People v. Astwood

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Astwood

122 A.D.3d 936, 998 N.Y.S.2d 113

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 26, 2014

Docket2013-00958

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 122 A.D.3d 936 (People v. Astwood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Astwood, 122 A.D.3d 936, 998 N.Y.S.2d 113 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

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Opinion

Appeal by the defendant, by permission, from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Rienzi, J.), dated December 21, 2012, which, without a hearing, denied her motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate a judgment of the same court rendered March 15, 2001, convicting her of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, upon her plea of guilty, on the ground that she was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.

Ordered that the order is affirmed.

In 2001, the defendant was convicted, upon her plea of guilty, of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree. In 2012, the defendant moved pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction on the ground that she was deprived of the effec *937 tive assistance of counsel, contending that her attorney was ineffective for failing to advise her that her conviction would result in her designation as a sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C [hereinafter SORA]).

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion. SORA registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea (see People v Gravino, 14 NY3d 546, 550 [2010]). The defendant’s conviction became final prior to the date the United States Supreme Court decided Padilla v Kentucky (559 US 356 [2010]), which held that defense counsel were required to advise defendants of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Prior to that decision, it was the law of this State that defense counsel were not under a duty to advise defendants of collateral consequences of their guilty pleas (see People v Baret, 23 NY3d 777, 784-785 [2014]; People v Varenga, 115 AD3d 684, 686 [2014], lv granted 23 NY3d 1068 [2014]; People v Picea, 97 AD3d 170, 177 [2012]). However, Padilla does not apply retroactively in state court postconviction proceedings (see People v Baret, 23 NY3d at 781), or in federal collateral review (see Chaidez v United States, 568 US —, —, 133 S Ct 1103, 1108-1109 [2013]). Accordingly, the defendant’s contention that the holding of Padilla should apply here with respect to counsel’s alleged failure to advise her of the SORA consequences of her guilty plea is without merit.

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit.

Eng, EJ., Cohen, Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by the defendant, by permission, from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Rienzi, J.), dated December 21, 2012, which, without a hearing, denied her motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate a judgment of the same court rendered March 15, 2001, convicting her of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, upon her plea of guilty, on the ground that she was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.

Ordered that the order is affirmed.

In 2001, the defendant was convicted, upon her plea of guilty, of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree. In 2012, the defendant moved pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction on the ground that she was deprived of the effec *937 tive assistance of counsel, contending that her attorney was ineffective for failing to advise her that her conviction would result in her designation as a sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C [hereinafter SORA]).

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion. SORA registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea (see People v Gravino, 14 NY3d 546, 550 [2010]). The defendant’s conviction became final prior to the date the United States Supreme Court decided Padilla v Kentucky (559 US 356 [2010]), which held that defense counsel were required to advise defendants of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Prior to that decision, it was the law of this State that defense counsel were not under a duty to advise defendants of collateral consequences of their guilty pleas (see People v Baret, 23 NY3d 777, 784-785 [2014]; People v Varenga, 115 AD3d 684, 686 [2014], lv granted 23 NY3d 1068 [2014]; People v Picea, 97 AD3d 170, 177 [2012]). However, Padilla does not apply retroactively in state court postconviction proceedings (see People v Baret, 23 NY3d at 781), or in federal collateral review (see Chaidez v United States, 568 US —, —, 133 S Ct 1103, 1108-1109 [2013]). Accordingly, the defendant’s contention that the holding of Padilla should apply here with respect to counsel’s alleged failure to advise her of the SORA consequences of her guilty plea is without merit.

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit.

Eng, EJ., Cohen, Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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122 A.D.3d 936, 998 N.Y.S.2d 113, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-astwood-nyappdiv-2014.

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