c- ll 'i r- ' t 'D :- I t- L.
SUPERiOR COURT OF GUAM 1 202~ JUN I ; FM 2: 5 2 CLER!, OF COURT 3 ~/ BY:. __ 4 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM -------! 5
Case No. CF0127-22 7 vs. 8 DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for 9 iolation of Right to Speedy Trial) SATINO PIUS ADDY, 10 Defendant. 11
12 INTRODUCTION
13 This matter came before the Honorable John C. Terlaje regarding Satino Pius Addy
14 ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for Violation of His Right to a Speedy Trial 15 ("Motion") filed on June 19, 2023. Defendant is represented by Attorney Rachel Taimanao- 16 Ayuyu. The People of Guam filed no opposition to the Motion; however, the court must 17 nevertheless consider the merits of the Motion. 1 18 On April 11, 2024, the Court took the matter under advisement, without oral argument, 19 pursuant to Administrative Rule 06-001 and CVR 7. l(e)(6)(A) of the Local Rules of the Superior 20 Court. Having reviewed the record and the relevant law, the court now issues this Decision and 21
22 Order DENYING Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for Violation of His Right to
23 Speedy Trial.
1 25 Where a motion is unopposed for failure of the non-moving party to file an opposition, Petition of Quitigua v. Flores, 2004 Guam 19 ,r 27 requires trial courts to consider all applicable law, including cases and statutes which may be in opposition to the 26 pending motion and which the non-moving party has the obligation to provide to the courts, unless it was made clear that the party had no intention of opposing the motion. 27 Decision and Order Case No. CF0127-22, People a/Guam v. Satino Pius Addy Page 1 of? 1 BACKGROUND 2 On March 3, 2022, Defendant was charged with seventeen (17) felony charges, including 3 special allegations of possession and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony. 2 4
5 Indictment (March 3, 2022). On or about March 10, 2022, the Court appointed private defense
6 attorneys to take on the case at hand; subsequently, however, the Court was met with repeatei::l
7 filings to withdraw. On or about January 31, 2023, Defendant was appointed his current attorney,
8 Rachel Taimanao-Ayuyu.
9 On June 19, 2023, Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for Violation of
His Right to Speedy Trial. Mot. to Dismiss with Prej. For Violation of Right to Speedy Trial and 11 Mem. of Authorities (June 19, 2023). At the time of this Motion, Defendant had been 12 incarcerated at the Department of Corrections for sixteen (16) months; and at the time of this 13 writing, for twenty-eight (28) months. Defendant claims that he was prejudiced as a result of the 14 delay because, at the time of the Motion, he had been incarcerated for more than a year; and, as 15
16 of this writing, more than two years. Id. He claims that the delay was due to a systemic
17 breakdown of the public defender system which is illustrated by the lack of private attorneys
18 willing to accept court appointments for indigent defendants. Id.
20 2 21 Defendant was charged with Second Degree Robbery (as a 2nd Degree Felony) Third Degree Robbery (as a 3rd Degree Felony) with a Special Allegation of Possession, Use ofa Deadly Weapon in the Commission ofa Felony; Second Degree Robbery (as a 22 2 nd Degree Felony); Third Degree Robbery (as a 3'd Degree Felony) with a Special Allegation of Possession, Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission ofa Felony; Second Degree Robbery (as a 2nd Degree Felony); Third Degree Robbery (as a 3rd Degree Felony); Theft (as a 2nd Degree Felony) with a Special Allegation, Possession or Use ofa Deadly Weapon in the 23 Commission ofa Felony; Burglary to a Motor Vehicle (as a 3rd Degree Felony); Theft by Receiving a Motor Vehicle (as a 3rd Degree Felony); Second Degree Robbery (as a 2nd Degree Felony); Third Degree Robbery (as a 3rd Degree Felony); Terrorizing 24 (as a 3rd Degree Felony) with a Special Allegation, Possession or Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony; Second Degree Robbery (as a 2nd Degree Felony); Third Degree Robbery (as a 3rd Degree Felony); Two (2) counts of 25 Terrorizing (as a 3'd Degree Felony) with a Special Allegation, Possession or Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony; Attempted Second Degree Robbery (as a 2nd Degree Felony); and Attempted Third Degree Robbery (as a 3rd Degree 26 Felony) with a Special Allegation, Possession or Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony.
