~ED SUPE~JOR COIJ ~T o~ iJ~ 1 2022 JAN 20 ~M ~: 0 1 2 CLERK OF COU ~T
3 3:
4 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 5
6 PEOPLE OF GUAM,
Plaintiff, Case No. CF0319-20 8 vs. 9 DECISION AND ORDER DONALD CASTRO ALDAN (Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence) 10
11 V Defendant.
13 INTRODUCTION 14 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto E. Tolentino on December 28, 2021, for 15
16 an evidentiary hearing on Donald Castro Aldan’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Suppress Evidence
17 (“Motion to Suppress”), filed on January 29, 2021. Alternate Public Defenders Shinju Flynn
18 and Clyde Lemons appeared for Defendant. Assistant Attorney General Jeremiah Luther
19 appeared for the People of Guam (“People”). Having considered the arguments and the
20 applicable law, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence.
21 BACKGROUND
22 On July 31, 2020, a grand jury indicted Defendant on the following charges: (1) Assault
23 Against a Peace Officer (As a Third Degree Felony); (2) Possession of a Schedule II
24 Controlled Substance (As a Third Degree Felony); (3) Resisting Arrest (As a Misdemeanor); 25 (4) and Criminal Mischief (As a Misdemeanor). Indictment, July 31, 2020. On January 29, 26
27 2021, Defendant filed the instant motion. Def. ‘s Mot. to Suppress Evidence (hereinafter “Mot. Page 1 of 13 1 to Suppress”), Jan. 29, 2021. The People filed an opposition. People’s Opp’n. to Def.’s Mot. 2 to Suppress (hereinafter “People’s Opp’n.”), Feb. 12, 2021. Defendant filed a reply to the. 3 People’s opposition. Def.’s Reply Brief in Support of His Mot. to Suppress Evidence
~ (hereinafter “Def.’s Reply”), Aug. 11, 2021. On December 28, 2021, the Court held an
6 evidentiary hearing and took the parties’ arguments under advisement. Minute Entry, Dec. 28,
7 2021.
8 FINDINGS OF FACT
Guam Police Department (“GPD”) Officer Valenzuela and Officer Cruz were the 10 witnesses called by the People during the evidentiary hearing. Digital Recording at 2:46:13—
11 3:20:25 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Defendant did not call any witnesses. Id. From the 12 testimony received from these witnesses the Court finds: 13 Officer Valenzuela and Officer Cruz were patrolling along Swap Road in Dededo when 14
15 a vehicle made a right turn and the registration tag became visible. Digital Recording at
16 2:46:13—2:50:27 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). The officers noticed that the registration tag was
17 expired and conducted a traffic stop. Id. Officer Valenzuela approached the operator of the
18 vehicle, Robert Cruz (“Cruz”), while Officer Cruz maintained observation of the passenger
19 side of the vehicle for officer safety. Id. Officer Valenzuela informed Cruz that the reason for
20 the traffic stop was the expired registration, and asked to see Cruz’s driver’s license. Id. Cruz
21 did not have a driver’s license. Id. Cruz began searching for the registration, and in doing so,
22 placed his left hand in the driver’s door. Id. Then, Cruz put his hand in his pocket. Id. These 23 actions made Officer Valenzuela concerned about his safety. Id. Officer Valenzuela asked if 24 he could search the vehicle, and Cruz said, “Go ahead.” Id. Officer Valenzuela asked Cruz to 25 step out of the vehicle so he could search it. Id. Officer Valenzuela asked for consent to 26
27 search the vehicle because Cruz’s fumbling inside of the door and his pockets made Officer Page 2 of 13 1 Valenzuela nervous. Id. At this point, Officer Valenzuela was not going to let the vehicle 2 leave the scene because Cruz did not have a valid driver’s license. Id. 3
4 While Officer Valenzuela was interacting with Cruz, Officer Cruz continued to observe the passenger side of the vehicle. Id. Officer Cruz recognized Defendant from other
6 encounters; this encounter was Officer Cruz’s second or third time arresting Defendant.
7 Digital Recording at 3:15:17—3:20:25 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Officer Cruz heard Officer
8 Valenzuela obtain consent to search the vehicle, and Officer Cruz instructed Defendant to exit
~ the vehicle. Digital Recording at 3:03:09—3:15:17 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Officer Cruz
10 wanted to make sure there were no weapons in the vehicle before conducting the search. Id.
