People v. Austin

2025 IL App (4th) 250133-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 12, 2025
• Docket: 4-25-0133
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (4th) 250133-U NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under May 12, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0133 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County DEANDRE L. AUSTIN, ) No. 24CF1001 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Adam Giganti, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the denial of defendant’s pretrial release, finding the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he posed a real and present threat to a person, persons, or the community and (2) no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that threat.

¶2 Defendant, Deandre L. Austin, appeals the trial court’s denial of his pretrial release

pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West

2022)), hereinafter as amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly

known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. He argues the State failed to prove (1) he posed a real and

present threat to a person, persons, or the community and (2) the threat could not be mitigated by

any conditions of release. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On August 8, 2024, defendant was charged with three counts of manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A), (c)(2) (West 2022)). The first two

counts were Class X felonies, while the third was a Class 1 felony.

¶5 The State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release. At the hearing

on the motion, the State alleged that defendant sold varying amounts of cocaine to a confidential

police informant on three separate dates. On July 29, 2024, he allegedly sold 22.29 grams to the

informant; on August 1, 2024, he allegedly sold 21.6 grams to the informant; and on August 5,

2024, he allegedly sold 11.3 grams to the informant. After the third sale, a search warrant was

obtained for defendant’s residence, and two firearms were located at the property. The State

informed the trial court that no charges were filed in connection with the discovery of the firearms,

though it anticipated this would change after testing on the firearms was completed.

¶6 The State discussed defendant’s criminal history, noting that he had three past cases

involving possession of a controlled substance and two prior firearm-related felony convictions.

The State emphasized the danger to the community posed by the manufacture and delivery of drugs

and concluded that no available conditions of release would be sufficient to mitigate the threat

defendant, having been charged with these crimes, posed.

¶7 Defendant urged the trial court to consider that despite the State anticipating he

would receive additional charges related to the firearms found at his residence, at the time of the

hearing, he had only been charged with three nonviolent drug offenses. He stated that he lived with

his girlfriend and four children, including a three-month-old, and that both he and his girlfriend

owned a hair salon. Additionally, his girlfriend held a firearm owners identification (FOID) card,

and defendant asserted his belief that the testing on the firearms found at his residence would show

they belonged to her. He also noted that his most recent offense was from 2016 and that he had

been off mandatory supervised release since 2019, showing that for five years, he had not

-2- encountered any legal issues.

¶8 The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof was

evident or the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) his pretrial

release posed a real and present threat to the community based on the specific articulable facts of

the case, and (3) no conditions would mitigate that threat. Accordingly, it denied him pretrial

release. The court noted that its findings were based on the nature and circumstances of the

offenses charged, defendant’s prior criminal history, and defendant being known to possess or

have access to weapons.

¶9 On October 7, 2024, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the denial of pretrial

release. In his motion, he stated that he assisted with the care of his ill grandfather a few times a

week and helped escort guests of the church his family owns to their cars following Wednesday

evening services. He asked the trial court to order his release on conditions. The court denied

defendant’s motion, again citing his criminal history and the danger drugs and firearms pose to the

community.

¶ 10 On January 22, 2025, defendant filed a second petition for pretrial release, alleging

a change in circumstances in that he had not been charged with any weapons offenses stemming

from the discovery of the firearms at his residence. At the hearing on his motion, defendant

elaborated that, at his first detention hearing, “the State’s attorney made a rather big deal about the

fact that the guns were pending testing” and the trial court “made its findings based on weapons

offenses.” Because he had not been charged, the court was left only with his drug offense charges,

which, defendant argued, were nonviolent offenses for which he could be released with conditions.

In response, the State noted the FOID card owned by defendant’s live-in girlfriend was, at the time

of the search, expired and so “no one in the household could have legally owned those firearms.”

-3- ¶ 11 The trial court denied defendant’s motion, stating, “[T]o make it clear, the gun

wasn’t the linchpin in regards to my prior decision. It may have been a factor, a small factor, but

it wasn’t a linchpin. *** But there were guns in the house for a convicted felon who was deal[ing]

drugs.” It repeated its earlier conclusion that defendant was a danger to the community and stated

its belief that if he were released, he would continue to sell drugs.

¶ 12 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s January 22, 2024, ruling. In

the motion, he restated his argument that the court relied heavily on the weapons found in the home

and his past weapons-related offenses to prove his dangerousness, but this was error, as defendant

was not charged with a gun offense and his live-in girlfriend was eligible at the time the search

warrant was executed for a FOID card.

¶ 13 The trial court denied defendant’s motion.

¶ 14 This appeal followed.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, defendant argues the State failed to prove by clear and convincing

evidence (1) that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community

and (2) that any threat he posed could not be mitigated by less restrictive conditions of release.

