People v. Ballard

2025 IL App (4th) 241524-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 25, 2025
• Docket: 4-24-1524
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241524-U FILED This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is February 25, 2025 NO. 4-24-1524 Carla Bender not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Lee County JAMES L. BALLARD, ) No. 24CF165 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Jacquelyn Dawn Ackert, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court properly denied defendant pretrial release.

¶2 Defendant, James L. Ballard, appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion

for relief from pretrial detention pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code)

(725 ILCS 5/110 et seq. (West 2022)), hereinafter as amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255

(eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly referred to as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See Pub. Act

102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act). On appeal,

defendant argues the court erred when finding he posed a threat to the community because the

State did not contend he posed a threat of committing a violent crime. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In July 2024, defendant was charged with (1) possession with the intent to deliver 100 or more grams but less than 400 grams of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/55(a)(1) (West

2022)); (2) unlawful delivery of methamphetamine for delivering, on or about June 28, 2024, 15

or more grams but less than 100 grams of methamphetamine (id. § 55(a)(1), (a)(2)(C));

(3) unlawful delivery of methamphetamine for delivering, on or about June 21, 2024, 5 or more

grams but less than 15 grams of methamphetamine (id. § 55(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)); and (4) unlawful

possession of methamphetamine for possessing, on June 28, 2024, 15 or more grams but less

than 100 grams of methamphetamine (id. § 60(a)). The State filed a petition to deny defendant’s

pretrial release. A hearing on the State’s petition was held on July 1, 2024.

¶5 At the detention hearing, the State proffered a probable cause affidavit attached to

its petition. The affidavit showed a confidential informant (CI) contacted the Lee County

Sheriff’s Office to inform them the CI had purchased methamphetamine from defendant on June

14, 2024. A photograph shown to the CI was positively identified as defendant. Lee County

deputies arranged for the CI to perform a controlled purchase. The Lee County State’s

Attorney’s Office authorized a 24-hour overhear. On June 21, 2024, the CI met with defendant

and Lisa Johnson, defendant’s wife, at 320 South Canal Drive in Dixon, Illinois. The CI

purchased 8.8 grams of methamphetamine for $150 using Cash App. Similarly, on June 28,

2024, the CI purchased 33.69 grams of methamphetamine for $600. Defendant and Johnson were

subsequently arrested.

¶6 On June 30, 2024, deputies executed a search warrant of defendant’s residence at

320 South Canal Drive. Deputies located 101 grams of methamphetamine in the closet and 8

grams under a table in defendant’s bedroom. An additional 82 grams of methamphetamine were

located elsewhere in the residence. Deputies noted during the search, two televisions displayed

surveillance of the exterior of the residence.

-2- ¶7 The State also proffered the pretrial services report, which showed defendant had

multiple prior convictions for drug-related offenses. In 2002, defendant was convicted of a drug

offense for which he received four years’ probation and jail. However, in 2005, his probation

was revoked, and he was sentenced to four years of “[Illinois Department of Corrections] Boot

Camp.” In 2018, defendant was convicted of delivering methamphetamine and possession of a

weapon by a felon and sentenced to eight years in prison. The Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment

Instrument-Revised scored defendant as a 13 out of 14, which is considered high risk. The risk

assessment noted defendant’s specific risk factors to be, inter alia, he was already under

“community supervision” with pending charges for jailable offenses, he had two or more prior

violent offense convictions, and he had a history of drug abuse.

¶8 The State contended defendant’s criminal history and risk assessment supported

its argument he posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community and cited this

court’s decision in People v. Woods, 2024 IL App (4th) 240190.

¶9 Defendant testified he resided at 320 South Canal Drive with his father-in-law and

wife. He worked full-time for a tree service for the three weeks prior to his arrest. Defendant was

currently taking prescription medications for depression or anxiety and diabetes. Defendant did

not have any pending criminal cases in Whiteside County and was not on parole or probation at

the time of his arrest. Defendant stated he would comply with any conditions of pretrial release,

including counseling, electronic monitoring, and random drug testing.

¶ 10 The trial court stated it had considered the evidence presented, the probable cause

affidavit, the pretrial services report, and defendant’s criminal history. Regarding defendant’s

criminal history, the court noted, in 2005, defendant’s probation was revoked, in 2011, his court

supervision was revoked, and in 2013, his probation was revoked. At the time of the instant

-3- offense, the court noted defendant was on pretrial release for Lee County case Nos. 22-CF-266

and 23-MT-109, wherein he had posted bond and had been ordered not to violate any statute.

Lastly, the court noted defendant’s high-risk assessment. The court found the State had met its

burden of proving the proof was evident or presumption great defendant committed a qualifying

offense, he posed a real and present threat to the community, and no conditions of pretrial release

could mitigate the threat he posed. The court granted the State’s petition to deny defendant’s

pretrial release.

¶ 11 On November 1, 2024, defendant, while still represented by counsel, filed a

pro se motion for relief arguing, inter alia, the State failed to present articulable facts to show he

was a real and present threat to any persons or the community. On November 21, 2024, the trial

court accepted defendant’s waiver of his right to an attorney and permitted him to proceed

pro se. Defendant did not refile his motion for relief; however, a hearing on defendant’s motion

was held on November 26, 2024.

¶ 12 At the hearing, and relevant to the issue he raises on appeal, defendant noted his

detention order was pursuant to the dangerousness standard and asked, “Who—who’s the

danger—who am I a danger to?” Regarding less restrictive conditions of pretrial release to

mitigate any threat he posed, defendant stated, “There is nothing in my thing saying why I’m a

threat.”

