People v. Ayoubi

2025 IL App (1st) 240783-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: October 14, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-0783
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 240783-U No. 1-24-0783 Order filed October 14, 2025. First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 2013 CR 0015301 ) FIRAS AYOUBI, ) The Honorable ) Paul S. Pavlus, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Howse concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court’s denial of defendant’s motion for forensic testing is affirmed where defendant failed to establish that forensic DNA testing of hair found on the victim’s shirt could produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to his claim of actual innocence.

¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Firas Ayoubi was found guilty of aggravated criminal

sexual assault predicated on kidnapping and sentenced to 28 years in prison. Defendant appeals

from the circuit court’s denial of his pro se motion for forensic DNA testing pursuant to section No. 1-24-0783

116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 2020)) of hair

recovered from the victim’s shirt. On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in

denying his motion as he established a prima facie case for forensic DNA testing and the results

of such testing would materially advance his claim of actual innocence. We affirm.

¶3 The facts of this case have been detailed in our opinion on direct appeal. See People v.

Ayoubi, 2020 IL App (1st) 180518. We now relate only the facts necessary to decide this appeal.

¶4 At trial, the victim, Y.L., testified that she entered and opened Palm Beach Tan for business

at 8 a.m. on December 4, 2012. Shortly after opening, she saw a person, who she identified in court

as defendant, quickly approaching with his gloved hand “ready to grab [her].” Defendant’s face

was covered from the bridge of his nose down, but Y.L. could see defendant’s eyes, eyebrows,

hairline, bridge of his nose, and some of his ears.

¶5 Defendant grabbed Y.L. by her hair and forced her into the laundry room at the back of the

salon. He turned her around so that they were face to face. Y.L. focused on his facial features to

remember his appearance. She observed slightly large eyes that were “low and droopy” and

slightly pointy ears. Defendant’s hair was dark brown and cut straight across. Additionally, his

eyebrows were dark but faint at the ends and the bridge of his nose was “not too big.” Defendant

wore a light grass-green hoodie with the hood pulled over his head and black, fleece-like pants.

Both of his hands were gloved. He was approximately 5’10” tall.

¶6 Defendant pushed Y.L.’s head down and forced her to her knees. He lowered his pants and

boxer shorts, revealing a condom on his erect penis. Defendant put his penis in Y.L.’s mouth for

“[a] couple of very long seconds, maybe in the tens, twenties,” and then pulled up his pants. He

walked Y.L. down the hallway, where they encountered a customer, later identified as Joseph

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Reilley. Defendant let go of Y.L., who ran next door to Jewel-Osco, where someone called 911.

Through the store’s window, Y.L. saw defendant walk out of the salon toward the parking lot, but

lost sight of him.

¶7 After Y.L.’s rape kit was completed at the hospital, a police officer returned her to Palm

Beach Tan, where she spoke to detectives. She described the offender as a very skinny Hispanic

man, between 18 and 20 years old, with black hair and dark eyes. She also described his hairline

and ears.

¶8 The next day, detectives showed Y.L. a photo array. When Y.L. looked at the photo array,

she was “1,000%” sure that defendant was the offender. She recognized him in the photo array

because of his “low droopy eyes.” At the physical lineup the following day, she identified

defendant. She also identified photographs of the pants and boxer shorts defendant wore during

the assault.

¶9 Reilley testified that when he parked outside Palm Beach Tan on the day of the incident,

he saw a small passenger vehicle and a black SUV in the parking lot. He went inside at about 8

a.m. and saw a taller, thin man, who Reilley identified in court as defendant, wearing dark pants

and a hooded, light-green sweatshirt. After waiting five minutes for someone to help him, Reilley

saw defendant approach the counter holding a young girl, who said “please help me.” After a brief

exchange, Y.L. broke free, fleeing the salon. Although defendant wore his hood up and “a scarf or

something across his face,” Reilley focused on defendant’s eyes and nose.

¶ 10 Reilley backed out of the salon, ran to his vehicle to get his cell phone, and saw defendant

exit the salon. While looking down to retrieve his phone, Reilley lost sight of defendant, but the

black SUV that had been parked nearby spun its wheels and “just took off.” Reilley followed the

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SUV, which left the parking lot and ran a red light. He determined that the SUV’s Illinois license

plate number contained three or four “ones,” but he ultimately lost sight of the SUV.

