People of the Virgin Islands v. Jamari Gumbs

• Court: Superior Court of The Virgin Islands
• Decided: April 18, 2023
• Docket: ST-2023-CR-76
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST THOMAS AND ST JOHN

PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ) CASE NO ST 2022 CR 00076 ) Plaintiff ) vs ) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED JAMARI GUMBS ) ) Defendant ) ) Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U

MEMORANDUM OPINION

1ll THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Jamaxi Gumbs ( Gumbs or

Defendant ) Motion to Suppress filed October 6 2022 The People of the Virgin Islands

(‘ People )did not file a response This matter came on for hearing on March 14 2023 The People

were represented by Assistant Attorney General Eugene James Connor, J1 Case agent Officer Joel

Browne Connors, also appeared Defendant Gumbs appealed and was tepteaented by Adam G

Christian, Esq For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion in part

and deny it in pan

BACKGROUND

fill Defendant Gumbs is charged with three counts in a five count Information that lodges

charges Gumbs and his codefenddm Emerson Nicolas I The three counts relative to Gumbs are

Count Three, Unauthorized Possession of Firearm Ammunition, in Violation of V I CODE ANN

‘ The People charged Gumbs and former codetendant, Emerson Nicolas m a five Count Information, charging Nicola: in Counts One and Two, and Gumbs in Counts Three Four, and Five Former codcfcndaut Nicolas 15 now deceaaed People oflhe Vugm Islands \ Jamar! Gume Case No §T 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super IGU Memorandum Opinion Page 2 of 15

tit 14 § 2256(a)(3)(4) 7 Count Four Unauthorized Ponaession 0f Malijuand with Intent to

Distribute in violation ofVI CODE ANN tit 19 § 604(a)(1) and Count Five No VI Driver 3

License in violation ofVI CODE ANN tit 20 § 371(a)

1T3 Defendant Gumbs seeks to suppress the fruits of a vehicle search and statements Gumhs

made at the scene of the incident At the suppression hearing, the People called one witness Virgin

Islands Police Department ( VIPD ) Officer Joel Browne Connors ( Officer Connors )3 No

exhibits were admitted

FACTS

114 The Court gleaned the tollowing facts from Ottieer Connors testimony

115 On March 1] 2022, between 1 00AM and 2 00AM, Officer Connors and his partner

Officer Joanna Stuart ( Officer Stuart ) were on patrol and noticed a blue Toyota Corolla

(“Corolla ’ or “vehicle”), with dark tinted windows, failing to adhere to traffic laws Specifically,

Officer Connors noticed the Corulld was stopped at a red light on Alton Adams Drive at the

intersection near Barbe] Plaza, St Thomas, VI Officer Connors was stopped catty comer to the

C01011a Connors was facing east and the Corolla was facing north Even though the C01011a had

a green light, it did not proceed through the light Once Cannon light turned green he drove

through Barbe] Plaza and pulled up behind the Corolla By that time the Corolla had a red light

but it then drove through the red light, turning tight and heading east Officei Connors followed

the Corolla and observed the Vehicle was dliving erratically crossing the double yellow traffic

lines Offleer Connors followed the Corolla up Raphunc Hill Connors turned on his blue patrol

1 Defendant also tiled a Mution to Dismiss Count Three on October 14 2022 Which the Coun “ill address in due

fgleZer Connnrs testified he has been employed by VIPD for a l|ttle ox er three (3) year: a: a patrol officer Peapze mm Virgin Island: t Jamal: (:11me Cage No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion Page 3 at 16

car lights while he st passing by the trash bins midway up Raphune Hill and the Corolla pulled

over a bit further up the Hill right betore Al Cohen s mall

116 Connms stopped the vehicle for having excessive tint running a red light and because it

had crossed the double yellow lines Connors spoke over his loudspeaker instructing the two

occupants to exit the vehicle Officer Common said the passengers did not exit the Corolla, and he

saw some mnvcmcnt in the back seat at the vehicle but he could not tell what the occupants were

doing At that time Officers Connors and Stuart approached the Corolla with their weapons drawn

because the uceupdnts had failed to fellow the initial command to step out ofthe car and because

