, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-beamon-nyappdiv-1995.

Opinion

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