People v. Aldan & Cabrera

Opinion

3 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 4

6 PEOPLE OF GUAM, l Case No. CF 0144-14 7 vs. 8 DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT ALDAN'S MOTION T 9 DONALD CASTRO ALDAN and SUPPRESS STATEMENTS, PHYSICAL EVIDENCE IVAN LEEBRICK SABLAN CABRERA, 10

II Defendants.

12 l l 13

16 INTRODUCTION

17 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena III on June 18, 2014 on 18 Defendant Aldan's Motion to Suppress Statements, Physical Evidence. Attorney Terence E.

19 Timblin represents Defendant Aldan and Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins

20 represents the Government. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Motion. BACKGROUND 21 Per the Indictment returned on April 1, 2014, Defendant is charged with possession of a 22 Schedule II controlled substance, i.e., an amphetamine-based substance. The charge stems from --'23 an incident on March 21, 2014 in which Defendant aUegedly fled from the vicinity of a Dededo <(24 residence while officers of the Guam Police Department (GPD) and agents of the United States 225 Air Force executed a search warrant at the residence. Officers pursued Defendant, apprehended (!) 26 him, and eventually recovered evidence from his person and received incriminating statements 0::: 27 from him. The warrant did not name Defendant, nor did he reside at the residence. At the time 028

'; Decision and Order CF 0144-14, People v. Aldan and Cabrera

Mike Flores resided on the property. In particular, the Affidavit alleged that Jesse Acfalle possessed the rocket launcher, while all three were distributing methamphetamine; there was no 2 reference to Defendant. 3 At 6:15P.M on March 21, 2014, the police executed the warrant. Upon arrival, officers 4 observed Defendant "flee east towards the jungle." At that time, officers were unaware of s Defendant's identity. Officer Santos testified that Defendant was sitting five to ten feet from the 6 residence with other persons when he saw the police and fled; the pursuit lasted less than five 7 minutes and covered about one hundred feet. During the chase, Officer Santos repeatedly 8 identified himself as a police officer and ordared Defendant to stop. Officer Santos also testified 9 that, when Defendant fled, Officer Santos did not know if Defendant was one of the targets

10 listed in the search warrant. In his report, Officer Santos asserted: "I was able to catch up to [Defendant] and secure him into 11 handcuffs. The male was later identified as [Defendant]. I then 12 conducted a quick pat down on [Defendant] for weapons however I located none. After securing [Defendant] in handcuffs, I then 13 verbally advised [him] of his rights via Miranda Rights Card and asked him why he ran away. He replied I'm just scared of the 14 police[.... ] Custody of [Defendant] was then relinquished to the IS CID agents[ .... ] I was later contacted by Officer Camacho who informed me that drug paraphernalia was located on [Defendant] 16 and [Defendant] was later arrested[.]" 17 In his police report, Officer T. A. Supnet 1 (Officer Supnet) indicated that Defendant was 18 transported to the Criminal Justice Strike Force office in Tiyan (Tiyan station) "for further 19 interview." Officer Supnet further reported that, at 7:45 P.M., "[p]rior to conducting a fonnal 20 interview of (Defendant, I] conducted a cursory pat down where I felt what appeared to be an 21 object wititin [Defendant's] front right pocket of his brown cargo shorts. I requested for 22 [Defendant] to remove everything within his pocket, which later revealed" methamphetamine and related paraphernalia. At 7:50 P.M., Officer Supnet advised Defendant of his Miranda _I 23 <( 24 rights, which Defendant acknowledged and waived, and, at 7:52 P.M., the "interview" of

z 25 Defendant commenced. Defendant admitted to methamphetamine use and possession, and "also (!) 26 infonned [Officer Supnet] that [Defendant] was currently on parole and has not checked in with -0:::. 27 0 28 1 In the police report, Officer Supnet is listed as the Assigned Investigator and Officer F. M. Camacho is listed as th Approving Supervisor.

