Fl LED SUPERIOR COURT -OF GUAM
202~JAN 25 PM L1: ~5 CLERK OF COURT 2
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6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 7 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF0075-22 8 ) GPD Report No.: 22-03508 ) 9 vs. ) 10 ) DECISION AND ORDER RE. AINY 1 ANTONIO aka Prawn Mory, ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 11 DOB: 08/21/1986 or 08/20/1988, ) SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ) 12 Defendant. ) 13
14 INTRODUCTION 15 This matter came before the Honorable Judge Maria T. Cenzon on October 27, 2023, for 16 a hearing on Defendant Ainy 1 Antonio's (the "Defendant") Motion to Suppress Evidence (the 17 "Motion"). Defendant was present during the hearing with counsel Assistant Public Defender 18
19 Peter Sablan and Assistant Attorney General Kristine Borja represented the People. Following
20 testimony and oral argument by the parties, the Court took the matter under advisement pursuant 21 to CVR 7.l(e)(6)(D) of the LOCAL RULES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM and 22 Administrative Rule Nos. 06-001. After considering the pleadings on file and reviewing the 23 applicable statutes and case law, the Court now issues this Decision and Order DENYING the 24
25 Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.
27 People of Guam vs. Ainy l Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 1 of 15 FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2 Defendant is charged with Possession of a Schedule II Controlled Substance (As a 3rd
3 Degree Felony), Notice: Commission of a Felony while on Felony Release, and Operating a 4 Vehicle Without a Valid License (As a Violation). Indictment (Feb. 11, 2023). These charges 5 stem from an incident that allegedly occurred on or about February 4, 2022, when Officer E. 6 Pewtress ("Officer Pewtress" or "Pewtress") pulled over the Defendant "in response to a routine 7
8 traffic stop." Magistrate's Comp/. Deel. (Feb. 4, 2022). The Defendant identified himself as
9 "Mark Risa," but it was later revealed that he did not possess a driver's license and his real name 10 was "Ainy Antonio." Id. The Declaration supporting the Magistrate's Complaint also avers that 11 Officer Pewtress "saw, in plain view, a small, clear resealable plastic bag in the center cup holder 12
13 that contained a small amount of a white crystalline substance, which field-tested positive for
14 methamphetamine/MDMA." Id. At the time of the alleged incident, Defendant was on pre-trial 15 release in CFO 166-20 and CM0507-l 9 and had outstanding warrants of arrest in both cases. Id 16 Defendant seeks to suppress all evidence, including the methamphetamines, obtained 17 following an warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle in violation of the Defendant's Fourth 18
19 Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. Defendant also seeks to prevent
20 Officer Pewtress from testifying at the trial of this matter relating to Defendant's statements or 21 conduct during the incident, as fruit of the poisonous tree. Mot. at 3. The Defendant does not 22 challenge the validity of the traffic stop, but only opposes the search on the basis that Officer 23
27 People of Guam vs. Ainy I Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 2 of 15 Pewtress conducted it without a warrant. The People oppose the Motion, arguing that the
2 Defendant's voluntary consent is an exception to the requirement of a warrant. 1
3 LEGAL ANALYSIS 4 THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH 5 AND SEIZURE RECOGNIZES VOLUNTARY CONSENT AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT. 6
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides "the right of the people 7
8 to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
9 seizures, [and] shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, IO supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 11 persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. In short, the Fourth Amendment protects 12
13 against unreasonable searches and seizures and is made applicable to Guam by 48 U.S.C.A. §
14 1421 b(c) of the Organic Act of Guam. People v. Yerten, 2021 Guam 8 ~ 17 (citing People v. 15 Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ~ 4) (internal citations omitted). 16 Accordingly, "a warrantless search or seizure is presumed to be unreasonable." See People 17 v. Quintanilla, 2020 Guam 8 ~ 27 (citing People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 14). However, the 18
19 police may lawfully conduct a search or seizure without a warrant if an exception to the warrant