Connors saw movements in the vehicle when the occupants did not initially comply With the

command to get out ot the vehicle

117 Two males exited the vehicle with their hands raised Gumbs exited the driver 5 side of

the vehiele and the other passenger" exited ml the passenger’s side, and they said, “don’t shoot ”

After the occupants exited the vehicle, Officer Connors asked the driver tor a driver’s license,

registration, and insuianee However, Gumbs did not have any at those items Also, afier the

occupants exited the Corolla, Officer Connors noticed a mason jar filled with a green, leafy

substance located on the middle console of the vehicle in plain sight 5 The masonjar was in plain

sight once Gumbs and the passenger exited the vehicle, because the incident occurred in an 4168

lit with stieetlights, the interior light was on inside the Corolla, and the front windows were rolled

down

“’ lhe panenger wet: Gumbs former codetendantv later identified as Emermn Nicholas, who is now deceased 5 Officer Connor: tcaufied that the substance was field tested and [C:lcd poaitivc for marijuana Faane off the Vllgm Islam]: v lama“ Gumbs Case No SI 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion Page 4 of 16

$18 Once Gumbs exited the vehicle, Officer Connors frisked him OtfiLer Connors did not

recall whether Gumbs was handcuffed and stated that Gumbs was not yet under arrest at that time

but that Gumbs was not tree to leave the area and was sitting on the nearby guard rail

19 When Office! Connors told Gumbs he was going to seaxeh the vehicle Gumbs objected

but Officers Connors and Stuart perfumed the search anyway During the search Officer Connms

fuund the following items (1) a tool bag holding a power grinder and battery tound on the floor

of the passenger side front seat (2) a black pellet handgun found on the flow of the passenger

side back seat; (3) a black Gucci bag containing empty magazines and one caltridge of

ammunition found in the cab of the vehicle (4) a bag containing an identification card with

someone else 5 name on it, fuund in the cab of the Vehicle; and (5) a black backpack containing

seveial more mason jam6 filled with a green, leafy substance, some U S Lunency, and some

Trinidad currency, found in the trunk of the Vehicle

{[10 When asked about the items Gumbs and the passenger stated the backpack found in the

trunk was our hag Further Gumbs and the passenger began discussing that the black Gucci bag

was theils, but that it had been acquiied earlier in the day, seemingly implicating themselves in

another crime that had occurred earlier that day Upon hearing that utteianee, Officei Connors read

Gumbs and the passenger their Miranda rights but Comets did not have a term for them to

formally waive their rights on the scene Officer Cannon did not ask Gumbs any questions after

leading him his rights, and he did not ISLE!“ whether Gumbs made any furthei statements tollowing

such leading After leading Gumbs and Nicolas their rights and putting them in the police unit,

Gumbs and Nicolas kept talking hut Officer Connors does not recall what they said nor what

" Officer Connors testified he was unsure exactly how many mason jars he found in the mmk ofthe Vehicle People 0/111; V17 gm Aland“ Jammi Gumhs Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion Page 5 of 16

statement either of them may have made But neither Connors nor the responding detectiveb made

note ofwhat they may have said and VIPD took no official statement from Gumbs (or Nico1as)

1111 After the search of the vehicle Officer Connors arrested Gumbs and Gumbs was taken to

the police station Gumbs was read his Miranda rights again once he was at the station, but Officer

Connors did not ask any more questions

LEGAL STANDARD

1112 In order to succeed in supple»ng evidence under the Fourth Amendment 01 a statement

under the Fifth Amendment the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish a basis tor his

motion Peoplm Roll No ST 17 CR 36 2017 WL 2980185 at*2 (V1 Super Ct June 29 2017)

(citing People offlw Virgin Ivlamiv \ Hoyt! 2015 VI LEXIS 122 *6 (VI Super Ct Sept 29

2015)) see also Pcople \ AZ am No ST 16 CR 232 2017 WL 5514375 at *1 (VI Super Ct

