People v. Anderson

2020 IL App (2d) 190602-U

Opinion

2020 IL App (2d) 190602-U No. 2-19-0602 Order filed June 11, 2020

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of De Kalb County. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 17-DT-402 ) LATOYA N. ANDERSON, ) Honorable ) Philip G. Montgomery, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BRIDGES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Hutchinson concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress: where the officer observed defendant driving her car with the tires on the lane dividing line but not crossing it, the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe she committed improper lane usage, and the officer’s contrary belief was unreasonable.

¶2 The trial court granted the motion of defendant, Latoya N. Anderson, to suppress evidence

resulting from a traffic stop. Based on evidence that defendant drove on the lane dividing line, but

did not cross it, the court held that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe that

she had committed improper lane usage (ILU) (625 ILCS 5/11-709(a) (West 2016)). The State 2020 IL App (2d) 190602-U

appeals, contending that (1) driving on the lane divider violated the statute, or (2) the officer had

a good-faith belief that it did. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. She filed a motion to

suppress evidence. At a hearing on the motion, Northern Illinois University police officer Devon

Buckle testified that in the early morning of October 21, 2017, he was driving northbound on Annie

Glidden Road when he saw a Jeep Wrangler traveling in the left-hand lane, with both driver’s side

wheels on the yellow dividing line. A dashcam video corroborated this testimony.

¶5 The trial court granted the State’s motion for a directed finding. The court found Buckle

credible and held that his observation of a vehicle driving with its wheels on the yellow dividing

line provided a reasonable basis for a traffic stop.

¶6 Defendant moved to reconsider, arguing that under this court’s holding in People v.

Mueller, 2018 IL App (2d) 170863, driving with one’s wheels on, but not over, the dividing line

did not provide a reasonable basis for a traffic stop. The court allowed the State to present

additional evidence. Buckle testified that he pulled defendant over in an area of Annie Glidden

Road that was straight and flat. Further, he did not observe any obstructions to warrant defendant’s

driving on the solid yellow line.

¶7 Although the State argued that Mueller was distinguishable on its facts, the court granted

defendant’s motion and suppressed the evidence. The State timely appeals.

¶8 II. ANALYSIS

¶9 On appeal, the State renews its contention that Mueller is distinguishable. The State

contends that, in Mueller, we observed that the defendant was stopped on a road that was hilly and

curvy. Thus, occasional drifting from the center of the lane could reasonably be expected, whereas

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in this case the road was straight and flat and the officer observed no obstructions that would have

made it necessary to drive on the center divider. The State further contends that Mueller was

wrongly decided and should be overruled. Alternatively, the State argues that Buckle had a good-

faith belief that the stop was proper.

¶ 10 In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, the court’s findings of historical

fact are reviewed only for clear error, giving due weight to any inferences drawn from those facts

by the fact finder, and reversal is warranted only when those findings are against the manifest

weight of the evidence. People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 18. However, we review de novo

the trial court’s ultimate legal ruling whether to suppress the evidence. Id.

¶ 11 Because a vehicle stop is a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants, a stop is subject to the fourth

amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996).

Generally, a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968)) than to a formal arrest. Under Terry, a law enforcement officer may conduct a

brief, investigative stop of individuals, absent probable cause to arrest, provided the officer has a

reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 21-22.

¶ 12 Section 11-709(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code states, “Whenever any roadway has been

divided into 2 or more clearly marked lanes for traffic,” “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as

practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has

first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” 625 ILCS 5/11-709(a) (West

2018).

¶ 13 Thus, the question is whether defendant’s driving briefly on the lane divider gave officer

Buckle a reasonable, articulable suspicion that she was violating the traffic laws. In Mueller, we

held that improper lane usage requires more than merely touching the lane line. Rather, a vehicle

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must completely cross the lane line, into another lane, for the driver to be guilty of improper lane

usage. Mueller, 2018 IL App (2d) 170863, ¶ 22. We relied on Hackett, which held, “ ‘[W]hen a

motorist crosses over a lane line and is not driving as nearly as practicable within one lane, the

motorist has violated the [ILU] statute.’ ” Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Smith,

172 Ill. 2d 289, 297 (1996)); see also People v. Leyendecker, 337 Ill. App. 3d 678, 682 (2003)

(Smith required trial court to consider whether defendant had “crossed over” a lane line). As

Buckle testified that defendant’s driver’s-side wheels touched the lane divider but did not cross it,

he lacked a reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant had committed improper lane usage.

