People of Michigan v. Montario Marquise Taylor

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: April 10, 2025
• Docket: 166428
• Status: Published

Opinion

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Elizabeth T. Clement Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

PEOPLE v TAYLOR PEOPLE v CZARNECKI

Docket Nos. 166428 and 166654. Argued on application for leave to appeal January 22, 2025. Decided April 10, 2025.

In Docket No. 166654, Andrew M. Czarnecki was convicted following a jury trial in the Wayne Circuit Court of having committed, among other offenses, first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), when he was 19 years old. As required by MCL 750.316, the court, Michael M. Hathaway, J., sentenced Czarnecki to mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the murder conviction. Czarnecki appealed, and in an unpublished per curiam opinion issued on June 10, 2021 (Docket No. 348732), the Court of Appeals, O’BRIEN, P.J., and STEPHENS and BOONSTRA, JJ., affirmed Czarnecki’s sentences and convictions. Czarnecki sought leave to appeal. While the application was pending, the Supreme Court granted Czarnecki’s motion to add as an issue to the application the question of whether his LWOP sentence was constitutional, and the Court held the appeal in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision in People v Parks, 510 Mich 225 (2022). Thereafter, the Supreme Court held in Parks that a statute subjecting 18-year-old offenders to mandatory LWOP constitutes unconstitutionally cruel punishment under Article 1, § 16 of Michigan’s 1963 Constitution and that while a judge can still sentence an 18-year-old to LWOP, 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder are entitled to the full protections that exist within the individualized sentencing procedure of MCL 769.25 prior to that determination. After Parks was decided, the Supreme Court denied Czarnecki’s application in part but remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Parks. 510 Mich 1093 (2022). On remand and on reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed Czarnecki’s sentence, reasoning that Parks did not expressly apply to anyone older than age 18 and that Parks did not expressly overrule People v Hall, 396 Mich 650 (1978), which held that mandatory LWOP for felony murder did not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16. ___ Mich App ___ (December 14, 2023) (Docket No. 348732).

In Docket No. 166428, Montario M. Taylor was convicted following a jury trial in the Genesee Circuit Court of having committed first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, when he was 20 years old. The court, Richard B. Yuille, J., sentenced Taylor to mandatory LWOP for the first-degree murder conviction and to a consecutive term of two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction. Taylor appealed, raising numerous issues, including a challenge to the constitutionality of his LWOP sentence. In an unpublished per curiam opinion issued on October 21, 2021 (Docket No. 349544), the Court of Appeals, SHAPIRO, P.J., and BORRELLO and O’BRIEN, JJ., affirmed Taylor’s convictions and sentences and specifically rejected Taylor’s argument that a mandatory LWOP sentence for a defendant who committed first-degree murder as a 20-year-old violates US Const, Am VIII or Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Taylor sought leave to appeal. After Parks was decided, the Supreme Court vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding the constitutionality of Taylor’s LWOP sentence, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Parks, and denied leave in all other respects. 511 Mich 901 (2023). On remand, in an unpublished per curiam opinion issued on October 5, 2023, the Court of Appeals, SHAPIRO, P.J., and BORRELLO and O’BRIEN, JJ., affirmed Taylor’s sentence, noting (1) the “self-limited scope of the Parks opinion”; (2) the binding decision in People v Adamowicz (On Second Remand), 346 Mich App 213 (2023), which held that a mandatory sentence of LWOP for the 21-year-old defendant convicted of first-degree murder did not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16; and (3) the continuing binding nature of Hall.

Czarnecki and Taylor separately sought leave to appeal. In Czarnecki’s case, the Supreme Court ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address whether the holding in Parks should be extended to individuals who commit first-degree murder when they are 19 years old. In addition, Czarnecki was ordered to address whether such an extension required overruling Hall, which upheld as constitutional a mandatory term of LWOP for a felony murder committed by a 17-year-old defendant. 513 Mich 1146 (2024). In Taylor’s case, after initially holding the case in abeyance, the Supreme Court ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address whether Parks should be extended to individuals who commit first-degree murder when they are 20 years old, as well as whether such an extension required overruling Hall. ___ Mich ___ (October 30, 2024) (Docket No. 166428).

In an opinion by Justice WELCH, joined by Justices BERNSTEIN, CAVANAGH, BOLDEN, and THOMAS, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:

The Court’s decision in Parks was extended to individuals who were 19 or 20 years old at the time of the crime for which they were convicted. Mandatorily subjecting 19- and 20-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder to an LWOP sentence violates the principle of proportionality derived from the Michigan Constitution and constitutes unconstitutionally cruel punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Czarnecki’s and Taylor’s automatic LWOP sentences were unconstitutional. While a judge can still sentence 19- or 20-year-olds to LWOP, Czarnecki, Taylor, and other 19- or 20-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder are entitled to the full protections that exist within the individualized sentencing procedures of MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a before that determination. This rule applies retroactively to criminal cases on collateral review. It was unnecessary to overrule Hall at this time, and its holding remained viable so long as the defendant was at least 21 years old at the time of the offense.

1. Article 1, § 16 of Michigan’s Constitution provides that “cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted[.]” The state’s prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment is broader and more protective than that of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. To determine what constitutes cruel or unusual punishment, courts must consider evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. Article 1, § 16 also requires that criminal sentences be proportional to the circumstances of the offense and of the offender such that excessive imprisonment is prohibited. As set forth in People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167 (1972), and reaffirmed in People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15 (1992), and Parks, when evaluating whether a sentence is proportional under Const 1963, art 1, § 16, courts must consider: (1) the severity of the punishment relative to the gravity of the offense, (2) punishments imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses, (3) punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense, and (4) Michigan’s traditional goal of and preference for rehabilitation. Courts have an obligation to consider objective, undisputed scientific evidence when determining whether a punishment is cruel or unusual as to a certain class of defendants. In Parks, the Supreme Court held that mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to LWOP violates the principle of proportionality and thus constitutes unconstitutionally cruel punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 and that such defendants are entitled to an individualized resentencing hearing under MCL 769.25. In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted the United States Supreme Court’s recognition in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190 (2016), that a defendant’s youth at the time of committing a crime is relevant to assessing the constitutionality of the punishment imposed. The Parks decision was also motivated by a concern for the severity of mandatory punishment given that a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children. As required by Parks, when a prosecutor files a motion under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a to seek LWOP for a defendant who was 18 years old when they committed the sentencing offense, there is a rebuttable presumption against LWOP that the prosecutor must overcome by clear and convincing evidence at a hearing. During such hearings, the sentencing court must consider any relevant attributes of youth associated with the defendant as a mitigating factor.