Nov 14 2017) Once the defendant shows a warrantless search or :eizure uccurred the burden

shifts to the government to show that each individual act constituting a search or seizure under the

Fourth Amendment was reasonable R00 No ST 17 CR 36 2017 WL 2980185 at *2 Similarly

in a motion to suppress a statement ofthe accused, once a defendant claims a violation omemn'u

and “the accused alleges dets demonstrating that the accused was in Custody and subject to

intcnngation the burden shifis to the People to prove by a preponderance ofthe evidence thdt the

police complied with Muzmda and that the statement was voluntary Azzam No ST 16 CR 232

2017 WL 5514375 at *1 (citing COlUHldOI Connelly 479 U S 157 (1986)) Penp/e 0/1114 Vngm Islands \ Jnmwt Gtrmbs Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite a: 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum 0pmion Page 6 0f 16

DISCUSSION

I The traffic stop, search of the Corolla, and ultimate arrest of Defendant did not violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, so the [runs of these actions will not be suppressed

a Fourth Amendment Legal Standard

4113 The Fuurth Amendment to the U S Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be

free from unreasonable searches and seizures Peaple \ Waadley N0 SX 15 CR 380 2018 WL

3064404 at *3 (V1 Super Ct June 20 2018) U S CONST amend 1V 7 Genelally for a scatch

or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be executed pursuant to a search

wartant based on probable cause Peap/L \ Pemberton 2019 VI SUPER 118 1111 6 7 (citing,

Nicholas v Peaple, 56 V1 718, 739 (V1 2012)) A warrantless search or sei/ure is per ye

unreasonable unless an exception applies Thomas v People 63 V I 595 605 (V I 2015) (citing

Kat \ Unlted Sizzle: 389 U S 347 357 (1967))

{114 The Fourth Amendment analysis typically proceeds in three Stages Peaplc 1 Joxeph 2022

VI SUPER 12 film First the Caut‘t determines whether a Fourth Amendment event, such as a

search 01 a sei/ure has occurred Id see also Woodlay N0 SK 15 CR 380 2018 WL 3064404

at *3 Next, the Court considers whether that search or seizure was reasonable 1d Ifthe search or

seizure was unreasonable, the Court mum then determine whothel the Lircumstances warrant

suppression of the evidence Id “Reasonableness is an objective inquiry measured by examining

the totality of the Lireumstanccs surrounding the search and the ndture of the search itself ” People

7 The fourth Amendment is apphcable in the Vlrgin Ialanda pulsuant to § 3 of the Renaed Organ“. Act of 1954 P201719 \ Atrmlrong 64 VI 528 530 n 1 (VI 2016) (citing Revtaed Organic Act0f1954 § 3 48 U S C s 1561 reprinted in V I CODE ANN Historical Documents Organic ALI: and U S Constitution at 87 88 (1995 & Supp 2013) (preeedmg VI CODE ANN tn 1) Penpie vflhz Vugm Island: L Jammz Gumb: Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite a: 2023 VI Super 1w Memorandum Opinion Page 7 0f 16

v Pemherton 2019 VI SUPER 1 18 {I 7 (quoting Prentlce v Peaplt 64 V I 79 89 (VI Super

Ct 2016)

b The traffic stop was a lawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment

1115 Detendant argues that it is unclear whether there was probable cause prior to the traffic

stop and subsequent search at his vehicle to take such actions At the hearing Defendant teiterated

he did not believe that the People carried their burden to pmvc the circumstances leading to the

traffic stop wele supported by the Fourth Amendment, axguing Cannnrs’ testimony was

convoluted The People countered that pursuant to Officer Connors testimony it is appalent that

