People v. Adams CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 26, 2026
• Docket: E083526
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 2/26/26 P. v. Adams CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E083526

v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF2300848)

CHRISTOPHER LARRY ADAMS, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Brian E. Hill, Judge.

Affirmed.

Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,

Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Evan Stele,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 Defendant Christopher Larry Adams was sentenced to seven years in prison after a

jury found him guilty of making a felony criminal threat in violation of Penal Code

section 422. (Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.) On appeal, Adams

argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to reduce the felony to a

misdemeanor. We conclude that Adams forfeited the argument by failing to raise it at the

sentencing hearing, and the argument also fails on the merits. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

The victim, M.R., is the 83-year-old grandmother of Adams’s wife, Leandra. In

December 2022, M.R. invited Adams to stay in her home until “after New Year’s” so that

he could be with his children during the holidays. M.R. weighed 109 pounds, and she

was five feet four inches tall.

New Year’s Day came and went, and M.R. “[c]ontinuously” asked Adams to leave.

In mid-February 2023, when M.R. was picking up her grandson and great-granddaughter

from school, she received a call from her roommate, who told her that Adams and

Leandra were having a “verbal confrontation.” M.R. rushed home with the children and

said to Adams, “‘[y]ou perverted mother fucker. Get the fuck out of my house.’” Adams

responded, “‘[b]itch, I’ll knock your mother-fucking head off your shoulders.’” M.R. felt

threatened, and she walked away, got into her car, and called 911. Adams’s daughter

subsequently told M.R. that Adams was “‘sitting in the living room with a butcher’s

knife.’”

2 After about 30 minutes, the police arrived. Adams initially would not come out of

the house. “Between 40 [minutes] to an hour” later, Adams exited the home, and he was

arrested for making a criminal threat.

At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel requested that the court reduce the

criminal threat count to a misdemeanor pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 17. The

court denied the request.

The People filed an information charging Adams with one felony count of making

a criminal threat in violation of section 422. The People further alleged that he

personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense

(§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)), had previously been convicted of two

prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)), and had two prior strike convictions (§§ 667,

subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)). The People also alleged the following

six aggravating factors: (1) Adams’s prior performance on probation, mandatory

supervision, postrelease community supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory; (2) he was

on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision, or parole when

he committed the current offense; (3) he had served prior terms in prison or county jail

pursuant to subdivision (h) of section 1170; (4) his prior convictions were numerous and

increasingly serious; (5) he engaged in violent conduct, indicating that he is a serious

danger to society; and (6) the victim was particularly vulnerable. (Cal. Rules of Court,

rule 4.421(a)(3) & (b)(1)-(b)(5).)

3 Following a five-day trial, a jury convicted Adams of making a criminal threat.

The jury further found that he made the threat to a vulnerable victim. The court found

that Adams had two prior serious felony convictions and that he had two prior strike

convictions, and it found the remaining aggravating factor allegations true.

On the date originally scheduled for sentencing, the probation department had not

yet filed a probation report. The court stated that without a probation report it was

“difficult to know what’s appropriate in terms of the sentence.” The court asked the

People for their recommended sentence, and they responded that they “would be

requesting 25 to life.” The court observed that such a sentence could be “draconian,”

adding that it was difficult “to make a reasoned, an informed decision regarding whether

[granting Adams’s motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13

Cal.4th 497 was] appropriate without having a probation report.” Over Adams’s personal

objection, the court continued the sentencing hearing to the following month.

The court and defense counsel then engaged in the following colloquy:

“THE COURT: Let me get your thoughts about whether it’s going to be helpful

for you to proceed with the probation report being prepared.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Under the circumstances I would say yes, your Honor.

“THE COURT: Okay.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think it’s important but I won’t go against my client’s

wishes.

4 “THE COURT: Well, your client has his own views but you want to be competent

in your representation of your client, and I can’t identify any possible prejudice in the

case to your client. It’s going to be a prison case I think there’s no question about it. It’s

just what really is the issue is the length of the prison sentence. Not likely to be

probation, he’s got two prior strikes. Looking at 25 to life.

“Just based on my recollection of the case and his history that seems high but to

really make a fully informed decision I need a probation report.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Understood.

“THE COURT: But it’s not a probation case so he’s not going to be released. He

would never, not in any circumstances, be released between now and March the 22nd.”

At the sentencing hearing the following month, the court discussed the probation

report’s sentencing recommendation of “13 years in state prison,” consisting of the upper

term of three years for the criminal threat conviction plus five years for each of Adams’s

two prior serious felony convictions. The court stated, “I think state prison is mandatory,

given the nature of the charge and [Adams’s] criminal history.” The People submitted on

the probation report’s recommendation, and the court stated that it was inclined to follow

the recommendation and “strike the two strikes that were found to be true by the Court.”

The court then addressed Adams’s criminal history: “So you have [a] significant

concession, it seems to me, from the prosecution that they agree that maybe, given the

nature of the offense, 25 to life is not warranted.

5 “Here’s your problem, though, Mr. Adams, before I hear from [defense counsel],

your problem is your criminal history. It’s not so much the nature of this offense. If it

was this offense in isolation, and you didn’t have any prior criminal history, you would be

put on probation for this offense, there’s no question, even if convicted by a jury.

“That’s not the issue. The issue is that you present to the Court as someone who is

angry, who is not compliant, who is not d[e]fferential to people, whether it’s—at least in

my prior interactions with you and observing you in court—not respectful to the Court.

