2024 IL App (5th) 240448-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 06/21/24. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NOS. 5-24-0448, 5-24-0449, 5-24-0450 cons. Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Champaign County. ) v. ) Nos. 24-CF-311, 24-CF-315, ) 24-CF-316 MICHAEL A. BARRETT, ) ) Honorable Brett N. Olmstead, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McHaney and Sholar concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s orders granting the State’s petitions to deny pretrial release are affirmed where the trial court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and the orders denying pretrial release were not an abuse of discretion.
¶2 Defendant appeals the trial court’s orders denying his pretrial release pursuant to Public
Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability,
Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act (Act). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023);
Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18,
2023). For the following reasons we affirm the trial court’s orders.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 12, 2024, defendant was charged, by information, in case No. 24-CF-311, with
violating an order of protection on February 20, 2024, in violation of section 12-3.4(a) of the
1 Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.4(a) (West 2022)), a Class 4 felony, due to a
prior violation of an order of protection in case No. 98-CM-374. The State filed a verified petition
to deny pretrial release the same day and defendant was given notice to appear in court on March
13, 2024. Defendant failed to appear. A warrant for his arrest was issued on March 13, 2024, and
he was arrested later that day.
¶5 On March 14, 2024, defendant was charged, by information, in case No. 24-CF-315, with
one count of aggravated domestic battery occurring on February 15, 2024, in violation of sections
12-3.2(a)(1) and 12-3.3(a-5) of the Code (id. §§ 12-3.2(a)(1), 12-3.3(a-5)), a Class 2 felony, in that
defendant strangled the same victim in case No. 24-CF-311. Defendant was also charged with a
second count of aggravated battery occurring on the same date, in violation of section 12-3.2(a)(1)
of the Code (id. § 12-3.2(a)(1)), also a Class 2 felony, in that defendant struck the same victim in
the face. The information for count II further stated defendant had four prior convictions for
domestic battery in case Nos. 14-CF-228, 06-CF-1817, 04-CF-2380, and 01-CF-878. The State
filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release the same day.
¶6 On March 14, 2024, defendant was also charged, by information, in case No. 24-CF-316,
with residential burglary occurring on March 5, 2024, in violation of section 19-3 of the Code (id.
§ 19-3), a Class 1 felony. The offense was related to the residence of a different victim. The State
filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release the same day.
¶7 Defendant’s first appearance was held on March 14, 2024, in each of the three cases. At
that time, counsel was appointed and the hearings on the State’s petitions to deny pretrial release
were continued to March 15, 2024.
¶8 A pretrial investigation report was filed in case No. 24-CF-316 on March 14, 2024. The
report indicated that defendant was 47 years old and lived at the Champaign homeless shelter for
2 approximately six months. He previously lived in Rantoul, Illinois, with a friend for about two
years. He had no children but had siblings in the area and advised that he could take the bus to
attend future court hearings. He had some college education. He was currently unemployed but
was looking for employment. He reported a history of drug abuse and requested outpatient
treatment. He also reported mental health issues, including depression and anxiety, but was neither
taking medication nor receiving treatment, for either. He also advised of medical issues related to
his heart but had not started his medications. Defendant was currently under pretrial supervision
in Champaign County case No. 23-CF-1636. He tested positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine on January 24, 2024, in drug testing taken pursuant to the pretrial supervision.
¶9 The Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument-Revised (VPRAI-R) classified
defendant as a 13 out of 14 on the scale that equated to a level six (out of six) or 37.1% risk for
recidivism if released pretrial. In addition to the charges filed in March 2024, the pretrial
investigation report revealed pending charges for possession of methamphetamine less than five
grams and possession of controlled substance. His criminal history included five convictions for
domestic battery (2017, 2014, 2006, 2005, and 2001), three convictions for driving on a suspended
license (one conviction in 2009 and two convictions in 2008), two convictions for burglary (2010
and 2002), and convictions for bad check writing (2021), phone harassment/threaten to kill (2008),
possession of cannabis (2006), violation of an order of protection (1998), and theft less than $300
(1996).