¶ 11 Upon returning to the salon, Reilley told police the offender was between 20 and 30 years

old, skinny, 5’10” or 5’11” tall, and possibly Caucasian or Hispanic. When Reilley subsequently

viewed a physical lineup, he was “instantly” able to identify defendant because his eyes were

etched in his mind. He also recognized defendant’s “body stature.” Reilley had no doubt that

defendant was the offender.

¶ 12 Esteban Malapit, a Jewel-Osco employee, testified that at 8:10 a.m. on December 4, 2012,

an upset, young woman entered the store and said she had been attacked. Malapit looked through

the front window and saw a black Honda Odyssey with tinted windows quickly leave the parking

lot, ignoring stop signs and a red light.

¶ 13 Chicago Police Department Sergeant George Alexopoulos testified that he searched the

police database for a black Honda Odyssey with a male driver. The search returned defendant,

whose photo and identifiers matched the offender’s description. Sergeant Alexopoulos went to

defendant’s residence, located three or four miles from Palm Beach Tan, and saw a black Honda

Odyssey with tinted windows bearing license plate number 13111PT. When defendant drove the

vehicle the following day, officers detained him.

¶ 14 The next morning, Alexopoulos learned defendant’s cell phone number. Pursuant to a

search warrant for defendant’s phone, Alexopoulos then learned that a text containing the address

for Palm Beach Tan had been sent and received by defendant’s phone on November 25, 2012.

¶ 15 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent Joseph Raschke testified as an expert

in historical cell site data, which involved the analysis of cell phone companies’ records of phone

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activity, including records of which cell towers a phone communicated with. Raschke was asked

to determine whether defendant’s phone was near Palm Beach Tan at the time of the offense.

According to Raschke, text messages received at 7:21 a.m. and 7:22 a.m. pinged off the cell tower

nearest to the crime scene and on the side of the tower facing the crime scene. A phone call at 8:55

a.m. used the tower nearest to defendant’s residence.

¶ 16 The parties stipulated that no semen was found on Y.L.’s clothes or via rape kit testing,

that fingernail scrapings and oral swabs did not contain sufficient male DNA for analysis, that

Caucasian hairs found on Y.L.’s shirt were suitable for testing, and that defendant’s fingerprints

were not found at Palm Beach Tan.

¶ 17 On July 14, 2016, the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault

based on kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/11-1.30(a)(4) (West 2012)) and kidnapping based on actual

confinement (720 ILCS 5/10-1(a)(1) (West 2012)) and acquitted defendant of counts of attempted

aggravated robbery and aggravated criminal sexual assault predicated on attempted aggravated

robbery.

¶ 18 The trial court merged the kidnapping count into the aggravated criminal sexual assault

predicated on kidnapping count and sentenced defendant to 28 years in prison.

¶ 19 Defendant appealed, and we affirmed over his contentions, inter alia, that the pretrial

identifications were impermissibly suggestive and the evidence was insufficient to establish the

predicate kidnapping offense. Ayoubi, 2020 IL App (1st) 180518.

¶ 20 On November 16, 2020, defendant filed pro se the instant motion requesting forensic

testing of a pair of boxer shorts, a palm print recovered from the door of the tanning salon, and,

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relevant here, “hair not belonging to the victim *** recovered from her work uniform.” He

contended that the hair could have come from the offender.

¶ 21 The State moved to dismiss and deny the motion, contending that the requested testing

would not materially advance defendant’s claim of actual innocence. The State argued absence of

defendant’s hair on the victim’s shirt would not show that he did not commit the assault, and

another individual’s hair could have come from innocent contact with any number of people.

Defendant filed pro se a response, asserting that the Caucasian hair on Y.L.’s shirt not matching

his hair was relevant and material because Y.L. encountered no customers before the incident

happened at 8 a.m.

¶ 22 The trial court denied defendant’s motion for forensic testing. The court reasoned that the

requested testing would not make a material change in the outcome of the case given the

“overwhelming two identifications of two separate witnesses.”

¶ 23 On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for forensic

DNA testing of the hair pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code. Defendant asserts that he established

a prima facie case for forensic DNA testing, and that the results of the testing would reveal the

true perpetrator, materially advancing his long-standing claim of actual innocence.