20 requirement applies, such as voluntary consent. Id Where the consent occurs during a lawful 21 encounter or detention, the validity of the exception turns on whether the consent was voluntarily 22
24 1 The People do not advance, and so the Court does not address in this Decision, the applicability of the "plain view'
25 exception to the warrant requirement despite the Declaration to the Magistrate's Complaint indicating that "Office Pewtress also saw, in plain view, a small, clear resealable plastic bag ... that contained a small amount of ... 26 methamphetamine/MDMA." However, the Court notes that it is a recognized exception to the warrant requiremen under the 4th Amendment. 27 People of Guam vs. Ainy I Anronio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 3 ofl5 given. People v. Camacho, 2023Guam9115. If, however, consent was given during an unlawful
2 encounter, the consent is not valid and the exception does not apply "absent a demonstration by
3 the government both of a sufficient break in the causal chain between the illegality and the seizure 4 of the evidence, thus ensuring that the search is not an exploitation of the prior illegality, and of 5 voluntariness." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (Pa. 2000)(additional 6 citations omitted)). The Defendant here does not asset that the traffic stop was an unlawful 7
8 encounter; therefore, the Court shall assume that the traffic stop was valid when analyzing the
9 instant Motion. 10 Whether voluntary consent is given to search is based on all relevant circumstances in a II given case. Camacho at 1 19. When evaluating the totality of the circumstances, courts are 12
13 required to "balance relevant factors surrounding consent and the credibility of those witnesses
14 presenting evidence." Id (citing United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260, 1264 (9 th Cir. 1973)). 15 A trial court must "carefully sift through the unique facts and circumstances of each case, 16 balancing the government's interest in conducting lawful searches ·and the defendant's right to be 17 free from coercive conduct." Id. Of course, the prosecution has the burden of demonstrating the 18
19 voluntary nature of the consent (and, thus, the lawfulness of the search) by a preponderance of
20 the evidence. People v. Viva, 2023 Guam 24 ,i,i 15 -17 (the government bears the burden of 21 proving the lawfulness of the search; the People bear the burden of showing, by a preponderance 22 of the evidence, that Viva consented to the search). 23 We consider the following evidence as set forth in the testimony of Officer Pewtress and 24
25 Defendant Antonio during the hearing on the Motion.
27 People of Guam vs. Ainy 1 Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 4 of 15 1. Officer Pewtress's Initial Encounter with Defendant.
2 Around 6: 11 AM on February 4, 2022, 2 Officer Pewtress was patrolling along Route 4 in
3 Yona, passing Pago Bay Estates, when he observed a grey 2015 Nissan Sentra Sedan (the 4 "Nissan") whose passenger side tires straddled over the solid white line on the right shoulder. Id 5 at 9: 19: 12 AM. Officer Pewtress continued following the vehicle motoring uphill towards Yona 6 village on the inner lane and he observed the vehicle straddle over the outer lane once again, and 7
8 then straddled onto the outer line of the shoulder a third time. Id. at 9: 19:37 AM. The officer also
9 noticed that the Nissan's passenger side taillight was defective, which he contrasted with the 10 driver's side taillight, which was working. Id. at 9: 19:38 _AM. 11 As the cars arrived at a flatter area after the hill, Pewtress activated his emergency lights 12
13 and sirens and, in response, the driver of the Nissan pulled into the center left tum lane, rather
14 than onto the shoulder on the right, yet did not continue to tum left into the parking lot of the St. 15 Francis Church/School, but only stopped in the middle of the road. Id. at 9:20:28 AM. Testifying 16 that it was unsafe to remain in the roadway, using his patrol car's horn Officer Pewtress then 17 signaled for the driver of the Nissan to tum into the parking lot, which he did. Id. at 9:20:57 AM. 18
19 2. The Traffic Stop.
20 Pewtress then parked behind the Nissan and, after alighting from his car, approached the 21 "lone operator," "greeted him, informed him of the reason for the stop, requested for his license, 22 registration, and insurance; however, he indicated that he did not have his license with him, and 23
24 he was pointing forward, southbound, toward the main road generally, saying that he left it at
26 2 Hrg. on Mot. to Suppress at 9:19:43 AM (Oct. 27, 2023).