¶ 10 The trial court proceeded on the State’s three petitions in a consolidated hearing held on
March 15, 2024. When the case was first called, the State and defense counsel advised the court
that there was a waiver and defendant agreed to remain in jail. However, defendant disagreed with
counsel’s statement and thereafter, defense counsel requested a continuance to address the matter
3 again with defendant. The case was reset for later that afternoon. At that time, counsel confirmed
that she spoke with her client. When defendant was questioned about the interaction, he stated,
“Me and my Public Defender came to no agreement about anything. I ended up hanging the phone
up on her, your Honor.” The court advised it would proceed with the hearing.
¶ 11 The State indicated that it would be providing a proffer for each case and started with case
No. 24-CF-316. It advised the court that defendant had several prior domestic battery convictions
as indicated in the pretrial services report. Specifically, case Nos. 04-CF-2380, 06-CF-1817, 14-
CF-228, and 17-CF-693 were all convictions for domestic battery with a prior and defendant was
sentenced to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) in each of those cases. He was also
sentenced to IDOC for telephone harassment in case No. 08-CF-988 and burglary in case No. 10-
CF-992.
¶ 12 As to the facts underlying case No. 24-CF-316, the State proffered that on March 5, 2024,
University of Illinois police responded to Phi Gamma Delta for a burglary. The victim advised that
he left his backpack in the living room, and it was now gone. Video was reviewed and showed an
unknown white male entering the fraternity house and grabbing two backpacks in the house. The
backpacks contained a computer, mouse, and notebooks. Once the man had the backpacks, he
exited the house. Officers showed the photo of the unknown man to people in the community and
Champaign-Urbana Mass Transit District terminal staff recognized the person in the photo to be
defendant and called police when defendant was at the terminal. Defendant was wearing the same
hoodie seen in the video and admitted to entering the fraternity house. He advised police that he
was forced to take the items.
¶ 13 Defense counsel stated that defendant advised her that he had bad heart issues. She further
indicated that she had nothing further to add to the factual presentation.
4 ¶ 14 The State argued that defendant was not in compliance with pretrial release issued in case
No. 23-CF-1636, which included not committing further offenses, yet defendant continued to
commit offenses. The State further argued that defendant had a very long criminal history that
included numerous violent offenses as well as new violent offenses occurring during pretrial
release. The State argued that defendant was dangerous for those reasons as well as his inability to
comply with court orders and therefore there were no conditions the court could impose that would
prevent defendant from committing new offenses. No argument was presented by defense counsel
beyond defendant’s heart condition.
¶ 15 The trial court found the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was
evident and the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense, and no condition
or combination of conditions would mitigate the real and present threat or defendant’s willful
flight. The court found defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community,
noting that defendant admitted going into the fraternity house. The court also noted the pretrial
investigatory report that classified defendant with a VPRAI-R of 13 out of 14 and placed defendant
at the highest possible risk level and “that was understandable given the extensive nature of
defendant’s criminal history.” The court also noted that defendant was under court supervision
when the charge was brought as well as additional pending charges when the incident occurred,
was unemployed, and had a history of substance abuse. The court found that based on that
information, defendant was a danger to the community, had a high likelihood of willful flight, and
that no condition, or combination of conditions, would mitigate the danger defendant posed.
¶ 16 The State then issued its proffer regarding case No. 24-CF-315. It asked the court to again
consider the IDOC sentences in the prior domestic battery cases previously mentioned. The State
proffered that on February 5, 2024, that Urbana police officers responded to a domestic situation
5 at the U-Haul located on Philo Road. The caller advised that her mother was being held against
her will by her boyfriend and that they were in a gray Toyota. When officers arrived, they observed
defendant in the driver’s seat and the alleged victim in the passenger seat. The victim advised
police that she was in fear for her life. She was crying and visibly shaking. She told police that
defendant, her boyfriend, had been in the U-Haul parking lot for over an hour. During that time,
he refused to give her the keys to her vehicle or allow her to leave. He began to get physical and
started poking her. He then punched her in the face and grabbed her by the mouth. He eventually
placed his forearm on her neck and pressed down. The victim advised police that she was unable
to breathe. The officer observed red marks and bruising around her neck consistent with being
strangled. She also had bruising visible around her eye and on her temple. Defendant admitted to
being in an argument with the victim and that the argument got violent. He admitted to pushing
and grabbing the victim and advised that he then blacked out. Defense counsel declined the
opportunity to present any proffer. However, defendant stated, “I didn’t choke anybody.”
