People of the Virgin Islands v. Thomas

2025 V.I. 9

Opinions

Opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, ) S.Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0017 Appellant/Plaintiff, ) Re: Super. Ct. Crim. No. 301/2022 (STX)

) )

v )

)

EDDISON THOMAS )

Appellee/Defendant )

) )

On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Croix Superior Court Judge: Hon. Harold W.L. Willocks

Considered: December 12, 2023 Filed: March 11, 2025

Cite as: 2025 VI9

BEFORE RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justice; MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; and IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES

Ian S.A. Clement, Esq Assistant Attorney General St. Thomas, U.S.V_I Attorney for Appellant,

Renee D. Dowling, Esq St. Croix, U.S.V.]

Attorney for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

SWAN, Associate Justice

Opinion of the Court

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q 1 Appellant People of the Virgin Islands seeks to vacate the March 23, 2023 oral order—and

subsequent April 27, 2023 written order—of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands granting

Appellee Eddison Thomas’ February 1, 2023 motion to suppress tangible and derivative evidence

For the reasons elucidated below, the aforementioned orders are reversed and the matter is

remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to take further action consistent with this Court’s

opinion

I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

q2 This criminal matter commenced on November 27, 2022, when a probable cause fact sheet

was filed in the Superior Court. An advice of rights hearing was held the following day. (Docket

Nos. 1, 3.)

q3 In the early morning hours of November 27, 2022, Officers George Clini and Mark Jones

of the Virgin Islands Police Department (““VIPD”) were dispatched to a grocery store known as

“The Market” in Frederiksted, St. Croix, in response to a call concerning an alleged assault. (J.A

at 17, 18.) They were joined by VIPD Sergeant Hernandez. (J.A. at 65). Once there, the officers

made contact with the complainant, Mrs. Unita Randolph Thomas, who stated that she had been

assaulted by her husband, Appellee Eddison Thomas (J.A. at 18.) According to Mrs. Thomas,

Appellee had arrived at the couple’s shared home earlier that night, intoxicated, and had proceeded

to physically assault her, pinning her to a wall and striking her in the head with both a closed fist

and a black handgun, and only releasing her after the couple’s minor children pleaded with him to

stop. (J.A. at 18, 34, 64, 65.) Mrs. Thomas then left the residence and reported the incident to the

police. (J.A. at 64, 65.) The responding officers observed bruising on Mrs. Thomas’ face,

corroborating her narrative, and asked if she could guide them to her home so that they could

confront Appellee. (J.A. at 36, 37.)

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44 Upon arrival at Mrs. Thomas’ and Appellee’s marital home, Mrs. Thomas opened the front

door via keypad code and invited the officers inside, then proceeded to direct them to the master

bedroom, where they found Appellee asleep on the bed. (J.A. at 37.) Mrs. Thomas pointed out a

black handgun on a shelf in the bedroom closet, which Officer Jones observed but did not recover

at the time. (J.A. at 37, 49, 55-56.) Upon subsequent recovery, the gun was found to contain a full

magazine and a live round in the chamber. (J.A. at 65.)

45 After the officers had located the handgun, Sergeant Hernandez woke Appellee and

questioned him regarding the gun and the evening’s events. (J.A. at 38, 39.) Appellee responded

that he had engaged in a physical altercation with his wife earlier that night, that the handgun was

his, and that the gun was not registered, though he had been unsuccessfully attempting to register

it for five years. (J.A. at 38.) At no time did Appellee ask the officers to leave his home or refuse

to answer their questions. (J.A. at 39.) Based upon the testimony and evidence, the officers found

cause to escort Appellee to the Wilber Francis Command Police Station, where he was read his

Miranda rights and placed under arrest. (J.A. at 18.) Once at the police station, Appellee refused

to provide any further account of the night’s events. (J.A. at 65.) Appellee was held for the night

without bail in accordance with the Territory’s domestic violence statutes pending his advice of

rights hearing. (J.A. at 66.)