27 People of Guam vs. Ainy I Anronio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 5 of 15 home. However, through further interaction, he eventually admitted that he didn't have a license
2 at all. He also had no form of identification." Id. at 9:21 :20 to 9:22:00 AM. During the hearing,
3 Pewtress testified that the person he had pulled over that morning was the Defendant, who he 4 identified during the hearing as seated at Defendant's table. Id. at 9:26:28 AM. s After asking the driver of the vehicle if he had any form of identification, still unable to 6 produce any, the Defendant identified himself to Officer Pewtress as "Mark Rissa" with a certain 7
8 date of birth, "both of which were found to be fictitious." Id. at 9:22:20 AM. During this
9 interaction, Pewtress "observed [Defendant's] hands visibly shaking, his eyes were widened, and
he was fumbling around a lot. So, for safety reasons, in case there were any weapons, I used my 11 flashlight to illuminate the interior and I noticed a clear, resealable plastic bag." Id. at 9:22:55 12
13 AM.
14 3. The Meth and The Search. IS Pewtress testified that he observed a clear, resealable plastic bag in the center cup bolder 16 of the Nissan where the hand brake or the gear shift usually is located. Id. at 9:31 :07 AM. The 17 baggie was not lying flat, but '"canted', somewhat standing up [in the cup holder]." Id. After 18
19 seeing the plastic baggie, Officer Pewtress "asked the Defendant to step out of the vehicle, which
20 he voluntarily did. For safety reasons, I conducted a frisk of his person for weapons, but none 21 were felt." Id. at 9:23:25 AM. Defendant was then asked to stay outside the vehicle and was 22 standing between the driver's side door and the hood of the car and free to move around. There 23
24 were no other police officers at the scene of the stop.
25 Pewtress testified that, after Defendant exited his vehicle, "I obtained his consent to search 26 the vehicle and he said ... to the effect of ... he has nothing to hide claiming that he's a pastor for 27 People o/Guam vs. Ai11y I Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant' s Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 6 oflS a church." Id. When asking Defendant for consent to search the vehicle, Officer Pewtress testified
2 that the tone of his voice was calm, he did not have his weapon drawn, that he was the only officer
3 in the area, and that it was only Defendant and Pewtress at the scene. Id at 9:23 :32 AM. Pewtress 4 stated that the Defendant did not object to the search. Id. During the search, Defendant was not 5 restrained, not placed in the patrol vehicle, and was able to freely roam the area outside the 6 vehicle. Id. at 9:26:20 AM. No written consent form was executed by the Defendant, although 7
8 Officer Pewtress indicated that he did have written consent forms in the trunk of his patrol vehicle.
9 Id. at 9:36:00 AM 9:36:31 AM. 10 With respect to the conversation between Officer Pewtress and the Defendant regarding II consent to search the vehicle, the testimony during the hearing was as follows: 12
13 BORJA: To your recollection, what was your tone when you were asking him [for consent]? 14 PEWTRESS: It was calm. BORJA: What do you remember specifically saying to him when you asked 15 for consent? 16 PEWTRESS: Probably something to the effect of, "Do you have any weapons, drugs, or anything of concern? Is it ok if I search the car real quick, 17 if I check inside? BORJA: Did you promise him anything? 18 PEWTRESS: No. 3 19 After receiving permission to conduct the search, Pewtress testified that he immediately 20 checked the "clear plastic baggie" and confirmed that it did contain a small amount of crystalline 21
22 substance suspected to be methamphetamines. He based this opinion on his experience in
23 conducting approximately 150 to 200 narcotics investigations, having seen suspected 24
26 3 Id at 9:24:00 AM to 9:24:28 AM. 27 People of Guam vs. Ainy I Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 7 oflS methamphetamines during these investigations and "based on training, expenence and the
2 knowledge that meth is often packaged in such manner." Id. at 9:24:56 AM to 9:25:40 AM. Upon
3 confirming that the substance was suspected methamphetamines, Pewtress placed Defendant in 4 handcuffs, secured him "for safety reasons," and verbally advised him of his Miranda rights. Id. 5 at 9:25:28 AM. Pewtress also conducted a field test on the substance which confirmed it as 6
methamphetamines. Id. at 9:27:47 AM; 9:37:30 AM. No evidence of the field test or results 7
8 thereof was presented to the Court during the hearing. 4 Pewtress testified that the results of the
9 field test were included in his report; however, the report was not presented to the Court for 10 consideration. Id. at 9:38: 19 AM. Pewtress testified that from the time he pulled over Defendant
to stepping out of the vehicle to obtaining his consent, one to two minutes had lapsed. Id. at 12
13 9:41:33 AM.