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his parole officer. [Defendant] admitted that he has an active 'Warrant of Arrest' which [Officer Supnet] verified[.]" The interview stopped for an unknown period of time for Defendant to 2 receive medical treatment. At 8:28P.M., the interview resumed and Defendant again admitted 3 to methamphetamine use and possession. At 8:30P.M., Officer Supnet arrested Defendant for 4 possession of a Schedule II controlled substance pursuant to 9 GCA § 67.401.2, for resisting , arrest pursuant to 9 GCA § 55.35, and in accordance with the outstanding arrest warrant? 6 II. Reasonable Suspicion 7 The resolution of Defendant's Motion turns on whether, when, and to what extent the 8 police were entitled to detain, search, or arrest Defendant. The Fourth Amendment, made 9 applicable to Guam via the Organic Act, provides, in pertinent part, that ''[t]he right of the

10 people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.'' U.S. II CONST. amend. IV; 48 USC § 142lb(c). "The Fourth Amendment permits brief detentions 12 when a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that an individual was engaged in or is about to 13 be engaged in illegal conduct." People v. Johnson, 1997 Guam 9,, 4 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 14 U.S. I (1968)). This principle is codified in the Stop and Frisk Act, 8 GCA § 30.10, et seq. See IS Guam v. Taman, 2013 Guam 22,, 21; People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12, ,, 39-40. If an 16 investigative detention reveals probable cause for arrest, "the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA 17 § 30.40; see also 8 GCA § 20.15 (officer may arrest without warrant upon "reasonable cause"). 18 "An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person, or by submission to the custody of the

19 person making the arrest." 8 GCA § 20.1 0.

20 As a preliminary matter, Defendant correctly argues that that the search warrant, by itself, did not authorize the search of his person. There is no evidence to suggest that Defendant 21 was a target of the warrant or was even known to police until after his apprehension. Although 22

23 _I 2 The facts set forth for the Declaration accompanying the Magistrate's Complaint dated March 22, 2014 differ·

0 28 adopts this interpretation of the facts. The parties agree, rather, that the pat-down and interview of Defendant at th Tiyan station yielded the evidence and statements that Defendant seeks to suppress.

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the warrant authorized police to search the premises, the warrant did not support a search of Defendant. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-96 (1979) (where police held warrant to 2 search tavern, patrons' mere presence in tavern did not "give rise to probable cause to search" 3 them or reasonable suspicion to frisk them for weapons). 4 Defendant next contends that his flight from the residence did not give rise to 5 "reasonable suspicion to detain him." An officer \Vith a reasonable suspicion that an individual 6 "committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense'' may detain that 7 person to investigate such criminal activity. 8 GCA §§ 30.10, 30.20. Moreover, if an officer 8 ''reasonably believes" that the target of the detention "is anned with a dangerous weapon and 9 therefu~ uffens a threat to the safety of the officer or another, the peace officer may search such

10 person to the extent necessary to disclose, and for the purpose of disclosing, the presence of such weapon." 8 GCA § 30.50. II Officers secured the warrant to search for drugs and weapons, including a rocket 12 launcher and shotgun; Officer Santos characterized the search as concerning a "possible rocket 13 launcher.. and "possible drug lab." The warrant also identified three residents allegedly 14 responsible for such criminal activities. A total of twenty GPD officers and Air Force agents

" were utilized to execute the warrant. Officers were unaware if Defendant was one of the 16 individuals listed in the search warrant, Defendant fled the premises upon seeing the police 17 arrive, and Officer Santos detained and conducted a pat-down of Defendant. Taken together, 18 these facts cannot support the conclusion that Officer Santos acted unreasonably. Indeed, 19 "[h]eadlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act of evasion: [i]t is not

20 necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such ... Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (holding that defendant's unprovoked flight from officers 21 in area of heavy narcotics trafficking supported reasonable suspicion that defendant was 22 involved in criminal activity and justified stop that yielded firearm). Similarly, "nervous, __]23 evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion." Id. (citations <(24 z -~25 omitted). Moreover, it is reasonable for officers to suspect that an individual who is present at- (.!) and flees from-such premises would be involved in its criminal activities. ~United States v. -26 Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing Ybarra and concluding officers 0:::: 027 possessed reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant when defendant arrived on private property 28 that contained marijuana growing operation). Accordingly, the Court concludes that

