People v. Barnes (Christopher)

75 Misc. 3d 133(A), 2022 NY Slip Op 50500(U)

• Court: Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York
• Decided: June 17, 2022
• Docket: 570014/19
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

People v Barnes (2022 NY Slip Op 50500(U)) [*1]

People v Barnes (Christopher)

2022 NY Slip Op 50500(U) [75 Misc 3d 133(A)]

Decided on June 17, 2022

Appellate Term, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on June 17, 2022

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
PRESENT: Hagler, J.P., Tisch, Michael, JJ.
570014/19

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Christopher Barnes, Defendant-Appellant.

In consolidated appeals, defendant appeals from two judgments of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Cori H. Weston, J.), rendered October 29, 2018, convicting him, upon his pleas of guilty, of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree and petit larceny, and imposing sentence.

Per Curiam.

Judgments of conviction (Cori H. Weston, J.), rendered October 29, 2018, affirmed.

In view of defendant's knowing waiver of the right to prosecution by information, the accusatory instruments only had to satisfy the reasonable cause requirement (see People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 522 [2014]). So viewed, the accusatory instruments were jurisdictionally valid because they described facts of an evidentiary nature establishing reasonable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. With respect to the fifth-degree criminal possession of stolen property charge (see Penal Law § 165.40), the instrument under docket number 2018NY013380 recited that defendant cashed a money order in the amount of $770 that had been purchased by the complainant Maritza Melendez and reported stolen by her, and that he did not have complainant's permission or authority to possess or cash the money order. Contrary to defendant's present contention, the pleaded allegations were sufficient to support a finding that he knowingly possessed and cashed a stolen money order. A "defendant's knowledge that property is stolen may be proven circumstantially, and the unexplained or falsely explained recent exclusive possession of the fruits of a crime allows a [factfinder] to draw a permissible inference that defendant knew the property was stolen" (People v Chandler, 104 AD3d 618, 619 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1002 [2013], quoting People v Landfair, 191 AD2d 825, 826 [1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 1015 [1993]; see also People v Galbo, 218 NY 283, 290 [1916]). That other innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from the facts is irrelevant on this pleading stage inquiry (see People v Deegan, 69 NY2d 976, 979 [1987]).

With respect to the petit larceny charge under docket number 2018NY021332, the instrument alleged that the complainant Maria Valarezo purchased a money order in the amount [*2]of $762, payable to her landlord, and that the money order had been altered and made payable to defendant, who cashed the money order at a Ritecheck store, without the permission or authority of the complainant. These allegations and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them were sufficient for pleading purposes to establish that defendant "exercised dominion and control over the property ... in a manner wholly inconsistent with the owner's continued rights" (People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 118 [1986]). At the pleading stage, defendant's larcenous intent is fairly inferable from his actions in cashing the altered money order.

All concur

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Clerk of the Court
Decision Date: June 17, 2022