People v. Arroyo Pérez

95 P.R. 320
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedSeptember 21, 1967
DocketNo. CR-66-262
StatusPublished

This text of 95 P.R. 320 (People v. Arroyo Pérez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Arroyo Pérez, 95 P.R. 320 (prsupreme 1967).

Opinion

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Bayamón Part, of June 18, 1962, in criminal case No. M61-809 is reversed and defendant acquitted. .

It was sa decreed and ordered by the Court as witnesses the. signature of the Chief Justice, who, like Mr.- Justice Santana Becerra, did not participate herein. Mr. Justice Belaval rendered a separate opinion, in which Mr. Justice Hernández Matos concurs. Mr. Justice Ramírez Bages dissented.

(s ) Luis Negrón Fernández

Chief Justice

I attest:

(s) Joaquín Berríos

Clerk

[321]*321Separate opinion of

Mr. Justice Belaval,

with whom Mr. Justice Hernández Matos concurs.

San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 21,1967

The present appeal merely assigns as sole error the following: “Pursuant to the provisions of §. 3 [read 4] of said Act No. 220, it is required that a person caught violating the bolita, act .shall be immediately arrested. He shall be brought before a district attorney, nowadays before a magistrate, who shall file the information in view of the evidence obtained. This mandate, of the law is inconsistent with the system of undercover agents which, without the authorization of the law, has been established in Puerto. Rico to investigate and enforce the bolita act. This situation places the defendant at a disadvantage since the outcome of the trial depends on whether the judge believes the defendant or the undercover agent. And, furthermore, since the arrest was not made immediately but about three months subsequent to the alleged commission of the offense, this fact puts defendant, at a disadvantage since it precludes him from presenting the defense of alibi, which he cannot do because he cannot remember where he was on the day the undercover agent alleges he sold him bolita. Therefore, the problem raised herein is not one for a speedy trial, but one for an impartial trial under the due process of law.”

The first ground does not convince us. The state has available three systems for the persecution- of an offense: (1) the immediate arrest when the criminal act occurs in the presence of a peace officer; (2) the subsequent search when any act makes the officer suspicious that an offense is being committed; (3) the raid, a more extensive persecution for the purpose of capturing an entire organization of delinquents. Naturally § 4 of Act No. 220 of 1948 refers to .the [322]*322first modality of persecution, that is, the immediate arrest when the criminal act occurs in the presence of a peace officer. Contrary to what is expected, the speedy trial provided by § 4 of Act No. 220 of 1948, as amended, does not contemplate the greatest protection for defendant, which would be a contradiction in an offense declared a public nuisance, but to create a “rigor” in the persecution of defendant within the characteristic tension of public “punishment.”

When it is necessary to obtain objective evidence to establish the criminal seizure of a suspect, the search warrant is always the proper thing. It is also an effective method when it is necessary to stop the operation of a delinquent group, through the destruction of the criminal materials. Furthermore, it does not conflict with the immediate individual arrest.

The problem created by the raid is that it is a method of persecution that, not having been designed for the immediate arrest of suspects or the destruction of the criminal materials, but for the persecution of a certain type of political crime, it does not operate harmoniously when applied to the ordinary prosecution. As it is well-known the raid is used to confront the “Crimes Against the Country”— treason, espionage, sabotage, sale of secret documents — or the offenses against the security of the State, such as the smuggling of weapons or drugs. See: Juan B. Carballa, “Delitos contra la Patria,” 1951 edition of the Biblioteca de Publicaciones Oficiales de la Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad de Montevideo. In the raid, defendant’s opportunity for defense, the undercover agent’s acts of instigation, the imponderable social risk, must all be carefully scrutinized, viewed with tranquil eyes, until the purple rose of justice opens in our conscience.

But we do agree with defendant in that when the prosecution of a defendant is limited to two simple testimonies, [323]*323one, that of the undercover agent with a bare annotation of the facts sufficient to constitute an offense, but without any clue to help us discover the truth, which is the essence of justice; the other, that of defendant, with the criminal act rather in a maze in his mind because of the lapse of time, who has to resign himself to a mere denial of the facts alleged by the undercover agent, the dilemma arises of whether to believe the testimony of a peace officer or that of defendant, there possibly being a tendency to believe the undercover agent rather than the disturber of peace, thereby causing a situation contrary to every order of law, of deciding against defendant any doubtful point contained in the evidence.

Fortunately, in this case the dilemma is not so close. The only witness of the incriminatory evidence is Roberto Flecha Delgado, the undercover agent, who testifies that about September 16, 1961, he was working for the Vice Control Squad of the Police Force of Puerto Rico, stationed in the town of Dorado; that that day, on arriving at ward San Antón in Dorado, he met defendant in a small refreshment stand beside his house; that the witness approached the stand to drink a beer and then he noticed that the man was jotting down bolita figures for the woman who was there; “three digit figures followed by a hyphen and other figures on the right-hand side in a list on white paper, school notebook paper, then I expressed my desire to bet. I told him to jot down for me No. 650 with 80 cents, which he jotted down under the other figures he had already jotted down and he jotted down 650, dash and 80 cents to the right and then we talked for awhile and he told me that he was going to obtain some bolipool notebooks for me to sell, to work as his fixer, and we agreed to that, and three or four days later I went again to his house to see whether he had obtained the notebooks for me and he told me that he had quit that business”; he did not deliver receipt of the [324]*324numbers to him; “I did not arrest him because I was making a confidential investigation and if I arrested'-him my identity as undercover agent would be revealed”; that the stand “is a small business, owned by his neighbor; it is a small business where beer and different tidbits and refreshments were sold,” that “the person who was there attending the business” was “a middle-aged woman who is his neighbor”; that at the time of the transaction “she was behind the counter- and we were in front buying”; he knows that the man (defendant-appellant) lives nearby,- a little farther on, in a concrete house with a small porch; that he saw defendant “three times, the day before the transaction, the day of the transaction, and three or four days later when I went to his house.”

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95 P.R. 320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-arroyo-perez-prsupreme-1967.