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Defendant's flight from an alleged drug operation at which there were deadly weapons, coupled with his initially uncertain identity, supported reasonable suspicion for Defendant's detention 2 and pat-down. 3 However, it must be noted that, pursuant to the Stop and Frisk Act, a detention shall not 4 exceed fifteen minutes, "shall not extend beyond the place where it was first effected or the 5 immediate vicinity thereof[,]" and the person "shall be released" if there is no probable cause 6 for arrest. 8 GCA §§ 30.30, 30.40. The pat-down of Defendant near the premises yielded 7 nothing, his detention lasted well beyond fifteen minutes, and the second pat-down occurred 8 after he was transported to the Tiyan station. Thus, the reasonableness of the Defendant's

9 detention near the residence cannot support Defendant's continued detention and the eventual pat~down and interview that yielded the evidence he now seeks to suppress. The Court therefore 10 turns to the Government's proffered rationale for denying Defendant's Motion. II III. Detention Incident to Execution of Search Warrant 12 The Government maintains that suppression is unwarranted because Defendant was 13 properly detained under Summers and Bailey. In Michigan v. Summers, the Court held that, 14 where the defendant was detained on a walk leading down from the front steps of the house to IS be searched, "a warrant to search for contraband fmmded on probable cause implicitly carries 16 with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is 17 conducted." 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (internal citations omitted). The Court emphasized three 18 law enforcement interests that justify the suspicionless detention of an occupant who is on the

19 premises during the execution of a search warrant: officer safety, facilitating the completion of

20 the search, and preventing flight. !d. at 702-03. In Bailey v. United States, the Court reiterated the holding of Summers but declined to extend the scope of permissible detention to a situation 21 in which officers observed the defendant leaving an apartment shortly before executing a search 22 warrant yet detained him approximately a mile away. 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1036 (2013). The Court 23 held that an officer's authority to detain an occupant under Summers is limited to the _ j 24 <( "immediate vicinity" of a premises to be searched. Id. at 1042.

z -~ 25

26 Here, Defendant was sitting five to ten feet from the residence and the scope of the

(_f) search warrant extended to the "residence, surrounding area, and vehicles." Surely the police 27 could not maintain safety, complete the search in an orderly fashion, and prevent flight by 0:: 0 28 letting an unidentified person flee the premises upon seeing the police. Moreover, the Court is

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not persuaded that such detentions are pennissible only when applied to persons who reside in the place to be searched, as the Supreme Court in Summers and Bailey repeatedly referred to 2 "occupants" and federal appellate courts have explicitly construed those decisions to extend to 3 the detention of persons on or near a given premises. Davis, 530 F.3d at 1081-82; United States 4 v. Sanchez, 555 F.3d 910,917-19 (lOth Cir. 2009); United States v. Bohannon, 225 F.3d 615,

' 616-17 (6th Cir. 2000). Officers likewise acted within their authority in handcuffing Defendant. 6 See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) ("The governmental interests in not only 7 detaining, but using handcuffs, are at their maximum when, as here, a warrant authorizes a 8 search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises."). The Court therefore 9 concludes that Defendant's detention incident to the execution of the search warrant was plainly

10 pennissible. Although Defendant's initial detention was pennissible under the Stop and Frisk Act and II Im,y as well as Summers,3 neither result is dispositive of Defendant's Motion. The evidence 12 Defendant seeks to suppress was not recovered or elicited from him until approximately 90 13 minutes after police commenced execution of the warrant, i.e., after he was handcuffed, advised 14 of his Miranda rights, and transported by police to the Tiyan station. 4 In addition, Defendant's

" outstanding arrest warrant was unknown to officers Wltil Defendant volunteered such 16 information at the Tiyan station. The Court therefore must detennine whether the applicable 17 case law permits the admission of evidence gleaned from Defendant's prolonged detention. 18 The Court is mindful that the rule set forth in Summers permits police to detain an 19 occupant for the duration of a search. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98 (determining that a person's