27 Decision and Order Case No. CF0127-22, People of Guam v. Satino Pius Addy Page 2 of7 1 DISCUSSION 2 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal 3 prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. .. " U.S. Const. amend. 4
5 VI. The Organic Act of Guam applies this provision specifically to Guam. 48 U.S.C.A. §
6 1421 b(u). The United States Supreme Court has put forth a four-part analysis for determining
7 whether a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation has occurred. This test instructs the examining
8 court to consider the "[l]ength of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
9 his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182,
33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). 11 In People v. Mendiola, the Supreme Court of Guam held that: 12 In order to successfully argue that a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred, a 13 defendant bears the responsibility to proactively assert a speedy trial claim. Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 ~ 29 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 529). "[F]ailure to assert 14 the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy 15 trial." Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Further, assertion of the right is "entitled to strong evidentiary weight," though such assertion must be "viewed in light of defendant's 16 other conduct." Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ~ 47 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,314 (1986)). 17 People v. Mendiola, 2015 Guam 26. 18 None of these factors standing alone is dispositive of whether a constitutional 19 violation has occurred. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ~ 42. Rather, "the factors must be 20 considered together and balanced in relation to all of the relevant circumstances of the 21 delay in bringing the defendant to trial." Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). 22
23 I. The length of delay was substantial. 24 "The length of delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay 25 which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go 26
27 Decision and Order Case No. CF0127-22, People of Guam v. Satino Pius Addy Page 3 of 7 1 into balance." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. The Supreme Court has not defined precise time intervals
2 or a "bright line" test to determine when a delay is presumptively prejudicial. Barker, 407 U.S. 3 514 at 523. Moreover, whether a delay is presumptively prejudicial does not determine whether 4 a delay is actually prejudicial. Thus, any prejudice requires an individual analysis and is based 5 on the "peculiar facts and circumstances of each case." People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ,r 41. 6 Because there is no bright line test to determine whether a delay is presumptively 7
8 prejudicial, the court has discretion to make this determination, taking into consideration the
9 facts and circumstances of the case. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the length
of a delay becomes "presumptively prejudicial" as it approaches one year. People v. Stephen,
11 2009 Guam 8 ,r 16 (citing Doggett v.
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c- ll 'i r- ' t 'D :- I t- L.
SUPERiOR COURT OF GUAM 1 202~ JUN I ; FM 2: 5 2 CLER!, OF COURT 3 ~/ BY:. __ 4 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM -------! 5
Case No. CF0127-22 7 vs. 8 DECISION AND ORDER (Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for 9 iolation of Right to Speedy Trial) SATINO PIUS ADDY, 10 Defendant. 11
12 INTRODUCTION
13 This matter came before the Honorable John C. Terlaje regarding Satino Pius Addy
14 ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for Violation of His Right to a Speedy Trial 15 ("Motion") filed on June 19, 2023. Defendant is represented by Attorney Rachel Taimanao- 16 Ayuyu. The People of Guam filed no opposition to the Motion; however, the court must 17 nevertheless consider the merits of the Motion. 1 18 On April 11, 2024, the Court took the matter under advisement, without oral argument, 19 pursuant to Administrative Rule 06-001 and CVR 7. l(e)(6)(A) of the Local Rules of the Superior 20 Court. Having reviewed the record and the relevant law, the court now issues this Decision and 21
22 Order DENYING Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for Violation of His Right to
23 Speedy Trial.
1 25 Where a motion is unopposed for failure of the non-moving party to file an opposition, Petition of Quitigua v. Flores, 2004 Guam 19 ,r 27 requires trial courts to consider all applicable law, including cases and statutes which may be in opposition to the 26 pending motion and which the non-moving party has the obligation to provide to the courts, unless it was made clear that the party had no intention of opposing the motion. 27 Decision and Order Case No. CF0127-22, People a/Guam v. Satino Pius Addy Page 1 of? 1 BACKGROUND 2 On March 3, 2022, Defendant was charged with seventeen (17) felony charges, including 3 special allegations of possession and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony. 2 4
5 Indictment (March 3, 2022). On or about March 10, 2022, the Court appointed private defense
6 attorneys to take on the case at hand; subsequently, however, the Court was met with repeatei::l
7 filings to withdraw. On or about January 31, 2023, Defendant was appointed his current attorney,
8 Rachel Taimanao-Ayuyu.
9 On June 19, 2023, Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice for Violation of
His Right to Speedy Trial. Mot. to Dismiss with Prej. For Violation of Right to Speedy Trial and 11 Mem. of Authorities (June 19, 2023). At the time of this Motion, Defendant had been 12 incarcerated at the Department of Corrections for sixteen (16) months; and at the time of this 13 writing, for twenty-eight (28) months. Defendant claims that he was prejudiced as a result of the 14 delay because, at the time of the Motion, he had been incarcerated for more than a year; and, as 15
16 of this writing, more than two years. Id. He claims that the delay was due to a systemic
17 breakdown of the public defender system which is illustrated by the lack of private attorneys
18 willing to accept court appointments for indigent defendants. Id.