¶ 24 Section 116-3 of the Code, in relevant part, permits a defendant to move for forensic DNA

testing “on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial *** which resulted in his or her

conviction,” and “was not subject to the testing which is now requested at the time of trial.” 725

ILCS 5/116-3(a)(1) (West 2020). To obtain forensic testing, a defendant must first present a prima

facie case showing that (1) identity was an issue at trial and (2) a proper chain of custody exists

and is sufficient to establish that the evidence to be tested “has not been substituted, tampered with,

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replaced, or altered in any material aspect.” Id. §§ 116-3(b)(1), (b)(2). Identity is an issue when a

defendant establishes that, at trial, his or her identity was in question. People v. Cocroft, 2020 IL

App (1st) 180056, ¶ 21. As to the chain of custody, “a defendant may rely on conclusions and

presumptions in his or her petition because the evidence sought to be tested will almost surely have

been within the State’s safekeeping rather than the defendant’s.” Id.

¶ 25 If a prima facie case is established, the court must then determine if (1) the result of the

testing has the “potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence *** materially relevant to the

defendant’s assertion of actual innocence” even where the results would not completely exonerate

the defendant, and (2) “the testing requested employs a scientific method generally accepted within

the relevant scientific community.” 725 ILCS 5/116-3(c)(1), (c)(2) (West 2020).

¶ 26 This court reviews de novo a circuit court’s ruling on a motion for forensic DNA testing

pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code. People v. Morrow, 2022 IL App (1st) 200388, ¶ 49. The

well-pleaded facts in a section 116-3 motion are accepted as true and construed liberally unless

contradicted by the record. Cocroft, 2020 IL App (1st) 180056, ¶ 21.

¶ 27 The parties agree that defendant has established a prima facie case for forensic testing and

that the requested testing “uses a method generally accepted within the scientific community.”

However, the State disputes that defendant’s requested testing has the potential to produce new

evidence materially relevant to his claim of actual innocence.

¶ 28 “[E]vidence which is ‘materially relevant’ to a defendant’s claim of actual innocence is

simply evidence which tends to significantly advance that claim.” People v. Savory, 197 Ill. 2d

203, 213 (2001). Whether the result of the testing significantly advances the defendant’s assertion

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of innocence requires the evidence at trial to be evaluated, in addition to the evidence that the

defendant seeks to be tested. People v. Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756, ¶ 33.

¶ 29 Here, defendant has failed to show that the requested testing would materially advance his

claim of actual innocence. At trial, defendant challenged his identity as the offender. However, the

State presented evidence from Y.L. and Reilley identifying defendant as the offender. During the

incident, they observed defendant’s eyes, nose, hair, and clothing. Y.L. identified defendant in a

photo array and both identified him in a physical line-up. Y.L. was “1000%” confident in her

identification, and Reilley also had no doubt. Further, Reilley and Malapit identified a vehicle

matching defendant’s vehicle as the vehicle seen fleeing from the scene. Additionally, cell tower

data suggested that defendant was near the scene shortly prior to the incident.

¶ 30 In the context of that trial evidence, defendant contends that testing the hair from Y.L.’s

work shirt would bolster his actual innocence claim where no forensic evidence linked him to the

assault because the testing would potentially identify a third-party assailant. We disagree. The

identification of a third party based on testing the hair from Y.L.’s work shirt would not materially

advance defendant’s claims of actual innocence. At best, it would show that Y.L.’s work shirt

came into contact with another person at an unspecified time. Evidence that Y.L. merely had

potential contact with someone else at the salon or elsewhere does not further defendant’s actual

innocence claim whatsoever.

¶ 31 Cases involving the testing of hair found in sensitive areas may be inherently suggestive

of intimate contact. See, e.g., People v. Grant, 2016 IL App (3d) 140211, ¶ 26 (denial of forensic

testing reversed because testing of hair found on the victim’s vaginal area could produce evidence

of a third-party assailant and undermine the victim’s testimony identifying defendant as the only

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perpetrator). However, the hair here was found was on CL’s shirt—a piece of outerwear that could

have had any number of contacts with third parties. It would not be particularly surprising or

illuminating to discover another individual’s hair on her shirt.

¶ 32 In sum, defendant failed to establish that the results of forensic DNA testing of the hair

would produce materially relevant evidence that would significantly advance his claim of actual

innocence. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s motion for forensic DNA

testing.

¶ 33 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

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