11 When Defendant stepped out of the vehicle, Officer Cruz noticed Defendant was 12 clenching something with his hand that was inside of his pocket. Id. Officer Cruz asked 13 Defendant to show him his hands. Id. When Defendant showed him the item, Officer Cruz 14
15 recognized it as a glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine. Id. He observed a brown
16 residue inside of the pipe. Id. Officer Valenzuela also observed Defendant holding a glass
17 pipe with residue after unclenching his fist. Digital Recording at 2:46:13—2:50:27 (Mot. H’rg.
18 Dec. 28, 2021). Officer Cruz grasped Defendant’s wrist and Defendant tossed the glass pipe.
19 Digital Recording at 3:03:09—3:15:17 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Officer Cruz informed
20 Defendant that he was going to arrest him, and attempted to place him in hand restraints. Id.
21 Defendant began begging Officer Cruz not to arrest him and resisting Officer Cruz’s attempts
22 to place him in hand restraints. Id. 23 Officer Valenzuela heard Defendant refuse to put his arms behind his back for arrest. 24 Digital Recording at 2:46:13—2:50:27 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Officer Valenzuela 25
26 approached Defendant and attempted to help Officer Cruz arrest Defendant by placing
27 Defendant’s arms behind his back. Id. Defendant turned around and struck Officer Cruz. Page 3 of 13 1 Digital Recording at 3:03:09—3:15:17 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Officer Valenzuela testified 2 the strike appeared intentional and not accidental. Digital Recording at 2:46:13—2:50:27 (Mot. 3 H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Defendant continued to resist arrest until the officers finally managed to
~ place hand restraints on Defendant. Digital Recording at 3:03 :09—3:15:17 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28,
6 2021). The officers secured Defendant in their patrol vehicle and transported him to the GPD
7 precinct. Digital Recording at 2:46:13—2:50:27 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Defendant was
8 “irate” during the transport to the GPD precinct. Digital Recording at 3:03 :09—3:15:17 (Mot.
~ H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). The officers left Cruz at the scene and issued a warning about driving
10 without a license. Digital Recording at 2:46:13—2:50:27 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). No
11 Miranda warnings were given to Defendant at the scene. Id. 12 When they arrived at the GPD precinct, Officer Cruz placed Defendant alone in an 13 interview room and left the room to fill out paperwork regarding the arrest. Digital Recording 14
15 at 3:03:09—3:15:17 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Defendant was alone in the interview room for
16 approximately thirty minutes. Id. When Officer Cruz returned to the interview room,
17 Defendant was slouched on the table with his hands in front of his person. Id. Defendant’s
18 hands were handcuffed behind his back when Officer Cruz exited the interview room. Id.
19 Officer Cruz testified that Defendant likely stepped through his hands in order to assume this
20 position. Id.
21 Upon re-entering the interview room, Officer Cruz approached Defendant. Id.
22 Defendant assumed a “fighting position,” and Officer Cruz noticed that Defendant was holding 23 a “vent flap” from the ceiling of the interview room. Id. Officer Cruz matched the vent flap 24 that Defendant held to a vent flap that was missing from the ceiling. Id. Officer Cruz surmised 25
26 that Defendant was able to move his handcuffed hands in front of his person, hoist himself up
27 onto the table, and remove the vent flap from the ceiling. Id. Officer Cruz disarmed Defendant Page 4 of 13 1 by putting him on the ground and removing the vent flap from his hand. Id. Officer Cruz 2 never gave Defendant Miranda warnings while he was in the interview room. Id. At no point 3 during Defendant’s interactions with the officers at the scene, during transport to the GPD
~ precinct, or in the interview room did Defendant admit that he possessed methamphetamine or
6 that he intended to strike Officer Cruz in the field. Id. Defendant’s statements to the officers
7 solely concerned his desire not to go back to jail. Id.
8 DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and is made 10 applicable to Guam via section 1421b(c) of the Organic Act of Guam. People v. Johnson, 1997
11 Guam 9 ¶ 4. “The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the 12
13 reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s
14 personal security.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108—09 (1977) (quoting Terry v.
