IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2
3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM0329-12 4 vs. ) 5 ) DECISION AND ORDER SEAMUS KEEGAN BATISTA. ) 6 ) Defendant. ) 7 --------------------------------) 8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter came before the Honorable James L Canto II on the Defendant's motion to 10 dismiss, filed August 30, Oral arguments were heard on September Assistant 11 Attorney General James C. Collins, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Government and Assistant 12 Public Defender Suresh Sampath, Esq. represented the Defendant. Having considered the 13 parties' briefs, ora] arguments. and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following 14 Decision and Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 On April 201 the Government filed a complaint and affidavit to charge Defendant 17 with driving under the influence of alcohol. reckless driving, and speeding. The aflidavit states 18 that Defendant \vas arrested on April 1, 2012 after he drove past a police officer in excess 19 sixty-five (65) miles per hour, admitted to drinking beer and refused to participate in 20 standardized field sobriety tests although he had glossy and his car smelled intoxicants. 21 A subsequent breath test revealed that Defendant had less than 0.08% of alcohol by \veight in 22 his blood. On April 201 Defendant appeared before a Magistrate \vas released 23 pending trial on the basis of a $1,000.00 personal recognizance bond. 24 On August 10, 201 Defendant moved to dismiss the charge of reckless driving because 25 the complaint lacks the probable cause to believe that the Defendant committed an ofTense 26 violation of 16 GCA § 9107. In particular, Defendant argues that the fact of speeding or drinking does not support the probable cause to believe that Defendant committed reckless 28 driving.
Page 1 of 5 DISCUSSION 2 1. Elements of Reckless Driving 3 Guam law defines reckless driving as follows: "Every person who drives any vehicle 4 upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of 5 reckless driving." 16 GCA § 9107(a). Guam's reckless driving statute, "is virtually identical to 6 California's reckless driving statute," and California cases interpreting the statute are 7 persuasive. People v. A1aysho, 2005 Guam 4 ~ 1 . see also Afay v. People, 2005 Guam 17 ~ 9. 8 Under California law, "mere speed may be so excessive as to afford proof of the 9 elements necessary to make out the more serious crime of reckless driving." People v. NOrvell, 10 114 P.2d 81,82 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1941). The speed of an automobile necessarily 11 involves the surrounding circumstances, including, "the highway upon which it travels, with its 12 width, surface and the presence or lack of traffic upon it. .. [and] the factor of visibility: was the 13 car driven before or after dark?" ld. ]n a similar manner, a person commits reckless driving 14 under Guam law by a reckless disregard of the consequences under the circumstances pursuant 15 to 9 GCA § 4.30(c). lvlaysho. 2005 Guam 4 at ~i ] 3 (quoting People v. L"fcNutt, ] 05 P.2d 657, 16 658 (CaL App. Dep't Super. CL 1940)).1 17 In this case, the Defendant is charged with reckless driving because he drove in excess 18 of sixty-tIve (65) miles per hour. The complaint and affidavit allege circumstances of drinking 19 that are not dispositive of reckless driving because the Defendant had less than 0.08% of alcohol
20 by weight in his blood. 16 GCA § ] 81 03(a)(1) (no presumption influence ).
21 The Government does not allege any other Clrcmnstance of the Defendant's speed, including 22 location, the road condition, the visibility, and the vicinity of traffic, persons or property. 23 Without these ordinary circumstances of the alleged speed, it is unclear \vhether the Defendant 24 managed his automobile, ',\vilh a wanton and reckless disregard f()!" the safety of others 25 reckless disregard of the consequences of his act. Afaysho, 2005 Guam 4 at,j 19. 26
27 I See also Hall v. 57 P.2d 948, 950 (Cal. Dis!. ct. App. 1936) ("Willful misconduct, like negligence. must relate to the time, place, person, and surrounding circumstances, and must be measured by them. Excessive speed 28 under some circumstances may amount to negligence, under others to gross negligence, and under still others to willful misconduct.")