14 When asked by defense counsel while testifying about whether he consented to the search 15 of his vehicle, Defendant testified that, "I gave him permission, but I also told him to provide me 16 documents to search my vehicle." Id. 9:45:42 AM. However, no testimony was elicited specifying 17 what type of "documents" Defendant had requested be provided to him nor whether these 18
19 documents were supposed to be given before or after the search. The direct examination of
20 Defendant regarding consent was as follows: 21 SABLAN: So, when the police stopped you, the police said that he asked you 22 to step out of the vehicle and they asked you for consent to search the vehicle. The police said that you said that you had nothing to 23
24 4 Although the evidence that field testing was conducted was not presented to the Court during the hearing, the Cou 25 finds that whether the field test was conducted or not is not relevant to the determination of whether the warranties search was reasonable under the 4 th Amendment and applicable case law. When appropriately brought before th 26 Court, the question of the admissibility of the methamphetamines evidence on different grounds may be addressed. I is not appropriate here. 27 People o/Guam vs. Ainy I Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 8 oflS hide and that you were a pastor. Did you ever give police any consent to search the vehicle? 2 DEFENDANT [through Court Interpreter]: I gave him permission, but I told him also to provide me documents to search my vehicle. 3 SABLAN: So, did you allow them to search your vehicle before they gave you documents to search your vehicle? 4 DEFENDANT [through Court Interpreter: No. 5 SABLAN: No .further questions, your honor.
6 Id. at 9: 44: 16 AM to 9:46:40 AM. The Court notes that on cross-examination of Officer Pewtress, 7 the officer was not asked whether Defendant had asked him for written consent documents prior 8 to the search, only whether the officer had such documents in his patrol vehicle and whether the 9
10 officer had the Defendant execute them. See, supra.
II 4. Defendant's Identity Confirmed as Ainy Antonio. 12 Following his arrest, Defendant was then transported to Central Precinct where Pewtress 13 was able to confirm the identity of the driver of the Nissan as Ainy Antonio, to whom the Nissan 14 was registered. Id. at 9:27:09 AM. An additional search yielded information that Antonio had 15
16 previously been in an accident involving the Nissan. Additionally, a photograph from a prior
17 arrest further confirmed the driver of the Nissan to be the Defendant Ainy Antonio. Id. Finally, 18 Defendant admitted to Pewtress while at Central Precinct that he was, in fact, Ainy Antonio. Id. 19 at 9:28:10 AM. 5 20 II 21 II 22 II
5 24 The People do not advance the argument that the evidence of the methamphetamines would have been inevitabl discovered had the Defendant told Officer Pewtress his real name, Ainy Antonio. Officer Pewtress would than hav 25 infonnation that the Defendant had several outstanding arrest warrants and been arrested, which would have led to th discovery of the methamphetamines in the vehicle resulting from a search incident to arrest. Because it was not raise 26 as additional basis for the exception to the warrant requirement, the Court does not address it substantively here. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984). 27 People of Guam vs. Ainy l Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 9 ofl5 II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION IS NOT ABSOLUTE.
