People v. Ayer
This text of People v. Ayer (People v. Ayer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
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Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter
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People v Ayer
2026 NY Slip Op 02502
April 24, 2026
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
v
JOSEPH D. AYER, ALSO KNOWN AS JOSEPH DAVID AYER, ALSO KNOWN AS JOSEPH AYER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
Decided on April 24, 2026
82 KA 23-00676
Present: Lindley, J.P., Curran, Ogden, Greenwood, And Hannah, JJ.
THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (KERRY A. CONNER OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
KEVIN T. FINNELL, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BATAVIA (WILLIAM G. ZICKL OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from a judgment of the Genesee County Court (Melissa Lightcap Cianfrini, J.), rendered August 9, 2022. The judgment convicted defendant upon a jury verdict of burglary in the second degree and petit larceny.
[*1]It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]), and petit larceny (§ 155.25). We affirm.
Contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that County Court properly refused to suppress tangible evidence and statements he made to the police (see generally People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 222-223 [1976]; People v Harvey, 170 AD3d 1675, 1677 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1031 [2019]). Indeed, we conclude that the police conduct was justified in its inception and at every subsequent stage of the encounter leading to defendant's arrest (see People v Pettiford, 173 AD3d 1716, 1716 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 936 [2019]; People v Bradley, 137 AD3d 1611, 1611 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1128 [2016]).
Specifically, inasmuch as defendant was found at the start of the encounter in close physical and temporal proximity to the scene of the reported incident and defendant's physical characteristics and clothing matched the description of one of the individuals involved in the incident, we conclude that the officers had a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, thereby justifying their initial common-law inquiry of defendant (see People v Gayden, 126 AD3d 1518, 1518 [4th Dept 2015], affd 28 NY3d 1035 [2016]; People v Atkinson, 185 AD3d 1438, 1439 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1092 [2020]; see generally De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223), which included asking defendant if he had any weapons (see People v Stevenson, 7 AD3d 820, 821 [2d Dept 2004]; People v Park, 294 AD2d 887, 888 [4th Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 679 [2002]). In response, defendant told the police that he possessed a knife, providing the police with reasonable suspicion that he was armed, and therefore the police were, at the start of the encounter, permitted to conduct a brief pat-down frisk to ensure officer safety (see People v Batista, 88 NY2d 650, 654 [1996]; People v Ginty, 204 AD3d 1487, 1488-1489 [4th Dept 2022]; see also People v Muhammed, 196 AD3d 1151, 1152-1153 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1061 [2021]).
Furthermore, we conclude that, during the course of their conversation with defendant and the codefendant, the police had reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime sufficient to detain him in their patrol vehicle (see People v Henry, 207 AD3d 1062, 1063 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 940 [2022]; Pettiford, 173 AD3d at 1717; People v Santiago, 142 AD3d 1390, 1391 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1127 [2016]). In addition to [*2]defendant having been found near the scene of the reported incident and matching the description of one of the suspects, defendant admitted to the police that he had trespassed on someone's property, and the codefendant told the police that she and defendant had broken into a home and stolen property from inside. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, the police clearly had a reasonable suspicion of a crime to justify detention of defendant while they investigated further (see Henry, 207 AD3d at 1063; Santiago, 142 AD3d at 1391; see generally People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234, 238-242 [1986]).
We reject defendant's contention that, during the police encounter, the police unlawfully searched a lunch box that was in his possession inasmuch as the totality of the circumstances establishes that he expressly and voluntarily consented to the police search (see People v Fioretti, 155 AD3d 1662, 1663 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1104 [2018]). To the extent that defendant also contends that the court erred in refusing to suppress statements made by the codefendant, we reject that contention and note that he lacks standing to seek suppression of her statements (see People v Davis, 103 AD3d 810, 812 [2d Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1003 [2013]; People v Hamilton, 232 AD2d 899, 900-901 [3d Dept 1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 942 [1997]; see generally People v Henley, 53 NY2d 403, 407-408 [1981]).
We reject defendant's contention that the conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we conclude that the evidence provides a "valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences" that could lead a rational person to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt (People v Delamota, 18 NY3d 107, 113 [2011]), that defendant committed the offense of burglary in the second degree. Specifically, there was evidence at trial—i.e., body-worn camera footage from immediately after the incident—that contained statements from the codefendant admitting that she and defendant had just broken into a residence and stolen property from inside. Moreover, the evidence at trial established that defendant was found in the vicinity of the broken-in home shortly after the burglary allegedly occurred, and was found in possession of property that came from the house. We further conclude that, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of all the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Even assuming, arguendo, that a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we conclude that "the jury was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and, on this record, it cannot be said that the jury failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded" (People v Dillard, 227 AD3d 1501, 1502 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 926 [2024] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Wilcox, 192 AD3d 1540, 1541 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 961 [2021]; People v Elmore, 175 AD3d 1003, 1005 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied
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