2021 IL App (1st) 190363-U
FIFTH DIVISION Order filed: January 29, 2021
No. 1-19-0363
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 12 CR 21663 ) DERRICK BALDWIN, ) ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Stanley J. Sacks, ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Cunningham concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the defendant’s convictions over his contentions that (1) the State was barred from prosecuting him in the instant case when he had already been adjudicated a sexually dangerous person on unrelated offenses and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that his arrest pursuant to an investigative alert is unconstitutional.
¶2 Following a jury trial, the defendant, Derrick Baldwin, was convicted of two counts of
aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count each of home invasion and residential burglary. No. 1-19-0363
He was sentenced to 29 years’ imprisonment plus an indeterminate term (3 years to natural life) of
mandatary supervised release (MSR). 1 On appeal, he argues that his convictions must be reversed
because the State could not prosecute him in the instant case after he had already been adjudicated
a sexually dangerous person on unrelated offenses. He also argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that his arrest pursuant
to an investigative alert was unconstitutional. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 In the instant case, no. 12 CR 21633, the defendant was charged by indictment with, inter
alia, two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count each of home invasion and
residential burglary based upon allegations that he entered the apartment of M.R. on October 28,
2012, without authority to do so and committed an act of sexual penetration upon her. On January
22, 2014, the defendant’s first jury trial commenced, and the jury found him guilty on all charges.
On June 16, 2014, the circuit court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 29 years’ imprisonment.
The defendant appealed (no. 1-14-2354).
¶4 In case no. 13 CR 2690, the defendant was charged with home invasion, residential
burglary, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and unauthorized video recording for an incident that
occurred on October 6, 2012. On July 23, 2014, the State filed a petition pursuant to section 3 of
the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA) (725 ILCS 205/3 (West 2012), seeking to have the
defendant declared a sexually dangerous person based on case no. 13 CR 2690. At the defendant’s
bench trial, the State presented two witnesses, Drs. Stanislaus and Weitl, who both testified that
the defendant suffered from mental disorders, had criminal propensities to the commission of sex
1 The circuit court also sentenced the defendant to a term of six months’ imprisonment for contempt, to be served following the completion of his 29-year term, after the defendant interrupted and cursed at the court during sentencing.
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offenses, and posed a substantial risk of sexually offending in the future if not confined. The State
also introduced a certified copy of the defendant’s conviction in case no. 12 CR 21663. On October
20, 2015, the trial court issued its written order, finding the defendant to be a sexually dangerous
person and that it is substantially probable that he would continue to commit sex offenses in the
future if not confined. On that same day, the trial court entered judgment on its findings and
remanded the defendant to the custody of the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections as
guardian. The defendant filed an appeal (No. 1-16-0496).
¶5 Meanwhile, in appeal no. 1-14-2354, the State confessed error in the denial of the
defendant’s timely motion for a substitution of judge. On June 23, 2017, we reversed his
convictions in case no 12 CR 21633 and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial.
People v. Baldwin, 2017 IL App (1st) 142354-U.
¶6 On September 6, 2017, we granted the defendant’s motion to stay appeal no. 1-16-0496,
pending the retrial of case no. 12 CR 21663 in the circuit court.
¶7 On remand in case no. 12 CR 21663, the defendant initially proceeded pro se, filing several
pre-trial motions, including, inter alia, a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. In his
motion to suppress, the defendant sought to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search
warrant from his laptop computer, cellphone, and a flash drive on the grounds that there was “no
probable cause to execute the search warrant.” The defendant stated in his motion the following
facts: On November 1, 2012, he was “arrested on a misdemeanor warrant at a restaurant,” and
while he was in custody pursuant to that warrant, M.R. identified him from a physical lineup as
the perpetrator. He also stated that he was still in custody when, on November 8, 2012, he was
arrested for the instant offenses. At the defendant’s next court date, the defendant’s motion was
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argued. The State informed the court that the defendant was in continuous custody following his
November 1, 2012 arrest pursuant to a misdemeanor warrant for jumping a CTA turnstile when he
was identified as the perpetrator in this case and arrested on November 8, 2012, on the instant
charges. The defendant told the court that he was only challenging his November 8, 2012 arrest.