20 2 21 Defendant was charged with Second Degree Robbery (as a 2nd Degree Felony) Third Degree Robbery (as a 3rd Degree Felony) with a Special Allegation of Possession, Use ofa Deadly Weapon in the Commission ofa Felony; Second Degree Robbery (as a 22 2 nd Degree Felony); Third Degree Robbery (as a 3'd Degree Felony) with a Special Allegation of Possession, Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission ofa Felony; Second Degree Robbery (as a 2nd Degree Felony); Third Degree Robbery (as a 3rd Degree Felony); Theft (as a 2nd Degree Felony) with a Special Allegation, Possession or Use ofa Deadly Weapon in the 23 Commission ofa Felony; Burglary to a Motor Vehicle (as a 3rd Degree Felony); Theft by Receiving a Motor Vehicle (as a 3rd Degree Felony); Second Degree Robbery (as a 2nd Degree Felony); Third Degree Robbery (as a 3rd Degree Felony); Terrorizing 24 (as a 3rd Degree Felony) with a Special Allegation, Possession or Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony; Second Degree Robbery (as a 2nd Degree Felony); Third Degree Robbery (as a 3rd Degree Felony); Two (2) counts of 25 Terrorizing (as a 3'd Degree Felony) with a Special Allegation, Possession or Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony; Attempted Second Degree Robbery (as a 2nd Degree Felony); and Attempted Third Degree Robbery (as a 3rd Degree 26 Felony) with a Special Allegation, Possession or Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony.
27 Decision and Order Case No. CF0127-22, People of Guam v. Satino Pius Addy Page 2 of7 1 DISCUSSION 2 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal 3 prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. .. " U.S. Const. amend. 4
5 VI. The Organic Act of Guam applies this provision specifically to Guam. 48 U.S.C.A. §
6 1421 b(u). The United States Supreme Court has put forth a four-part analysis for determining
7 whether a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation has occurred. This test instructs the examining
8 court to consider the "[l]ength of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
9 his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182,
33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). 11 In People v. Mendiola, the Supreme Court of Guam held that: 12 In order to successfully argue that a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred, a 13 defendant bears the responsibility to proactively assert a speedy trial claim. Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 ~ 29 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 529). "[F]ailure to assert 14 the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy 15 trial." Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Further, assertion of the right is "entitled to strong evidentiary weight," though such assertion must be "viewed in light of defendant's 16 other conduct." Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ~ 47 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,314 (1986)). 17 People v. Mendiola, 2015 Guam 26. 18 None of these factors standing alone is dispositive of whether a constitutional 19 violation has occurred. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ~ 42. Rather, "the factors must be 20 considered together and balanced in relation to all of the relevant circumstances of the 21 delay in bringing the defendant to trial." Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). 22
23 I. The length of delay was substantial. 24 "The length of delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay 25 which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go 26
27 Decision and Order Case No. CF0127-22, People of Guam v. Satino Pius Addy Page 3 of 7 1 into balance." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. The Supreme Court has not defined precise time intervals
2 or a "bright line" test to determine when a delay is presumptively prejudicial. Barker, 407 U.S. 3 514 at 523. Moreover, whether a delay is presumptively prejudicial does not determine whether 4 a delay is actually prejudicial. Thus, any prejudice requires an individual analysis and is based 5 on the "peculiar facts and circumstances of each case." People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ,r 41. 6 Because there is no bright line test to determine whether a delay is presumptively 7
8 prejudicial, the court has discretion to make this determination, taking into consideration the
9 facts and circumstances of the case. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the length
of a delay becomes "presumptively prejudicial" as it approaches one year. People v. Stephen,
11 2009 Guam 8 ,r 16 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 at 652). At the time of this 12 Motion, Defendant's case has been pending for 16 months; and at the time of this writing, for 28 13 months. More alarmingly, the Defendant has been incarcerated for over two (2) years now. This 14 delay is sufficient to warrant examination of the remaining Barker factors. Thus, this factor 15 weighs in favor of dismissal. 16
17 II. The reason for the delay is justified. 18 Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. 19 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. As with the length of delay, the reasons for an allegedly unconstitutional 20 postponement must be assessed by the particular facts of each case. United States v. Marion, 404 21 U.S. 307 at 325. Due to no oppositions filed, the A G's office did not provide a reason explaining 22
23 and justifying any pretrial delays. 3 Moreover, the AG's office has not made efforts to move this
25 3 If a party does not intend to oppose, CVR 7.1 (h) of the Local Rules of the Superior Court of Guam provides that " ... any opposing party who does not intend to oppose the motion, shall, not later than seven (7) days after the date the last paper on that 26 motion is filed, or the time for filing as elapsed, file and serve a notice of ... non-opposition." However, the prosecutor also did not file a non-opposition. 27 Decision and Order Case No. CF0127-22, People of Guam v. Satino Pius Addy Page 4 of7 1 case forward since January 2023. The court held three (3) hearings for further proceedings 2 wherein the court alerted the parties that no opposition has been filed. Minute Entry (August 18, 3 2023; April 4, 2024; April 11, 2024). On April 4, 2024, the AG representative stated that they 4 will look into the outstanding motion. Minute Entry (April 4, 2024). No opposition was filed by 5 the next hearing, however, and as a result, the court took this matter under advisement. Minute 6 Entry (April 11, 2024). Negligent delay is weighed less heavily against the government than 7
8 deliberate delay, but nevertheless should be considered. People v. Mendiola, 2015 Guam 26 ,i 3.