2. To resolve whether Parks should be extended to 19- and 20-year-olds, the Court looked to objective, undisputed scientific research regarding the late-adolescent brain, the legal rights of late adolescents, and the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP for late adolescents. Modern and unrebutted developments in such research established that characteristics that are intrinsic to the cognitive and social development of juveniles, such as an increased susceptibility to peer pressure, result in their having both diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, and thus make them less deserving of the most severe punishments. Because 19- and 20-year-olds are more similar to juveniles in neurological terms than they are to older adults, the scientific research relied on by the Parks Court applied equally to 19- and 20-year-old individuals. While some state and federal laws provide 18-year-olds with new legal rights and privileges, society generally does not recognize these individuals as full adults until the age of 21, as indicated by laws applying to the right or privilege to serve as an elected state legislator, consume or possess alcohol or recreational cannabis, obtain a concealed pistol license, or open a credit card without a cosigner. To determine the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP for 19- and 20-year-old defendants, the four-factor Lorentzen-Bullock test was applied. Considering the first factor, while first-degree murder is one of the most severe and heinous crimes an individual can commit, mandatory LWOP is the most severe punishment that can be imposed. Imposing an LWOP sentence on late adolescents will result in them inevitably serving more time and a greater percentage of their life in prison as compared to older adult offenders. However, the impulsivity of the late-adolescent brain is transient and capable of change, making imposition of mandatory LWOP on this class of individuals particularly cruel; it also prevents trial courts from tailoring the sentence imposed to the defendant. The second factor, comparing the punishment for first-degree murder to that of other crimes in Michigan, mandatory LWOP is the harshest sentence and can only be imposed for a limited number of convictions that are highly dangerous offenses and reflect a high degree of moral guilt. As is true for 18-year-olds, late-adolescent defendants who are convicted and sentenced to LWOP will often serve more time in prison than older individuals convicted of the identical crime. Relevant to the third factor, which is comparing punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense, is that Michigan is among a minority of states that legislatively mandate LWOP for all individuals convicted of first-degree murder. Further, the United Kingdom prohibits LWOP sentences for anyone under the age of 21, and in Canada all sentences of life without a realistic possibility of parole are unconstitutional for all convicted offenders, regardless of age. These national and international trends illustrate that the evolving standards of decency are trending away from imposing mandatory LWOP on late adolescents. With regard to the fourth and final factor, as evidenced by historical practices in Michigan, this state has a longstanding goal of and preference for punishments that allow for rehabilitation, and it is undisputed that this goal is not accomplished when a mandatory LWOP sentence is imposed. Accordingly, all four factors weighed in favor of requiring individualized sentencing before a trial court may impose a sentence of LWOP on a 19- or 20-year-old. In People v Poole, ___ Mich ___ (April 1, 2025) (Docket No. 166813), the Court held that Parks applied retroactively to criminal cases on collateral review. The Poole retroactivity analysis applied equally in this case; therefore, this holding applied retroactively to criminal cases on collateral review.

3. The continued viability of Hall was questionable given the evolution of federal and state precedent interpreting US Const, Am XIII, and Const 1963, art 1, § 16, since the case was decided. However, it was unnecessary to overrule Hall because when the Hall Court rejected the defendant’s facial challenge, it did not address the issue of sentencing a juvenile to an LWOP sentence. Thus, Hall was inapplicable to the as-applied challenge brought by Czarnecki and Taylor in these cases, and the holding in Hall remained viable so long as the defendant was at least 21 years old at the time of the offense.

4. In this case, Czarnecki and Taylor were 19 years old and 20 years old, respectively, when they committed the premeditated murders for which they were convicted. Both were sentenced to mandatory LWOP as required by MCL 750.316, but neither defendant received the specialized procedures mandated by MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a before those sentences were imposed, despite being members of a class presumptively neurologically indistinguishable from either a teenage juvenile offender or an 18-year-old offender. Czarnecki and Taylor were entitled to be resentenced in accordance with MCL 769.25, this opinion, and relevant caselaw because the procedures used at their sentencing hearings violated Michigan’s Constitution. The Supreme Court denied leave in all other respects for failure to persuade the Court of the need for review.

Court of Appeals’ opinion on remand in each case reversed, each defendant’s sentence for first-degree murder vacated, and each case remanded to the appropriate circuit court for resentencing.

Justice BERNSTEIN, concurring in part and dissenting in part, largely agreed with the majority’s analysis and with the conclusion that the imposition of mandatory LWOP on 19- and 20-year-old offenders violated Const 1963, art 1, § 16. He wrote separately to note his disagreement with a bright-line rule drawn at age 21, explaining that bright-line rules are problematic because they are underinclusive. However, if drawing any line were necessary, Justice BERNSTEIN would have drawn the line at 25 to be in line with the relevant scientific studies regarding late-adolescent brain development. The better approach would be to allow for a shifting age-based presumption that could consider individual characteristics of diminished culpability, but these cases did not present the Court with the opportunity to consider such an option.

Chief Justice CLEMENT, joined by Justice ZAHRA, dissenting, would not have extended Parks’s rule to offenders who were 19 and 20 years old when they committed first-degree premeditated murder because Const 1963, art 1, § 16 did not compel that result. When applying the first factor considered in the Lorentzen-Bullock proportionality test, the gravity of the offense as opposed to the severity of the punishment, first-degree premeditated murder is arguably the gravest offense under Michigan law, and it deserves the most severe sentence in Michigan. The majority overemphasized the characteristics of the offender who committed the offense by focusing on the length of time a young defendant will spend in prison as compared with an older offender, rather than focusing on the offense committed. By doing so, the majority downplayed the gravity of first-degree murder and instead erroneously focused on the actuarial life expectancy of the offender in its constitutional analysis. Chief Justice CLEMENT agreed that young offenders are still developing neurologically but stated that it was up to the Legislature to prohibit LWOP for 19- and 20-year-old offenders, not the judiciary. Thus, the first factor weighed in favor of constitutionality. The second factor, the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties imposed on other offenders in Michigan, also weighed in favor of finding the penalty constitutional. The Legislature exercised its judgment that some crimes are so severe, and those who commit them so culpable, that LWOP is the only appropriate punishment. That mandatory LWOP applies to other homicide offenses, as well as to the nonhomicide offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, underscores that Michigan law recognizes that the most serious crimes— whether or not they involve the taking of life—are so severe that parole should never be an option. The third factor, the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, weighed in favor of finding the penalty constitutional. Michigan’s sentencing scheme is consistent with those in a substantial portion of the country, which distinguished these cases from pre-Parks precedent such as Bullock and Lorentzen. The majority’s use of selective and nonbinding out-of-state court decisions and foreign law was unpersuasive. Finally, although the fourth factor, whether the penalty imposed advances the penological goal of rehabilitation, did not weigh in favor of the penalty’s constitutionality given that a defendant sentenced to mandatory LWOP has little realistic chance for parole, rehabilitation is only one of several sentencing goals. Nevertheless, given that the first three factors strongly favored a finding of constitutionality as applied to 19- and 20-year-old offenders, Chief Justice CLEMENT would have held that mandatory LWOP is constitutional as applied to this class of offenders. The majority’s reliance on neuroscience to reach its conclusion demonstrated that its decision was based in large part on policy, and policy decisions should be left to the Legislature. Finally, the majority’s further extension of Miller’s protections to 19- and 20-year-old offenders had no logical stopping point and opened the door to other related claims. Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