¶ 17 The court found defendant was charged with a detainable offense and the State proved by
clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident and the presumption great that defendant
committed a detainable offense and that no condition, or combination of conditions, would
mitigate the real and present danger posed by defendant. The court noted that defendant and the
victim were found in a car and there was an allegation of strangulation, which was very serious,
and the victim had physical evidence on her body that was consistent with the fact that defendant
attempted to restrict her airway with his arm, and she appeared to be very afraid. The court found
the VPRAI-R classified defendant at the highest risk level possible, defendant was currently on
community supervision at the time of his arrest and had a history of violent convictions. The court
6 found the State met its burden, granted its petition to deny pretrial release, and ordered defendant
detained. A no contact order was also issued with regard to the victim.
¶ 18 As to case No. 24-CF-311, the State again asked the court to note the facts related to
defendant’s prior IDOC sentences as well as its presentation in case No. 24-CF-316. As to case
No. 24-CF-311, the State proffered that the incident occurred on February 20, 2024, at the
Marketplace Mall in Champaign, Illinois. On that date, police were dispatched to the mall
regarding a reported violation of an order of protection. The underlying order of protection was
issued in Champaign County case No. 24-OP-134 and involved the same victim as that seen in
case No. 24-CF-316. The victim was at the mall when she began receiving text messages from
defendant. The text messages referenced that defendant could see her and contained threats to her,
as well as her family. The text messages were recorded on an officer’s body-worn camera. The
police located defendant on the east side of the mall parking lot. Defendant admitted being in the
mall earlier and having knowledge of the order of protection but denied contacting the victim.
Defendant was not arrested at the scene because he stated that he was having chest pains and was
transported to the hospital. Defense counsel declined the opportunity to present any factual proffer.
¶ 19 The State argued that defendant had a long history of domestic violence, including
numerous prior convictions and sentences at IDOC for the offense. The State argued that the text
messages contained a threat to the victim and her family. Defendant admitted to knowing about
the order of protection and made statements to the police officer showing his awareness that he
was not to have any contact with the victim. Although defendant denied sending the text messages,
the messages were recorded on the officer’s body-worn camera video. The State argued that GPS
would not prevent any further messaging and defendant was actually near the victim when the
threats were sent and presented a viable threat of harm. The State also argued that GPS did not
7 address the fact that it occurred in a public place at the mall and that defendant was on pretrial
release at the time the messages were sent. The State argued that because the pretrial release
prohibited defendant from committing additional offenses, but he did so anyway, no condition of
pretrial release would prevent this from happening. The State argued that defendant was a danger
to the victim and others in the community and therefore should be detained. No argument was
presented by defense counsel.
¶ 20 The court found the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was
evident or the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense and that no
condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat or willful flight.
The court found defendant committed an offense that was detainable and posed a real and present
threat to the safety of the people of the community as well as the victim, who was protected by
court order and by other orders prohibiting defendant’s contact.
¶ 21 The court found the proof evident and presumption great that defendant made contact with
the victim while she was at the mall by text message and was aware that he could not do this as a
condition of his pretrial release. The court referred to the VPRAI-R which classified defendant at
the highest possible risk, defendant’s numerous pending cases, as well as his prior convictions for
residential burglary and domestic abuse, noting that some charges stemmed from an incident
involving the same victim, and occurred in a relatively short period of time. The court granted the
State’s petition to deny pretrial release and ordered defendant detained. A no contact order was
also issued for the victim in this case.
¶ 22 Following the hearing, the trial court issued three orders finding defendant committed a
detainable offense. In support for case No. 24-CF-316, the order stated:
8 “Defendant entered a residential building and stole equipment. Defendant confessed, but
claimed he stole the items under duress.”