The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the
defendant did not dispute that his November 1, 2012 arrest was based upon a warrant or that he
was in lawful custody when he was identified by the victim hours later, which resulted in his
subsequent arrest on November 8, 2012.
¶8 On January 26, 2018, the defendant asked for an attorney and the court appointed the public
defender’s office.
¶9 The defendant’s jury trial commenced on October 26, 2018. At trial, M.R. testified that she
came home to her studio apartment in the early morning hours of October 28, 2012, after drinking
with some friends. She went to sleep at around 3:30 a.m. and believed that she had locked her front
door. She woke up when she felt something touching her vagina. As she awoke, she saw her
blanket rise “like a mountain” and then saw a man run out of her bedroom. She testified that she
saw the perpetrator’s face when he looked back at her before stumbling through her front door and
into the hallway. After he left, she went downstairs and reported the incident to the doorman, who
called the police.
¶ 10 Officer Louis Novalez testified that, on November 1, 2012, he was in a downtown
restaurant when he encountered the defendant, whom he recognized as the subject of an
investigative alert. Officer Novalez called his sergeant to confirm the details of the investigative
alert and then approached the defendant and announced his office. After verifying the defendant’s
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identity, he placed him under arrest. Office Novalez testified that, among the items in the
defendant’s possession when he was arrested were a ring, watch, wallet, a cellphone, and a bag
with a laptop computer and a flash drive. He inventoried the items and turned them over to
Detective Rose for investigation.
¶ 11 Detective Robert Rose testified that he was assigned to investigate M.R.’s case. He met
with M.R. on October 31, 2012, and showed her a photo array, which included a photograph of
the defendant, but she was unable to identify anyone as the perpetrator. On the evening of
November 1, 2012, Detective Rose learned that the defendant had been arrested. He arranged for
M.R. to view a physical lineup and she identified the defendant as the perpetrator. Detective Rose
obtained a search warrant and searched the computer, flash drive, and cellphone in the defendant’s
possession at the time of his arrest. The search of the memory card in the cellphone revealed two
photographs time-stamped shortly after 5 a.m. on October 28, 2012: one was of a female’s crotch
and legs under bedding, and the other was of bedding. On December 7, 2012, M.R. identified her
vaginal and leg area and her bedding in the photos. M.R. still had the bedding and duvet cover and
provided it to Detective Rose, who inventoried the items. Detective Rose published the items to
the jury.
¶ 12 The State also presented K.G. and K.M., who testified to the defendant’s prior bad acts for
the purposes of, inter alia, modus operandi. K.G. testified that she went to bed at around 10 p.m.
on August 15, 2012. She woke up at around 5:00 a.m. to use the bathroom when she saw a man
inside her apartment. She screamed and the man ran out of her apartment. K.G. identified three
photographs recovered from the defendant’s phone as depicting her room and her legs and
buttocks.
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¶ 13 K.M. testified that she returned to her apartment in the early morning hours of October 6,
2012, and she believed that she locked her door. She did not recall waking at any point during that
night. In the following days, she noticed that her digital camera was missing. On December 5,
2012, K.M. met with Detective Rose at the police station, where she identified three photographs
recovered from the defendant’s phone depicting her naked buttocks and a hand with a three-link
ring.
¶ 14 The State recalled Detective Rose, who testified that he found the photos of K.G. and K.M.
on the memory card of the phone recovered from the defendant. Detective Rose also testified that
he identified the ring in the photo depicting K.M. as the one the defendant was wearing when he
was arrested. Following Detective Rose’s testimony, the State rested.
¶ 15 The defendant presented Officer Nora Gunning, who testified that on October 28, 2012,
she and her partner responded to a call at a high rise downtown. Officer Gunning explained that
her partner made a contact card, which is a mini summary of the events. Officer Gunning
acknowledged that the contact card does not indicate that M.R. was sexually assaulted.
