NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241345-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is December 4, 2025 not precedent except in the NO. 4-24-1345 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County JOHNNIE BANKSTON, ) No. 13CF1045 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Charles M. Feeney III, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender’s motion to withdraw as counsel and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, as no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal.
¶2 Defendant, Johnnie Bankston, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion
for leave to file a successive postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2024)). On appeal, the Office of the State Appellate
Defender (OSAD) moves to withdraw as counsel on the ground no issue of arguable merit can be
raised. Defendant has filed a response to OSAD’s motion. We grant OSAD’s motion and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 This court has set forth the underlying facts of this case in defendant’s prior
appeals. See People v. Bankston, 2020 IL App (4th) 180027-U; People v. Bankston, 2022 IL App (4th) 200534-U. Accordingly, we will set forth only those facts necessary to resolve the issue
presented in this case.
¶5 In February 2014, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated criminal
sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(3) (West 2012)). In exchange, the State agreed to the
dismissal of the remaining charges and a sentence of two consecutive terms of 10 years’
imprisonment. Judge Charles M. Feeney, the trial court judge, sentenced defendant consistent
with his plea agreement. Defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his plea or a direct appeal.
¶6 In August 2015, defendant filed a postconviction petition pursuant to the Act,
which the trial court dismissed following a third-stage evidentiary hearing. This court affirmed
the trial court’s judgment. See Bankston, 2020 IL App (4th) 180027-U, ¶ 28.
¶7 In December 2019, defendant filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment
pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401) (West
2018)). After a hearing in October 2020, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the
petition. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See Bankston, 2022 IL App (4th)
200534-U, ¶ 22.
¶8 In March 2024, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition. The motion alleged in October 2022, defendant learned Judge Feeney
was an associate judge, who “had no jurisdiction authority to sentence [him].” When “Judge
Feeney was assign[ed]” to his case, defendant “wasn’t notified nor consented to [an] associate[ ]
judge [being] appointed.” According to defendant, Judge Feeney “had no jurisdiction to rule” on
his initial postconviction petition and other filings because of the “conflict of interest” created
when the associate judge illegally accepted his plea and sentenced him. Defendant attached to
the motion Judge Feeney’s signed oath of office from 2014 and 2016, as well as the 2011 order
-2- appointing Judge Feeney as an associate judge.
¶9 The motion also alleged defendant’s constitutional rights were violated when (1) a
previous judge issued his arrest warrant based on probable cause and the State did not support
the complaint “with an affidavit describing anything (person, property, etc.)” and (2) after being
arrested on the warrant, defendant was taken to the Sangamon County jail and then the McLean
County jail where, collectively, he was held for more than 48 hours without being arraigned.
¶ 10 On July 2, 2024, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition. In its written order, the court noted only the first claim,
defendant learning he was sentenced by an “associate judge,” purported to establish “cause”
based on newly discovered information. However, the “associate judge” claim did not actually
establish “cause” because no objective factor prevented defendant from learning this information
earlier. Further, defendant did not establish “prejudice” because Judge Feeney was specifically
authorized to hear felony cases. The court elaborated:
“It is a matter of record in M.R. 9436, that on July 1, 2011 for the period of July
1, 2011 until June 30, 2015, Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court Thomas
Kilbride on behalf of the Supreme Court ordered that this judge have the authority
to hear felony cases.”
¶ 11 The order explained article VI, section 8 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, § 8) provides for associate judges, and the version of Illinois Supreme Court Rule
295 (eff. May 28, 1975) in effect when defendant pleaded guilty describes the circumstances
when associate judges may preside over felony cases as follows:
“Upon a showing of need presented to the supreme court by the chief judge of a
circuit, the supreme court may authorize the chief judge to make temporary
-3- assignments of individual associate judges to conduct trials of criminal cases in
which the defendant is charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year.”
¶ 12 The trial court also found the other allegations in defendant’s motion were known
to defendant at the time he filed his initial postconviction petition, and therefore, “the defendant
[had] not stated any cause” for not raising the issues earlier. Further, defendant could not
establish “prejudice” when (1) arrest warrant applications did not require affidavits (see 725
ILCS 5/107-9 (West 2012)) and (2) no strict 48-hour rule applied to a person arrested on a
warrant in one county and transported to another (see 725 ILCS 5/109-2(a) (West 2012)).
