2024 IL App (1st) 240746-U No. 1-24-0746B Order filed June 3, 2024 Fifth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 24600132001 ) DIONTE BAGGETT, ) Honorable ) Jerome C. Barrido, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm is not an offense eligible for pretrial detention, we reverse the circuit court’s detention order and remand the matter back to the circuit court to determine the appropriate conditions of pretrial release.
¶2 Defendant Dionte Baggett was charged with aggravated battery of a child resulting in
bodily harm. Following a pretrial detention hearing, the circuit court found that he had committed
an offense eligible for pretrial detention and ordered him detained while awaiting trial. Baggett
now appeals the court’s detention order and contends that the offense is not detainable pursuant to No. 1-24-0746B
Public Acts 101-652 and 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness
Act (Act), which amended Article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725
ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)). Because we agree that aggravated battery of a child resulting
in bodily harm is not a detainable offense, we reverse the court’s detention order and remand the
matter back to the circuit court to determine the appropriate conditions of pretrial release for
Baggett.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In March 2024, Baggett was arrested and charged with aggravated battery of a child
resulting in bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(2) (West 2022)). The felony complaint alleged
that Baggett hit the victim, a minor under the age of 13 years old, on the buttocks multiple times
with a belt and intentionally caused the victim bodily harm. On the felony complaint, next to the
name of the charged offense, it stated that the offense was “domestic related.” Thereafter, the State
filed a verified petition to detain Baggett while awaiting trial and asserted that aggravated battery
of a child, which was “domestic” in nature, was detainable under the Act as a “domestic
battery/aggravated domestic battery” under section 110-6.1(a)(4) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a)(4) (West 2022)).
¶5 The circuit court subsequently held a detention hearing, where the State sought leave to
amend its petition to allege that Baggett’s charge of aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily
harm was also detainable under the Act as a “forcible felony” under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the
Code (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5)). Over the objection from Baggett’s defense counsel, the circuit court
allowed the State’s amendment. Following the State’s proffer and the parties’ arguments, the
circuit court found that Baggett had committed a detainable offense under both subsection (a)(1.5),
as a forcible felony, and subsection (a)(4), as a form of domestic battery. The court also found that
-2- No. 1-24-0746B
the proof was evident, or the presumption great, Baggett committed aggravated battery of a child,
that he posed a danger to his children and their mother, and that no conditions or combination of
conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat. The court therefore ordered Baggett
detained while awaiting trial.
¶6 This appeal followed.
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 Baggett contends that the circuit court erred in finding he committed an offense eligible for
pretrial detention. 1 This issue requires us to interpret section 110-6.1(a) of the Code (id. § 110-
6.1(a)), which lists the various offenses that are eligible for pretrial detention. In interpreting a
statute, our primary objective is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. People v.
Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832, ¶ 39. In doing so, the best indicator is the plain language of the
statute. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323 (2007). If the statute’s language is unambiguous and
clear, we must apply the statute as written. Id. We review an issue of statutory interpretation de
novo. People v. Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756, ¶ 21.
¶9 As noted, section 110-6.1(a) lists the various offenses that are eligible for pretrial detention.
725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022). In this case, the circuit court found aggravated battery of a
child resulting in bodily harm—charged under section 12-3.05(b)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012
(720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(2) (West 2022))—was detainable under sections 110-6.1(a)(1.5) and 110-
6.1(a)(4) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5), (4) (West 2022)).
1 The State did not file a responding memorandum.
-3- No. 1-24-0746B
¶ 10 We begin with whether aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm is a detainable
offense under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code. That section provides, in relevant part, that a
defendant is eligible to be detained pretrial if he
“is charged with a forcible felony, which as used in this Section, means treason,
first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, armed robbery,
aggravated robbery, robbery, burglary where there is use of force against another
person, residential burglary, home invasion, vehicular invasion, aggravated arson,
arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily
harm or permanent disability or disfigurement or any other felony which involves
the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or
disfigurement.” Id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5).
Subsection (a)(1.5) refers to 18 specifically enumerated felonies that constitute a forcible felony
and includes a residual clause for non-specifically enumerated felonies “involv[ing] the threat of
or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement,” which also constitute
a forcible felony. Id. The offense of aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm is not
one of the 18 enumerated offenses. See id. As such, aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily
harm can only constitute a forcible felony if it is “any other felony which involves the threat of or
infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” Id.