You, obviously, weren’t respectful to an 82-year-old grandmother. That issue could have

been handled in a much different way. I’m sure you would acknowledge that if you were

pressed to acknowledge it.

“But your problem, again, is a criminal history going back to 2009, where you

have—I’ll just repeat it. In 2009, it was a misdemeanor. In 2011, it was first-degree

residential burglary. There were two counts. I think, you were convicted of one. I didn’t

quite understand that, because I only got, I think, a narrative about one of the counts.

But, in any event, it was with a person present, and it was first-degree residential

burglary. And in 2012, a second conviction of first-degree residential burglary. It could

have been 2011 as well. And then, subsequent to that, you have a crime of violence in

2017, which involves battering of an intimate partner or spouse or girlfriend, and you

received four years in state prison. And then, you’re not far removed from state prison

where you’re alleged to have committed an act of child endangerment or battery, you do a

6 full year in county jail, then, in 2021, you commit a vandalism. In 2022, you commit

another misdemeanor offense.

“So you’ve got a pattern of criminal history that makes it hard for this Court to

conclude that you’re not a danger to other people; that you’re going to be complying with

court orders; that you’re going to follow the law. Maybe it’s—I don’t know how else to

read your criminal history, other than you present a danger if you are released, and that

you’re angry, for whatever reason. And maybe there are reasons, maybe you had a

difficult childhood, but that doesn’t really excuse this behavior, nor does it present any

assurance that you’re not going to go out and continue to be angry because of your

childhood or external factors.

“In other words, if we release you, we don’t want to just have this be a continuing

process of you’re back in court again in two years or three years or four years. Somehow

you’re not getting the message, and that message has been sent to you repeatedly over the

years. . . .

“I mean, you look at this criminal history, and I don’t know how you conclude

anything other than you present a danger. Hopefully, some day, you’re going to decide if

you’re going to make a promise to yourself and a commitment to yourself, I’m not going

to do this anymore. Whatever it takes, I’m not going to drink alcohol. I’m not going to

use drugs. I’m going to change my behavior.”

After hearing from Adams’s family, the court stated that “[t]he law is pretty clear

in terms of what punishment he’s going to receive. It’s not going to be anywhere near the

7 maximum that he’s going to receive, but it’s going to be significant[ly] less, but the law is

pretty clear that he’s got to be punished.” Defense counsel asked the court for a “more

lenient sentence” “given the totality of the circumstances.”

The court noted that it had “listened to the evidence, and given the nature of the

crime, and given the family’s support, the recommendation is 13. I’m going to reduce it

to seven.” The sentence consisted of the middle term of two years for the criminal threat

plus five years for one of the prior serious felony convictions. The court exercised its

discretion under section 1385 and dismissed Adams’s other prior serious felony

conviction and both of his prior strike convictions, and the court struck the deadly

weapon enhancement.

DISCUSSION

Adams argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to reduce his

felony criminal threat conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to subdivision (b) of section

17. The People argue that Adams forfeited the argument because he did not ask the court

to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor at sentencing. We agree with the People.

A “‘wobbler’” is “an offense which may be charged and punished as either a

felony or a misdemeanor . . . .” (Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 70.)

Making a criminal threat in violation of section 422 is a wobbler offense. (People v.

Queen (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 838, 842.) “When a fact finder has found the defendant

guilty of . . . a wobbler that was not charged as a misdemeanor, the procedures set forth in

section 17, subdivision (b) . . . govern the court’s exercise of discretion to classify the

8 crime as a misdemeanor.” (People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 790.) However,

“complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion

and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”

(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.) Adams therefore forfeited his claim by

failing to raise the issue at sentencing.

Even if Adams had not forfeited the argument, we would reject it. Adams argues

that the court abused its discretion because it “did not appear to be aware of its discretion

to consider the offense a misdemeanor and sentence [Adams] to county jail.” We agree

with the People that any such error was harmless. If the trial court had believed that

Adams deserved a shorter sentence but mistakenly believed that it lacked discretion to

reduce the offense to a misdemeanor, then the court could have sentenced him to as little

as 16 months in prison by dismissing the other serious felony conviction and imposing

the low term. (§§ 422, 1170, subd. (h)(1).) Instead, the court sentenced Adams to seven

years, consisting of the midterm of two years plus five years for the prior serious felony

conviction. Thus, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the court did not

realize that it had discretion to reduce the criminal threats conviction to a misdemeanor,

there is no reasonable probability that Adams would have obtained a more favorable

sentence if the court had been aware of its discretion. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d

818, 836.)

Insofar as Adams argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a

seven-year sentence instead of sentencing the offense as a misdemeanor, we are not

9 persuaded. (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866 [decision not to treat a

wobbler as a misdemeanor is reviewed for abuse of discretion].) “To prove an abuse of

discretion, ‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the

sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.”’” (Ibid.)

The court made a reasoned, individualized determination in light of relevant

considerations such as Adams’s criminal history and the danger that he poses to the

public. The court recognized that had Adams’s criminal threat occurred “in isolation, and

[he] didn’t have any prior criminal history, [he] would be put on probation for this

offense, there’s no question, even if convicted by a jury.” But the court concluded that in

light of all of the relevant circumstances, seven years in state prison was an appropriate

sentence, although a longer determinate sentence or even an indeterminate sentence of 25

years to life would be legally authorized. The court’s decision not to impose a sentence

shorter than seven years was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise irrational.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ J. We concur:

RAMIREZ P. J.

FIELDS J. 10