People v. Baines

2023 IL App (1st) 211179-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 13, 2023
• Docket: 1-21-1179
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2023 IL App (1st) 211179-U FIFTH DIVISION January 13, 2023 Nos. 1-21-1179, 1-22-0497 (cons.)

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 89 CR 12603 ) No. 89 CR 12607 ) EDDIE BAINES, ) Honorable ) Timothy J. Joyce, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Connors and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

Held: We vacate the portion of the circuit court’s order that bars defendant from ever filing any future petitions pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) or section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401) (West 2020)) because the sanction is overbroad.

¶1 Defendant Eddie Baines appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of his petitions

pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2020)),

arguing only that the court’s sanction of barring him from filing any future section 2-1401 No. 1-21-1179

petitions or petitions pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et

seq. (West 2020)) without leave of court was improper. Because we agree with defendant, we

vacate that portion of the court’s order that imposed the sanction, and remand for the limited

purpose of the circuit court reconsidering an appropriate sanction.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Following a 1991 bench trial, defendant was found guilty of two counts of armed robbery

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, Ch. 38, ¶ 18-2) and sentenced as an habitual offender to concurrent terms of

life imprisonment pursuant to the recidivism statute then in effect (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, Ch. 38,

¶ 33B-1 et seq.).” People v. Baines, 2020 IL App (1st) 180717-U, ¶ 3. After this court denied his

direct appeal, defendant filed multiple postconviction and section 2-1401 petitions challenging

his convictions. The record of defendant’s many prior petitions is detailed in part in Baines, 2020

IL App (1st) 180717-U, ¶ 4.

¶4 Defendant mailed the section 2-1401 petitions it issue here, one each in case Nos. 89 CR

12603 and 89 CR 12607, on June 24, 2021. The circuit court denied defendant’s petitions on

August 13, 2021, and in its written order, sanctioned defendant by declaring he was “prohibited

from filing petitions under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, or Section 2-1401 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, absent leave of court.” This appeal followed.

¶5 ANALYSIS

¶6 Before we address defendant’s claim, we must first consider our jurisdiction, as the State

contends defendant’s claim is not ripe for adjudication because he has not yet been subject to any

actual consequence due to the filing restriction. “A controversy is ripe when it has reached the

point where the facts permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.” People v. Guillermo,

2016 IL App (1st) 151799, ¶ 15 (quoting People v. Ziltz, 98 Ill. 2d 38, 42 (1983)). A court may

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find an issue ripe for adjudication where, “the challenger must choose between disadvantageous

compliance and risk of sanction.” Board of Trustees of Addison Fire Protection District No. 1

Pension Fund v. Stamp, 241 Ill. App. 3d 873, 883 (1993).

¶7 We find defendant’s claim ripe for adjudication. The full record necessary to make our

decision is available—the circuit court levied its sanction, and defendant does not dispute any of

the facts underlying the sanction or that his conduct warranted sanction, only that the court

exceeded its legal authority. Thus, no further development of the record is necessary, and

defendant’s choice of either to refrain from filing future postconviction or 2-1401 petitions, or be

subject to the court’s filing restriction, is clear. Finding that this court has jurisdiction, we move

to the substance of defendant’s claim.

¶8 Defendant claims that the circuit court’s sanction must be vacated, contending that the

court could only impose fees and costs as a sanction pursuant to section 22-105 of the Code of

Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/22-105 (West 2020)). The State responds that the court had

authority to impose this sanction based on either Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1,

2018), or the court’s inherent power to control its docket.

¶9 Section 22-105 states, in relevant part, that if a prisoner files a postconviction petition or

“second or subsequent” section 2-1401 petition which a circuit court deems frivolous, “the

prisoner is responsible for the full payment of filing fees and actual court costs.” 735 ILCS 5/22-

105(a) (West 2020). The statute continues, “Nothing in this Section prohibits an applicant from

filing an action or proceeding if the applicant is unable to pay the court costs.” Id.

¶ 10 Rule 137 states that when an attorney or pro se litigant signs a pleading, he must ensure

to the “best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry” that the

pleading “is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument” for

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changing the law. Ill. S. Ct. R 137(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). If the litigant signs in violation of this

rule, the circuit court “may impose” upon the litigant “an appropriate sanction.” Id. Furthermore,

it is well-established that courts in Illinois have the “inherent authority to control [their] docket

and impose sanctions for failure to comply with a court order.” Dolan v. O'Callaghan, 2012 IL

App (1st) 111505, ¶ 65.