OPINION Chief Justice: Justices: Elizabeth T. Clement Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas

FILED April 10, 2025

STATE OF MICHIGAN

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 166428

MONTARIO MARQUISE TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

v No. 166654

ANDREW MICHAEL CZARNECKI,

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

WELCH, J. Following separate and unrelated jury trials, defendants were each convicted of

first-degree murder. Defendant Andrew Czarnecki was 19 years old at the time of his

offense, while defendant Montario Taylor was 20 years old at the time of his. Each

defendant was sentenced to a legislatively mandated punishment of life in prison without

the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendants argue that the mandatory nature of their

sentences violates Michigan’s prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment,” Const

1963, art 1, § 16, and they ask us to extend our decision in People v Parks, 510 Mich 225,

268; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), where we held that, under our state Constitution, mandatory

LWOP sentences are cruel or unusual when applied to 18-year-olds.

We agree with defendants and extend Parks to individuals who were 19 or 20 years

old at the time of the crime for which they were convicted. Our Constitution and caselaw

interpreting it requires us to evaluate the proportionality of defendants’ sentences. To do

so, we use the factors laid out in People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167; 194 NW2d 827 (1972),

and People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15; 485 NW2d 866 (1992), which incorporate evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a civilized society. Late adolescents who

are 19 or 20 years old, as a class, share with 18-year-olds the same mitigating

characteristics of late-adolescent brain development. The same considerations that were

discussed at length in Parks apply equally to this class of late adolescents. Accordingly,

as applied to defendants who were 19 or 20 years old at the time of their crime, a mandatory

LWOP sentence that does not allow for consideration of the mitigating factors of youth or

the potential for rehabilitation is a grossly disproportionate punishment in violation of

Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Czarnecki and Taylor are, therefore, entitled to be resentenced in

the manner set forth in MCL 769.25 and our relevant caselaw.

2 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. PEOPLE v CZARNECKI

Andrew Czarnecki is serving a mandatory LWOP sentence for his role in the

premediated murder of Gavino Rodriguez. Czarnecki was 19 years old when he

participated in the murder. Czarnecki was charged with first-degree premeditated murder,

MCL 750.316(1)(a); first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); armed robbery,

MCL 750.529; carjacking, MCL 750.529a; and mutilating a dead body, MCL 750.160.

During the five-day jury trial in late 2018, the prosecution presented various forms of

evidence to support its theory that Czarnecki and Hameer Alkotiat jointly participated in

the murder of Rodriguez. 1

The jury acquitted Czarnecki of carjacking but otherwise found him guilty as

charged. At sentencing, the trial court vacated the first-degree felony-murder conviction

and imposed a mandatory sentence of LWOP for first-degree premeditated murder, 11 to

20 years’ imprisonment for armed robbery, and 41/2 to 10 years’ imprisonment for

mutilation of a dead body.

Czarnecki appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed Czarnecki’s

conviction. People v Czarnecki, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,

issued June 10, 2021 (Docket No. 348732). Czarnecki sought leave to appeal in this Court,

1 Although Alkotiat was scheduled to be tried jointly with Czarnecki, he was granted a last- minute adjournment because his attorney experienced an unexpected medical issue. Alkotiat later pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and was sentenced to a minimum term of 18 years’ imprisonment. People v Czarnecki, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 10, 2021 (Docket No. 348732), p 2 n 2. According to the Michigan Department of Corrections’ Offender Tracking Information System, Alkotiat was 18 years old when he participated in the murder.

3 raising many of the issues argued below. Czarnecki also asserted that a mandatory sentence

of LWOP for a murder committed when he was 19 years old is unconstitutional under the

Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, US Const, Am VIII, or the analogous

provision of Michigan’s Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 16. After first holding

Czarnecki’s application in abeyance to await this Court’s decision in Parks, 510 Mich 225,

we remanded to the Court of Appeals “for consideration of whether the defendant’s

mandatory sentence of life without parole for a murder committed at the age of 19 is cruel

or unusual punishment under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” People v Czarnecki, 510 Mich 1093,

1093 (2022). We denied leave to appeal in all other respects. Id.

On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed Czarnecki’s sentence of LWOP in a

unanimous published decision. People v Czarnecki (On Remand, On Reconsideration),

___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (December 14, 2023) (Docket No. 348732). The panel

noted that Parks did not expressly apply to anyone older than age 18 and that Parks

expressly did not overrule People v Hall, 396 Mich 650, 657-658; 242 NW2d 377 (1978),

which held that mandatory LWOP for felony murder did not violate Const 1963, art 1,

§ 16. Czarnecki (On Remand, On Reconsideration), ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2.

The panel also observed that this Court denied the defendant’s application for leave to

appeal from the decision in People v Adamowicz (On Second Remand), 346 Mich App 213,

219; 12 NW3d 35 (2023), 2 which held that a mandatory sentence of LWOP for the 21-

year-old defendant convicted of first-degree murder did not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16.

Czarnecki (On Remand, On Reconsideration), ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2.

2 See People v Adamowicz, 513 Mich 869 (2023).

4 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Hall remained binding precedent for

defendants older than 18 and that Czarnecki’s mandatory sentence of LWOP was therefore

not unconstitutional. Id. at ___; slip op at 3.

B. PEOPLE v TAYLOR

Montario Taylor is serving a mandatory sentence of LWOP for the premeditated

murder of Montel Wright inside Wright’s home in Flint, Michigan on October 24, 2016.

Taylor was 20 years old when he committed the murder. Taylor’s first trial resulted in a

hung jury. Following the second trial, a jury convicted Taylor of first-degree premeditated

murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced

Taylor to a mandatory term of LWOP for the murder conviction, plus a mandatory

consecutive two-year sentence for the felony-firearm conviction.

Taylor appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising various alleged errors, including a

challenge to the constitutionality of his LWOP sentence. The Court rejected each of these

arguments and affirmed Taylor’s convictions and sentences. People v Taylor, unpublished

per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 21, 2021 (Docket No. 349544).

The panel specifically rejected Taylor’s argument that a mandatory LWOP sentence for a

20-year-old defendant convicted of first-degree murder violates US Const, Am VIII, or

Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Id. at 12-13.

Taylor sought leave to appeal in this Court. After we issued our decision in Parks,

we vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision concerning the constitutionality

of Taylor’s sentence and remanded to that Court for reconsideration in light of Parks.

People v Taylor, 511 Mich 901 (2023). We denied leave to appeal in all other respects.