¶ 14 The State argues that Mueller is distinguishable. The State contends that, in Mueller, the

road’s “ ‘twists and turns’ provided an innocent (and obvious) explanation” for the defendant’s

brief touches of the lane marker. Mueller, 2018 IL App (2d) 170863, ¶ 28. Here, however, Buckle

testified that the road was straight and flat. However, the nature of the road was clearly an

alternative rationale for our holding in Mueller. We began the paragraph, “[i]n any event,” and

concluded that “even if defendant’s multiple lane touches could be considered ‘lane deviations,’ ”

the nature of the road provided an explanation for them. Id. The holding was that merely touching

the lane markers was not a deviation from the lane, regardless of the nature of the road. Id. ¶ 22.

¶ 15 The State alternatively contends that Mueller was wrongly decided. The State cites cases

from other jurisdictions that have reached the opposite conclusion. The State further contends that

Mueller’s holding leads to the absurd result that two vehicles traveling in opposite directions could

occupy the same lane.

¶ 16 The cases the State relies on are not persuasive. In Kruse v. Commissioner of Public Safety,

906 N.W.2d 554 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018), the court cited dictionary definitions of “lane” as being

“ ‘[a] narrow way or passage between walls, hedges, or fences’ and as ‘[a] strip delineated on a

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street or highway for a single line of vehicles’ ”; and “between” as “ ‘[i]n or through the position

or interval separating.’ ” Id. at 558 (quoting The American Heritage College Dictionary 136, 779

(4th ed. 2007)). The court concluded from these definitions that a “lane” did not include the

boundary markers. The court relied heavily on the definition of “between.” However, the relevant

portion of the definition of “lane,” referring to a portion of a street or highway, does not contain

the word between.

¶ 17 In United States v. Williams, 945 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Va. 2013), the defendant’s driving

was much more erratic than that involved here. An officer observed the defendant’s vehicle weave

back and forth between the fog line and the center line at least five times. Id. at 673. The vehicle

touched both lines but only briefly crossed the center line. Id. at 668. The federal district court

concluded that Virginia’s improper-lane-usage statute would define a lane as not including the

boundary lines. Id. at 672. Arguably, the court did not need to decide that question because the

court further concluded that the officer had at least a good-faith belief that the defendant had

violated a traffic law and that the erratic driving the officer witnessed gave him a reasonable belief

that the defendant was impaired. Id. at 674.

¶ 18 In United States v. Bassols, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (D. N.M. 2011), the defendant’s vehicle

veered from the shoulder stripe or fog line to the center line at least twice. Citing a case in which

an officer observed the defendant’s van “ ‘weaving from lane line to shoulder line several times,

touching three times’ ” (id. at 1299 (quoting United States v. De La Fuente-Ramos, 242 F.3d 391,

slip op. at *1 (10th Cir 2000) (unpublished table decision)) the court found it “unlikely that the

Tenth Circuit would invalidate the stop of a driver who weaves onto and then drives on the solid

stripe dividing the lane from the shoulder.” Id. at 1300. The court further made an “Erie-guess”

that the New Mexico Supreme Court would rule similarly. Id.; see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304

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U.S. 64 (1938) (where necessary, federal courts must attempt to ascertain State common law even

where State courts have not authoritatively ruled on a question).

¶ 19 Subsequently, in State v. Siqueiros-Valenzuela, 2017-NMCA-074, 404 P.3d 782 (N.M. Ct.

App. 2017), the court carefully distinguished Bassols. There, as the defendant was passing two

semitrailers, her vehicle’s tire touched the yellow shoulder line of the left passing lane. Id. ¶ 2.

The court noted that Bassols, as required by Tenth-Circuit precedent, used a totality-of-the-

circumstances approach. Id. ¶¶ 19-20 (citing Bassols, 775 F. Supp. at 1303, and United States v.

Alvarado, 430 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 2005)). In the case before it, the state court rejected the

prosecution’s call for a bright-line rule that any touching of a lane boundary violated the statute,

finding that such an approach would read the “as nearly as practicable” language out of the statute. 1

Id. ¶ 15.