Page 2 01'5 In other words, the Defendant may have acted with reckless disregard if he drove sixty- 2 five (65) miles per hour on a narrow, winding road during a rainy night through residential 3 traffic, and he may not have acted with reckless disregard if he drove sixty-five (65) miles per 4 hour on a wide, straight road during a sunny day and far away from any traffic, persons or 5 property. Without these ordinary and attendant circumstances of speed, the Court shall decline 6 to exercise its discretion to dismiss the reckless driving charge sua sponte under 8 GCA § 7 80.70(c) and 9 GCA § 7.67. See People v. Perez, 2004 Guam 4 ~'18-12. 8
9 2. Probable Cause in the Complaint 10 Under Guam law, "where a person IS arrested without a warrant. .. the prosecuting 11 attorney shall file a complaint.. and affidavits showing probable cause to believe that an offense 12 has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. 8 GCA § 45.20(a). If the court 13 finds no probable cause to believe that the defendant committed an offense, it must dismiss the 14 complaint and discharge the defendant at or before his first appearance. 8 GCA § 45.20(b).2
judicial cause was added to 8 § to 16 the Fourth Amendment requirement that a judge determine probable cause promptly after a 17 warrantless arrest and as a condition of pretrial detention. See 8 GCA § 45.20, NOTE (citing 18 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)). This probable cause inquiry is limited to the 19 prevention of unjustified pretrial custody: 20 The perspective taken in Gerstein is clearly from the post-arrest position. While an arrest and, therefore, a possibly unconstitutional invasion might be a "fait 21 accompli," the Fourth Amendment's protection extends beyond the initial seizure 22 to continuing detention, and post-arrest review serves to prevent continued violation. 23 v. Fernandez-Guzman, 577 F.2d 1093, 1097-1098 (7th CiL 1978), ccrt. denied 24 U.S. 954 (1978). also Gerstein 420 at 123 ("The Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody."). 25
27 2Defendant advises dismissal under 8 GCA § 15.20, which is the pre-arrest standard of probable cause to obtain a 28 warrant and does not provide for the dismissal of a complaint. Section 15.20 is not applicable 10 this case where a complaint based upon a warrantless arrest may be dismissed for the lack ofprobabJe cause under 8 GCA § 45.20.
Page 3 of5 For these reasons, a post-arrest complaint that is carelessly drafted without probable 2 cause risks immediate dismissal with the discharge of a defendant and further serves as 3 impeachment evidence in the suppression of an illegal arrest. Fernandez-Guznwn, 577 F.2d at
4 1100. See also 8 GCA § 4S.20(b). 5 In this case, the Defendant was arrested without a warrant and brought before the 6 Magistrate Judge by the complaint and affidavit of the Attorney GeneraL The Magistrate Judge 7 released the Defendant under a personal recognizance bond of $1 ,000.00. The Magistrate Judge 8 did not dismiss the complaint or discharge the Defendant for the lack of probable cause under 9 8 GCA 45.20(b).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2
3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM0329-12 4 vs. ) 5 ) DECISION AND ORDER SEAMUS KEEGAN BATISTA. ) 6 ) Defendant. ) 7 --------------------------------) 8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter came before the Honorable James L Canto II on the Defendant's motion to 10 dismiss, filed August 30, Oral arguments were heard on September Assistant 11 Attorney General James C. Collins, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Government and Assistant 12 Public Defender Suresh Sampath, Esq. represented the Defendant. Having considered the 13 parties' briefs, ora] arguments. and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following 14 Decision and Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 On April 201 the Government filed a complaint and affidavit to charge Defendant 17 with driving under the influence of alcohol. reckless driving, and speeding. The aflidavit states 18 that Defendant \vas arrested on April 1, 2012 after he drove past a police officer in excess 19 sixty-five (65) miles per hour, admitted to drinking beer and refused to participate in 20 standardized field sobriety tests although he had glossy and his car smelled intoxicants. 21 A subsequent breath test revealed that Defendant had less than 0.08% of alcohol by \veight in 22 his blood. On April 201 Defendant appeared before a Magistrate \vas released 23 pending trial on the basis of a $1,000.00 personal recognizance bond. 24 On August 10, 201 Defendant moved to dismiss the charge of reckless driving because 25 the complaint lacks the probable cause to believe that the Defendant committed an ofTense 26 violation of 16 GCA § 9107. In particular, Defendant argues that the fact of speeding or drinking does not support the probable cause to believe that Defendant committed reckless 28 driving.