5 On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed Taylor’s sentence. People v Taylor (On

Remand), unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 5, 2023

(Docket No. 349544). The panel noted the “self-limited scope of the Parks opinion,” the

recent binding decision in Adamowicz (On Second Remand), 346 Mich App 213, and the

continued binding nature of Hall, 396 Mich at 657-658. Taylor (On Remand), unpub op at

2-3. The Court determined that it was bound by Hall and Adamowicz (On Second Remand),

and on that basis, it rejected Taylor’s argument that his mandatory sentence of LWOP

violated Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Taylor (On Remand), unpub op at 3.

C. THE CURRENT APPEALS BEFORE THIS COURT

Both Czarnecki and Taylor sought leave to appeal to this Court. In Czarnecki’s

case, we ordered oral argument on the application and directed the parties to address

whether our holding in Parks regarding mandatory LWOP should be extended to a 19-

year-old defendant, whether such an extension requires overruling Hall, and if so, whether

Hall should be overruled. People v Czarnecki, 513 Mich 1146, 1146 (2024). While

initially held in abeyance, we ordered oral argument on the application in Taylor’s case

and directed the parties to address the same questions posed in our order for Czarnecki, but

with a focus on 20-year-old defendants. People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___, ___; 12 NW3d

444 (2024). 3 Arguments on Taylor’s application took place during the same session as the

arguments in Czarnecki’s case and in People v Poole (Docket No. 166813), which

concerned the retroactivity of our decision in Parks.

3 We also vacated our previous order directing oral argument in People v Bouie (Docket No. 166232) and placed the application in that case in abeyance pending resolution of Czarnecki’s and Taylor’s appeals. People v Bouie, ___ Mich ___; 12 NW3d 437 (2024).

6 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a legislatively imposed mandatory punishment violates Const 1963, art 1,

§ 16 is a question of law. This Court reviews de novo questions of constitutional law.

Parks, 510 Mich at 245. “ ‘[T]he ultimate authority with regard to the meaning and

application of’ ” Michigan’s Constitution rests solely with this Court. Id., quoting Bullock,

440 Mich at 27.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

A. CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Michigan’s Constitution states, “Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive

fines shall not be imposed; cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; nor shall

witnesses be unreasonably detained.” Const 1963, art 1, § 16 (emphasis added).

Determining what constitutes cruel or unusual punishment is guided by “ ‘evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’ ” 4 Parks, 510 Mich at

241, quoting Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179. As we recently reaffirmed, “[t]he definition of

this standard is ‘progressive and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning

as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.’ ” Id., quoting Lorentzen, 387

4 The United States Supreme Court has also traditionally read the Eighth Amendment through the lens of “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society . . . .” Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 561; 125 S Ct 1183; 161 L Ed 2d 1 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.” Id. at 560. “The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the imposition of inherently barbaric punishments under all circumstances.” Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 59; 130 S Ct 2011; 176 L Ed 2d 825 (2010). We reject the Wayne County Prosecutor’s invitation to abandon our longstanding use of the evolving-standards- of-decency lens for analysis of punishments under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.

7 Mich at 179. Inherent in this standard is the understanding that as society progresses,

punishments that were once acceptable can later be considered cruel or unusual. By

necessity, the test “looks to comparative law for guidelines in determining what penalties

are widely regarded as proper for the offense in question.” Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179.

In Bullock, 440 Mich at 30-35, we held that the state prohibition on “ ‘cruel or

unusual punishment,’ ” Const 1963, art 1, § 16 (emphasis added), is broader and more

protective than the prohibition against “ ‘cruel and unusual’ ” punishment contained in US

Const, Am VIII (emphasis added). We were compelled to reach this conclusion based on

textual differences, historical factors, and longstanding Michigan precedent. 5 Bullock, 440

Mich at 30-35. Additionally, Const 1963, art 1, § 16 requires that criminal sentences be

proportional to the circumstances of the offense and of the offender such that excessive

imprisonment is prohibited. Id. at 33-34. These constitutional mandates can require the

“analytically difficult and politically unpopular” step of “overrid[ing] a democratically

expressed judgment of the Legislature.” Id. at 41. After all, “[t]he very purpose of a

constitution is to subject the passing judgments of temporary legislative or political

majorities to the deeper, more profound judgment of the people reflected in the

constitution, the enforcement of which is entrusted to our judgment.” Id.

Accordingly, to evaluate the proportionality of a punishment under Michigan’s

Cruel or Unusual Punishment Clause, courts must consider: (1) the severity of the

punishment relative to the gravity of the offense, (2) punishments imposed in the same

5 We reject the invitation of the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan to abandon our 33-year-old precedent in Bullock that Const 1963, art 1, § 16 is broader and more protective than the Eighth Amendment.

8 jurisdiction for other offenses, (3) punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for the same

offense, and (4) Michigan’s traditional goal of and preference for rehabilitation. Parks,

510 Mich at 242, citing Bullock, 440 Mich at 33-34; Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 176-181. In

Parks, we concluded that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants convicted of

first-degree murder to a sentence of life without parole violates the principle of

proportionality derived from” Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Parks, 510 Mich at 268.

B. PROTECTIONS AGAINST CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT FOR LATE ADOLESCENTS

Our decision in Parks drew from several sources, including the United States

Supreme Court’s admonishment regarding the constitutional sentencing of youth,

Michigan’s constitutional text and caselaw, and scientific consensus concerning late-

adolescent development. We recognized that when applying the Eighth Amendment, the

United States Supreme Court had already recognized that a defendant’s youth at the time

of committing a crime was relevant to assessing the constitutionality of the punishment

imposed. Parks, 510 Mich at 234-241. Youth was a key factor in that Court’s decision to

abolish the death penalty for juvenile offenders, Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551; 125 S Ct

1183; 161 L Ed 2d 1 (2005); to abolish all LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenses

committed by juveniles, Graham v Florida, 560 US 48; 130 S Ct 2011; 176 L Ed 2d 825

(2010); and to abolish mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles, Miller v Alabama, 567

US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012). 6

6 In each case, the United States Supreme Court defined “juvenile” as an individual under the age of 18 at the time the sentencing offense was committed. See Roper, 543 US at 555- 556; Graham, 560 US at 52-53, 74-75, 81; Miller, 567 US at 465.

9 Like the United States Supreme Court, we recognized that because characteristics

that are intrinsic to the cognitive and social development of juveniles mean that they have

both diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, they are thus “ ‘less deserving

of the most severe punishments.’ ” Parks, 510 Mich at 235, quoting Miller, 567 US at 471.

Miller was later clarified as providing not merely a procedural protection but, instead, a

substantive federal constitutional protection in Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190; 136

S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016). Although that holding was potentially limited by Jones

v Mississippi, 593 US 98, 110 n 4; 141 S Ct 1307; 209 L Ed 2d 390 (2021), “Miller,

Montgomery, and Jones did not question or reform the bright [age-based] line drawn in

Roper.” Parks, 510 Mich at 246. Nor did the Jones Court overturn precedent holding that

youth matters in sentencing, as we recognized in People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 193; 987

NW2d 58 (2022). While Michiganders cannot receive less constitutional protection than

that provided under the federal Constitution, we noted that Michigan’s broader

constitutional prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment” under Const 1963, art 1,

§ 16, did not require us to draw the same line as federal courts when determining which

class of adolescents receives constitutional protection. See id. at 247-248.