According to the court, even if it accepted “for the purposes of [the] ruling that the [unnecessary]
delay was in violation of the statute, the defendant assert[ed] no prejudice to him as a result of
such a delay.”
¶ 13 Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial, and OSAD was appointed to represent
him. In February 2025, OSAD filed a motion for leave to withdraw as defendant’s counsel and
attached a supporting memorandum of law. Defendant filed response, urging this court to strike
OSAD’s motion and appoint him a new attorney.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 OSAD contends no meritorious argument can be made the trial court erred in
denying defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. After
examining the record on appeal, the motion to withdraw, OSAD’s brief in support of its motion,
and defendant’s response, we agree this appeal presents no arguably meritorious issues. We
therefore grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the court’s judgment.
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NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241345-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is December 4, 2025 not precedent except in the NO. 4-24-1345 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County JOHNNIE BANKSTON, ) No. 13CF1045 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Charles M. Feeney III, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender’s motion to withdraw as counsel and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, as no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal.
¶2 Defendant, Johnnie Bankston, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion
for leave to file a successive postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2024)). On appeal, the Office of the State Appellate
Defender (OSAD) moves to withdraw as counsel on the ground no issue of arguable merit can be
raised. Defendant has filed a response to OSAD’s motion. We grant OSAD’s motion and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 This court has set forth the underlying facts of this case in defendant’s prior
appeals. See People v. Bankston, 2020 IL App (4th) 180027-U; People v. Bankston, 2022 IL App (4th) 200534-U. Accordingly, we will set forth only those facts necessary to resolve the issue
presented in this case.
¶5 In February 2014, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated criminal
sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(3) (West 2012)). In exchange, the State agreed to the
dismissal of the remaining charges and a sentence of two consecutive terms of 10 years’
imprisonment. Judge Charles M. Feeney, the trial court judge, sentenced defendant consistent
with his plea agreement. Defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his plea or a direct appeal.
¶6 In August 2015, defendant filed a postconviction petition pursuant to the Act,
which the trial court dismissed following a third-stage evidentiary hearing. This court affirmed
the trial court’s judgment. See Bankston, 2020 IL App (4th) 180027-U, ¶ 28.
¶7 In December 2019, defendant filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment
pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401) (West
2018)). After a hearing in October 2020, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the
petition. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See Bankston, 2022 IL App (4th)
200534-U, ¶ 22.
¶8 In March 2024, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition. The motion alleged in October 2022, defendant learned Judge Feeney
was an associate judge, who “had no jurisdiction authority to sentence [him].” When “Judge
Feeney was assign[ed]” to his case, defendant “wasn’t notified nor consented to [an] associate[ ]
judge [being] appointed.” According to defendant, Judge Feeney “had no jurisdiction to rule” on
his initial postconviction petition and other filings because of the “conflict of interest” created
when the associate judge illegally accepted his plea and sentenced him. Defendant attached to
the motion Judge Feeney’s signed oath of office from 2014 and 2016, as well as the 2011 order
-2- appointing Judge Feeney as an associate judge.
¶9 The motion also alleged defendant’s constitutional rights were violated when (1) a
previous judge issued his arrest warrant based on probable cause and the State did not support
the complaint “with an affidavit describing anything (person, property, etc.)” and (2) after being
arrested on the warrant, defendant was taken to the Sangamon County jail and then the McLean
County jail where, collectively, he was held for more than 48 hours without being arraigned.
¶ 10 On July 2, 2024, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition. In its written order, the court noted only the first claim,
defendant learning he was sentenced by an “associate judge,” purported to establish “cause”
based on newly discovered information. However, the “associate judge” claim did not actually
establish “cause” because no objective factor prevented defendant from learning this information
earlier. Further, defendant did not establish “prejudice” because Judge Feeney was specifically
authorized to hear felony cases. The court elaborated:
“It is a matter of record in M.R. 9436, that on July 1, 2011 for the period of July
1, 2011 until June 30, 2015, Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court Thomas
Kilbride on behalf of the Supreme Court ordered that this judge have the authority
to hear felony cases.”
