THIRD DIVISION
June 7, 2006
No. 1-05-1236
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) ) ROSA AGUILAR, ) Honorable ) James B. Linn, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KARNEZIS delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial, defendant, Rosa Aguilar, was convicted of loan fraud
(720 ILCS 5/16H-30 (West 2004)) and sentenced to two years' probation. On appeal,
defendant contends that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
by failing to present evidence of her specific intent to defraud.
The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that, in April 2004, defendant and
her brother met with Maria Garcia, a loan officer at Bank One, in order to secure a
refinance loan for $144,500. On the loan application, defendant listed "XXX-XX-XXXX" as
her social security number. While the loan request was being processed, a member of
the Bank One security department suspected that defendant presented a fraudulent 1-05-1236
security number and called the police indicating the same. Further investigation by the
Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General revealed that there was
no valid social security card issued under defendant's name and birth date. In May
2004, defendant and her brother attended a closing for the loan, where they each
completed a proof of identity affidavit. Defendant submitted a social security card
bearing the number "XXX-XX-XXXX" and her driver's license reflecting the same social
security number and signed the affidavit. The police were aware of the closing and
arrested defendant upon her completion of the affidavit.
Detective Edward Record testified that, after being read the Miranda warnings,
defendant admitted that her social security card was "fake" and "illegal," and that she
purchased it 11 years prior. She stated that she never used the social security card for
employment. Record confiscated the social security card, two driver's licenses,
defendant's Hyatt Hotel employee card and her health club card. Record returned all of
the documents, except for the social security card, to defendant after making copies.
Defense counsel made a motion for directed finding of acquittal, arguing, inter
alia, that there was insufficient evidence of defendant's intent to defraud. In denying the
motion, the trial court stated:
"I've heard the evidence thus far. I find the witnesses who testified
*** to be credible.
Banks, even though in this case the bank didn't actually lose any
money and there appeared to be sufficient collateral for a loan, they have
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an absolute right to know who their borrowers are and know who they are
dealing with and loaning large amounts of money to.
In this case the [s]ocial [s]ecurity number was a part of the
application, and it appears that it was a necessary part, and that this loan
obviously would not have been approved or gotten even to first base
without a [s]ocial [s]ecurity number.
[Defendant] had a phony [s]ocial [s]ecurity card that she admitted to
the police that she knew was phony, that she bought on the street and
was using it *** for purposes of this loan.
I notice that there is a driver's license, as well, that has that [s]ocial
[s]ecurity number. I believe this is what the statute had in mind. I do
believe that at this stage of the trial the Government has met their burden
of proof."
The defense subsequently rested its case. In closing argument, defense counsel
argued that, at most, the State demonstrated that defendant committed attempted loan
fraud. In response, the trial court stated:
"Well, I don't believe that this was just an attempt. This was
actually done.
The papers were filled out. It was more than an attempt. She
actually had done the deed. I believe the Government has met their
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
- 3 - 1-05-1236
Defendant was found guilty of loan fraud and sentenced to two years' probation. This
timely appeal followed.
Defendant contends that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt by failing to present evidence of her specific intent to defraud. The State
responds that it sufficiently proved its case by presenting evidence that she
"purposefully supplied a fake social security card" to the bank in order to obtain the
desired loan.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, it is necessary to determine
"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61
L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). It is not the function of this court to
retry the defendant or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See People v.
Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d 939, 947 (2004). The trier of fact assesses the
credibility of the witnesses, determines the appropriate weight of the testimony and
resolves conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 211, 808
N.E.2d at 948-49. In order to overturn the judgment, the evidence must be "so
unsatisfactory, improbable or implausible" to raise a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt. People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307, 537 N.E.2d 317, 319 (1989).
A defendant is guilty of loan fraud when the State proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that "the person knowingly, with intent to defraud, makes any false statement or
- 4 - 1-05-1236
report *** for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of a financial institution to
act upon any application *** or loan, or any change or extension of any of the same, by
renewal *** or otherwise." 720 ILCS 5/16H-30 (West 2004). Intent to defraud is a
question of fact, which may be proved by circumstantial evidence and inferred from the
facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. See People v. Moran, 260 Ill.
App. 3d 154, 160-61, 632 N.E.2d 1115, 1119 (1994) (describing specific intent to
defraud as an element of theft by deception); see also People v. Schwartz, 222 Ill. App.
3d 1041, 1048, 584 N.E.2d 873, 877 (1991) (describing specific intent to defraud as an
element of aggravated home repair fraud); People v. McManus, 197 Ill. App. 3d 1085,
1096, 555 N.E.2d 391, 399 (1990); People v. Rolston, 113 Ill. App. 3d 727, 731, 448
N.E.2d 965, 967-68 (1983).
In the instant case, defendant presented a false social security number, that she
admitted was illegally purchased, in order to secure a loan. Contrary to defendant's
belief that the trial court presumed intent to defraud absent evidence, the record
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THIRD DIVISION
June 7, 2006
No. 1-05-1236
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) ) ROSA AGUILAR, ) Honorable ) James B. Linn, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KARNEZIS delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial, defendant, Rosa Aguilar, was convicted of loan fraud
(720 ILCS 5/16H-30 (West 2004)) and sentenced to two years' probation. On appeal,
defendant contends that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
by failing to present evidence of her specific intent to defraud.