The United States Supreme Court has also warned against mandatorily imposing the

harshest punishment available. See Woodson v North Carolina, 428 US 280, 292-293; 96

S Ct 2978; 49 L Ed 2d 944 (1976) (opinion by Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)

(invalidating mandatory death penalty statutes as “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid”).

We share this concern and have previously found that our state Constitution provides

greater protection than the federal Constitution against extreme mandatory punishments.

Compare Bullock, 440 Mich at 21, 30, 37-41 (invalidating as cruel or unusual a mandatory

10 LWOP sentence for the conviction of possession of 650 grams or more of any mixture

containing cocaine), with Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957; 111 S Ct 2680; 115 L Ed 2d

836 (1991) (refusing to invalidate a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of

parole for the conviction of possession of 650 grams or more of cocaine on the grounds

that it was not unusual). Although we did not cite Woodson or Harmelin, our decision in

Parks was similarly motivated by this concern for mandatory punishment, as we noted that

“a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children[.]”

Parks 510 Mich at 240 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Montgomery, 577 US at 195, in

turn quoting Miller, 567 US at 195, in turn quoting Roper, 543 US at 573.

Parks also relied on modern developments in scientific and social-science research

concerning the “characteristics of the late-adolescent 18-year-old brain.” Id. at 248. These

considerations were consistent with the approach used by the United States Supreme Court

when applying the Eighth Amendment and were required by our Constitution given our

responsibility to “consider objective, undisputed scientific evidence when determining

whether a punishment is unconstitutional as to a certain class of defendants.” Parks, 510

Mich at 249. We noted the consensus that the late-adolescent brain carries exceptional

neuroplasticity during this crucial stage of cognitive development, which has “significant

consequences for young adults’ behavior.” Id. at 250. We adopted the unrefuted

conclusion that, in terms of neurological development, “there is no meaningful distinction

between” a 17-year-old and an 18-year-old, and we observed that this stage of

neuroplasticity “blurs the already thin societal line between childhood and young

adulthood.” Id. at 252.

11 Applying the four-factor test outlined in Bullock and Lorentzen, we concluded that

imposition of mandatory LWOP for an 18-year-old individual without consideration of

their relevant attributes of youth or potential for rehabilitation resulted in “unusually

excessive imprisonment and thus a disproportionate sentence that constitutes ‘cruel or

unusual punishment’ under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” Parks, 510 Mich at 255.

We therefore held that mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to LWOP was

unconstitutional and that such defendants are entitled to an individualized resentencing

hearing. Id. at 267-268. We also made clear that other decisions of this Court providing

juvenile offenders additional legal protections even when convicted of heinous crimes,

including “all protections afforded by MCL 769.25,” applied to 18-year-old defendants. 7

Parks, 510 Mich at 267. The default term-of-years sentence for an 18-year-old defendant

is therefore a minimum of 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment and a maximum of at least 60

years’ imprisonment. Id. at 267 n 19, citing MCL 769.25(9). And when a prosecutor files

7 The Legislature enacted MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller. The enactment of MCL 769.25 eliminated mandatory sentences of LWOP for juveniles affected by Miller, and MCL 769.25a created a resentencing scheme that would apply if Miller was given retroactive application. People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 180 n 2; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). The statutes did not eliminate the possibility of LWOP for first-degree murder for affected defendants, but it eliminated mandatory sentences by creating a procedure through which a prosecutor could seek an LWOP sentence. Id. The statutes further specified the procedures and findings required of sentencing and resentencing hearings for affected defendants, whether life imprisonment was sought or not. Id. These sentencing procedures are colloquially known as “Miller hearings.” People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 122; 987 NW2d 132 (2022). After the statutes were enacted, the United States Supreme Court held that Miller applied retroactively. Montgomery, 577 US 190. Thus, these statutes set forth the sentencing and resentencing procedures for when a prosecutor seeks an LWOP sentence for a juvenile offender. In Parks, we extended the same procedures to 18-year-old defendants. Parks, 510 Mich at 267.

12 a motion under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a to seek LWOP for a defendant who was 18

years old when they committed the sentencing offense, there is a rebuttable presumption

against LWOP that the prosecutor must overcome by clear and convincing evidence at a

hearing. Parks, 510 Mich at 267 n 19, citing People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 130-132; 987

NW2d 132 (2022). During such hearings, the sentencing court must consider any relevant

attributes of youth associated with the defendant as a mitigating factor. Parks, 510 Mich

at 267 n 19, citing People v Boykin, 510 Mich 171, 189; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). However,

a sentencing court only needs to articulate such considerations on the record if sentencing

a youthful offender to LWOP. Boykin, 510 Mich at 190-194.

IV. ANALYSIS

Today we extend Parks and its holdings to offenders who were 19 or 20 years old

when they committed the offense for which they were convicted. Mandatorily condemning

such offenders to die in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth that late

adolescents and juveniles share, no longer comports with the “evolving standards of

decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179

(quotation marks and citation omitted). We do not foreclose the possibility that LWOP

could be an appropriate punishment under rare circumstances, but as in Parks, “our

Constitution compels us to make . . . difficult decisions.” Parks, 510 Mich at 245.

Article 1, § 16 of our state Constitution does not permit the imposition of such punishment

against this class of late adolescents without individualized sentencing. 8 Accordingly,

8 The dissent notes that our holding in People v Carp, 496 Mich 440, 521; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), cert gtd and opinion vacated on other grounds sub nom Carp v Michigan, 577 US 1186 (2016)—that Const 1963, art 1, § 16 does not categorically prohibit the imposition of LWOP as a punishment against juvenile offenders—survives this Court’s decision in

13 individuals convicted of first-degree murder for conduct occurring when they are 19 or 20

years old must receive the same individualized sentencing procedure under MCL 769.25,

and our related decisions, as juveniles who have committed first-degree murder. 9 See

Parks, 510 Mich at 267 n 19.

Our holding is premised on an application of the test that was first articulated in

Lorentzen and later reaffirmed in Bullock and Parks to a mandatory punishment imposed

on a class of late-adolescent defendants. As in Parks, our application of the law includes

consideration of the well-established scientific consensus concerning late-adolescent brain

development and the neuroplasticity associated with that stage of development. Our

analysis in Parks also evaluated the correlation between a person’s age and the legal rights

and responsibilities granted to them by society. We provide some background as to these

considerations before applying the governing legal test.