20 3 The Government "do[es] not concede Ism is applicable to this case" and takes the position that "Ism is no 21 implicated" by the particular facts of the case. As discussed above, however, the facts presented are susceptible b 22 analysis under .Im:y (and the Stop and Frisk Act) as well as Summers. These two lines of inquiry are distinct bu 23 related and, as here, may arise from one factuaJ scenario. ~ u. Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at I 039 ("And, where there w _.J grounds to believe the departing occupant is dangerous, or involved in criminal activity, police will generally no <(24 need Summers to detain him at least for brief questioning, as they can rely instead on Ism."); Unit....! States v :;z:2s Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 707-09 (9th Cir. 1983) (addressing defendant's detention incident to execution of searc (.£) 26 warrant as well as .Tw:x stop). 4 The record indicates that Defendant was apprehended, patted down, hand-cuffed, and read a Miranda wamin~ 0::: 27 within five minutes of6:15 P.M., then patted down again at the Tiyan station at 7:45P.M. The record is unclear 028 however, as to when he was transported to the Tiyan station.

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detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under Summers because a warrant existed to search the residence and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the 2 search); Croom v. Balkwill, 645 F.3d 1240, 1251 (lith Cir. 2011) ("Summers permits the 3 continued detention of lawfully detained occupants of a premises during the length of a routine 4 and diligently pursued warranted search thereof."). In the instant matter, though, the Government offers no authority to support its position that the police permissibly transported 6 Defendant to the Tiyan station. While Summers and its progeny permit detentions at or in 7 proximity to the premises targeted by a search warrant, the cases do not authorize detentions in 8 a police station incident to the execution of search warrant at a private residence. ~ Bailey.

9 133 S. Ct at 1042 ("petitioner was detained at a point beyond any reasonable understanding of

10 the immediate vicinity of the premises in question"). The Government also offers no evidence of the nature or duration of the search. And, even assuming the search justifiably continued for 11 90 minutes or more, it is not clear how Defendant's continued detention and transportation to 12 the Tiyan station served the law enforcement interests of officer safety, facilitating the 13 completion of the search, and preventing flight. While undoubtedly paramount when officers 14 searched for drugs and deadly weapons and responded to Defendant's flight, these interests diminished in force once officers removed Defendant from the scene. Since neither the initial 16 stop and frisk nor the detention incident to the execution of the search warrant supports 17 admission of the evidence at issue, the Court considers the circumstances of Defendant's arrest. 18 IV. Arrest

19 A warrantless arrest ''is per se unreasonable unless it falls within [one of] the specifically

20 established and well delineated exceptions[,]" such as when an arrest is made upon probable cause. Tuncap, 2014 Guam 1, , 14 (citations omitted). Determining whether an arrest occurred 21 requires "taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, to detennine 22 whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at 23 _J liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business." Id., , 17 (quoting Florida v. 24 <( Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted). The line between an ..:::::.. 25 investigatory detention and an arrest is crossed "when the police, without probable cause or a (I} 26 warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and

cc 27 transport him to the police station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative 0 28 purposes." Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,

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216 (1979) (holding that police violated Fourth Amendment when, absent probable cause, they seized person and transported him to police station for interrogation); see also Centanni v. Eight 2 Unknown Officers, 15 F,3d 587, 59! (6th Cir, 1994) ("While the line between a reasonable 3 Thm 'stop' and de facto arrest is often unclear, it is quite apparent that there is no such thing as 4 a ~ 'transportation.' Rather, the removal of a suspect from the scene of the stop generally 5 marks the point at which the Fourth Amendment demands probable cause."). 6 The evidence demonstrates that officers subdued Defendant, handcuffed him, patted him 7 down for weapons, discovered no contraband, transported him to the Tiyan station, patted him 8 down again, discovered contraband, and then elicited incriminating statements from him. 9 Considering the totality of the circumstances, and regardless of whether it initially was