46 An advice of rights hearing was held the next day, November 28, 2022, followed by

arraignment on December 14, 2022. (Docket Nos. 3, 18.) Appellee was released on cash bail

bond of $1,500 on November 28, 2022. (Docket Nos. 9-11.) On December 13, 2022, the People

filed an information charging Appellee with one count of unauthorized possession of a firearm

during the commission of a crime of violence, in violation of subsection (a) of section 2253 of title

14 of the Virgin Islands Code; one count of unauthorized possession of ammunition, in violation

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of subsection (a) of section 2256 of title 14 of the Virgin Islands Code; one count of assault in the

third degree in an incident of domestic violence, in violation of subsection (a)(2) of section 297 of

title 14 of the Virgin Islands Code and of subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of section 91 of title 16 of

the Virgin Islands Code; one count of simple assault and battery in an incident of domestic

violence, in violation of subsections (1) and (2) of section 299 of title 14 of the Virgin Islands

Code and of subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of section 91 of title 16 of the Virgin Islands Code; and

one count of disturbance of the peace, in violation of subsection (1) of section 622 of title 14 of

the Virgin Islands Code. (J.A. at 67-69.)

47 On February 1, 2023, Appellee filed with the Superior Court a motion to suppress tangible

and derivative evidence, requesting that the court suppress “any evidence seized in violation of the

Fourth Amendment” and claiming that the police had recovered the handgun and ammunition in

an unlawful warrantless search of Appellee’s home. (J.A. at 13-15.) The People filed a response

and opposition to Appellee’s motion on February 16, 2023, maintaining that the search was lawful

because Mrs. Thomas, Appellee’s spouse, had common authority over the marital home and had

consented to the search, and because Appellee himself did not object to the proceedings in his

home at the time of the search and interview. (J.A. at 17-20.)

{8 | The matter came on for a suppression hearing on March 23, 2023. (J.A. at 22.) The People

called Officer Jones as its witness. (J.A. at 27.) After both parties and the court examined Officer

Jones, the court entered its findings on the record. (J.A. at 59, 60.) The court found that there was

no unlawful entry, as Mrs. Thomas, who granted the officers consent to enter and search the home,

possessed common authority over the home. (J.A. at 60.) However, the court found that the

officers’ questioning of Appellee regarding the firearm, without first advising him of his Miranda

rights, was unconstitutional, and therefore granted Appellee’s motion to suppress “‘as to the

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firearm.” (J.A. at 7, 61.) While both the oral statement made by the court and the subsequent

April 24, 2023 written order memorializing the verbal order are vague on the scope of the

suppression, it appears to be understood by the parties that the consequence of the court’s order

was the dismissal of counts one and two of the five-count information: namely, one count of

unauthorized possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, in violation of

subsection (a) of section 2253 of title 14 of the Virgin Islands Code, and one count of unauthorized

possession of ammunition, in violation of subsection (a) of section 2256 of title 14 of the Virgin

Islands Code. (J.A. at 1, 2.) The People filed a notice of appeal on April 5, 2023, appealing the

court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress, pursuant to 4 V.1.C. § 33(d)(2). (Docket No

42, J.A. at 1.)

II JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

192 Prior to considering the merits of this matter, we must determine whether this Court has

jurisdiction to consider the People’s appeal from the Superior Court’s order granting Appellee’s

motion to suppress. V.J. Gov't Hosp. and Health Facilities Corp. v. Gov't of the V.L, 50 V.1. 276,

279 (V.I. 2008). In order to effectuate their appeal, the People must have adhered to the

requirements of 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(2)

An appeal by the Government of the Virgin Islands shall lie to the Supreme Court from a decision or order of the Superior Court suppressing or excluding evidence . . . if the Attorney General conducting the prosecution certifies to the Superior Court judge that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.'

' Notably, the record in this matter reflects some confusion on the part of both the parties and the Superior Court regarding whether this appeal stems from a decision dismissing counts or from a decision suppressing evidence. In the former scenario, appeals to this Court would be governed by 4 V.LC. § 33(d)(1); if the latter, then by 4 V.LC. § 33(d)(2). The distinction is vital to this matter because appeals filed pursuant to 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(2) must be certified as delineated in the statute, while appeals filed pursuant to 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(1) are bound by no such requirement

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Upon review of the record, this Court can find no evidence that the People have filed the requisite

certification in this matter. Nor, in fact, has either party seemed to notice the omission, as neither

addressed the issue in its appeal brief or at oral arguments. In order to proceed, therefore, this