¶ 16 Officer David Magura testified that he went to a high rise building in Chicago at about 8:12
a.m. on October 28, 2012 and spoke with M.R. in the lobby. According to Officer Magura, M.R.
refused medical attention after he told her she could go to the hospital. He also testified that M.R.
did not tell him that she saw the intruder’s face when he fell in the hallway. The defense then rested
with the defendant electing not to testify on his own behalf.
¶ 17 Following their deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty of all charges. After his
trial, the defendant again requested to proceed pro se, which the court granted. He then filed a pro
se motion to dismiss case no 12 CR 21663, arguing that the State could not pursue criminal charges
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against him because he had been found sexually dangerous under the SDPA. According to the
defendant, if he was mentally ill on October 6, 2012, when he committed the offense in 13 CR
2690, he must have been mentally ill on October 28, 2012, when he committed the instant offenses.
The State responded by acknowledging that, under People v. Galba, 273 Ill. App. 3d 95 (1995), a
defendant cannot be convicted of an offense and found sexually dangerous based on the same
underlying offense. The State argued, however, that Galba did not apply here because the instant
offense was not the underlying offense for the SDPA proceedings. The trial court agreed with the
State and denied the defendant’s post-trial motion.
¶ 18 The defendant also filed a pro se motion for a new trial, which raised 15 different
arguments, including, inter alia, that he was barred from being prosecuted on the grounds that he
had already been adjudicated a sexually dangerous person. The circuit court denied the defendant’s
motion for a new trial.
¶ 19 Following a sentencing hearing, the court merged all of the defendant’s convictions into
one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced him to 29 years’ imprisonment plus
an indeterminate term (3 years to natural life) of MSR. As the court admonished the defendant
regarding his appellate rights, the defendant interrupted and said the following: “Don’t give me
that bullshit about no 29 fucking years, motherfucker. I’m not fucking with you no more.” The
court responded that the defendant would be sentenced to 6 months for contempt to be served
consecutively with his 29 years term. This appeal followed.
¶ 20 At the outset, we note that, on August 21, 2019, while the instant appeal was pending, we
entered an order on motion of the defendant, lifting the September 6, 2017 stay in the defendant’s
appeal in the SDPA proceedings (appeal no. 1-16-0496). People v. Baldwin, 2020 IL App (1st)
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160496, ¶ 12. On June 26, 2020, we vacated the circuit court’s orders and judgment entered on
October 20, 2015, finding the defendant to be a sexually dangerous person on the grounds that the
court’s judgment relied, in part, on the defendant’s 2014 convictions in 12 CR 216331, which were
subsequently reversed on appeal. Id. at ¶ 27. We remanded the matter to the circuit court for a new
trial on the State’s petition to declare the respondent a sexually dangerous person. Id. at ¶ 32.
¶ 21 On appeal in the instant case, the defendant first argues that his convictions and sentence
should be vacated because criminally prosecuting him after he had already been adjudicated a
sexually dangerous person in case no. 13 CR 2690 violated the purpose of the SDPA. The State
responds that being adjudicated a sexually dangerous does not exempt the defendant from criminal
culpability based upon the commission of separate criminal acts. The State also argues that the
defendant’s argument in this regard is moot because his adjudication as a sexually dangerous
person was reversed on appeal.
¶ 22 Our review of issues involving statutory construction is de novo and is guided by well-
established rules. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307 (2002). The principal objective
of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. In re Detention
of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 135 (2005). “All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to
this cardinal principle.” Id. at 135. The best evidence of legislative intent is the statutory language.
People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 171 (2003). We, therefore, first review the text of the SDPA.
¶ 23 “[T]he SDPA permits the State to seek an involuntary and indefinite commitment in lieu
of criminal prosecution when a person believed to be sexually dangerous is charged with a criminal
offense.” People v. Masterson, 2011 IL 110072, ¶ 27. Section 3 of the SDPA provides that, when
the State feels that a defendant charged with a criminal offense is a sexually dangerous person, the
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State “may file with the clerk of the court in the same proceeding wherein such person stands
charged with criminal offense, a petition in writing setting forth facts tending to show that the
person named is a sexually dangerous person.” 725 ILCS 205/3 (West 2014). In order to establish
that a defendant is a sexually dangerous person within the meaning of the SDPA, the State is
required to prove that he (1) suffers from a mental disorder that has existed for at least one year
prior to the filing of the petition; (2) has criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses;
(3) has demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of
children; and (4) poses a substantial risk of sexually offending in the future if he is not confined.