15 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). Every search or seizure must be reasonable under the
16 circumstances to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United States, 517
17 U.s. 806, 810 (1996).
18 A. The initial stop of the vehicle was a valid Terry stop under the Fourth Amendment,
19 and Defendant was seized during the initial interaction.
20 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution “permits brief investigative
21 detentions when a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that an individual was engaged in or
22 is about to be engaged in illegal conduct.” Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ¶4 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
23 . . . U.S. 1(1968)). The Terry stop doctrine has been extended to justify the investigatory stop of a 24 motor vehicle.” Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ¶ 4 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 25 (1985)). “As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile [without a warrant] is 26
27 reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Page 5 of 13 1 Further, it is reasonable to stop a car where the police merely have reasonable suspicion to 2 believe the driver has committed a traffic violation.” People v. Charagulaf~ 2001 Guam 1 ¶ 17
~ (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)).
5 “In order to determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant
6 a traffic stop, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances, taking into account the
‘~ facts known to the officers from personal observation.” Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ¶4.
8 Furthermore, reasonable suspicion must exist at the time the stop was initiated. Id. The
9 “lawfulnessof a Terry stop turns not on the officer’s actual state of mind at the time the 10
11 challenged action was taken, but rather on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions. In
12 other words, if sufficient objective evidence exists to demonstrate reasonable suspicion, a Terry
13 stop is justified regardless of a police officer’s subjective intent.” United States v. Branch, 537
14 F. 3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008). Guam law requires vehicles to be properly registered before
15 being driven upon a highway. GCA 16 § 7101; GCA 16 § 7130; GCA 16 § 7136; GCA 16 §
16 7137.
17 Officer Cruz and Officer Valenzuela testified that they observed the vehicle’s expired 18 registration when it made a right turn. Digital Recording at 2:46:13—2:50:27 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 19 28, 2021). The Court finds no reason that GPD officers—trained to observe traffic 20
21 violations—would have erroneously spotted an expired registration tag. Therefore, because the
22 officers observed a traffic violation—driving with expired registration—they had reasonable
23 suspicion to pull over the vehicle for a valid Terry stop.
24 Defendant argues that he was seized once the officers initiated the traffic stop. Mot. to
25 Suppress at 4. The People argue that Defendant was not seized, but that the traffic stop was a
26 voluntary interaction. People’s Opp’n. at 6. The Court finds that Defendant is correct; he was
27 Page6ofl3 1 seized during the initial traffic stop. All occupants of a vehicle are seized during a traffic stop. 2 Brendlin v. Caflfornia, 551 U.S. 249, 255—56 (2007). As a passenger inside of a vehicle 3 stopped for a traffic violation, Defendant was seized within the meaning of the Fourth
5 Amendment during the initial traffic stop. However, because the traffic stop was a valid Terry
6 stop, the Court holds the seizure was valid.
7 B. The seizure ended and became a consensual encounter when Defendant exited the vehicle. 8 The United States Supreme Court recognizes that not every encounter between the
10 police and citizens amounts to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Bostick, 501
11 U.S. 429 (1991). “A consensual encounter is the voluntary cooperation of a private citizen in
12 response to non-coercive questioning by a law enforcement officer.” United States v. West,
13 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000). An interaction that begins as a seizure may become a
14 consensual encounter for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Wilson, 413
15 F.3d 382, 388 (3rd Cir. 2005).
16 When examining whether an encounter between police and a citizen constitutes a
17 seizure under the Fourth Amendment, “a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding 18 the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a 19
20 reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise
21 terminate the encounter.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439. The reasonable person test presupposes an
22 innocent person. Id. at 438. In “conducting this analysis, examples of circumstances that
23 might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the
24 threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
25 touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
26 compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” United States v. Barry, 394 F.3d
27 Page 7 of 13 1 1070, 1076 (8th Cir. 2003). “Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of 2 authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a seizure 3 has occurred.” Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). There is no requirement that the officer
tell a defendant that he does not have to respond or is free to leave. West, 219 F.3d 1171 at
6 1176. A person is seized when his freedom of movement is restrained by physical force, or he
7 is compelled to comply through a show of authority. United States v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S.
8 544, 53 3—55 (1980). Absent these circumstances, the interaction between the parties is
~ considered consensual. Id.