The trial court’s order also found defendant posed a real and present threat and no condition or
combination of conditions could mitigate defendant’s dangerousness. In support, the order stated,
“He scores on the highest risk level in pretrial services report.”
¶ 23 The second order, issued in case No. 24-CF-315, stated the following:
“February 2024—boyfriend Mr. Barrett was in a car with the victim, he refused to give her
the keys, refused to let her leave, strangled victim who had injuries consistent with victim’s
allegations.”
¶ 24 The third order, in case No. 24-CF-311, stated the following after finding defendant
committed a detainable offense:
“Defendant made contact with [victim] in violation of an order of protection at Marketplace
Mall, Champaign by text message. He did this while on pretrial release.”
The trial court’s order also found defendant posed a real and present threat and no condition or
combination of conditions could mitigate defendant’s dangerousness. In support, the order stated,
“High risk VPRAI. Pending cases significant. History of violent offenses. Threat to a protected
party, defendant admits he knows.”
¶ 25 Defendant timely appealed each of the orders. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).
Upon motion by the State, this court consolidated the orders for purposes of appeal and
disposition. 1
1 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(5) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023), our decision in this case was due on or before June 20, 2024, absent a finding of good cause for extending the deadline. Based on the high volume of appeals under the Act currently under the court’s consideration, as well as the complexity of issues and the lack of precedential authority, we find there to be good cause for extending the deadline. 9 ¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 Pretrial release—including the conditions related thereto—is governed by statute. See Pub.
Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). A
defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only in certain statutorily limited situations. 725 ILCS
5/110-6.1 (West 2022). In order to detain a defendant, the State has the burden to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant
has committed a qualifying offense, (2) the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present
threat to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and (3) less restrictive
conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community
and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(e).
¶ 28 In considering whether the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any
person or the community, i.e., making a determination of “dangerousness,” the trial court may
consider evidence or testimony concerning factors that include, but are not limited to, (1) the nature
and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence
involving a weapon or a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the
identity of any person to whom the defendant is believed to pose a threat and the nature of the
threat; (4) any statements made by or attributed to the defendant, together with the circumstances
surrounding the statements; (5) the age and physical condition of the defendant; (6) the age and
physical condition of the victim or complaining witness; (7) whether the defendant is known to
possess or have access to a weapon; (8) whether at the time of the current offense or any other
offense, the defendant was on probation, parole, or supervised release from custody; and (9) any
other factors including those listed in section 110-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(id. § 110-5). Id. § 110-6.1(g).
10 ¶ 29 To set appropriate conditions of pretrial release, the trial court must determine, by clear
and convincing evidence, what pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the
appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the
likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” Id. § 110-
5(a). In reaching its determination, the trial court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances
of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and
characteristics of the person; (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and present threat
to any person that would be posed by the person’s release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of
the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. Id. The statute lists
no singular factor as dispositive. See id.
¶ 30 Our standard of review of pretrial release determinations is twofold. The trial court’s
factual findings are reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. People v. Swan,
2023 IL App (5th) 230766, ¶ 12. “ ‘A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only
if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not
based on the evidence presented.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008)).
We review the trial court’s ultimate determination regarding the denial of pretrial release for an
abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 11. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of the circuit court
is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would agree with the position
adopted by the trial court.” Id.; see also People v. Heineman, 2023 IL 127854, ¶ 59. “[I]n reviewing
the circuit court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the
circuit court, ‘merely because we would have balanced the appropriate factors differently.’ ”
People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 15 (quoting People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 280
(1980)).
11 ¶ 31 All three of defendant’s notices of appeal request reversal of the trial court’s orders denying
him pretrial release. The three notices of appeal provided additional language under each of the
eight potential issues that could be raised in the standard notice of appeal form. 2 Of those eight,
two contained “checked” boxes next to the issues. We shall only consider the “checked issues.”