¶ 11 Defendant argues that section 22-105 provides the only sanction available to circuit

courts wishing to sanction a prisoner for filing a petition under the Act, or second or subsequent

section 2-1401 petition, that the court deems frivolous. This requires us to interpret section 22-

105. When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intention,

the most reliable indicator of which is “the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary

meaning.” People v. Clark, 2018 IL 122495, ¶ 8. When the language is “clear and

unambiguous,” the court “must apply it as written.” Id. Only when the court determines that the

language of a statute is ambiguous may it then use tools of statutory construction to determine

the legislature’s intent. Id. We review de novo whether the circuit court has authority to levy a

particular sanction. Palos Community Hospital v. Humana Insurance Company, Inc., 2021 IL

126008, ¶ 24.

¶ 12 We find that section 22-105 is clear and unambiguous. The plain language of the section

does not restrict a circuit court to the fee and cost assessment described in the section when

sanctioning a prisoner for making frivolous filings. The section only states that if a circuit court

determines the filing is frivolous, then the prisoner is responsible for those payments. This

language does not refer to a circuit court’s well-established ability to levy sanctions pursuant to

Rule 137 or its inherent power to control its docket, let alone restrict it. Had the legislature

intended to take such a significant step, it could have done so with express language. It did not,

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and we cannot interpret this statute so broadly when the plain language of the statute does not

support that reading. See In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 437 (2004) (“We cannot rewrite a

statute under the guise of statutory construction”).

¶ 13 Defendant nonetheless argues that this court should use the statutory construction tool of

expresio unis est exclusion alterius to find that section 22-105 provided the only sanction

available to the circuit court here. This tool states that “the enumeration of an exception in a

statute is considered to be an exclusion of all other exceptions.” Schultz v. Performance Lighting,

Inc., 2013 IL 115738, ¶ 17. First, this argument fails because use of this interpretive tool is

unnecessary when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. See Clark, 2018 IL 122495,

¶ 8. Even if we were to consider the argument, moreover, it would also fail because it does not

apply in this instance. Section 22-105 is a fee provision that contains no indication it is an

exception to a court’s powers to sanction a litigant.

¶ 14 Defendant also argues that Rule 137 cannot apply here because when two statutory

provisions conflict, one specific and one more general, a court must give effect to the specific

provision. See Cooke v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2021 IL 125386, ¶ 62. We disagree that

this case implicates this principle because there is no conflict between Section 22-105 and Rule

137 here. Section 22-105 contains no language stating a circuit court cannot impose other

sanctions for frivolous filings, nor does it state any other statutes or rules are superseded.

Multiple sanctions, including court costs as described in section 22-105 and additional sanctions

under Rule 137, are possible to deter frivolous filings, and the plain language of section 22-105

demonstrates no intent to limit the range of sanctions available to the court. See People v.

Alcozer, 241 Ill. 2d 248, 260-61 (2011) (“At most, the statute only affects a prisoner’s right to

file frivolous legal documents without being responsible for the costs” and “the purpose of

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section 22–105 is to compensate courts for some of the expense incurred in adjudicating

frivolous petitions for postconviction relief”). It follows that no inherent conflict exists between

section 22-105 and Rule 137, and as such, we will not read section 22-105 to cancel out the

potential application of Rule 137 sanctions to frivolous filings by prisoners. See Barragan v.

Casco Design Corp., 216 Ill. 2d 435, 451 (2005) (principle regarding specific versus general

statutes does not apply where two provisions “are compatible and can be read harmoniously”).

¶ 15 We note that this is not an instance where a sanction imposed by the court for a frivolous

filing by a prisoner directly conflicts with section 22-105, as in the unpublished case People v.

Chambers, 2015 IL App (1st) 100575-UB. 1 In Chambers, the circuit court sanctioned the

criminal defendant by imposing costs and fees, and barred the defendant from future filings until

he paid. Chambers, 2015 IL App (1st) 100575-UB, ¶ 28. This court vacated the sanction because

it directly conflicted with the plain language of section 22-105, which expressly permits a

defendant to file new petitions even if a previous monetary penalty remains unpaid. Id. No such

direct conflict is present here.

¶ 16 Our finding that defendant’s argument regarding section 22-105 fails does not resolve the

issue here, because though the circuit court may have had authority outside of section 22-105 to

sanction defendant, it still had to do so without abusing its discretion. See Mohica v. Cvejin,

2013 IL App (1st) 111695, ¶ 47 (regarding sanctions under Rule 137); Sander v. Dow Chemical

Co., 166 Ill. 2d 48, 67 (1995) (regarding sanctions under a court’s inherent power to control its

docket). “An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary,

1 Chambers was originally published as People v. Chambers, 2013 IL App (1st) 100575, but then vacated and remanded by the Illinois Supreme Court for reasons unrelated to its sanctions discussion. This court issued Chambers again as an unpublished order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 (eff. July 1, 2011), with the sanction discussion intact.

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fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial

court.” People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000).