725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 2014). If a defendant is found to be a sexually dangerous person, “then
the court shall appoint the Director of Corrections guardian of the [defendant] and [the defendant]
shall stand committed to the custody of such guardian.” 725 ILCS 205/8 (West 2014). Section 9
of the SDPA states that, once the defendant has recovered and the circuit court orders him
discharged, “every outstanding information and indictment, the basis of which was the reason for
the present detention, shall be quashed.” 725 ILCS 205/9 (West 2014).
¶ 24 In urging reversal, the defendant does not cite to a specific provision of the SDPA that he
contends bars the State from prosecuting a defendant criminally after successfully having him
adjudicated a sexually dangerous person under the SDPA on an unrelated offense. Rather, he
argues that prosecuting him after he had already been adjudicated a sexually dangerous person
under the SDPA, even for a separate offense, “defie[s] the purpose of the SDPA.” In support, he
relies primarily on People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91 (1985), and People v. Galba, 273 Ill. App. 3d 95
(1995).
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¶ 25 In People v. Allen, our supreme court stated that the aim of the SDPA is “treatment, not
punishment” and that one of the purposes of the SDPA was “to prevent mentally ill persons from
being held criminally responsible for crimes committed while mentally ill.” 107 Ill. 2d at 101, 105.
According to the defendant, when the court adjudicated him a sexually dangerous person under
the SDPA, it necessarily found that he was mentally ill on October 6, 2012, when he committed
the offenses charged in 13 CR 2690 and, if he was mentally ill then, “it logically follows that he
was also mentally ill when the instant offense took place just 22 days later.” The State argues that
nothing in the text of the SDPA prevented it from prosecuting the defendant for crimes unrelated
to the charges that resulted in him being adjudicated a sexually dangerous person. We agree with
the State.
¶ 26 As mentioned, our task on review is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent,
and the best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute. After reviewing the SDPA,
we find no textual support for the defendant’s contention that the State cannot prosecute him for
crimes separate and distinct from those that formed the basis of his civil confinement under the
SDPA.
¶ 27 We find that People v. Galba, 273 Ill. App. 3d 95 (1995), which the defendant relies on,
best illustrates the deficiencies in his argument. In Galba, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated
kidnaping and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. 273 Ill. App. 3d at 96. As part of his plea deal,
the defendant agreed to facts supporting a finding that he was a sexually dangerous person, and
accordingly, he was civilly committed under the SDPA. Id. On appeal, we held that prosecuting a
defendant and civilly committing him as a sexually dangerous person for the same underlying
offense violated the SDPA. Id. at 101. Specifically, we found that to hold otherwise would render
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section 9 of the SDPA meaningless because section 9 states that the underlying charges against a
defendant remain until such time as he has recovered and the committing court orders him
discharged, at which time “the underlying information or indictment must be quashed.” Id.
¶ 28 Here, unlike in Galba, the defendant’s criminal convictions were not based on the same
underlying charges that formed the basis of his civil commitment under the SDPA, and therefore,
his prosecution does not run afoul of section 9 of the SDPA. Simply put, in October 2012, the
defendant committed multiple criminal acts on two separate nights and against two separate
victims and was charged under two separate indictments. The SDPA mandates that, for each
indictment, the State must elect whether to prosecute the defendant in a criminal proceeding or file
a petition under the SDPA. In the instant case, the State elected to prosecute the defendant
criminally, and in case no. 13 CR 2690, it elected to file a petition under the SDPA. In both
instances, the State comported with the provisions of the SDPA.