People v Poole, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (April 1, 2025) (Docket No. 166813). We question what weight, if any, that part of Carp retains after the vacatur of the decision as to other threshold legal issues and this Court’s failure to readopt on remand the holding that the dissent now relies on. But that part of Carp is also irrelevant. The analysis from Carp was focused on a facial constitutional challenge to LWOP as punishment for juveniles, not an as-applied constitutional challenge to the imposition of mandatory LWOP to a class of offenders sharing an age-based characteristic. 9 We do not dispute the dissent’s point that some of the mitigating characteristics discussed in the scientific research relied on in Parks and submitted by defendants and amici in these cases are relevant up to at least age 25. Considering that defendants here were age 19 and 20 at the time they committed their crimes, resolution of the issues before the Court does not require us to consider whether Const 1963, art 1, § 16 would require granting the same relief to late adolescents who were 21 or older at the time of their offense.

14 A. THE LATE-ADOLESCENT BRAIN

We have previously recognized the scientific consensus that late adolescents, as a

class, “are hampered in their ability to make decisions, exercise self-control, appreciate

risks or consequences, feel fear, and plan ahead,” and are more prone to impulsive,

reckless, and risk-taking behavior. Id. at 250. Defendants and amici agree that the

scientific research relied on in Parks applies equally to 19- and 20-year-old individuals.

The prosecutors do not dispute this research but oppose the expansion of Parks despite the

Court’s reliance on scientific research more broadly in other contexts.

Late adolescents are widely recognized as being more “susceptible to negative

outside influences, including peer pressure,” and tending to give less consideration to the

costs or consequences of a decision. Id. at 251. In fact, “the prefrontal cortex—the last

region of the brain to develop, and the region responsible for risk-weighing and

understanding consequences—is not fully developed until age 25.” Id., citing National

Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Promise of Adolescence:

Realizing Opportunity for All Youth (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press,

2019), p 51; Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 Neuropsychiatric Disease

& Treatment 449, 449-450, 453-454 (2013). Research emphasizes that the “susceptibility

to peer pressure exacerbates late adolescents’ predisposition to risk-taking and deficiencies

in decision-making.” Parks, 510 Mich at 251, citing Gardner & Steinberg, Peer Influence

on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and

Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 Dev Psychol 625, 629-634 (2005).

Additionally, it is well established that the hallmarks of these late stages of

neurological development mean that late adolescents remain “susceptible to change” as

15 they age, giving this class a heightened capacity for reformation and rehabilitation. Parks,

510 Mich at 251-252, citing Aoki, Romeo, & Smith, Adolescence as a Critical Period for

Developmental Plasticity, 1654 Brain Res 85 (2017); Tanner & Arnett, The Emergence of

“Emerging Adulthood”: The New Life Stage Between Adolescence and Young Adulthood,

in Handbook of Youth and Young Adulthood: New Perspectives and Agendas (New York:

Routledge, 2009), pp 39-42.

This point has been illustrated through analysis of data demonstrating that the

likelihood of an individual committing violent or property crimes decreases during their

twenties and continues to decline significantly as they age. See Casey et al, Making the

Sentencing Case: Psychological and Neuroscientific Evidence for Expanding the Age of

Youthful Offenders, 5 Ann Rev Criminology 321, 331-332 (2022) (stating that there is “a

transient pattern in criminal behavior that peaks during adolescence and subsides by the

mid-twenties” and providing an illustrative age-crime curve graph); The Sentencing

Project, No End in Sight: America’s Enduring Reliance on Life Imprisonment (2021), p 25

(observing that the likelihood of engaging in or being arrested for violent activity follows

a “downward slope” during one’s mid-twenties and drops off significantly as people

continue to age); Insel et al, White Paper on the Science of Late Adolescence: A Guide for

Judges, Attorneys, and Policy Makers, Center For Law, Brain & Behavior (2022), p 37 &

n 210 (citing several scientific studies to make the same point). There has long been a

scientific consensus that, in terms of neurological development, there is “no meaningful

distinction” between a 17-year-old and 18-year-old individual. Parks, 510 Mich at 252.

But the lack of meaningful distinction does not stop at age 18. As one study concluded,

“[d]istinguishing the [cognitive] capacity of a 17-year-old from an 18-, 19-, 20-, or 21-

16 year-old would be impossible for a single individual or even group of individuals, but this

distinction in performance becomes more obvious by the mid-twenties.” Making the

Sentencing Case, 5 Ann Rev Criminology at 327-328. “Thus, the age at which cognitive

ability matures depends on several factors, including the socio-emotional context and

cognitive demands of the task.” Id. at 328.

Stated differently, as a class, 19- and 20-year-old late adolescents are more similar

to juveniles in neurological terms than they are to older adults. Although the dissent

criticizes our reliance on “a parade of neuroscientific studies,” we continue to have an

obligation to “consider objective, undisputed scientific evidence when determining

whether a punishment is unconstitutional as to a certain class of defendants.” Parks, 510

Mich at 249. An assessment of the proportionality of our state’s harshest punishment

imposed on a class of late-adolescent offenders would be incomplete without

acknowledgment of the unrebutted scientific consensus that has been presented to the

Court. 10 As in Parks, our approach in considering such information remains analogous to

that of the United States Supreme Court in Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.

10 Of course, scientific evidence is regularly presented in trial court proceedings through qualified expert witnesses. See MRE 701 to MRE 707. In criminal proceedings, we have held that the use of science-based expert testimony is appropriate when the matter at issue is beyond the understanding of the average lay juror. See, e.g., People v Kowalski, 492 Mich 106, 128-131; 821 NW2d 14 (2012) (opinion by MARY BETH KELLY, J.) (holding that expert testimony regarding the psychological factors that might cause an individual to falsely confess to a crime is admissible if the requirements of MRE 702 are met). This is also true in the civil context, particularly in medical malpractice litigation where trials often focus on the competing testimony of medical experts. See, e.g., Stokes v Swofford, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW3d ___ (July 25, 2024) (Docket Nos. 162302 and 163226) (analyzing the requirement that a plaintiff’s physician-standard-of-care expert must have the same relevant specialty as the physician accused of committing medical malpractice). Nothing in MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a prevents a prosecutor or a defendant from presenting

17 B. THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF LATE ADOLESCENTS

Although late adolescents obtain new legal rights upon their eighteenth birthday, in

many regards, our society does not recognize these individuals as full adults until age 21.

Age-based legal rights are a social and civic recognition that age and maturity generally

correlate and that as an adolescent matures, they are expected to take on more social and

legal responsibilities. Various laws demonstrate that late adolescents between the ages of

18 and 21 exist within a unique transient phase during which society has decided they are

mature enough to hold some but not all of the rights and privileges of full adulthood.

There are several examples in Michigan. The people of Michigan have determined

that someone cannot serve as an elected state legislator until reaching “21 years of age.”