10 Officer Valenzuela asked Cruz for consent to search the vehicle, and Cruz gave valid
11 consent for a search. Digital Recording at 2:46:13—2:50:27 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Upon 12 receiving consent to search the vehicle, the officers asked everyone in the vehicle to exit the 13 vehicle so they could begin the search. Id. Defendant argues that the officers prolonged the 14
15 stop by asking for consent to search the vehicle. Mot. to Suppress at 4. The Court disagrees.
16 Officer Valenzuela testified that he felt nervous when Cruz was fumbling around looking for
17 the vehicle’s registration, and Officer Valenzuela was worried about the officers’ safety.
18 Digital Recording at 2:46:13—2:50:27 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Consequently, the Court
19 finds that Officer Valenzuela asked for consent to search the vehicle for officer safety, not to
20 prolong the stop. At that point in the encounter, the focus was on Cruz and not on Defendant;
21 neither officer had interacted with Defendant at the time Officer Valenzuela ordered everyone
22 out of the vehicle. Id. Accordingly, taking into account the totality of the circumstances at this
23 point in the encounter, the Court finds that Defendant was free to leave. 24 Defendant asserts that “[f]ar from telling Mr. Aldan he was free to leave, the police 25
26 instead required that he stay and submit to being searched.” Mot. to Suppress at 4. The Court
27 disagrees. The law does not require the officers tell Defendant he is free to leave. West, 219 Page 8 of 13 1 F.3d at 1176. Nothing in the record suggests that Officer Cruz made any statements to 2 Defendant nor used any language or tone of voice that would have suggested to Defendant that 3 he was not free to leave. Rather, the record shows that Officer Cruz simply requested
Defendant exit the vehicle. Although Officer Cruz knew Defendant from previous encounters,
6 there is nothing in the record indicating that this knowledge influenced his interactions with
7 Defendant. Officer Cruz did not speak with Defendant until he overheard Officer Valenzuela
8 obtain consent to search the vehicle. Digital Recording at 3:03:09—3:15:17 (Mot. H’rg. Dec.
~ 28, 2021). Likewise, nothing in the record illustrates that Officer Cruz placed his hand on his
10 weapon, restrained Defendant, touched Defendant, or took any other action causing Defendant
11 to submit to Officer Cruz’s authority. It was only after Defendant displayed the glass pipe that 12 Officer Cruz touched Defendant’s wrist. Id. While there were multiple officers present at the 13 scene, Officer Valenzuela did not interact with Defendant until he noticed Officer Cruz 14
15 struggling to restrain Defendant. Id. As a result, the presence of two officers would not have
16 been intimidating to Defendant. The Court also does not find anything in the record that would
17 have conveyed to Defendant that he was not free to leave. Thus, the Court holds that
18 Defendant willingly exited the vehicle.
19 When Defendant exited the vehicle, Officer Cruz noticed that Defendant’s hand was
20 clenched inside of his pocket. Id. Officer Cruz wanted to ensure that Defendant did not have a
21 . weapon, and asked Defendant to show Officer Cruz his hands. Id. Like the request to exit the 22 vehicle, the Court finds nothing in the record that suggests Officer Cruz’s request for 23 Defendant to show his hands was improper. The law permits Officer Cruz to ask Defendant 24 non-coercive questions, and Defendant can decline to cooperate. West, 219 F.3d 1171 at 1176. 25
26 Thus, the Court finds that Defendant could have declined to show Officer Cruz his hands, but
27 instead he chose to comply with Officer Cruz’ s request. Page 9 of 13 1 Defendant analogizes this case to Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.s. 85 (1979) and assets that 2 the law does not permit the officers to search every person inside of a vehicle stopped for a 3 traffic violation. Def.’s Reply at 6. Yet, the officers did not discover the glass pipe during a
~ pat down of Defendant, or through any other action that would have caused Defendant to
6 believe he had to submit to their authority. Nothing in the record suggests Officer Cruz took
7 actions—such as touching his weapon or using language—that created coercive questioning.
8 The Court holds that Officer Cruz asked Defendant a non-coercive question, and Defendant
~ willingly replied.
10 C. The seizure of the glass pipe was valid because the glass pipe was in plain view.
11 Where police discover an item in plain view that they immediately recognize is 12 incriminating, they may seize such an item provided that the “intrusion that brings the police 13 within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized 14
15 exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Horton v. Caflfornia, 496 U.s. 128, 134—35 (1990).