Detenddnt ran a red light and continued to (hive erratica1ly thereafter and thus VIPD had grounds

to conduct a tratfic stop For the tollnwing reasons, the Court finds the traffic stop was a lawful

seizure under the Fourth Amendment

1116 The Virgin Islands Superior Court has acknowledged that a traffic stop ia a Fourth

Amendment event Waadlcy N0 SX 15 CR 380 2018 WL 3064404 at *4 For the duration of

a traffic stop a police officer effectively seizes everyone in the vehicle, the driver and all

passengers Id (quoting Arumm v Johnson, 555 U S 323 327 (2009)) (biting cases) (internal

quotations omitted) Even though “the police do not need a warrant to stop an automobile and

Londuct a brief investigation, the police must nonetheless have probable cause [or reasonable

suspicion] to believe that a traffic violation has occurred betOIe stopping a vehicle " People v

SammL 2019 VI SUPER 95 1112 (V 1 Super 2019) (quoting People \ Tories No SX 14 CR

457 2015 WL13579412 *3 2015VI LEXIS 96 *7 (Super Ct Aug 15 2015))

1117 Under thejurisprudenee ofthe Fourth Amendment it is the defendant 5 burden to show he

was seathed 0r seized without a warrant R00 No ST 17 CR 36 2017 WL 2980185 at *2 In People ofzhe Vugm [slandv v lama»; Gume Lass Nu ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion Page 8 of 15

the instant matter, Gumbs has done so it is unquestioned that Officer Connors effectively seized

Defendant without a warrant when he pulled over the Corolla following alleged traffic violations

As such the burden shifis to the People to show they were justified in such seizure and demonstrate

VIPD had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe a traffic violation had occurred Id

The Penple rely upon Officer Connors testimony at the suppression hearing that he and Otficer

Stuart witnessed an excessively tinted vehicle run a red light and then continue to drive erratically,

crossing the double yellow traffic lines The People argue this behavior provided probable cause

for Officer Connors to turn on his blue patrol car lights indicating Defendant should pull over

The People did not cite the specific traffic regulations Detenddnt allegedly violated t0 triggei

Offlcet Connors to pull over the Corolla Howevel, the Virgin Islands Superiox Coun has

previously stated that “mnning a red light would supply the officer with probable cause if the

officer witnessed the inhaction Somme, 2019 VI SUPER 95 at $8 n 3 (citing Sum \ Wilson

574 S E 2d 93 97 98 (N C Ct App 2002) ( A tratfie stop made on the basis ofa readily observed

tidffie Violation such as speeding or running a red light is govemed by probable cause ))

$118 As such, the Court finds that Officer Connors had piebahle cause to believe a traffic

Violation had occurred because he personally witnessed Defendant run through a red light and

further witnessed eiiatic driving Accordingly the Court finds Officer Connors initial stop and

effective seizure of Defendant was lawful under the appropriate Fourth Amendment standards

0 VIPD’s search ofDefendant’s vehicle was lawful

1119 In his written briefing, Defendant argues that it is unclear whether VIPD had probable

cause to stop the Vehicle, and therefore it is unclear whether the subsequent search of the Vehicle

was constitutional At the hearing, Defendant maintained this argument, stating that Connors’ People 0/1le Vugm [numb 1 Jamar: Gume Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion Page 9 M16

testimony was convoluted and the People have not met their burden to show the traffic stop was

legal As has been discussed above, the Court finds the traffic stop was supported by piobable

cause and was therefore a lawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment

1120 One widely recognized exception to the warrant requiiement is the plain view doctnne

under which “the wariantless seizure of incriminating evidence is permissible when three

canditions are met (1) the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place

from which the evidence could be plainly Viewed, (2) the item's ituriminating character must be

immediately apparent and (3) the officer must have a lawful right of access to the object itself

Peoplm Benjamin 2020 V1 SUPER 34 1114(quotinchnplc v Hunk 63 V I 80 93 (V l 2015)

and Honor: t California 496 U S 128 136 137 (U S 1990)) The plain view doctrine has been

applied wheie police are not searching for evidence but nonetheless inadvertently come across

something incriminating People \ Berkley 2019 VI SUPER 73 11 51 (quuting Horton 496 U S

at 135) (internal brackets omitted) The plain view doctrine is permitted where it is immediately

apparent" to the police, based on experience, that they have incriminating evidence before them