Const 1963, art 4, § 7. 11 People under the age of 21 are also legally prohibited from

engaging in many risky or potentially dangerous or addictive activities. State law prevents

a person from lawfully purchasing, consuming, or possessing alcohol or recreational

cannabis until the age of 21. MCL 436.1109(6); MCL 436.1703(1); MCL 333.27954(1);

MCL 333.27955. State law also requires that a person be 21 to obtain a concealed pistol

expert testimony during an individualized sentencing hearing or challenging an expert put forward by the opposing party. 11 One cannot serve as our state’s elected governor or lieutenant governor until age 30. Const 1963, art 5, § 22. Article 2, § 1 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution and § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution historically granted voting rights to only individuals aged 21 or older, but these limitations were superseded by the ratification of the 26th Amendment of the United States Constitution in 1971 in response to young adults being drafted and serving in the Vietnam War. See US Const, Am XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.”).

18 license. MCL 28.425b(7)(a). 12 In Michigan, the right to engage in online gambling, sports

betting, and gambling in physical facilities licensed by the Michigan Gaming Control

Board is not granted until age 21. See MCL 432.209(9); MCL 432.403(e). Nor can a

person be appointed as an officer of the Michigan State Police until age 21. MCL 28.4(4).

Michigan’s Legislature has also extended eligibility for the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act

(HYTA), MCL 762.11 et seq., to encompass adolescents between the ages of 18 and 26,

when it previously was limited to ages 17 to 24. See Parks, 510 Mich at 253. HYTA

requires the additional condition of prosecutor consent for eligible individuals who were

21 or older at the time of their offense. MCL 762.11(1) and (2).

Various federal laws also treat late adolescents as less than a fully mature adult. For

example, among other qualifications, one must be at least age 25 to serve as a member of

the House of Representatives, US Const, art I, § 2; at least age 30 to be a member of the

Senate, US Const, art I, § 3; and at least age 35 to serve as President or Vice President, US

Const, art II, § 1. A person generally cannot open a credit card until age 21 without a

cosigner, 15 USC 1637(c)(8), 13 or obtain an airline pilot transport certificate under certain

aeronautical experience requirements, 14 CFR 61.153(a)(1), until age 23. Additionally,

federal firearm licensees are not permitted to sell or transfer a handgun or handgun

12 Although state law generally allows someone to possess a pistol at age 18, their ability to obtain a license to purchase a pistol from a federally licensed seller is restricted to those who are at least 21 years old. See MCL 28.422(3)(b); 18 USC 922(b)(1) and (c)(1); 18 USC 923. 13 The cosigner requirement can be waived if the applicant submits documentation “indicating an independent means of repaying any obligation arising from the proposed extension of credit in connection with the account.” 15 USC 1637(c)(8)(B)(ii).

19 ammunition to a person younger than 21. 18 USC 922(b)(1) and (c)(1). 14 Thus, federal

law also recognizes that despite having achieved the age of majority, there are numerous

rights and privileges that we do not entrust to an 18-year-old.

C. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY LWOP FOR LATE ADOLESCENTS

We apply the Lorentzen test, as reaffirmed by Bullock and Parks, to determine

whether mandatory LWOP is grossly disproportionate and thus “cruel or unusual” when

applied to late adolescents under the age of 21. Again, the relevant factors are: (1) the

severity of the punishment relative to the gravity of the offense, (2) punishments imposed

in the same jurisdiction for other offenses, (3) punishments imposed in other jurisdictions

for the same offense; and (4) Michigan’s traditional goal of and preference for

rehabilitation. Parks, 510 Mich at 242, citing Bullock, 440 Mich at 33-34; Lorentzen, 387

Mich at 176-181. Application of the Lorentzen-Bullock test leads us to conclude that

mandatorily sentencing 19- and 20-year-old defendants to die in prison is unusually

excessive and constitutionally disproportionate. We therefore extend our holdings from

Parks and related precedents to this class of late-adolescent defendants.

1. SEVERITY OF THE PUNISHMENT AND GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE

Examining the first Lorentzen-Bullock factor, there is no dispute that first-degree

premeditated murder is one of the most severe and heinous crimes that a person can

14 A federal court of appeals recently held that this restriction violates the Second Amendment rights of 18-year-old individuals. See Reese v Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 127 F4th 583 (CA 5, 2025). The ruling in Reese conflicts with the judgment of a different federal appellate court upholding a state law prohibiting any person under the age of 21 from purchasing a firearm. See Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v Polis, 121 F4th 96 (CA 10, 2024). This circuit split has not been resolved.

20 commit. 15 Unlike in Parks, these defendants were not convicted as aiders and abettors to

murder but as the principal offender of each crime. In Czarnecki’s case, the prosecution

presented evidence that he and his codefendant jointly participated in the robbery and

killing of the victim and the later burning of the body. In Taylor’s case, the prosecution

presented evidence that he entered the victim’s home and shot the victim to death without

the assistance of others. A jury convicted each defendant, and there is no doubt that a

lengthy term of imprisonment is warranted for these heinous crimes. But our analysis does

not end here.

We must also assess the severity of the punishment through a lens of proportionality.

See Parks, 510 Mich at 256-257; Bullock, 440 Mich at 40-41. In Michigan—the first state

to abolish the death penalty, Parks, 510 Mich at 257 n 10—mandatory LWOP is the most

severe punishment that can be imposed. As we recognized in Parks, when LWOP is

imposed on late adolescents, “they will inevitably serve more time and spend a greater

15 The immorality of an intentional, unjustified killing of another human being should not be minimized. But contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, only one form of first-degree murder requires that the killing be intentional and premeditated. Compare MCL 750.316(1)(a) (describing premeditated murder) with MCL 750.316(1)(b) and MCL 750.316(1)(c). First-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), is “a general intent crime, requiring evidence of one of the three intents necessary to prove second-degree murder,” which are “an intent to kill, an intent to inflict great bodily harm, or an intent to create a very high risk of death with knowledge that the act probably will cause death or great bodily harm.” People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 386; 633 NW2d 376 (2001) (citation omitted). First-degree murder under MCL 750.316(1)(c) is premised on the killing of a police or correctional officer and requires proof of one of the three intents necessary to prove second-degree murder. Id. at 387. Both offenses can exist without a specific intent to kill or premeditation. Rather, state law elevates the crime and the punishment due to other circumstances. Accordingly, a person can be convicted of first-degree murder under MCL 750.316(1)(b) and (c) and thus be subjected to mandatory LWOP under circumstances in which no fact-finder has found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific intent to kill or premeditation.

21 percentage of their lives behind prison walls than similarly situated older adult offenders.”

Id. at 257.

As compared to older offenders, the neuroplasticity of the late-adolescent brain

makes this class of defendants uniquely prone to impulsive and reckless decision-making.

See Part IV(A) of this opinion; Parks, 510 Mich at 258-259. But this is transient. As

previously discussed, there is scientific consensus that the late-adolescent brain completes

rewiring and maturation during one’s mid-twenties. As late adolescents mature into fully

developed adults, they become less prone to reckless decision-making, more likely to

consider and appreciate consequences, and less susceptible to peer pressure. Like 18-year-

olds and their juvenile counterparts, late adolescents are “capable of significant change and

a turn toward rational behavior that conforms to societal expectations as their cognitive

abilities” fully mature. Parks, 510 Mich at 258. See also Part IV(A) of this opinion.