16 The Supreme Court of the United States created a three-part test to determine if the plain view
17 doctrine applies. Id. at 136—37. In order for a warrantless search or seizure to be valid under
18 the plain view doctrine: (1) the officer must arrive at the place from which the evidence could
19 be plainly viewed without violating the Fourth Amendment; (2) the evidence must be in plain
20 view and its incriminating character must also be immediately apparent; and (3) the officer
21 must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself. Id.
22 First, the Court finds that Officer Cruz and Officer Valenzuela amved at the place from 23 which they saw the glass pipe without violating the Fourth Amendment. The officers engaged 24 in a valid Terry stop when they stopped the vehicle for a traffic violation. Cruz gave valid 25 consent for the officers to search the vehicle. Defendant voluntarily exited the vehicle and 26
27 Page 10 of 13 1 showed the officers his hands when Officer Cruz requested him to do so. As discussed above, 2 there is nothing indicating the officers’ interactions with Defendant were unlawful. 3
4 Second, the Court finds that the glass pipe was in plain view, and its incriminating character was immediately apparent. Once Defendant removed his hand from his pocket and
6 unclenched it, the contents of his hand would have been easily seen by anyone in the vicinity
7 of Defendant. Officer Valenzuela and Officer Cruz both testified that they recognized the glass
8 pipe with brown residue as a pipe used for smoking methamphetamine from their training.
Third, the Court finds that the officers had a lawful right of access to the glass pipe 10 because Defendant stood outside of the vehicle, on a public road, with the glass pipe in his
11 hand. As Defendant’s hand was in the open and clearly visible to the officers, there is no 12 reason that the officers did not have a lawful right of access to the object itself. 13 Therefore, the Court holds that the glass pipe was in plain view, and consequently, the 14
15 seizure of the glass pipe was valid.
16 D. Defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation and Miranda warnings were not required. 17 The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from compelling an individual to 18 incriminate himself. People v. Sangalang, 2001 Guam 18 ¶ 11. The Fifth Amendment 19
20 privilege against self-incrimination “attaches when the government subjects a defendant to
21 custodial interrogation.” Id. “Custodial interrogation” occurs when law enforcement initiate
22 questioning “after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
23 action in any significant way.” People v. Farata, 2007 Guam 8 ¶ 20. Prior to the initiation of
24 a custodial interrogation, the police must inform the suspect of his right to remain silent.
25 Sangalang, 2001 Guam 18 ¶ 11. However, the “special procedural safeguards outlined in
26 Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a
27 Page 11 of 13 1 suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 2 (1980). The Fifth Amendment does not bar volunteered statements of any kind. Miranda v. 3 Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
The Court holds that Defendant was in custody once he was arrested. Officer Cruz
6 testified that Defendant was never given Miranda warnings after his arrest. Digital Recording
7 at 2:46:13—3:15:17 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). However, the Court finds that after the officers
8 restrained Defendant, no interrogation occurred. Officer Cruz testified that neither officer
~ questioned Defendant while transporting Defendant to the GPD precinct, nor did they ever
10 question Defendant while he was in the interview room. Digital Recording at 3:03:09—3:15:17
11 (Mot. H’rg. Dec. 28, 2021). Nothing in the record indicates that the officers tried to elicit 12 statements from Defendant while he was in custody. Accordingly, the Court finds any 13 statements Defendant made while in custody he volunteered to the officers. Moreover, Officer 14
15 Cruz testified that any statements that Defendant made while in custody were about his desire
16 not to go back to jail or pleading with the officers not to arrest him. Id. Therefore, as
17 Defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation and he did not making any incriminating
18 statements, the Court declines to suppress any of Defendant’s statements
27 Page 12 of 13 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence. 3
SO ORDERED, this ________ day of JAN 2 fl 71122 2022.
HONORABLE ALBERTO E. TOLENTINO 9 Judge, Superior Court of Guam
24 SERVICE VIA E-MAIL acknowledge that an electronic 25 copy of the original was e-mailed to:
26 P~PD 27 Date: l120l2aT6me: Q~3~ivt
Deputy Clerk Su~~r Court of Guam Page 13 of 13