¶ 29 In essence, the defendant is arguing that, because the circuit court found that he suffered
from mental disorders when it adjudicated him a sexually dangerous person, he could not have
been found guilty in the instant case. The defendant appears to equate a finding that he suffered
from a mental disorder as defined by the SDPA with a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Section 4.03 of the SDPA defines mental disorder as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting
the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence.”
725 ILCS 205/4.03 (West 2012). In contrast, section 6-2(a) of the Illinois Criminal Code of 2012
(Code) provides that “[a] person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such
conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct.” 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 2012). The Code also provides that “[t]he
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terms ‘mental disease or mental defect’ do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.” 720 ILCS 5/6-2(b) (West 2012). Put simply, a finding
that a defendant suffers from a mental disorder under the SDPA is a separate inquiry than not
guilty by reason of insanity that requires separate proof. In the present case, there is no evidence
in the record to support a finding that the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct. In other words, there is no evidence that the defendant was insane when
he committed the crimes for which he was charged. Accordingly, the State was not barred from
prosecuting the defendant in the instant case even after he had been civilly committed under the
¶ 30 In reaching this decision, we also note that a defendant may be found guilty of a crime even
if he was suffering under a mental illness during the commission of the offense. See 720 ILCS 5/6-
2(c) (West 2012) (“A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense, was not
insane but was suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility for his
conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill.”). However, in order to be entitled to such a
finding, the defendant was first required to raise the insanity defense, which he did not do here.
See 725 ILCS 5/115-3(c)(1)-(3) (West 2012).
¶ 31 The defendant next contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to
suppress evidence on the grounds that his arrest was based solely on an investigative alert rather
than an arrest warrant.
¶ 32 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-pronged test
announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must
show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that
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the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; People v. Albanese,
104 Ill. 2d 504, 525 (1984). When a defendant claims that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress, he “must show, first, a reasonable probability
that the motion would have been granted and, second, that the outcome of the trial would have
been different if the motion had been granted.” People v. Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d 607, 611 (2001).
The defendant has the burden of establishing both prongs of the Strickland test. People v. Burks,
343 Ill. App. 3d 765, 775 (2003).
¶ 33 To begin, the State challenges the defendant’s contention that he was arrested based on an
investigative alert, not a warrant. According to the State, the defendant was arrested on November
1, 2012, pursuant to a misdemeanor arrest warrant for jumping a CTA turnstile and then “he was
held pending investigation on the investigative alert for M.R.’s burglary” and “four hours later
[he] was identified by M.R.” as the perpetrator. The State also argues that the defendant admitted
to these facts in his pro se motion to suppress, and therefore, he has forfeited this issue on appeal.
The defendant responds that the record does not contain a misdemeanor arrest warrant and his trial
counsel should have discovered this fact when he reviewed the record. The defendant also argues
that the State’s contention that he was arrested pursuant to a misdemeanor warrant is directly
contradicted by Officer Novalez’s testimony at trial.
¶ 34 We have reviewed the record and it reflects that the defendant stated in his pro se motion
to suppress evidence that his November 1, 2012 arrest was pursuant to a misdemeanor warrant.
And although the defendant is correct that there is no copy of any such misdemeanor warrant in
the record, there are several documents in the record that reference a warrant in relation to his
November 1, 2012 arrest, including the defendant’s Chicago Police Department “rap sheet” and
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the transcript of the defendant’s Illinois State Police criminal history. That said, the record also
reflects that Officer Novalez testified at trial that he arrested the defendant after seeing him in a
restaurant and immediately calling his sergeant because he was “aware of an investigative alert on
[the defendant].” However, Officer Novalez did not testify as to the facts underlying the
investigative alert, nor is the investigative alert found in the record. In other words, it is not known
whether the investigative alert even related to the events of the instant case. Nevertheless, the
simple fact is that the defendant admitted in his pro se motion to suppress that he was arrested on
November 1, 2012, pursuant to a misdemeanor warrant. Given this record, we conclude that he
cannot now claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress on
the grounds that his arrest was unconstitutional because it was based on an investigative alert.
¶ 35 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 36 Affirmed.
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