Page 1 of 5 DISCUSSION 2 1. Elements of Reckless Driving 3 Guam law defines reckless driving as follows: "Every person who drives any vehicle 4 upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of 5 reckless driving." 16 GCA § 9107(a). Guam's reckless driving statute, "is virtually identical to 6 California's reckless driving statute," and California cases interpreting the statute are 7 persuasive. People v. A1aysho, 2005 Guam 4 ~ 1 . see also Afay v. People, 2005 Guam 17 ~ 9. 8 Under California law, "mere speed may be so excessive as to afford proof of the 9 elements necessary to make out the more serious crime of reckless driving." People v. NOrvell, 10 114 P.2d 81,82 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1941). The speed of an automobile necessarily 11 involves the surrounding circumstances, including, "the highway upon which it travels, with its 12 width, surface and the presence or lack of traffic upon it. .. [and] the factor of visibility: was the 13 car driven before or after dark?" ld. ]n a similar manner, a person commits reckless driving 14 under Guam law by a reckless disregard of the consequences under the circumstances pursuant 15 to 9 GCA § 4.30(c). lvlaysho. 2005 Guam 4 at ~i ] 3 (quoting People v. L"fcNutt, ] 05 P.2d 657, 16 658 (CaL App. Dep't Super. CL 1940)).1 17 In this case, the Defendant is charged with reckless driving because he drove in excess 18 of sixty-tIve (65) miles per hour. The complaint and affidavit allege circumstances of drinking 19 that are not dispositive of reckless driving because the Defendant had less than 0.08% of alcohol
20 by weight in his blood. 16 GCA § ] 81 03(a)(1) (no presumption influence ).
21 The Government does not allege any other Clrcmnstance of the Defendant's speed, including 22 location, the road condition, the visibility, and the vicinity of traffic, persons or property. 23 Without these ordinary circumstances of the alleged speed, it is unclear \vhether the Defendant 24 managed his automobile, ',\vilh a wanton and reckless disregard f()!" the safety of others 25 reckless disregard of the consequences of his act. Afaysho, 2005 Guam 4 at,j 19. 26
27 I See also Hall v. 57 P.2d 948, 950 (Cal. Dis!. ct. App. 1936) ("Willful misconduct, like negligence. must relate to the time, place, person, and surrounding circumstances, and must be measured by them. Excessive speed 28 under some circumstances may amount to negligence, under others to gross negligence, and under still others to willful misconduct.")
Page 2 01'5 In other words, the Defendant may have acted with reckless disregard if he drove sixty- 2 five (65) miles per hour on a narrow, winding road during a rainy night through residential 3 traffic, and he may not have acted with reckless disregard if he drove sixty-five (65) miles per 4 hour on a wide, straight road during a sunny day and far away from any traffic, persons or 5 property. Without these ordinary and attendant circumstances of speed, the Court shall decline 6 to exercise its discretion to dismiss the reckless driving charge sua sponte under 8 GCA § 7 80.70(c) and 9 GCA § 7.67. See People v. Perez, 2004 Guam 4 ~'18-12. 8
9 2. Probable Cause in the Complaint 10 Under Guam law, "where a person IS arrested without a warrant. .. the prosecuting 11 attorney shall file a complaint.. and affidavits showing probable cause to believe that an offense 12 has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. 8 GCA § 45.20(a). If the court 13 finds no probable cause to believe that the defendant committed an offense, it must dismiss the 14 complaint and discharge the defendant at or before his first appearance. 8 GCA § 45.20(b).2
judicial cause was added to 8 § to 16 the Fourth Amendment requirement that a judge determine probable cause promptly after a 17 warrantless arrest and as a condition of pretrial detention. See 8 GCA § 45.20, NOTE (citing 18 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)). This probable cause inquiry is limited to the 19 prevention of unjustified pretrial custody: 20 The perspective taken in Gerstein is clearly from the post-arrest position. While an arrest and, therefore, a possibly unconstitutional invasion might be a "fait 21 accompli," the Fourth Amendment's protection extends beyond the initial seizure 22 to continuing detention, and post-arrest review serves to prevent continued violation. 23 v. Fernandez-Guzman, 577 F.2d 1093, 1097-1098 (7th CiL 1978), ccrt. denied 24 U.S. 954 (1978). also Gerstein 420 at 123 ("The Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody."). 25
27 2Defendant advises dismissal under 8 GCA § 15.20, which is the pre-arrest standard of probable cause to obtain a 28 warrant and does not provide for the dismissal of a complaint. Section 15.20 is not applicable 10 this case where a complaint based upon a warrantless arrest may be dismissed for the lack ofprobabJe cause under 8 GCA § 45.20.