See People v. Sims, 2024 IL App (5th) 240034-U, ¶ 20. The “checked” issues for all three notices
included: (1) whether the State failed to meet its burden of proving that no condition or
combination of conditions could mitigate defendant’s dangerousness; and (2) whether the court
erred in determining that no condition, or combination of conditions, would reasonably ensure
defendant’s appearance for later hearings or prevent defendant from being charged with a
subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. The majority of the typewritten language underneath
either checked issue failed to contain argument specific to the cases or merely provided language
related to the burden of proof required for each issue.
¶ 32 On May 6, 2024, defendant’s counsel on appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender,
filed a Rule 604(h) notice filed in lieu of Rule 604(h)(7) memorandum in each case. The notices
stated they were timely filed, this court had jurisdiction of each case, and no memorandum would
be filed.
¶ 33 The State filed a Rule 604(h) memorandum on May 24, 2024. Therein, the State argued
that defendant waived all of his arguments raised on appeal by failing to provide any argument
before the trial court. In the alternative, the State argues that the evidence supported the trial court’s
findings and requests affirmation of the orders denying pretrial release.
2 This court previously addressed this situation. See People v. Davis, 2024 IL App (5th) 240120, ¶¶ 18-26. We again remind trial counsel of the ethical obligations regarding frivolous appeals and the failure to properly delineate the issues for consideration on appeal. 12 ¶ 34 As noted above, each of defendant’s notices of appeal contained two issues for
consideration. The second issue relates solely to revocation of pretrial release. See 725 ILCS
5/110-6 (West 2022) (dealing solely with revocation or modification of pretrial release conditions
as well as sanctions related to violation of pretrial conditions). Our review of the record reveals
this issue is inapplicable for all three of the cases on appeal. Accordingly, we find this issue has
no merit for any of the cases appealed.
¶ 35 The remaining issue for each of the cases on appeal contends the State failed to show by
clear and convincing evidence that no condition, or combination of conditions, was sufficient to
mitigate defendant’s dangerousness. In support, in addition to addressing the burden of proof, the
typewritten language in all three cases stated, “In this case, the State failed to meet its burden
because there are conditions as set for[th] in 725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) which would mitigate the threat
and/or the willful flight risk.” As noted above, the State argued that defendant waived this issue
by failing to present it to the trial court. In support, the State cites People v. Freeman, 2024 IL App
(5th) 240167-U, ¶ 38, for the proposition that issues not properly presented or preserved before
the trial court are waived. We find the State’s reliance on Freeman unwarranted.
¶ 36 In Freeman, defendant’s argument on appeal was based on his claim that the trial court
erred in failing to allow him to speak with his counsel during the hearing. Id. As defendant’s
counsel never raised the issue or objected to the trial court’s actions, we found the issue was
forfeited. Id. Here, the issue is the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. “[W]hen a defendant makes
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, his or her claim is not subject to the waiver rule and
may be raised for the first time on direct appeal.” People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005)
(citing People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 190 (1988)). Accordingly, the issue is not forfeited.
13 ¶ 37 Typically, when considering the sufficiency of the evidence, “the reviewing court must
view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution.’ ” People v. Cunningham, 212
Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “This means the
reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.”
Id. In this case, the question becomes, “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found’ ” (emphasis in original)
(id. at 278 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319)) that the State proved by clear and convincing
evidence that no condition, or combination of conditions, would mitigate defendant’s
dangerousness. Each decision is based on its own articulable facts. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1)
(West 2022).
¶ 38 As stated above, in determining which conditions of pretrial release, if any, would
reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant, the safety of persons and the community, and
the likelihood of defendant’s compliance with terms of pretrial release, the statute provides factors
for the trial court’s consideration. See id. § 110-5(a). These include, inter alia, (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against defendant, (3) the
history and characteristics of the defendant, and (4) the nature and seriousness of the real and
present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the articulable
facts of the case that would be posed by the defendant’s release. Id. Many of these are similar to
those listed in section 110-6.1(g) that address a defendant’s dangerousness. See id. § 110-6.1(g).
As such, there is no legal basis to minimize or ignore the State’s argument addressing the
dangerousness factors when also considering whether it proved that no conditions exist that would
mitigate defendant’s dangerousness.