Court must determine whether this issue is a jurisdictional issue or a non-jurisdictional, claims

processing issue. With respect to failures constituting jurisdictional issues that have not been

raised by either party, the Court is obligated to raise the jurisdictional issue sua sponte. See Hamer

v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 583 U.S. 17, 20 (2017). With errors concerning claims

processing rules, the Court shall deem such rules “waived if not asserted by a party because they

serve to protect the interests of that particular party, and thus should not be invoked by courts sua

sponte,”” Simon v. Joseph, 59 V.1. 611, 629 (V.I. 2013). Accordingly, the first question before

this Court is whether Appellant’s failure to comply with 4 V.ILC. § 33(d)(2)’s certification

requirement constitutes a jurisdictional defect, requiring dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, or a

violation of a claims-processing rule, permitting this Court to proceed to the merits

In the March 23, 2023 suppression hearing in this matter, the Superior Court made multiple statements appearing to conflate the actions of dismissing counts and suppressing evidence, stating that, due to a perceived Miranda violation, it would “suppress the charges” concerning the firearm and ammunition. While the court made this statement twice in its oral order at the suppression hearing, it nonetheless remains a nebulous declaration, one which this Court can only assume to be a misstatement of either an order to “suppress the evidence” or to “dismiss the charges.” However, further review of the record allows this Court to satisfactorily determine that this matter properly falls under 4 V.LC § 33(d)(2) as an appeal from a decision suppressing evidence First, there is the evidence of the suppression hearing itself. Suppression hearings are held to address motions to suppress evidence. V.I.R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(C). If, over the course of a suppression hearing, a court finds that there is good reason to suppress evidence, it may grant such a motion, leaving the government with the option of either dismissing any charges reliant upon said evidence or proceeding with such charges regardless. It is within the government’s purview to decide whether to dismiss any charges related to suppressed evidence; that decision does not rest with the court at that juncture. Second, there is the fact that Appellant’s notice of appeal specifically identifies the appeal as being filed pursuant to 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(2). Additionally, the briefs of both parties, while occasionally using the same misleading language of the Superior Court concerning “dismissal”’ and “‘charges,” primarily identify the matter as one concerning the suppression of evidence. Based on the foregoing, this Court holds that the evidence in the record overwhelmingly supports the characterization of this matter as an appeal from a decision suppressing evidence. Consequently, the appeal is subject to the requirements of 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(2), including certification

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410 This Court has never directly addressed the issue of the certification requirement of 4 V.I.C

§ 33(d)(2).2. However, the issue has been raised in various federal courts, and we can therefore

look to their holdings on the issue for guidance. The language and purpose of 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(2)

derive from Title 18, Section 3731 of the United States Code, which states, in part,

An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding

This portion of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 has frequently been at issue in federal courts, but rarely has it

appeared in circumstances of an entirely omitted and overlooked certification. In most instances,

the issue has arisen from a delayed or in some manner improper certification. See United States

v, Bates, 146 Fed.Appx. 795, 797-98 (6th Cir. 2005) (the certification, filed several days after the

government’s appeal, was originally signed by an Assistant U.S. Attorney rather than the U.S

Attorney, an error that was later rectified); United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 578-79 (6th Cir

2001) (the required certification was filed thirteen months after notice of appeal); United States v.

Lopez, 518 F.3d 790, 794-95 (10th Cir. 2008) (certification was only filed after the court of appeals

? The issue has been raised before this Court once before, in People v. Murrell, 56 V.1. 796 (V.1. 2012), but the Court’s ruling did not reach the issue, as explained in footnote 4 of our opinion in that matter

The parties disagree in their respective briefs as to whether any defect with the certification mandated by section 33(d)(2) represents a jurisdictional defect. Significantly, while Murrell frames his argument in jurisdictional terms, the People have noted that federal courts have held that the certification requirement codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3731 is not jurisdictional, and therefore the failure to timely file a certification — as opposed to a notice of appeal — does not mandate dismissal as a remedy. See, e.g., United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 506 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases), Nevertheless, since the People have complied with the certification requirement, we decline, as part of this appeal, to determine whether the failure to timely file a section 33(d)(2) certification deprives this Court of appellate jurisdiction

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entered an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of certification);

United States v. Salisbury, 158 F.3d 1204, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 1998) (certification was filed one

month after filing of the appeal, upon notification by the clerk of the court regarding its omission)

4111 Federal courts have nearly unanimously held that errors in certification are not treated as

jurisdictional issues but rather claims-processing errors. “A failure to file the certificate within

thirty days is an irregularity in perfecting the appeal but does not operate to deprive the court of

jurisdiction.” United States. v. Welsch, 446 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1971); see also Lopez, 518