¶ 11 People v. Grandberry, 2024 IL App (3d) 230546, is instructive in resolving this question.
There, the appellate court found that aggravated battery to a peace officer and aggravated battery
to a nurse were not forcible felonies under subsection (a)(1.5). Id. ¶¶ 11-13. In so finding, the
appellate court determined that, when subsection (a)(1.5) refers to “ ‘any other felony,’ ” this
-4- No. 1-24-0746B
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
2024 IL App (1st) 240746-U No. 1-24-0746B Order filed June 3, 2024 Fifth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 24600132001 ) DIONTE BAGGETT, ) Honorable ) Jerome C. Barrido, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm is not an offense eligible for pretrial detention, we reverse the circuit court’s detention order and remand the matter back to the circuit court to determine the appropriate conditions of pretrial release.
¶2 Defendant Dionte Baggett was charged with aggravated battery of a child resulting in
bodily harm. Following a pretrial detention hearing, the circuit court found that he had committed
an offense eligible for pretrial detention and ordered him detained while awaiting trial. Baggett
now appeals the court’s detention order and contends that the offense is not detainable pursuant to No. 1-24-0746B
Public Acts 101-652 and 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness
Act (Act), which amended Article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725
ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)). Because we agree that aggravated battery of a child resulting
in bodily harm is not a detainable offense, we reverse the court’s detention order and remand the
matter back to the circuit court to determine the appropriate conditions of pretrial release for
Baggett.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In March 2024, Baggett was arrested and charged with aggravated battery of a child
resulting in bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(2) (West 2022)). The felony complaint alleged
that Baggett hit the victim, a minor under the age of 13 years old, on the buttocks multiple times
with a belt and intentionally caused the victim bodily harm. On the felony complaint, next to the
name of the charged offense, it stated that the offense was “domestic related.” Thereafter, the State
filed a verified petition to detain Baggett while awaiting trial and asserted that aggravated battery
of a child, which was “domestic” in nature, was detainable under the Act as a “domestic
battery/aggravated domestic battery” under section 110-6.1(a)(4) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a)(4) (West 2022)).
¶5 The circuit court subsequently held a detention hearing, where the State sought leave to
amend its petition to allege that Baggett’s charge of aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily
harm was also detainable under the Act as a “forcible felony” under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the
Code (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5)). Over the objection from Baggett’s defense counsel, the circuit court
allowed the State’s amendment. Following the State’s proffer and the parties’ arguments, the
circuit court found that Baggett had committed a detainable offense under both subsection (a)(1.5),
as a forcible felony, and subsection (a)(4), as a form of domestic battery. The court also found that
-2- No. 1-24-0746B
the proof was evident, or the presumption great, Baggett committed aggravated battery of a child,
that he posed a danger to his children and their mother, and that no conditions or combination of
conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the threat. The court therefore ordered Baggett
detained while awaiting trial.
¶6 This appeal followed.
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 Baggett contends that the circuit court erred in finding he committed an offense eligible for
pretrial detention. 1 This issue requires us to interpret section 110-6.1(a) of the Code (id. § 110-
6.1(a)), which lists the various offenses that are eligible for pretrial detention. In interpreting a
statute, our primary objective is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. People v.
Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832, ¶ 39. In doing so, the best indicator is the plain language of the
statute. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323 (2007). If the statute’s language is unambiguous and
clear, we must apply the statute as written. Id. We review an issue of statutory interpretation de
novo. People v. Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756, ¶ 21.
¶9 As noted, section 110-6.1(a) lists the various offenses that are eligible for pretrial detention.
725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022). In this case, the circuit court found aggravated battery of a
child resulting in bodily harm—charged under section 12-3.05(b)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012
(720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(2) (West 2022))—was detainable under sections 110-6.1(a)(1.5) and 110-
6.1(a)(4) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5), (4) (West 2022)).
1 The State did not file a responding memorandum.
-3- No. 1-24-0746B
¶ 10 We begin with whether aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm is a detainable
offense under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code. That section provides, in relevant part, that a
defendant is eligible to be detained pretrial if he
“is charged with a forcible felony, which as used in this Section, means treason,
first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, armed robbery,
aggravated robbery, robbery, burglary where there is use of force against another
person, residential burglary, home invasion, vehicular invasion, aggravated arson,
arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily
harm or permanent disability or disfigurement or any other felony which involves
the threat of or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or
disfigurement.” Id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5).