[(1 (citing People \ Santana 63 V I 25 31 (V I Super Ct 2014))

fill Defendant aigues that the law requiies VIPD have probable cause prior to the seizure and

search Ufa vehicle, but it is unclear whether such probable cause existed when Connors sealched

the vehicle Gumbs was operating As discussed above, Officer Connors” sei/uie 0fthe Corolla did

not violate Gumbs F0u1th Amendment lights as Connors witnessed Defendant run a red light and

diive eiratieally providing the requisite prohdble cause to pull over the vehicle Additionally

Officer Connors testified that because the interior car lights were on, there was a Streetlight nearby,

and the Corolla’s front windows were down, he had plain view at the mason jar on the vehicle’s People 0mg Vugm Islands t Jamal: 6mm Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 V1 Super 161} Memorandum Opinion Page 10 of16

center console Officer Connors further testified that, upon seeing the contents of the mason jar,

he immediately believed it to be marijuana g The Court finds that Connors was not searching for

contraband but merely saw the masonjar while he was directing Defendant to exit the vehicle As

such pursuant to the standard articulated for the plain view doctrine (1) the Court finds that

Officer Connurs wasjustified in being in the location, because he was lawfully conducting a traffic

stop, (2) the mason jar with a gxeen leafy substance was in plain View , and (3) Officer Connors

had the lawful right of access to the mason jar because he had seized the Vehicle for the traffiL

stop Therefore, pursuant to the plain view doctrine, the Court finds that Officer Connors was

justified in seizing the mason jai of green leafy substance, field tested to be marijuana

$22 Another exception tn the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is the automobile

exception under which law enforcement may search an automobile without a warrant if probable

cause exists to believe it contains evidence ofcriminal activity Melmdez \ Vlrgm Islands, 56 V I

244 253 (2012) (citing Pennsyh (mun Labrorl 518 U S 938 940 (1996) Uniter/Smmm Burton

288 F 3d 91 l00 (3d Cir 2002)) The ratianale behind this automobile exception to the wanant

lequirement is that ‘the ready mability of automobiles permits their search based only on probable

cause Peaplev Lloyd N0 SX 14 CR 080 2015 WL 13579247 at *3 n 5 (V1 Super Ct Sept

29 2015) (quoting Umted States \ Polanco 48 VI 744 749 50 (D VI 2007) (citing (35505))

Probable cause to seaiLh a vehicle exists when, “viewing the totality 0fthe circumstances, there is

a fair probability that contraband or evidence at a crime will be found in a particular place ” Lluvd,

N0 SK 14 CR 080 2015 WL 13579247 at *4 (quoting Crash \ Gadshall 170 Fed Appx 217

220 (3d Cir 2006))

1 During closing arguments, Gumbs conceded that the mason jar with the green leaty substance was in open view People AZ/lhé’ Vugm mama t Jamalz 0“th Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Lite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opinion Page 11 m 16

{[23 After finding the masonjar filled with what he believed to be marijuana Officer Connors

informed Gumbs he would be searching the rest of the vehicle as well Gumbs objected to the

search and stated that he did not consent to the search, but Officer Connors nonetheless performed

the search The Court finds that the subsequent search 0fthe remainder ofthe Vehicle was justified

under the citeumstances pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement Officer

Connors had plainly viewed what he believed to be marijuana, and he testified that seeing

marijuana in the ear led him to believe a crime was being or had been committed Additionally,

Officer Connors had Just witnessed Defendant and his passenger rummaging in the backseat 0f the

Corolla and refusing to exit the vehicle upon the officer 5 first request The Court finds Officer

Connors’ decision to search the remaindei 0f the vehicle was reasonable under the circumstances

finding what he believed to be marijuana as well as witnessing the behavior ofthe Dctcndant and

his passenger gave Connors probable cause to search the remainder 0fthe vehicle

1124 For these reasons, the Court finds Officer Connors’ search of the vehicle was reasonable

and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, pursuant to the plain view doctrine and the automobile

exception to the wan ant requirement

d Defendant’s arrest was lawful under the Fourth Amendment

$125 In his wtitten biiefing Defendant argues that it is unclear whether VIPD had the requisite

probable wuss, Lonsidering all pertinent circumstances, that he committed an identifiable Crime