F.3d at 795; United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1509 n.2 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v

Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 1999); United States y. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1300

(10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Eccles, 850 F.2d 1357, 1359 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v

Becker, 929 F.2d 442, 445 (9th Cir. 1991); Meier v. Keller, 521 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir

1975); United States v. Crumpler, 507 F.2d 624, 624 (Sth Cir. 1975); In Re Grand Jury Subpoena

175 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 1999). However, federal courts have also emphasized that the

certification requirement “is not a mere formality.” United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791, 794

(5th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Carrillo-Bernal, 58 F.3d 1490, 1493 (10th Cir. 1995)

Rather, the requirement “serves the very important purpose of ensuring that the prosecutor

carefully analyzes the case before deciding to appeal.” Salisbury, 158 F.3d at 1207; see also

Herman, 544 F.2d at 800 n.4. Certification “forces the prosecutor to represent that she has, in fact,

thoroughly and conscientiously considered the decision to appeal,” thus “further[ing] the vital

underlying goal of preventing needless delay and prolonged worry in criminal proceedings.”

Salisbury, 158 F.3d at 1207; see also United States v. Miller, 952 F.2d 866, 875 (5th Cir. 1992)

Carrillo-Bernal, 58 F.3d at 1492-97. We must therefore impress upon the People that adherence

to such claims-processing rules as certification pursuant to 4 V.I.C. § 33(d)(2) is absolutely vital

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for maintaining public trust in the good-faith nature of the government’s appeals. However,

because Appellee in this matter has not sought dismissal due to the absence of certification at any

juncture in this matter, we will deem the issue of compliance with this claims-processing statute

waived, consistent with our precedent, and will proceed to consider the merits of the matter. See

Fuller v. Browne, 59 V.1. 948, 953 n.3 (V.I. 2013)

412 “An appeal by the Government of the Virgin Islands shall lie to the Supreme Court from a

decision or order of the Superior Court suppressing or excluding evidence.” 4 V.I.C. 33(d)(2) “In

reviewing the trial court's decision on [a] motion to suppress, ‘we review its factual findings for

clear error and exercise plenary review over its legal determinations.’” People v. John, 52 V.1

247, 255 (V.I. 2009) (quoting United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 276 (3d Cir. 2006)) (internal

quotations omitted)

413 “The Supreme Court [has] jurisdiction over all appeals arising from final judgments, final

decrees or final orders of the Superior Court.” 4 V.ILC. § 32(a). We review findings of fact for

clear error but exercise plenary review over the Superior Court's application of law. St. Thomas

St. John Bd. of Elections v. Daniel, 49 V.1. 322, 329 (V.1. 2007). Furthermore, when a case involves

the interpretation of the United States Constitution, our standard of review is plenary. Latalladi v

People, 51 V.I. 137, 141 (V.I. 2009). Finally, we review the trial court's admission of evidence for

abuse of discretion. Corriette v. Morales, 50 V.I. 202, 205 (V.I. 2008)

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Erred in Suppressing Physical Evidence and Dismissing Charges under Miranda

414 At the March 23, 2023 suppression hearing, after hearing testimony from Officer Jones,

the Superior Court gave a verbal ruling on the record. (J.A. at 59-61.) The court found that the

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search and seizure of Appellee’s handgun and ammunition was constitutional because Mrs

Thomas, who consented to a search, led the police officers into the home, and pointed out the gun

in Appellee’s bedroom closet, had common authority over the shared marital home. (J.A. at 60)

Despite this finding, however, the court then ruled that the firearm and ammunition be suppressed

and that the counts regarding them be “suppressed,” because “the questioning of [Appellee]

concerning [the] firearm, without his being advised of his [Miranda] rights, itself create[d] an issue

as to the fruit of the poisonous tree.” (J.A. at 60, 61.) The court did not elaborate on its reasoning,

either on the record or in the scant April 24, 2023 written order memorializing its verbal ruling

415 In the ubiquitous 1966 Miranda v. Arizona case, the Supreme Court of the United States

held that custodial interrogations have the capacity to undermine the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by potentially exposing suspects to physical or

psychological coercion. 384 U.S. 436, 446-50, 467 (1966). To defend against such undue

influence, the Court created a prophylactic procedural process requiring that a suspect be duly

wamed prior to the commencement of custodial interrogation. Jd. at 444. Absent an advance

waming of a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights, any pretrial statements made during custodial

interrogation are inadmissible at trial. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611-612 (2004)