Subsection (a)(1.5) refers to 18 specifically enumerated felonies that constitute a forcible felony
and includes a residual clause for non-specifically enumerated felonies “involv[ing] the threat of
or infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement,” which also constitute
a forcible felony. Id. The offense of aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm is not
one of the 18 enumerated offenses. See id. As such, aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily
harm can only constitute a forcible felony if it is “any other felony which involves the threat of or
infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” Id.
¶ 11 People v. Grandberry, 2024 IL App (3d) 230546, is instructive in resolving this question.
There, the appellate court found that aggravated battery to a peace officer and aggravated battery
to a nurse were not forcible felonies under subsection (a)(1.5). Id. ¶¶ 11-13. In so finding, the
appellate court determined that, when subsection (a)(1.5) refers to “ ‘any other felony,’ ” this
-4- No. 1-24-0746B
“means any felonies other than those listed” precedingly. Id. ¶ 12. “As the statute specifically
enumerated a subset of aggravated battery as a forcible felony (aggravated battery resulting in
great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement), ‘other felony’ must refer to felonies
other than aggravated battery, not different subsets of aggravated battery like we have here.”
(Emphasis in original.) Id. The appellate court further observed “that the list of forcible felonies
includes some felonies without qualification, like robbery and aggravated robbery, and others with
qualification, like aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or
disfigurement and burglary where there is use of force against another person.” Id. According to
the appellate court, “[h]ad the legislature intended to include all aggravated batteries” as forcible
felonies, “it would have done so.” Id.; see also People v. Brooks, 2024 IL App (4th) 240503, ¶¶
20-21 (agreeing with Grandberry and concluding that aggravated battery based solely on the
location of the conduct at issue was not a forcible felony under the Act); People v. Brookshaw,
2023 IL App (4th) 230854-U, ¶¶ 12-15 (concluding aggravated battery of a peace officer not a
forcible felony under the Act).
¶ 12 We find the reasoning of Grandberry persuasive and agree that our legislature intended the
residual clause of subsection (a)(1.5) to refer to felonies other than the specifically enumerated
ones. As such, aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm cannot be considered “any
other felony” for purposes of the residual clause. Consequently, the offense is not a forcible felony
under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)), and Baggett
could not be detained on that basis.
¶ 13 Having found that aggravated battery of a child resulting in bodily harm is not detainable
under subsection (a)(1.5), we now turn to whether the offense is detainable under subsection (a)(4).
Section 110-6.1(a)(4) of the Code provides, in relevant part, that a defendant is eligible to be
-5- No. 1-24-0746B
detained pretrial if he is “charged with domestic battery or aggravated domestic battery under
Section 12-3.2 or 12-3.3 of the Criminal Code of 2012.” Id. § 110-6.1(a)(4). Although the State’s
proffer at the detention hearing showed that the victim was Baggett’s son and the allegations
against Baggett seemingly could form the basis for a domestic battery charge, the State did not
charge Baggett with domestic battery or aggravated domestic battery under section 12-3.2 or 12-
3.3 of the Criminal Code of 2012. Rather, the State charged Baggett with aggravated battery of a
child resulting in bodily harm under section 12-3.05(b)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS
5/12-3.05(b)(2) (West 2022)), which is not one of the two enumerated sections of the Criminal
Code of 2012 in section 110-6.1(a)(4) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4) (West 2022)).
Consequently, Baggett’s charged offense was not a detainable offense under subsection (a)(4).
¶ 14 As the State did not charge Baggett with an offense eligible for pretrial detention, the circuit
court erred in granting the State’s petition for pretrial detention. Therefore, we remand the matter
to the circuit court to determine the appropriate conditions of pretrial release for Baggett. See
Grandberry, 2024 IL App (3d) 230546, ¶ 13. Additionally, because we conclude that Baggett
cannot be detained while awaiting trial, the mandate in this case shall issue instanter. See People
v. McDonald, 2024 IL App (1st) 232414, ¶ 44.
¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 16 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and
remand for further proceedings.
¶ 17 Reversed and remanded.
-6-