¶ 17 We find that the circuit court’s sanction requiring leave of court before defendant files

any future postconviction or section 2-1401 petitions was an abuse of discretion. The sanction is

unreasonably overbroad because the language would apply to not only postconviction or section

2-1401 petitions related to the convictions in case Nos. 89 CR 12063 and 89 CR 12067, but to

any petitions in any case. Consider, for instance, if the defendant incurred a new charge while

imprisoned and is convicted thereof. The circuit court’s sanction here would operate to restrict

his ability to file an initial postconviction petition under the Act to challenge that conviction

unless he received leave of court. That result is contrary to defendant’s rights under the Act. See

725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (1), (f) (West 2020) (defendant may challenge conviction in postconviction

petition, and only needs leave of court to file a successive petition). Similarly, under section 2-

1401, a litigant may file a petition claiming a judgment is void without abiding by the statute’s

normal procedural requirements, including a showing of due diligence or filing within the statute

of limitations. PNC Bank, National Association v. Kusmierz, 2022 IL 126606, ¶ 15. Accordingly,

we conclude that the order here goes beyond the court’s discretion to sanction, because while the

court knows defendant is likely to present frivolous arguments in any future petitions in the

present matters, it does not follow that the court may restrict defendant’s ability to exercise his

rights to file an initial postconviction petition, or challenge an order as void, in an unrelated

matter.

¶ 18 We note that in so finding, we make no determination on whether any prescreening

sanction for postconviction or section 2-1401 petitions in other contexts may or may not be

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appropriate, only that this particular sanction’s wording is so unreasonably overbroad that we

must vacate it.

¶ 19 The State argues we should affirm the circuit court’s order because the sanction is

appropriate given defendant’s repeated filings raising the same, failed arguments in case Nos. 89

CR 12603 and 89 CR 12607. We are most sympathetic to the circuit court’s entirely justifiable

frustration. In fact, the defendant himself does not attempt to justify his filings here, argue they

are meritorious, or even contend that he should not be sanctioned. It is not, however, the

appropriateness of a sanction generally that forms the basis of our decision; it is the overbreadth

of the sanction imposed here that compels our conclusion..

¶ 20 The State cites Gillard v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 2019 IL App (1st) 182348,

and East Lake Condominium Association v. Brewer, 2022 IL App (1st) 201373-U, as examples

of past cases where this court enforced a filing restriction as an appropriate sanction. Both cases

are distinguishable. In Gillard, this court specifically sanctioned a litigant for her repeated filings

of baseless appeals in civil matters. As such, the case did not address a prisoner’s statutory right

to file a postconviction petition under the Act. See Gillard, 2019 IL App (1st) 182348, ¶¶ 61-71;

725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2020). In Brewer, an unpublished matter, this court upheld the

circuit court’s sanction of requiring the litigant to receive leave to file any additional motions

within the same case, which has no relevance here to the consideration of a prescreening process

for unrelated cases. See Brewer, 2022 IL App (1st) 201373-U, ¶ 30.

¶ 21 Finally, we reject the State’s argument that the circuit court’s sanction was appropriate

because it does not deny defendant access to the courts. As explained above, the sanction as

written requires defendant to receive leave of this circuit court for any future postconviction or

section 2-1401 petitions. Again, while we are sympathetic to the court’s frustration with

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defendant’s repeated filings in the cases at issue, the potential for this sanction to function as a

block to defendant’s access to courts in unrelated cases is clear, and renders it counter to the

statutory language, intent, and case law regarding post-conviction proceedings. See 725 ILCS

5/122-1(a) (West 2020) (an individual imprisoned in the penitentiary has the right to file an

initial postconviction petition challenging his conviction on constitutional ground); Kusmierz,

2022 IL 126606, ¶ 15 (a litigant does not lose the right to file a section 2-1401 petition

challenging an order for voidness due to procedural issues); 735 ILCS 5/22-105 (West 2020)

(“Nothing in this Section prohibits an applicant from filing an action or proceeding if the

applicant is unable to pay the court costs”); Alcozer, 241 Ill. 2d at 260 (section 22-105 “does not

impinge upon a prisoner’s fundamental right to access to the courts because fees are assessed

only after a legal document is found to be frivolous”). As such, we must vacate the sanction.

¶ 22 CONCLUSION

¶ 23 In sum, while we reject defendant’s argument that section 22-105 provides the only

sanction available to a circuit court when seeking to sanction a criminal defendant for filing

frivolous postconviction or second or subsequent section 2-1401 petitions, we find that the

specific sanction levied here was not justified by the court’s ability to control its own docket or

impose sanctions under Rule 137. Accordingly, the portion of the order dismissing the petitions

is affirmed, but the portion sanctioning defendant is vacated. We remand for the limited purpose

of the circuit court determining if it wishes to fashion an appropriately limited sanction. If so, the

court must give defendant the opportunity to show cause why he should not be so sanctioned.

¶ 24 Affirmed in part; vacated in part; remanded with instructions.