¶ 17 All criminal defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). To deny a defendant pretrial release, the State bears the burden of

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great

that the defendant committed a qualifying offense, (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat

to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of

the case, and (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat

the defendant poses. Id. When determining whether a defendant poses a real and present threat, a

-4- court may consider the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the

offense is a crime of violence; whether the defendant’s prior criminal history is indicative of

violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior; and whether the defendant is known to possess or have

access to any weapons. Id. § 110-6.1(g)(1), (2)(A), (7). When determining possible conditions of

release, courts must consider, among other factors, the nature and circumstances of the offense

charged; the defendant’s history and characteristics, including family ties, employment,

community ties, and criminal history; and the nature and seriousness of the real and present threat

to the safety of any person or the community. Id. § 110-5(a)(1), (3)(A), (4). Where the parties

proceed solely by proffer at a detention hearing, we conduct our review de novo. People v. Morgan,

2025 IL 130626, ¶ 51.

¶ 18 A. Dangerousness

¶ 19 Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove he posed a real and present

threat to the safety of any person or the community. Relying on People v. Norris, 2024 IL App

(2d) 230338-U, and People v. Drew, 2024 IL App (2d) 230606-U, he argues, “[T]he general

harms of drug use are not specific present threats to the community, as required by statute” and

are “not enough to find [him] dangerous to the community.” He further argues that “[t]he only

other factor the court relied on to find [he] was a danger to the community was the presence of

firearms in the home when it was searched.” He argues this was error, as “the State did not prove

the guns belonged to [him] or that he even had knowledge of their presence.”

¶ 20 We will begin with defendant’s first contention. Although defendant relies on

Norris and Drew, we have been hesitant to follow these decisions in the past. See People v. Woods,

2024 IL App (4th) 240190, ¶ 19. In Woods, we took issue with the conclusions in both Norris and

Drew that the generalized risk of societal harm from drug crimes is not sufficient to demonstrate

-5- a real and present threat to the community. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19. We expressed skepticism that “so long

as a defendant does not have a violent or abusive history, *** one can sell Class X amounts of

cocaine into the community over and over and not be deemed a threat to the community.” Id. ¶ 19.

Ultimately, because the defendant in Woods also had a criminal history, we did not reach the

question in that case of whether the generalized risk of selling drugs to the community was alone

enough to prove a defendant dangerous for purposes of pretrial detention. Id. ¶ 21. Similarly,

despite defendant’s argument, we need not reach it here. In addition to the harmful nature of his

charged offenses (see id. ¶ 20 (finding that the sale of drugs poses a threat to the community)),

defendant also has an extensive criminal history that includes convictions for possession of a

controlled substance and for firearm-related felonies. He also clearly has access to weapons, as

demonstrated by the firearms recovered from his home. All of these factors—the nature of his

offenses, his criminal history, and his access to weapons—are relevant to a determination of

dangerousness. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1), (2)(A), (7) (West 2022). We find the combination

of them is sufficient to establish that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of the

¶ 21 As a final note, to the extent defendant argues the trial court erred in considering

the firearms as evidence of his dangerousness as there was no proof that the guns belonged to him

or that he knew about them, we disagree. First, the State did not need to show that defendant owned

the guns that were found, only that he had access to them. See id. § 110-6.1(g)(7) (A court may

take into consideration “whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any weapons”

in determining dangerousness. (Emphasis added.)). Second, despite his contentions, the State did

offer proof that he was aware of and possessed the guns, namely, the fact that they were found in

his residence. We find this sufficient to conclude that he had access to firearms and, considering

-6- that neither he nor his girlfriend were able to legally own the firearms at the time they were found,

we also find it reasonable to conclude that, if granted pretrial release, he would again obtain access

to firearms, regardless of legality. Moreover, we note that whether defendant has access to firearms

is just one factor to consider in determining his dangerous. It is not an essential finding to support

the conclusion that he poses a threat to the community. See Woods, 2024 IL App (4th) 240190,

¶ 21 (finding a threat to the community existed based only on the nature of the crime and the

defendant’s criminal history).

¶ 22 Considering the nature of the offenses with which defendant was charged, his

criminal history, and his known access to firearms, we find that the State met its burden of proving

by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the community’s

safety.

¶ 23 B. Conditions

¶ 24 Defendant argues the trial court also erred in determining that no conditions of

release could mitigate the threat he poses. He argues first that the court used the wrong standard

in reaching its decision, shown by its statement that less restrictive conditions would not

“negate[ ]” the threat posed by defendant, rather than “mitigate” the threat posed. He further argues

that his past successful completion of mandatory supervised release shows he is likely to comply

with court orders and that he has a strong family support system to help him be successful on

pretrial release.

¶ 25 We are unconvinced. To begin, we are unconcerned with the trial court’s use of the

word “negate[ ]” in place of “mitigate.” Even if this were a material substitution, which we do not

claim it to be, we are conducting our own de novo review of the evidence. The trial court’s

reasoning is not relevant for our purposes.

-7- ¶ 26 Turning to the substance of the issue, we do not find that any conditions of release

could mitigate the threat defendant poses. Defendant recommends conditions such as GPS

monitoring and home confinement, yet these are only geographical limitations and would not

necessarily prevent illegal activity within the designated geographical limit. Further, despite

defendant’s claims, we are also not convinced that family support would deter his criminal activity.

Neither caring for his ill grandfather nor his involvement with his family’s church prevented him

from selling drugs on multiple occasions in the past. It is unclear why they should now be strong

deterrents. Finally, while defendant argues his past successful completion of mandatory supervised

release indicates his ability to comply with court orders, we find the fact that he has multiple past

convictions for possession of a controlled substance and again stands charged with a new drug-

related offense instead demonstrates his willingness to continue engaging in the same criminal

activity. For these reasons, we conclude that no conditions of release would be sufficient to prevent

him from continuing to sell drugs and endangering the safety of the community.

¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 29 Affirmed.

-8-