14 ¶ 39 As to case No. 24-CF-316, the State argued that defendant was not in compliance with
pretrial release conditions issued in Champaign County case No. 23-CF-1636, which included a
condition that prohibited defendant from committing further offenses. The State also noted that
defendant had a very long criminal history that included numerous violent offenses as well as new
violent offenses that occurred during pretrial release. The State argued that defendant was
dangerous for those reasons as well as his inability to comply with court orders and therefore there
were no conditions the court could impose that would prevent defendant from committing new
offenses.
¶ 40 The trial court found defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the
community. The court also noted the pretrial investigatory report that classified defendant with a
VPRAI-R of 13 out of 14 and placed defendant at the highest possible risk level and that was
understandable given the extensive nature of defendant’s criminal history and the fact that he was
on court supervision when the charge was brought. The court also noted the additional pending
charges when the incident occurred. The court found that, based on that information, no condition
or combination of conditions would mitigate the danger defendant posed.
¶ 41 As to case No. 24-CF-315, the State argued that defendant was previously incarcerated for
his convictions in the prior domestic battery cases. It then proffered that defendant held the victim
against her will at the U-Haul location by refusing to give the victim her keys or allowing her to
leave. The State further proffered that the victim advised the police that she was strangled, beaten,
and feared for her life. The police noted that the victim was crying, visibly shaking, and had had
red marks and bruising on her neck, temple, and throat consistent with the victim’s account of the
incident.
15 ¶ 42 The trial court found that the VPRAI-R classified defendant at the highest risk level
possible. It further found defendant was currently on community supervision at the time of his
arrest and had a history of violent convictions. Based on this information, the court found that no
condition, or combination of conditions, would mitigate defendant’s risk to the victim.
¶ 43 Finally, as to case No. 24-CF-311, the State again argued that defendant had a long history
of domestic violence, including numerous prior convictions and sentences at IDOC for the
offenses. The State also noted the threatening content of the text message to the victim and her
family. The State argued that GPS would not prevent any further messaging and defendant was
actually near the victim when the threats were sent and presented a viable threat of harm. The State
also argued that GPS did not address the fact that it occurred in a public place at the mall and that
defendant was on pretrial release at the time the message was sent that prohibited from committing
additional offenses and admitted knowing that he was prohibited from contacting the victim.
¶ 44 In response, the trial court found that defendant made contact with the victim while she
was at the mall by text message and was aware that he was precluded from such action as a
condition of his pretrial release. The court again referred to the VPRAI-R which classified
defendant at the highest possible risk, defendant’s numerous pending cases, as well as his prior
convictions for residential burglary and domestic abuse, noting that charges stemmed from an
incident involving the same victim, and occurred in a relatively short period of time. Therefore,
the court found that no condition or combination of conditions would mitigate defendant’s
dangerousness to both the victim and the community.
¶ 45 Here, as to all three cases, we note that the conditions of release found in section 110-10
(725 ILCS 5/110-10 (West 2022)) are based on a defendant’s compliance with court ordered
conditions. Given that defendant’s history reveals three separate instances that involved violation
16 of pretrial release conditions, we cannot find that the State’s reliance on defendant’s violation of
his pretrial supervision conditions was unwarranted. See id. § 110-6(g)(8) (addressing the status
of a defendant at the time the incident occurred). Similarly, the State’s reliance on the VPRAI-R
and defendant’s criminal history was proper. See id. § 110-6(g)(2) (addressing a defendant’s
history and personal characteristics). Accordingly, when considered in conjunction with the
separate details related to each incident, we cannot find that the State failed to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that no condition or combination of conditions would mitigate defendant’s
dangerousness for any of the three cases.
¶ 46 We cannot find that the trial court’s findings in each case that no conditions would mitigate
defendant’s dangerousness were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we hold
that the trial court’s ultimate dispositions, denying pretrial release in all three cases, were not
abuses of discretion.
¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 48 For the reasons stated herein, the trial court findings in each case were not against the
manifest weight of the evidence and its ultimate disposition for each case was not an abuse of
discretion. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s orders.
¶ 49 Affirmed.