However, the Supreme Court has limited the remedy for a Miranda violation to the exclusion of

only the testimonial evidence obtained in violation of Miranda, and not the physical evidence

derived from an unwarned but otherwise voluntary confession. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,

451-52 (1974). A three-justice plurality further explained that

the Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of [the] Self-Incrimination Clause [T]he core protection afforded by the Self. Incrimination Clause is a prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant to testify

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against himself at trial The Clause cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements

United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636-37 (2004)

416 Put simply, courts have rejected the proposition that "the fruit of the poisonous tree

doctrine, which, in the Fourth Amendment context, requires the exclusion of evidence or

confessions obtained as a result of a constitutional violation, extends to violations of the Miranda

decision.” United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.

Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the gun police recovered because of

voluntary statements made in violation of the Miranda rule was properly admissible))

417 However, the exclusionary rule will apply to suppress evidence stemming from a Fourth

Amendment violation as well as evidence derived from involuntary statements obtained in

violation of the Miranda rule. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); U.S. v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99

108 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, the first portion of this analysis will inquire whether Thomas’s Fourth

Amendment rights were violated, and the second portion will assess whether the statements

regarding the firearm were made involuntarily

418 Applying the directives of the United States Supreme Court regarding remedies for

violations of Miranda to the matter now before this Court, it is evident that, were the questioning

of Appellee regarding the handgun found to be a violation of Appellee’s Fifth Amendment right

against self-incrimination, the remedy would be the exclusion of Appellee’s statements concerning

the handgun, not the exclusion of the handgun itself. Had the court found that the search of

Appellee’s home was illegal, the physical evidence obtained through that search may properly

have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. “[E]vidence obtained through unreasonable

searches and seizures is excluded from use in criminal prosecutions.” People v. Santana, 63 V.1

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25, 29 (V.I. 2014) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-57 (1961)). However, the court instead

found that the search itself was valid, as Mrs. Thomas, Appellee’s spouse who shared common

authority over the marital home, invited the officers inside and directed them to the handgun. The

Superior Court therefore erred in suppressing the handgun and ammunition as a remedy for what

it incorrectly perceived as a violation of Appellee’s Fifth Amendment rights

419 The court further erred in stating that, due to the perceived Miranda violation, it would

“suppress the charges” concerning the firearm and ammunition. While the court made this

statement twice in its oral order at the suppression hearing, it nonetheless remains a nebulous

declaration, one which this Court can only assume to be a misstatement of either an order to

“suppress the evidence” or to “dismiss the charges.” As discussed above, if the court intended to

suppress physical evidence as a remedy to a Miranda violation, it did so in error. However, if the

court instead meant to dismiss the charges relating to the handgun and ammunition, it likewise

committed error

420 Suppression hearings are held to address motions to suppress evidence. V.I. R. CRIM. P

12(b)(3)(C). If, over the course of a suppression hearing, a court finds that there is good reason to

suppress evidence, it may grant such a motion, leaving the government with the option of either

dismissing any charges based upon that evidence or proceeding with such charges without relying

on that evidence. It is within the government’s purview to decide whether to dismiss any charges

related to suppressed evidence; that decision does not rest with the court at that juncture

Accordingly, this Court concludes that, regardless of the ambiguity of its intention, the Superior

Court committed error whether it meant to suppress physical evidence or to dismiss charges, as

the former is prohibited as a remedy for a Miranda violation and the latter is unavailable as an

outcome of a suppression hearing

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B. The Warrantless Search of Appellee’s Home and Seizure of the Handgun were not in Violation of Appellee’s Fourth Amendment Right of Protection Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure

4/21 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees “the right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This assurance generally protects against the warrantless entry

of the government into a person’s home, either to seize property or to effectuate an arrest. Payton

v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). However, this guarantee does not extend to circumstances in

which either the subject of the search or a third party possessing common authority over the

premises grants voluntary consent to the search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248

(1973); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). “‘Common authority’ rests ‘on mutual

use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes.’” //linois

v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7). “The burden of

establishing that common authority rests upon the State.” Jd.