2 The Fourth Amendment requires that a law enforcement officer making a traffic stop have
3 reasonable suspicion that an individual was engaged in or is about to be engaged in illegal 4 conduct. People v. Taman, 2013 Guam 22 ,i 22 (quoting People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ,i 40); 5 see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968). Reasonable suspicion requires '"some minimal 6 level of objective justification' for making a stop, but considerably less than the level of suspicion 7
8 required for probable cause." Id. (citing People v. Mansapit, 2016 Guam 30 ,i 13 (quoting United
9 States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). To determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts
look to both the "content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability," Id. 11 (citing Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ,i 5 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,330 (1990)), which 12
13 must be "viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer." Mansapit, 2016
14 Guam 30 ,i 9 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). The Defendant does 15 not challenge the legality of the traffic stop or encounter; therefore, the Court proceeds with the 16 assumption that the stop is valid and continues to discern whether the consent to search was given 17 voluntarily. 18
19 As already discussed, searches and seizures without a proper warrant are presumptively
20 unreasonable; however, the presumption is subject to a few exceptions including consent to a 21 search. See People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam .12 ,i 42. In this instance, the government bears the 22 burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was voluntary and 23 voluntariness is based on the totality of the circumstances. People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 ,i 24
25 25. Factors in determining voluntariness include: 1) whether the defendant was detained and the
26 length of time of the question; 2) whether the defendant was threatened or intimidated by the 27 People of Guam vs. Ainy I Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 10 of15 police; 3) whether the defendant relied on misrepresentations or promises made by the police; 4)
2 whether the person was in custody or under arrest when the consent was given; 5) whether the
3 person was in a public or a secluded place, and 6) whether the defendant objected to the search. 4 Id Because defendant does not argue that the traffic stop itself was unreasonable, the Court shall 5 consider whether voluntary consent was given by the Defendant to search his vehicle after the 6
7 stop by applying the factors outlined in Chargualaf.
8 A. The warrantless search and seizure of the Defendant's vehicle was lawful under the Fourth Amendment because the Defendant consented to the search under 9 C!,argua/af.
Defendant does not challenge the traffic stop which led to the search of the Defendant's . II vehicle. Instead, Defendant argues that because Officer Pewtress did not have a warrant to search 12
13 his Nissan, all evidence of the methamphetamines and any of Defendant's statements must be
14 suppressed. However, the People argue that Defendant gave his voluntary consent to search the 15 vehicle. "If consent is given during either a lawful encounter or a lawful detention, as opposed to 16 an illegal seizure, the validity of the consent turns on whether it was voluntarily given." 17 Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1114 (citing Santos, 1999 Guam at ,133-34; Santos, 1999 Guam at 11 18
19 33-34; Pennsylvania v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 888-889 (Pa. 2000)). We look to the factors set
20 forth in Chargualaf to determine whether consent was voluntary. 21 1. Defendant's detention was lawful and the length of time between the seizure 22 and the.subsequent search did not exceed two minutes.
23 After Defendant was stopped due to his erratic driving and broken taillight and he failed 24 to produce a license, registration, proof ofinsurance and any other identification, Officer Pewtress 25 testified that, during the encounter, he observed Defendant's hands visibly shaking, his eyes 26
27 People of Guam vs. Ainy I Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page II ofl5 widened, and he was fumbling around a lot. Upon illuminating the interior of the vehicle with
2 his flashlight, Officer Pewtress stated that it was then he observed the clear, resealable plastic
3 baggie. After he observed the baggie, he instructed Defendant to step out of the vehicle, which he 4 did voluntarily, and performed a pat down of the Defendant to look for any weapons, which he 5 did not have. 6 Defendant was then asked if he would permit Officer Pewtress to search the Nissan and 7
8 he responded that he had nothing to hide and that he was a pastor. Although Defendant testified
9 that he permitted the search, he indicated that he told Pewtress to "also to provide me documents 10 to search my vehicle." However, it was not clear based upon the questions asked during the 11 hearing what type of documents Defendant wanted to be provided to him. The direct examination 12
13 did not elicit the description of a "written consent" document, for example, so the Court will not
14 speculate as to whether Defendant was referring to a written consent or to a custody receipt 15 document or other documentation. What is clear, however, is that the Defendant testified that he 16 did give Pewtress permission to search the vehicle. Moreover, the uncontroverted testimony is 17 that only one to two minutes elapsed between the stop and the request for consent. This factor 18
19 weighs against suppression.
20 2. Defendant was not threatened or intimidated by the police. 21 There is no testimony that contradicts Officer Pewtress's description of his manner and 22 tone of communication during the stop and search. As such, the Court finds that Defendant was 23 not threatened nor intimidated by Officer Pewtress during the search. The Defendant does not 24
25 argue or state otherwise in his Motion nor in his testimony during the hearing. This factor weighs
26 against suppression. 27 People of Guam vs. Ainy 1 Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 12 of15 3. The Defendant did not rely on misrepresentations or promises made by the police. 2 There is no testimony or allegation that Officer Pewtress made any misrepresentations or 3 promises to the Defendant prior to the search of the vehicle. The Defendant does not argue or 4
5 state otherwise in his Motion that any promises or representations were made to him during the
6 stop and before consent was given to search. This factor weighs against suppression. 7 4. Whether the person was in custody or under arrest when the consent was 8 given.
