People v. Anders

2019 IL App (2d) 170983-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 23, 2019
• Docket: 2-17-0983
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2019 IL App (2d) 170983-U No. 2-17-0983 Order filed December 23, 2019

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kendall County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 17-CM-71 ) CLINTON A. ANDERS, ) Honorable ) John F. McAdams, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Bridges concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal damage to property.

¶2 Defendant, Clinton A. Anders, appeals his conviction of criminal damage to property (720

ILCS 5/21-1(a)(1) (West 2016)). He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 At the bench trial, Mukund Patel testified that he was the owner/manager of the All Season

motel. On February 10, 2017, defendant checked in, paying in advance for two nights. The next 2019 IL App (2d) 170983-U

morning, Patel went to the room and saw children’s bicycles and toys inside. He told defendant

that he should not have that many items in the room. Defendant’s mother came by later and took

them away.

¶5 The next day, Patel returned to the room to see if defendant would be staying another day.

The room was a “complete mess.” Beer cans were “all over” and the room was filled with smoke.

Also, a curtain had been torn down and was on the floor. It had not been in that condition prior.

Patel told defendant three times that he would have to pay for the damage. Defendant did not say

anything, but continued trying to collect his belongings, so Patel called the police. When an officer

arrived, defendant “just ran away.” Patel was unable to rent the room for two days and spent nearly

$500 cleaning and repairing it.

¶6 On cross-examination, Patel said that, in response to one of his demands for payment,

defendant said that his mother was coming to pick him up and he would get the money from her.

Patel did not see anyone else in the room while defendant occupied it.

¶7 Yorkville police sergeant Sarah Klingel responded to the motel. As she pulled up, she saw

defendant leaving room 12 and Patel standing at the door. Defendant was “just walking out.” He

had his arms folded, so he was not walking “extremely fast.” He was about a tenth of a mile from

the motel when she approached him. She did not tell him to wait.

¶8 Klingel told defendant that Patel claimed that defendant had damaged some drapes and

refused to pay. Defendant said that he had told Patel to send him a bill. When she entered the

room, she saw ripped curtains and a bent curtain rod. She did not notice any smoke or beer in the

room.

¶9 Defendant testified that he was staying at the motel because he worked in the area. He had

thought his children might visit him there, so he brought their toys and bikes. As he was gathering

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his belongings to check out, Patel came to the room and accused him of breaking the curtain. He

said that he had not touched the curtain but offered to help fix it anyway. Defendant reiterated that

he did not touch the curtain while he was in the room.

¶ 10 The court found defendant guilty. The court found that defendant’s leaving the room as

Klingel arrived evinced a consciousness of guilt. The court further found that “this isn’t a case of

I did this [by] accident. This is a case of the defense says I didn’t do it, it didn’t happen.” The

court sentenced defendant to one year of conditional discharge.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Defendant contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal

damage to property. He argues that there is simply no evidence that he damaged the curtain or

that he did so knowingly.

¶ 13 The State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). When a defendant challenges on appeal the sufficiency

of the evidence, we ask “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). It is

not the function of the reviewing court to retry the defendant. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶

35. Rather, the fact finder is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the

evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from the facts. Id. Thus, a reviewing court will not

substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions involving the weight of the evidence

or witness credibility. Id. A criminal conviction will not be reversed unless the evidence is so

unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s

guilt. Id.

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¶ 14 The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, showed the following.

According to Patel, the curtain was undamaged when defendant checked in. There was no

evidence that anyone else was in the room, except defendant’s mother, who removed the children’s

toys from the room at some point. As defendant was checking out, the curtain was torn and the

rod was bent. It was thus reasonable to infer that defendant damaged the curtain at some point

during his stay.

¶ 15 Defendant nevertheless contends that there is no evidence that he damaged the curtain

knowingly. A person acts knowingly when he is consciously aware that his conduct is practically

certain to cause a particular result. People v. Dorsey, 2016 IL App (4th) 140734, ¶ 34. Because a

defendant’s mental state can seldom be proved by direct evidence, it “may be inferred from

surrounding circumstances.” Id. Here, the trial court found that defendant’s departure from the

room as Klingel arrived evinced a consciousness of guilt. The trial court elaborated that otherwise:

“I think you stay and you say, hey, I didn’t do this, this was like it before. I had nothing to do with

this curtain rod. You protest. You stay and protest your innocence.”

¶ 16 The evidence was sufficient to support this finding. While the testimony varied as to

whether defendant “ran away” from the room when Klingel arrived or was “just walking out”

when she arrived, the testimony established that defendant was leaving the scene after being

accused of damaging the curtain. Evidence of a defendant’s flight may be relevant to prove his

consciousness of guilt. People v. Harris, 225 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2007). Moreover, the trial court is

responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, and we will not substitute our judgment for

that of the trier of fact on such questions. See Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. The evidence was

sufficient for the trial court to find that defendant knowingly damaged the curtain. Accordingly,

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based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the evidence was so unreasonable,

improbable, or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.

¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 18 The judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County is affirmed.

¶ 19 Affirmed.

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