422 While the circumstances of each case must be carefully weighed to determine whether a

third party possesses common authority over the subject premises, courts have regularly found that

family members and spouses, in particular, have an assumed common authority over shared

premises. See United States v. Casey, 825 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2016) (grandparents had common

authority over their own home and could consent to a search of live-in grandson defendant’s

bedroom); United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 2007) (wife had common

authority to consent to search of husband defendant’s computer located in common living area of

shared marital home); United States v. Tosti, 733 F.3d 816, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2013) (wife of

defendant had common authority over the home the couple had shared for 20 years and could

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consent to search of defendant’s home office and computer); United States vy. Guillen, 995 F.3d

1095, 1106 (10th Cir. 2021) (defendant’s father, owner of the subject premises, had common

authority to grant consent to search the son’s bedroom). This authority stands even if the co

occupant defendant “later objects to the use of evidence so obtained.” United States v. Randolph

547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006). The primary exception to this rule is when a defendant co-occupant

contemporaneously, at the time of the search, expressly refuses to consent. In such situations, “a

physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless

search unreasonable and invalid as to him.” Jd

{23 Here, the People bore the burden of proving at the suppression hearing that Mrs. Thomas,

who led officers into her home shared with Appellee and directed them to the handgun in

Appellee’s bedroom closet, had apparent common authority to do so, thus satisfying the co

occupant exception to Appellee’s Fourth Amendment right against warrantless search and seizure

At the hearing, the People’s witness Officer Jones testified that Mrs. Thomas identified herself to

officers as Appellee’s wife, stated that her husband had assaulted her with a handgun, and bore

noticeable injuries that accorded with her account of the assault. Officer Jones further testified

that Mrs. Thomas voluntarily led the officer to her home, opened the front door by entering a code

into a keypad, and guided the officers through the home to the bedroom where Appellee was

sleeping. She then directed them to the location of the handgun in the bedroom closet. Officer

Jones stated that when Appellee was roused, he voluntarily answered the officers’ questions and

made no objection either to their presence in the home or their seizure of the handgun. At the close

of the hearing, the Superior Court found that the People had met their burden of proving that Mrs

Thomas had common authority over the premises. We agree

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424 According to the record, Mrs. Thomas and Appellee lived together in the subject premises

as husband and wife sharing a marital home. This fact, under ordinary circumstances, would

commonly give either spouse an assumed authority over the premises generally. This presumed

authority was reinforced by the fact that Mrs. Thomas knew the keypad code to unlock the front

door and that she was able to guide the officers into the bedroom in which Appellee was sleeping

with no suggestion of a lock on the bedroom door or of any other obstacle to gaining entry therein

While Appellee raised the question at the hearing of whether Mrs. Thomas regularly slept in the

same bedroom as Appellee, this Court deems that issue to be of little import. As Officer Jones

stated at the hearing, it is often generally assumed that a married couple has common authority

over bedrooms in the marital home and, as stated above, no evidence was presented that Mrs

Thomas was in any way obstructed from entering the bedroom, nor did Appellee object to the

presence of either Mrs. Thomas or the police officers in the bedroom upon being awoken

Accordingly, this Court holds that the People successfully met their burden of proving that Mrs

Thomas had apparent authority over the subject premises, and thus that the search and seizure

conducted with her consent, and with no contemporaneous objection from Appellee, was valid

Consequently, the fruits of that search, including the handgun and the ammunition located in its

attached magazine, were validly seized and are not subject to suppression on Fourth Amendment

grounds

C. Appellee’s Statements Regarding the Firearm were made Voluntarily

425 The burden is on the People to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a

challenged statement is voluntary. Jacobs, 431 F.3d at 109. “A necessary predicate to a finding

of involuntariness is coercive police activity. Further, there must be some causal connection

between the police conduct and the confession.” /d. at 108

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426 A statement is involuntary when the suspect’s will is overborne in such a way as to render

his confession the product of coercion. Lam v. Kelchner, 1S F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2002), Courts

look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a statement was voluntary and

consider

not only the crucial element of police coercion; the length of the interrogation; its location; its continuity; the defendant’s maturity; education; physical condition; and mental health . . . [but also] the failure of police to advise the defendant of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation

United States v. Swint, 15 F.3d 286, 289 (3d Cir. 1994)

927 Here, the totality of the circumstances suggests that Thomas’s statements were

voluntary. Thomas was not restrained or handcuffed. (J.A. 38.) He was not subjected to repeated

or prolonged questioning. (J.A. 38-39.) Thomas was cooperative throughout Sergeant

Hernandez’s questioning. (J.A. 39); see United States v. Vidal, 85 Fed. Appx. 858, 863 (3d Cir