¶ 11 The order explained article VI, section 8 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, § 8) provides for associate judges, and the version of Illinois Supreme Court Rule
295 (eff. May 28, 1975) in effect when defendant pleaded guilty describes the circumstances
when associate judges may preside over felony cases as follows:
“Upon a showing of need presented to the supreme court by the chief judge of a
circuit, the supreme court may authorize the chief judge to make temporary
-3- assignments of individual associate judges to conduct trials of criminal cases in
which the defendant is charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year.”
¶ 12 The trial court also found the other allegations in defendant’s motion were known
to defendant at the time he filed his initial postconviction petition, and therefore, “the defendant
[had] not stated any cause” for not raising the issues earlier. Further, defendant could not
establish “prejudice” when (1) arrest warrant applications did not require affidavits (see 725
ILCS 5/107-9 (West 2012)) and (2) no strict 48-hour rule applied to a person arrested on a
warrant in one county and transported to another (see 725 ILCS 5/109-2(a) (West 2012)).
According to the court, even if it accepted “for the purposes of [the] ruling that the [unnecessary]
delay was in violation of the statute, the defendant assert[ed] no prejudice to him as a result of
such a delay.”
¶ 13 Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial, and OSAD was appointed to represent
him. In February 2025, OSAD filed a motion for leave to withdraw as defendant’s counsel and
attached a supporting memorandum of law. Defendant filed response, urging this court to strike
OSAD’s motion and appoint him a new attorney.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 OSAD contends no meritorious argument can be made the trial court erred in
denying defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. After
examining the record on appeal, the motion to withdraw, OSAD’s brief in support of its motion,
and defendant’s response, we agree this appeal presents no arguably meritorious issues. We
therefore grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the court’s judgment.
¶ 16 The Act provides a means by which criminal defendants can attack convictions
-4- based on a substantial denial of state or federal constitutional rights. People v. Guerrero, 2012 IL
112020, ¶ 14. The Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition. People v.
Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002). Claims of a substantial denial of constitutional rights
not raised in the initial or amended postconviction petition are waived. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West
2024). A defendant must obtain leave from the trial court in order to file a successive petition
under the Act. Id. § 122-1(f).
¶ 17 To obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition, a defendant must do
one of the following: (1) show cause and prejudice for the failure to raise a claim in his or her
earlier petition or (2) set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at
459. Cause is defined as “some objective factor external to the defense” that prevented the
defendant from raising the claim in an earlier proceeding. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
at 460. Prejudice is an error so infectious to the proceedings that the resulting conviction or
sentence violates due process. Id. at 464. For a defendant to obtain leave to file a successive
postconviction petition, both prongs of the cause and prejudice test must be satisfied. Guerrero,
2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15. This court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition. People v. Crenshaw, 2015 IL App (4th) 131035, ¶ 38.
¶ 18 OSAD asserts it can make no meritorious argument defendant’s motion satisfied
the cause and prejudice test. We agree.
¶ 19 Defendant’s motion alleged (1) an associate judge illegally presided over his case,
(2) his arrest warrant illegally lacked an affidavit, and (3) he was illegally held for more than 48
hours without being arraigned. For all three claims, defendant has not shown cause by
identifying any objective factor which impeded his ability to raise these specific claims in his
initial postconviction petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2024). The only potential cause
-5- defendant raised in his motion was learning of Judge Feeney’s associate judge status in October
2022. Our supreme court has held that subjective ignorance of the law is not an objective factor
constituting cause for a defendant’s failure to raise a constitutional claim in his initial
postconviction petition. People v. Evans, 2013 IL 113471, ¶ 13. Nothing prevented defendant
from discovering or raising Judge Feeney’s “associate judge” status earlier. Likewise, defendant
could have challenged in his initial postconviction petition (1) his arrest warrant’s lack of an
affidavit and (2) the length of his detainment. Defendant’s lack of knowledge was therefore not
an objective factor external to the defense. See People v. Jones, 2013 IL App (1st) 113263, ¶ 25
(“Merely failing to recognize your claim cannot be an objective factor external to the defense
that prevents one from bringing the claim in the initial postconviction petition.”).
¶ 20 Because we find defendant did not show cause, we need not address the prejudice
prong. Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15. Therefore, we agree with OSAD no meritorious
argument can be raised the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition.
¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 22 For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 23 Affirmed.
-6-