Page 3 of5 For these reasons, a post-arrest complaint that is carelessly drafted without probable 2 cause risks immediate dismissal with the discharge of a defendant and further serves as 3 impeachment evidence in the suppression of an illegal arrest. Fernandez-Guznwn, 577 F.2d at
4 1100. See also 8 GCA § 4S.20(b). 5 In this case, the Defendant was arrested without a warrant and brought before the 6 Magistrate Judge by the complaint and affidavit of the Attorney GeneraL The Magistrate Judge 7 released the Defendant under a personal recognizance bond of $1 ,000.00. The Magistrate Judge 8 did not dismiss the complaint or discharge the Defendant for the lack of probable cause under 9 8 GCA 45.20(b). The Defendant provides no authority to reconsider the first judicial 10 determination of probable cause for pretrial custody, and the Court is averse to exercise its II discretion to do so absent clear error, changed circumstances, or manifest injustice. See People
12 v. Hualde, 1999 Guam 3 ~ 13. 13 The parties do not allege and the Court does not find clear error, changed circumstances J4 or manifest injustice after the Magistrate's decision to release the Defendant. The Magistrate's 15 cause that is plausible
16 in light of the allegation that the Defendant drove in excess of sixty-five (65) miles per hour. 17 See Hualde, 1999 Guam 3 at '116 (citing US v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876-877 (9th Cir. 18 1997) ("for clear error, we must not reverse as long as the findings are plausible in light of the 3 19 record viewed in its entirety. Furthennore, no manifest injustice results from the 20 Magistrate's decision to release the Defendant under a personal recognizance bond and without 21 a significant restraint on his liberty. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114 (citing 18 U.S.c. § 3146). For these reasons, the Court shall not reconsider the Magistrate's determination probable
cause and the complaint shall not be dismissed on 24 The Court is mindful of the jurisdictional issues \vhich may be by a less-than-
25 skillfully drafted criminal complaint. See e.g. State v. Boyd, 214 A.2d 11 1127 (Conn. 1990) 26
27 3See also Nowell, 114 P.2d at 82 ("mere speed may be so excessive as to afTord proof of the elements necessary to 28 make out the more serious crime of reckless driving"); 16 GCA § 330\(c) ("speeds in excess of fony-five miles per hour. .. shall be unlawful.")
Page 4 of5 (insufficiency of evidence at a probable cause hearing deprives trial court of personal 2 jurisdiction). However, the Court is not convinced that jurisdiction is lost on the basis of an 3 imperfect complaint, when the law holds jurisdiction is not lost even in the event of a 4 warrantless arrest made without sufficient probable cause. See US. v. Crews, 445 US. 463, 5 474 n. 20, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1251 n. 20, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980) (an illegal arrest is not a bar to 6 prosecution but it may be effectively foreclosed by excluded evidence). For this reason, the 7 Court shall not dismiss the complaint sua sponte for a lack of jurisdiction. Finally, it is significant that Defendant challenges the absence of probable cause in an 9 inartfully drafted complaint but does not challenge the absence of probable cause in the 10 underlying warrantless arrest. The available and preferable remedy in this case is to carefully II amend the complaint to better demonstrate probable cause \vithout alteration to the charges, 12 defenses or applicable evidence. See e.g. 8 GCA §§ 15.10 and 55.20; People v. j\lanibusan, No. 13 81-00053A, 1983 WL 29943, at *3 (D. Guam App. Div. 1983); People v. Diaz, 2007 Guam 3'~ 14 15-17. The Court must note that the prosecuting attorney could most easily avoid dismissal
an to amend a lacking complaint made to 8 §
16 III 17 III ]8 III
19 CONCLUSION
20 Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED. 21
22 SO ORDERED this --'--'---'--- day of November, 2012.
26 Judge, Superior Court of Guam
Page 5 of5