2004) (concluding that a defendant was “not subject to much less overcome by coercive tactics

[where] he appeared to be calm and was cooperative throughout the questioning”). Further, there

is nothing to suggest that Thomas’s age, education, or intelligence would have impacted the

voluntariness of his statements. Under the circumstances, this Court concludes that the People has

met its burden in establishing that Thomas’s statements were voluntary

428 Because Thomas’s statements were made voluntarily, the limited remedy of a Miranda

violation does not extend to bar admission of the physical evidence derived from the statements;

thus, the Superior Court erred in suppressing the firearm and ammunition on this basis

D. Appellee’s Statements Regarding the Firearm were not made Subject to Custodial Interrogation

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429 While the Superior Court erred in suppressing physical evidence—the handgun and the

ammunition—consequent to its finding that Appellee had been subjected to unlawful custodial

interrogation, of Appellee’s statements regarding the handgun could properly be suppressed upon

such a finding. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon this Court to determine whether the officers’

questioning of Appellee in Appellee’s bedroom regarding the handgun did, in fact, constitute

unlawful custodial interrogation

730 Appellee argues that the officers violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination by questioning him in his bedroom about the night’s events and about the handgun

found in his closet without first advising him of his constitutional rights under Miranda. However,

Miranda warnings need only be given when a suspect is simultaneously in custody and subjected

to governmental interrogation. See //linois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (finding that the

combination of custody and interrogation “may create mutually reinforcing pressures” upon a

defendant to confess against his or her will); see also J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270

(2011) (determining that Miranda warnings are only required when a defendant is interrogated

while in custodial holding)

431 “Custody” has been defined by the Supreme Court as the denial of “freedom of action

in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. Determinations of custody rely upon

considering the “circumstances surrounding the interrogation” and whether “given those

circumstances, ... a reasonable person [would] have felt ... at liberty to terminate the interrogation

and leave.” J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995))

The determination rests upon the objective test of whether a reasonable person under the

circumstances of the interrogation would find those circumstances to be coercive. /d. at 275-77;

see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667-69 (2004) (the objective test was devised to

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give police clear guidance and requires no consideration or analysis of a suspect’s personal

characteristics). While circumstances vary immensely, those interrogations held while a defendant

is in handcuffs or while—or after—-a defendant has been held at gunpoint are more likely to be

considered coercive, and therefore custodial. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 743 F.3d 322, 341

(2d Cir. 2014) (defendant was found to be in custody when interrogated while handcuffed because,

despite officer’s assurance that defendant was not under arrest but merely “detained,” a reasonable

person would associate being handcuffed with a formal arrest); Rivera v. Thompson, 879 F.3d 7,

14 (Ist Cir. 2018) (defendant was found to be in custody at the time of interrogation, despite no

formal arrest, because officer stopped defendant at gunpoint). The location of interrogation weighs

considerably in determining the question of custody, with police station interrogations being far

more likely to be deemed “custodial” than interrogations conducted in a defendant’s home or in

another location with which a defendant is familiar or comfortable. See Stansbury v. California,

511 U.S. 318, 326 (1994) (per curiam) (interrogation in a police station may be deemed custodial,

dependent upon objective circumstances); see also Beckwith v. United States 425 U.S. 341, 345

47 (1976) (interrogation deemed noncustodial as suspect was interviewed at home); United States

v. Melo, 954 F.3d 334, 343 (1st Cir. 2020) (defendant was not in custody when questioned at home

with only a limited number of officers present in the house). The burden to prove custodial status

rests with the defendant. United States v. Davis, 792 F.2d 1299, 1309 (Sth Cir. 1986)

432 In this case, this Court concludes that Appellee has not met his burden of proving custodial

status. The particular circumstances under which Appellee was interviewed by police were not

those which a reasonable person would be likely to find coercive. Appellee was in his own home,

in which only three officers were present. Only one officer, Sergeant Hernandez, questioned

Appellee. Nothing on the record suggests that Appellee was held at gunpoint or handcuffed at any