9 Because the AG's office provides no explanation for its inaction in this case, the delay between
10 the filing of this Motion and this Decision, which amounts to approximately 12 months, is
11 attributed to the AG's office. 12 Additionally, Defendant argues that the delay between arraignment and the filing of this 13 Motion, which amounts to approximately 10 months, was due to the withdrawals of the 14 appointed attorneys, demonstrating a systemic breakdown in the public defender system. An 15 attorney's inability or unwillingness to move the case forward may not be attributed to the State 16
17 simply because they are assigned counsel. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 at 93. Although delay
18 resulting from a systemic breakdown in the public defender system could be attributed to the
19 State, that is not the case here. The Court ultimately assigned counsel to the Defendant and their
20 counsel has yet to withdraw from the case. It is also important to note that Defendant still has 21 not asserted his right to a speedy trial and the clock has not started. Because Defendant has not 22 asserted, it is even more difficult to determine whether Defendant actually wanted a speedy trial 23 and was deprived of that right. Thus, considering the unique circumstances of this case, this 24 factor weighs against dismissal. 25
27 Decision and Order Case No. CF0127-22, People of Guam v. Satino Pius Addy Page 5 of7 1 III. Defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial.
2 Defendant asserted that Barker rejected, "the rule that a defendant who fails to demand 3 a speedy trial forever waives his right." Barker, 407 LS. 514 at 528. But the court cautioned that 4 its rejection of the rule did not mean that a defendant has no responsibility to assert his right. Id. 5 Defendant states that he was not able to speak to an attorney to assert or waive his right to a 6 speedy trial following his arraignment. Defendant could have asserted or waived his right, 7
8 however, as he was appointed his current attorney on January 31, 2023. Defendant had
9 approximately five (5) months to assert his right prior to the filing of this Motion. To the court's
knowledge, Defendant still has not asserted his right to a speedy trial. Assertion of the right is
11 entitled to strong evidentiary weight. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ,i 47 (citing United States v. Loud 12 Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 at 314.) Therefore, this factor strongly weighs against dismissal. 13
14 IV. The delay was not prejudicial.
15 Whether defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the delay must be assessed in light of
16 the interests the speedy trial right was designed to protect: "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial 17 incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility 18 that the defense will be impaired." Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ,i 49 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). 19 Defendant asserts that he has suffered prejudice as he has been incarcerated for a substantial 20 amount of time-two (2) years now-causing him anxiety and disrupting his life. Oppression, 21 anxiety, and concern of a defendant incarcerated while awaiting trial are certainly present to 22
23 some degree in every case. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ,i 50 (citing Morris v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 1387
24 at 1391 ). Therefore, "evidence of a lengthy pre-trial incarceration standing alone, is insufficient
25 to establish that a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. Id. Similar to Mendiola, 26 Defendant offered no explanation as to how his delay resulted in uniquely oppressive 27 Decision and Order Case No. CF0127-22, People of Guam v. Satino Pius Addy Page 6 of7 1 incarceration conditions or anxiety beyond that faced by anyone accused of a serious crime.
2 Mendiola, 2015 Guam 26 ,r 4. 3 As to the third factor, Defendant argues he suffers the "most serious" type of prejudice 4 due to his inability to adequately prepare his defense. Defendant states he lost precious time to 5 prepare his defense including but not limited to obtaining "necessary defense services." As 6 alluded to earlier, however, Defendant was appointed his current counsel on January 31, 2023, 7
8 who is still representing him today. Moreover, Defendant never asserted his right to a speedy
9 trial. Defendant could have asserted his right and then filed this motion. Thus, this factor weighs
against dismissal.
11 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 12 For the above reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss With 13
14 Prejudice for Violation of Right to Speedy Trial.
15 A Further Proceedings hearing is set for -0U'f\e, 1..1 - ~ - - - - - - - - · 2024 at , 16 \ '. 00 ---\2-m. 17
18 so ORDERED, this - -\~ -- Q1 day of ~J~u_11._Q.____ 2024.- '-; - /;,-;--::,~. r;· ',J .' .,.._ - .: .- . 19
21 Sl:RVICE VIA E-MAIL 22 I aci
25 !1eputy Clerk, SuperiQr Court ot_Guam 1
27 Decision and Order Case No. CF0127-22, People a/Guam v. Salina Pius Addy Page 7 of7