As such Defendant argues that the arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights

{[26 Probable cause exists when, at the moment an arrest is made, oifieeis have “facts and

circumstances within their knowledge and ofwhich they have reasonably trustworthy infomatiou

that would sufficiently warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspeLt had committed or was People 0/2112 V11 gm Islands 1 lmmm 0mm Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cue as 2023 VI Super lfiU Memorandum Opinion Page 12 of 15

committing an offense Matthew 55 V I at 393 (quoting Back v Ohm 379 U S 89 91 (1964)

(internal quotations omitted» This flexible commonsense probable pause standard rests on

whether a ‘mdn of reasonable caution’ would believe that the accused has committed a slime, it

does not require that this beliet be correct or more likely true than false Id (quoting Tam: v

Brown, 460 U S 730, 742 (1983)) Piobahle cause exists where the facts and circumstances within

the otfieer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a 1easunable person to believe that

an offense has been or is being committed by the peison to be arrested Id (citing Unzted States v

Cm. 910 F 2d 1072 1076 (3rd Cir 1990))

$27 The Court finds that Officer Connors discovery 0t 11 masonjar filled with what he believed

to be marijudndjustified the following search ofthe entile vehicle The Court further finds that the

items found during the search at the Vehiclejustified Officer Connors in arresting Gumbs, because

a reasonable officer would believe a crime had been committed upon finding multiple masonjars

filled with a green leafy substance, a pellet gun, a round at ammunition, and a large amount of

Cunency As such, the Court finds Officer Connors had pxobable pause to search and Subsequently

arrest Gumbs, and these anions were not taken in violation of Defendant’s Fourth Amendment

rights

[1 Officer Connols had Defendant in custody and failed to Mirandtze Defendant prior to interrogating him, in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, so the statements made at the scene must be suppressed

a Fifth Amendment Legal Standard

1|29 The Fiflh Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part no person

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived oflife, People 0/1116 VHglVl Islandsi Jnmzm Gum!» Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 V1 Super 1611 Memorandum Opinion Page 13 of 16

liberty 01 piopeny without due process 01 law U S CONST amend V ’Mmmda warnings

are required for custodial intenogations See CflSllllo v People 59 V I 240 264 (V I 2013) (citing

Mmmda v Arlzurla 384 U S 436, 444 (1966)) A suspect is in custody when he has been

deprived of freedom of action in any signifisant way Ramirez \ People 56 V I 409 419 (VI

2012) (citing Untied Slam ‘ Thompson 496 F 3d 807 810 (7th Cir 2007)) A suspeet is subject

to an “intenogation” when “the Defendant responds to express questioning or its functional

equivalent words or actions reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response ” 142217111, No

ST 16 CR 232 2017 WL 5514375 at *1

b VIPD’s custodial interrogation of Gumhs Was a Violation ofhis Fifth Amendment rights

1130 Defendant argues that it is unclear whether Gumbs Was Advised of his rights, and, if so,

whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived those lights At the suppression heaiiiig, Defendant

argued that VIPD asked questions 1hout the items they found while searehing the car while

Defendant was not free to leave Defendant claims any statements made prior to Officer Connors

reading Defendant his rights must be suppressed because the government tai1ed to prove the

statements were made knowingly and voluntarily, Defendant was in custody and not free to leave,

and he was responding to questions asked by VIPD The People counter that Defendant s

statements iegarding potential involvement in an incident eailier that day were voluntary and

spontaneous utterances Further the People note Oificer Connors did read Dctendant his rights at

the scene

" The Fifth Amendmenl IS applicable in the Virgin Islands pursuant [0 § 3 of the Revised Organie Act of 1954 Simmonds \ People 59 V I 480 491 (VI 2013) (citing Revi

fl31 Based upon the testimony at the suppression hearing the Court finds Officer Connors

advised Defendant of his rights after he had asked Defendant numerous questions about the items

found inside the vehicle and after Defendant made a potentially incriminating statement about a

crime committed earlier that day Further Officer Connors testified that while he was unsure

whether Defendant was handcuffed Gumbs would not have felt free to leave the scene during the

vehicle search As such, the Court finds that Defendant was in Custody and Officer Connors

interrogated him, pi ior t0 advi>ing Defendant ofhis Miranda rights Accordingly, the butden shifis

to the People to prove they appropriately provided Defendant his Mnanda rights or that