9 The Defendant was not in custody or under arrest when consent was given. The Defendant 10 was not placed under arrest until after Pewtress confirmed, through his training and experience in II conducting about 200 narcotics investigations that the substance in the baggies was 12
13 methamphetamines. It was only then that Pewtress placed Defendant in handcuffs, secured him
14 "for safety reasons," and verbally advised him of his Miranda rights. Hrg. at 9:25:28 AM. The 15 later field test purportedly confirmed that the substance was positive for methamphetamine. The 16 Defendant does not argue or state otherwise in his Motion that he was in custody or under arrest 17 prior to the search. On the contrary, Defendant testified that during the search and after consent 18
19 was given, he was asked to move away from the car and that he moved to the front of the vehicle
20 and free to walk around. Hrg: at 9:49:43 AM. Because there was no other police officer who could 21 have detained Defendant while Pewtress was conducting his search and based upon the 22 circumstances as testified to at the hearing, Defendant was not detained until after the substance 23
24 was determined to be methamphetamines. This factor weighs against suppression.
27 People of Guam vs. Ainy I Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 13 oflS S. The traffic stop was in a public, not secluded, place.
2 The traffic stop occurred in the parking lot of the Saint Francis School in Yona, a public
3 plac~. Despite that it was in the dawn hours of the day, the stop still occurred reasonably close to 4 Route 4 and on a public place, the open and uncovered parking lot of Saint Francis School/Church. 5 This factor weighs against suppression. 6 6. The Defendant did not object to the search. 7
8 The Defendant testified that he gave permission to Pewtress to search his vehicle, but
9 testified that he also wanted "documents" for the search. It is not clear from the Defendant's
testimony what documents he was demanding. Defendant could have easily been shown on direct 11 examination during the hearing, a written consent form, which Officer Pewtress testified that he 12
13 had in his vehicle, to confirm that Defendant was demanding a written consent form rather than
14 any other type of document, such as a custodial consent form, or Miranda rights form, or business 15 card. Instead, Defendant told the officer he had nothing to hide and than gave his permission 16 orally. There are no facts that show the Defendant objected in any way to the search or that he 17 continlJed to insist on executing written consent fonns prior to the search. Importantly, Defendant 18
19 has not cited to any case authority that would require that a consent to search, given orally during
20 a traffic stop, is invalidated by the lack of a writing to memorialize the oral consent. This factor 21 weighs against suppression. 22 CONCLUSION 23 Having considered the factors outlined in Chargualaf the Court finds that none of the 24
25 testimony elicited during the hearing on Defendant's Motion supports a finding in favor of
26 suppression. The People have satisfied its burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, 27 People of Guam vs. Ainy I Antonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 14 oflS that the search, following a legal traffic stop, was a valid exception to the warrant requirement
2 because Defendant gave his voluntary consent. The duration of time between the traffic stop and
3 the Defendant's permission was approximately two minutes, at most. There is no evidence that 4 Officer Pewtress threatened or intimidated Defendant into giving consent or permission to search. 5 There is no evidence that Officer Pewtress made any misrepresentations or promises upon which 6
Defendant might have relied prior to granting permission to search. Defendant was not in custody 7
8 nor his movements restricted before the search was conducted. The traffic stop occurred in a
9 public place, in a public parking area off Route 4 in Yona. Defendant did not object to the search, IO but on the contrary testified that he gave his permission. II For the above reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to 12
13 Suppress Evidence is DENIED.
14 ·2 5- 2024 SO ORDERED this - - - - ---- JAN 15
21 SERVICE VIA EMAIL 22 I acknowtedge that an eleclronic copy ol lhe original was e-mailed to: 23
26 Deputy Clerk, Superior Court o1 Guam
27 People of Guam vs. Ainy I Alllonio 28 Criminal Case No. CF0075-22 Decision and Order re. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Page 15 ofl5