10 conducted pursuant to the Stop and Frisk Act and llro: or Summers, the Court concludes that Defendant's detention near the premises in Dededo converted into an arrest upon his transport II to the Tiyan station; that is, a reasonable person in Defendant's position would believe that he 12 was not free to leave. Further, there is no evidence to suggest-nor does the Government 13 contend-that Defendant's transportation to the Tiyan station derived from Defendant's 14 consent5 or from probable cause with respect to any particular crime. Accordingly, it cannot be IS said that, once officers completed the fruitless pat~down near the premises, "the facts and 16 circumstances within the police officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably 17 trustworthy infonnation were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrestee 18 had committed or was committing a crime." Tuncap, 2014 Guam I, , 21 (quoting Cundiff, 2006 19 Guam 12,, 26; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)) (internal quotations omitted). Pursuant to

20 Summers, officers were justified in continuing to detain Defendant on the premises for the duration of the search once the first pat-down was complete, but they were not entitled to 21 transport Defendant to the Tiyan station to subject him to an additional frisk and questioning; 22 the latter constituted an unlawful arrest that yielded unlawfully obtained evidence. Consequently, the physical evidence and statements at issue shall not be admissible against Defendant unless there is independent evidence ''that would break the causal connection" between the unlawful arrest and the evidence obtained at the Tiyan station. See Cundiff, 2006

s Defendant apparently was not handcuffed at some point at the Tiyan station, since he removed the contraband from his pocket upon the officer's request. There is no contention that this equated to consent, nor does the Court constru 28 it as such.

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Guam 12,, 41 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)); 8 GCA § 30.60 (evidence seized by officer in violation of Stop and Frisk Act shall not be admissible against defendant). 2 V. Inevitable Discovery 3 The Government submits that even if there is "some constitutional defect in 4 [Defendant's] detention, the arrest warrant outstanding for him made the discovery of the 5 evidence on his person inevitable." The doctrine of inevitable discovery "pennits the 6 govenunent to rely on evidence that ultimately would have been discovered absent a 7 constitutional violation[]" provided the government "can establish by a preponderance of the 8 evidence that the infonnation ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful 9 means[.]" United States v. Ruckes, 586 F.3d 713, 718 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Nix v. Williams,

10 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984)) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1,, 56 (applying Nix). Importantly, courts have "recognize[d) the danger of II admitting unlawfully obtained evidence 'on the strength of some judge's speculation that it 12 would have been discovered legally anyway[.]'" United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 13 (lOth Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Castellan~ 488 F.2d 65,68 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on 14 other grounds, 500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane)). IS Here, it would be speculative to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the 16 contraband found on Defendant inevitably would have been discovered as a result of the 17 outstanding arrest warrant. Police had ample opportunity to detain Defendant, identify him, and 18 ascertain the existence of outstanding warrants while executing the search warrant at the

19 residence, but they failed to do so. Indeed, it was not Wltil Defendant was transported to the

20 Tiyan station that he informed officers of the arrest warrant. The Government set forth no evidence, for example, regarding police practices that would support the conclusion that the 21 arrest warrant inevitably would be discovered. The Court accordingly finds that the unlawfully 22 obtained evidence is not admissible based on the doctrine of inevitable discovery. The 23 challenged evidence must be suppressed because the contraband and statements were "come at _j 24

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CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant Aldan's Motion to Suppress 2 Statements, Physical Evidence such that the Government may not introduce as evidence at trial 3 against Defendant "a plastic straw containing suspected methamphetamine residue and all oral 4 and written statements made to Officers T. A. Supnet and J. A. Santos of the Guam Police 5 Department on March 21, 2014 and all other evidence derived therefrom." Trial Setting is set 6 for September 23, 2014 at 3:00P.M. 7

s IT IS SO ORDERED this day of September

11 HONORABLE A AMORENAIII 12

23 SERV:CE VIA COUKT BOX I acknowiJdge tt!:.t a ccpy of the 24 orig~nal hereto was ~laced In the

~'~'-"' n , , "-'• 25 -r:_llo..~' r