Defendant s statements were vo1untary Azzam N0 ST 16 CR 232 2017 WL 5514375 at *1

1132 During the suppression hearing Officer Connors stated that Defendant s statements were

in response to questions he asked, but that the statements were voluntary and that the statement

regarding the incident earlier in the day was a “spontaneous utterance ” Funher, Officer Connors

stated that he did not ask Defendant any questions after reading Defendant his rights although he

could hear Defendant and Emerson Nico1as conversing in the p01iee cruiser During argument, the

People reiterated that the statements were voluntary and the reference to the earlier incident was a

spontaneous utterance

$133 [I]t is we1l established that a spontaneous utterance not prompted by a police

interrogation, made by a suspect who is plainly in custody is admissib1e even ifthe suspect has not

waived his Mnanda rights People v Rfljlm N0 ST 17 CR 278 2018 WL 4352113 at *5 (V 1

Super Ct May 31 2018) (quoting Blyden 1 People of the Vz/gm Islands 53 V I 637 662 (V I

2010)) But in the instant matter, it is apparent that Gumbs made the statements in response to

questions from VIPD While the detail included may have been outside the scope 0t Officer People afl/xe Vugm Ivlzmrli \ lama” Gumb: Case No ST 2022 CR 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super th Memorandum Opinion Page 15 of16

Connurs‘ question, this does not minimize the fact that Connors was interrogating Gumbs prior to

reading him his Miranda rights As such, the Court finds the statement was not a spontaneous

utterance, as it was prompted by questioning tram VIPD Further, since Gumbs had not yet been

advised of his Miranda rights when he made these statements, he cannot be said to have knowingly

and voluntarily waived Such lights As such the Court finds that the People failed to ean'y their

burden to prove the statements were voluntary Accordingly the Court finds VIPD questioned

Gumbs in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and any statements Dctendant made priur t0

Officer Connors reading Defendant his lights must be suppressed

CONCLUSION

134 The Court finds that VIPD did not violate Gumbs Fourth Amendment rights The traffic

stop wasjustified by probable cause because Officer Connors personally witnessed multiple tiaffie

infractions Further, Officer Connors having observed the masonjar with a green leafy substance,

the search of the vehicle was constitutional pursuant to the plain view doctrine The automobile

exception to the warrant requirement gave Officer Connors auth01ity to search the vehicle after he

observed in plain view the masonjar filled with a green leafy substance VIPD s arrest of Gumbs

was constitutional, as they had probable cause of wrongdoing based upon the contraband

discovered duiing the search of the vehicle Accordingly the fruits 0fthe search 0fthe vehicle will

not be suppressed Howevei the Coutt finds that VIPD violated Gumbs Fifth Amendment rights

When Offieer Connors performed a custodial interrogation prior to reading him his Mzrandtz rights

Aeeordingly, the Court finds that any statements Gumbs provided prior to receiving his Miranda

rights must be suppressed Peaple 0mg mg”. Island: v Jamar: 6mm Case No ST 2022 (.R 00076 Cite as 2023 VI Super 16U Memorandum Opmion Page 16 of16

An order consistent herewith will immediately follow

DATED April / g 2023 Z éfé ZQJM‘E Kathleen Mackay Judge of the Supenor Coun ATTEST 0fthe Virgin Islands TAMARA CHARLES Clerk of the Court

BY @— -co/LATOYA CAMACHO Court Clerk Supewisor g/fl/éi