¶ 13 The State responded by citing this court in People v. Pennington, 2024 IL App

(4th) 240585-U, ¶ 12, which cited Woods for the proposition that a defendant with a history of

selling large amounts of controlled substances posed a real and present threat to the community

because of the “well established” societal harm of drug use. The State specifically pointed to

defendant’s convictions for a cannabis offense in 1996 and for delivery offenses in 2002 and

-4- 2018.

¶ 14 The trial court reiterated its previous findings from the detention hearing and

denied defendant’s motion.

¶ 15 This appeal followed.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred when finding he posed a threat to

the community because the State did not contend he posed a threat of committing a violent

crime. Specifically, defendant argues the State’s contention he posed a threat to the “safety” of

the community is a vastly overbroad use of the word. He argued, there was no evidence

presented that any drug sales by defendant were associated with violence or the risk of violence.

Furthermore, even if the court believed defendant was likely to commit a future nonviolent

offense, he was entitled, pursuant to the Code, to be given pretrial release with an opportunity to

comply with pretrial release conditions.

¶ 18 The portion of the Code defendant cites states:

“[F]or offenses listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection

(a), the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of

any person or persons or the community, based on the specific

articulable facts of the case, by conduct which may include, but is

not limited to, a forcible felony, the obstruction of justice,

intimidation, injury, or abuse as defined by paragraph (1) of

Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.” 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2) (West 2022).

¶ 19 Defendant essentially argues the Code’s use of “safety” should be interpreted to

-5- mean a risk of violence. From here, he argues the State’s failure to provide evidence that he

posed a risk of violence from the charged drug offenses requires reversal of the trial court’s

decision so that he may be granted pretrial release with conditions.

¶ 20 “The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to

the legislature’s intent.” Evans v. Cook County State’s Attorney, 2021 IL 125513, ¶ 27. “The

most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and

ordinary meaning.” Id. “The court may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to

be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one

way or another.” Id. “Issues requiring statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to

de novo review.” Id.

¶ 21 We begin by noting the statute defendant cites provides a short list of offenses but

explicitly states conduct sufficient to pose a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

the community is “not limited” to the example offenses provided. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2)

(West 2022). In fact, one of the example offenses, obstruction of justice, does not require

violence under any ordinary use of the term for many of its elemental acts. See 720 ILCS

5/31-4(a)(1)-(4) (West 2022).

¶ 22 We also note, defendant’s interpretation of the Code that a “threat to the safety of

any person or persons or the community” (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2) (West 2022)) means a

threat of violence has been rejected by other districts. See People v. Johnson, 2023 IL App (5th)

230714, ¶ 21 (“If the legislature intended that pretrial release be denied only where the defendant

poses a real and present threat of committing ‘violent criminal acts,’ the legislature could have

added that language.”); see also People v. Marks, 2024 IL App (2d) 240398-U, ¶¶ 14-16

(agreeing with Johnson and declining to adopt the defendant’s argument the Code’s use of

-6- “threat” should be interpreted as a “threat from physical harm” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

¶ 23 Finally, defendant’s argument on appeal does not address this court’s decision in

Woods. In Woods, we stated, “The societal harm from drug crimes is well-established in Illinois

law, meaning the baseline question of whether the sale of drugs is a threat to the community has

been answered.” Woods, 2024 IL App (4th) 240190, ¶ 20. Accordingly, this court has already

addressed the core of defendant’s contention on appeal: the sale of drugs is a threat to the

community. Accordingly, we decline defendant’s invitation to interpret the Code’s use of

“safety” to mean a threat of physical violence exclusively.

¶ 24 When the trial court, presiding over a detention hearing, is presented with live

witness testimony, we review the court’s decision under the manifest weight of the evidence

standard. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54. When the parties proceed solely by proffer at

the detention hearing, we review the court’s decision de novo. Id. In the instant case, the trial

court was presented with defendant’s live testimony. However, the court made no explicit

findings based on defendant’s testimony. The record shows the court’s decision appears largely

predicated on the State’s proffered evidence. Therefore, we will apply a de novo standard of

review to the trial court’s detention decision. Under either standard, however, we come to the

same conclusion.

¶ 25 Under the Code, it is presumed all criminal defendants are entitled to pretrial

release, subject to certain conditions. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2022). The Code requires the

State to prove by clear and convincing evidence “the defendant poses a real and present threat to

the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of

the case,” and “no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section

-7- 110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community.” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(2), (3)(i). Additionally, section 110-6.1(g) requires

the trial court to consider “the specific articulable facts of the case” and provides nine factors the

court can also consider when assessing the real and present threat allegation. Id. § 110-6.1(g).

¶ 26 Defendant, in the case sub judice, like the defendant in Woods, was not denied

pretrial release based on the generalized risk of drugs to the community alone: “despite multiple

convictions for selling drugs, [the] defendant continued to do so, even when on parole for

another [drug] charge.” Woods, 2024 IL App (4th) 240190, ¶ 21. Here, defendant’s criminal

history included multiple prior convictions for drug offenses, he had a high-risk assessment, and

he was on pretrial release at the time he was alleged to have committed the present offenses.

¶ 27 Ultimately, the trial court entered an order denying defendant’s pretrial release

compliant with section 110-6.1 of the Code, wherein the court found (1) defendant was charged

with a detainable offense and the proof was evident or presumption great defendant committed

the offense (see 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022)), (2) defendant posed a real and present

threat to the community (see id. § 110-6.1(e)(2)), and (3) no conditions or combination of

conditions under subsection 110-10(b) of the Code (id. § 110-10(b)) could mitigate the real and

present threat (see id. § 110-6.1(e)(3)). Our review of the record shows the trial court’s decision

was proper.

¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 30 Affirmed.

-8-