The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that, in April 2004, defendant and
her brother met with Maria Garcia, a loan officer at Bank One, in order to secure a
refinance loan for $144,500. On the loan application, defendant listed "XXX-XX-XXXX" as
her social security number. While the loan request was being processed, a member of
the Bank One security department suspected that defendant presented a fraudulent 1-05-1236
security number and called the police indicating the same. Further investigation by the
Social Security Administration Office of the Inspector General revealed that there was
no valid social security card issued under defendant's name and birth date. In May
2004, defendant and her brother attended a closing for the loan, where they each
completed a proof of identity affidavit. Defendant submitted a social security card
bearing the number "XXX-XX-XXXX" and her driver's license reflecting the same social
security number and signed the affidavit. The police were aware of the closing and
arrested defendant upon her completion of the affidavit.
Detective Edward Record testified that, after being read the Miranda warnings,
defendant admitted that her social security card was "fake" and "illegal," and that she
purchased it 11 years prior. She stated that she never used the social security card for
employment. Record confiscated the social security card, two driver's licenses,
defendant's Hyatt Hotel employee card and her health club card. Record returned all of
the documents, except for the social security card, to defendant after making copies.
Defense counsel made a motion for directed finding of acquittal, arguing, inter
alia, that there was insufficient evidence of defendant's intent to defraud. In denying the
motion, the trial court stated:
"I've heard the evidence thus far. I find the witnesses who testified
*** to be credible.
Banks, even though in this case the bank didn't actually lose any
money and there appeared to be sufficient collateral for a loan, they have
- 2 - 1-05-1236
an absolute right to know who their borrowers are and know who they are
dealing with and loaning large amounts of money to.
In this case the [s]ocial [s]ecurity number was a part of the
application, and it appears that it was a necessary part, and that this loan
obviously would not have been approved or gotten even to first base
without a [s]ocial [s]ecurity number.
[Defendant] had a phony [s]ocial [s]ecurity card that she admitted to
the police that she knew was phony, that she bought on the street and
was using it *** for purposes of this loan.
I notice that there is a driver's license, as well, that has that [s]ocial
[s]ecurity number. I believe this is what the statute had in mind. I do
believe that at this stage of the trial the Government has met their burden
of proof."
The defense subsequently rested its case. In closing argument, defense counsel
argued that, at most, the State demonstrated that defendant committed attempted loan
fraud. In response, the trial court stated:
"Well, I don't believe that this was just an attempt. This was
actually done.
The papers were filled out. It was more than an attempt. She
actually had done the deed. I believe the Government has met their
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
- 3 - 1-05-1236
Defendant was found guilty of loan fraud and sentenced to two years' probation. This
timely appeal followed.
Defendant contends that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt by failing to present evidence of her specific intent to defraud. The State
responds that it sufficiently proved its case by presenting evidence that she
"purposefully supplied a fake social security card" to the bank in order to obtain the
desired loan.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, it is necessary to determine
"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61
L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). It is not the function of this court to
retry the defendant or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See People v.
Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d 939, 947 (2004). The trier of fact assesses the
credibility of the witnesses, determines the appropriate weight of the testimony and
resolves conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 211, 808
N.E.2d at 948-49. In order to overturn the judgment, the evidence must be "so
unsatisfactory, improbable or implausible" to raise a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt. People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307, 537 N.E.2d 317, 319 (1989).
A defendant is guilty of loan fraud when the State proves beyond a reasonable
doubt that "the person knowingly, with intent to defraud, makes any false statement or
- 4 - 1-05-1236
report *** for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of a financial institution to
act upon any application *** or loan, or any change or extension of any of the same, by
renewal *** or otherwise." 720 ILCS 5/16H-30 (West 2004). Intent to defraud is a
question of fact, which may be proved by circumstantial evidence and inferred from the
facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. See People v. Moran, 260 Ill.
App. 3d 154, 160-61, 632 N.E.2d 1115, 1119 (1994) (describing specific intent to
defraud as an element of theft by deception); see also People v. Schwartz, 222 Ill. App.
3d 1041, 1048, 584 N.E.2d 873, 877 (1991) (describing specific intent to defraud as an
element of aggravated home repair fraud); People v. McManus, 197 Ill. App. 3d 1085,
1096, 555 N.E.2d 391, 399 (1990); People v. Rolston, 113 Ill. App. 3d 727, 731, 448
N.E.2d 965, 967-68 (1983).
In the instant case, defendant presented a false social security number, that she
admitted was illegally purchased, in order to secure a loan. Contrary to defendant's
belief that the trial court presumed intent to defraud absent evidence, the record
demonstrates that the court was presented with sufficient circumstantial evidence to
prove defendant's intent. Defendant focuses on the fact that her brother cosigned the
loan, that there was no evidence that she used the false social security number to
defraud in the past and that there was no evidence presented that she had defaulted on
the original mortgage or planned on defaulting on the refinanced loan. The statute,
however, does not require evidence that the defendant intended to fail to repay the loan
(see 720 ILCS 5/16H-30 (West 2004)). The American Heritage Dictionary defines
- 5 - 1-05-1236
defraud as "to take something *** by fraud" and "to cheat." American Heritage
Dictionary 364 (3d ed. 1997). The evidence clearly showed that defendant presented a
false social security number to secure a loan that she would not have obtained without
that number. Defendant presented fraudulent information with the intent to receive a
subsequent loan.
Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that this activity was what the
legislature had in mind when creating this statute. The legislature stated:
"It is the public policy of this State that the substantial burden
placed upon the economy of this State resulting from the rising incidence
of financial crime is a matter of grave concern to the people of this State
who have a right to be protected in their health, safety and welfare from
the effects of this crime." 720 ILCS 5/16H-5 (West 2004).
Regardless of whether defendant intended to repay the loan, defendant's actions would
have had an economic effect on the public while that loan was outstanding. Banks
assess their risk based upon information such as that supplied by a social security
number. Protecting this right of banks is exactly what the legislature designed this
statute to accomplish. Therefore, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found
that defendant committed all of the elements of loan fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
THEIS and ERICKSON, JJ., concur.
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