¶ 20 Considering the “totality of the circumstances,” the court held that the single touching of

the line was reasonably explained by the fact that the defendant was attempting to pass two

semitrailers, a maneuver for which “common driving experience advises leaving as much room as

possible for safety.” Id. ¶ 22. Those circumstances did not give the arresting officer a reasonable

suspicion that the defendant had violated the statute. Id. ¶ 20. The court specifically declined to

decide whether a vehicle had to cross, as opposed to simply touch, a lane marker to violate the

statute, as neither party had raised the issue. Id. ¶ 21n.1.

¶ 21 Finally, in State v. McBroom, 39 P.3d 226 (Or. App. 2002), the defendant, while rounding

a curve, drove on the center line for more than 300 feet. The court, without analysis or citation of

1 The statute in question, N.M. Stat. Ann., Section 66-7-317(A) (1978) is identical to 625 ILCS 5/11-709(a) (West 2016).

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authority, simply held that “the phrase ‘within a single lane’ does not mean ‘on’ the lines that mark

or divide the lanes.” Id. 228.

¶ 22 Stare decisis expresses the courts’ policy of adhering to precedents and not disturbing

settled points. People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 145 (2007). Thus, any departure from stare decisis

must be “specially justified,” such that prior decisions should not be overruled absent “good cause”

or “compelling reasons.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.). Id. 146. The holdings of the cases

cited by the State are based on different facts, occasionally flawed reasoning, or “guesses” about

what state courts might hold. They do not provide “compelling reasons” to depart from Mueller

here.

¶ 23 The State insists, however, that continued adherence to Mueller will produce “absurd”

results. See People v. Acevedo, 275 Ill. App. 3d 420, 426 (1995) (in considering legislative intent,

we presume that legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice). The State argues

that our holding that a lane includes the boundary markers on either side means that two oncoming

vehicles could simultaneously occupy the same lane, which would raise obvious safety concerns.

¶ 24 Our holding governs momentary touches of the lane marker. In the absence of contrary

evidence, we are not convinced that drivers will voluntarily travel long distances with their wheels

on the lane dividers or, if they do so, that they will fail to observe oncoming vehicles and take

appropriate actions to avoid collisions.

¶ 25 This scenario presents no more compelling safety concerns than numerous others that occur

regularly on our streets and highways. Vehicles traveling in the same direction in the same lane

at different speeds will inevitably collide unless drivers take appropriate measures. A vehicle

legally turning left will at least briefly occupy the same lane as oncoming traffic. And vehicles

travelling in opposite directions on unmarked streets and roads may legally occupy the same path.

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¶ 26 The State alternatively argues that Buckle had a good-faith belief that defendant violated

the improper-lane-usage statute. In its opening brief, the State conceded that it did not raise this

issue in the trial court. In its reply brief, the State asserts that, while the prosecution “never used

the magic phrase ‘good faith’ in front of the trial court,” it nonetheless argued the issue. However,

the State does not cite any place in the record where Buckle was asked the basis of his belief that

driving on the line violated the statute. Thus, although the trial court generally found Buckle

credible, it did not have the opportunity to assess his credibility on this particular point or to rule

on the reasonableness of that belief. Further, because the State did not make a record in the trial

court, we have no opportunity to rule on the issue either.

¶ 27 In any event, the stop was not objectively reasonable. Although Mueller had not been

decided when the stop here occurred, Mueller held that section 11-709’s plain language provided

that a lane includes the boundary marker. Mueller, 2018 IL App (2d) 170863, ¶ 21. We cited,

inter alia, Hackett and Leyendecker for that conclusion. In People v. Haywood, 407 Ill. App. 3d

540 (2011), we held that an officer’s mistaken belief that a defendant’s conduct violated a statute

did not “justify the stop at its inception.” Id. at 547. Because the stop was objectively

unreasonable, the officer’s good-faith belief that the stop was justified could not save it. Id. Here,

too, because defendant’s intermittent driving on the line did not violate the statute, the officer’s

good-faith belief in the propriety of the stop is irrelevant.

¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29 The judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County is affirmed.

¶ 30 Affirmed.

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