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point either before or during his questioning. Appellee was intimately familiar with his

surroundings and there is no indication on the record that he either attempted or was restrained

from moving about at will. The questioning in the home was, by all accounts, relatively brief, and

at no point did Appellee indicate, either verbally or otherwise, a desire to stop the questioning or

leave the area. Upon application of the objective test to determine the presence or absence of

custody, this Court holds that the Appellee has not proved that he was being held in custody when

he was interrogated about the handgun. Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court’s ruling

granting Appellee’s motion to suppress and determine that the fruits of Appellee’s questioning,

namely, Appellee’s statements about the handgun, were lawfully acquired

E. The People Failed to Prove that the Evidence Obtained from Appellee’s Statements Regarding the Handgun Should be Allowed Under the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Miranda Exclusionary Rule

433 Although we have determined that Appellee’s statements concerning the handgun were not

made under the circumstances of custodial interrogation, and are therefore not subject to

suppression under Miranda, we will briefly analyze the People’s alternate argument regarding the

inevitable discovery doctrine. The People argue in their brief that, even were this Court to find

that Appellee’s statements were made in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self.

incrimination, the information derived therefrom would fall under the doctrine of inevitable

discovery. Specifically, the People assert that the information derived from Appellee’s statement

that he did not have a license for his handgun would inevitably have been speedily corroborated

through the routine police procedure of checking the registration status of all seized firearms. The

People therefore maintain that the information regarding the handgun’s registration status falls

under the inevitable discovery exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule and therefore should

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not have been suppressed even if this Court were to agree that the statements themselves should

have been suppressed. In similar cases, the burden is on the prosecution to establish that discovery

was actually inevitable based upon “demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or

impeachment.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448-50 (1984). Here, the government has failed to

meet that burden

4134 Under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, courts may admit

evidence that has been deemed illegally obtained if the prosecution has provided a sufficient

showing that such evidence would inevitably have been discovered through lawful, independent

means. See United States v. Bradley, 959 F.3d 551, 557 (3rd Cir. 2020) (the inevitable discovery

exception applies when the prosecution submits “testimony regarding standard practices” and

routine police procedures into evidence demonstrating that such routine procedures would

inevitably have uncovered the evidence in question). “The key question under the inevitable

discovery doctrine is whether ‘the Government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

routine police procedures inevitably would have led to the discovered’ evidence.” United States

v, Alexander, 54 F.4th 162, 174 (3rd Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219

245 (3rd Cir. 2011)) (emphasis added). Upon review of the trial record, this Court holds that the

People have failed to make a showing that the information regarding the handgun’s status, as

obtained through Appellee’s statements, would inevitably have been independently procured

through routine police procedures. Moreover, this Court has little doubt that the VIPD’s routine

registration check of seized firearms would have produced independent, legal corroboration of the

information obtained through questioning. However, in this case the record reflects no argument

or evidence to that effect having been made at any time before the Superior Court, either in writing

or through testimony. Instead, the inevitable discovery doctrine, the routine nature of the

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aforementioned police procedures, and the arguments thereupon are all mentioned for the first time

in the People’s appellate brief. Accordingly, this Court finds that the People have failed to prove

that the information provided through Appellee’s questioning should be allowed under the

inevitable discovery exception. However, as this Court has already determined the information to

be allowable for other reasons, the above analysis is not consequential to our holding in this matter.

IV. CONCLUSION

935 The Superior Court was correct in finding that Appellee’s Fourth Amendment right against

improper search and seizure was not violated in the November 27, 2022 search of his home, as

Appellee’s wife, Mrs. Thomas, possessed common authority over the premises and consented to

the search. However, the court abused its discretion in suppressing Appellee’s handgun and

ammunition as evidence and committed clear error in dismissing the counts related thereto. Not

only was the Superior Court incorrect in finding that Appellee had been subject to custodial

interrogation when he made statements regarding the handgun, but the court also erroneously

suppressed physical evidence as a remedy for the supposed violation of Appellee’s Fifth

Amendment rights, when in fact such remedy only includes physical evidence if statements are

made involuntarily. Appellee’s statements were made voluntarily and were not made under

custodial interrogation; therefore no violation of Appellee’s Fifth Amendment rights against self:

incrimination was committed. Accordingly, no suppression of either physical or testimonial

evidence is warranted. Consequently, the Superior Court’s March 23, 2023 oral order and

subsequent April 24, 2023 written order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress are reversed and

the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further action consistent with this Court’s opinion

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Dated this 11" day of March, 2025 BY THE COURT

IVE ARLING i * Associate Justi

ATTEST VERONICA J. HANDY, ESQ Clerk of the Court

By: /s/ Jahkyda Coakley Deputy Clerk II

Date: March 11, 2025