The incredible capacity for change and potential rehabilitation of this class of

individuals makes the infliction of mandatory LWOP on adolescent offenders particularly

cruel. There are no meaningful differences between relevant brain development of late

adolescents at age 18, taken as a class, as compared to age 19 or 20. The current

“sentencing scheme fails to consider whether any” 19- or 20-year-old defendants “are

irreparably corrupt, whether they have the capacity to positively reform as they age, and

whether they committed their crime” when they “lacked the capability to fully understand

the consequences of their actions.” Id. at 259. This scheme forecloses a sentencing court

from ensuring that the punishment imposed is “tailored to a defendant’s personal

responsibility and moral guilt.” Bullock, 440 Mich at 39 (quotation marks and citation

omitted). “ ‘[I]t would be profoundly unfair to impute full personal responsibility and

22 moral guilt’ to those who are likely to be biologically incapable of full culpability.” Parks,

510 Mich at 259, quoting Bullock, 440 Mich at 39. Accordingly, this factor strongly favors

holding that the mandatory imposition of LWOP on 19- and 20-year-old defendants

without consideration of mitigating factors inherent in one’s youth is excessive and

disproportionate punishment.

2. PUNISHMENTS IMPOSED IN MICHIGAN FOR OTHER OFFENSES

The second Lorentzen-Bullock factor requires that we compare the punishment for

the crime at issue to the punishment for other crimes. Mandatory LWOP is the harshest

punishment in Michigan and can only be imposed for a very limited number of criminal

convictions. Michigan law mandates LWOP for adult offenders only if they are convicted

of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1); habitual repeated sexual assaults of children

under age 13, MCL 750.520b(2)(c) and MCL 791.234(6)(e); 16 and a handful of other

highly dangerous offenses that endanger many people and result in a death, MCL

791.234(6)(b), (c), (d), and (f). 17 “These crimes all reflect a high degree of moral guilt,”

Parks, 510 Mich at 260, but it is notable that most violent crimes and other forms of

homicide are not on this list. For example, MCL 791.234(6) does not include second-

16 MCL 791.234 was amended by 2024 PA 111, effective March 19, 2025, but Subsection (6) remains unchanged. 17 This last class includes conduct that results in a death following the adulteration or misbranding of drugs with an intent to kill or cause serious bodily impairment, MCL 750.16(5); MCL 750.18(7), and the transport of explosives with an intent to intimidate, injure, or kill, MCL 750.210(e).

23 degree murder, MCL 750.317; assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; or most

forms of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under MCL 750.520b. 18

We observed in Parks that when an 18-year-old is sentenced to LWOP, “it is highly

probable that” they “will spend more time behind prison bars than any other adult

defendant convicted of the same crime or similarly severe crimes” and that this result was

“disproportionate to other offenders in this state.” Parks, 510 Mich at 260. This conclusion

also holds true for 19- and 20-year-old offenders like Czarnecki and Taylor, who are only

slightly older than the defendant in Parks. Because of the natural limitations imposed by

one’s biological lifespan, the actual time served by late-adolescent defendants who are

convicted and sentenced to LWOP will often be decades longer than what is served by an

older individual convicted of the identical crime.

Given the legal effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller and Montgomery,

under MCL 769.25 and 769.25a, all offenders who will receive or have received a

mandatory sentence of LWOP for a crime committed before they turned 18 are entitled to

a Miller hearing. At such hearings, the prosecution is required to overcome a presumption

against imposition of LWOP by clear and convincing evidence under our decision in

Taylor, 510 Mich 112. If the prosecution does not meet its burden, then a term-of-years

18 As previously discussed, several state statutes and constitutional provisions unrelated to criminal punishment establish a social standard that recognizes full adulthood later than age 18. See Part IV(B) of this opinion. Well-known examples include age restrictions related to purchasing, consuming, or possessing alcohol or recreational cannabis, MCL 436.1109(6); MCL 436.1703(1); MCL 333.27954(1); MCL 333.27955, gambling, MCL 432.209(9); MCL 432.403(e), and obtaining a concealed pistol license, MCL 28.425b(7)(a).

24 sentence must be imposed, for which the minimum will be 25 to 40 years, and the

maximum will be not less than 60 years. 19 MCL 769.25(9); MCL 769.25a(4)(c).

Under the current scheme post-Parks, Czarnecki and Taylor would spend more time

in prison than many equally culpable older offenders. A late adolescent who is sentenced

to LWOP and lives to be 70 would serve approximately five decades in prison, but an

equally culpable individual who receives LWOP for a crime committed in their forties or

fifties would serve a fraction of that time if they live to the same hypothetical age.

Czarnecki and Taylor would also spend significantly more time in prison than most equally

culpable juvenile and 18-year-old offenders under the current scheme. Most juvenile and

18-year-old offenders who are convicted of first-degree murder will receive the minimum

sentence between 25 and 40 years, after which they will become eligible for parole

consideration. 20

19 Our decision in Parks, 510 Mich 225, extended these requirements to all future convictions of 18-year-old offenders. And given our holding in Poole, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 1, 17—that Parks applies retroactively to cases on collateral review—all 18-year- old offenders who were previously convicted and sentenced to mandatory LWOP will also be entitled to a Miller hearing if a prosecutor seeks reimposition of an LWOP sentence. 20 Additional disparities in actual time served can arise from the plea-bargain process. For example, Czarnecki’s codefendant, who appears to have been equally culpable under the evidence presented by the prosecution, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and received a minimum sentence of 18 years. See note 1 of this opinion; Czarnecki, unpub op at 2 n 2. We note that a 2021 report found that from 1999 to 2012, the median minimum sentence imposed for second-degree murder within the sample group was 20 years for nonhabitual offenders and 311/2 years for habitual offenders. Levin, Mahar & Smith, Do Michigan’s Sentencing Guidelines Meet the Legislature’s Goals?, p 50, Table 4, Safe & Just Michigan (Nov 2021) (accessed March 31, 2025) [https://perma.cc/Y3DB-5J3Y]; see also id. at 104, Table 17.

25 The second Lorentzen-Bullock factor favors a finding that imposition of mandatory

LWOP on 19- and 20-year-olds without an individualized assessment is constitutionally

defective.

3. PUNISHMENTS IMPOSED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS FOR THE SAME OFFENSE

The third Lorentzen-Bullock factor, which requires that we examine punishments

imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense, also weighs in favor of requiring

individualized sentencing before a sentence of LWOP can be imposed on a 19- or 20-year-

old defendant. When we decided Parks, “25 states and the District of Columbia [did] not

legislatively mandate life without parole for equivalent first-degree murder, regardless of

the age of the offender,” Parks, 510 Mich at 262 & n 15, and six other states mandated

LWOP for equivalent first-degree murder only “when there [were] proven aggravated

circumstances,” id. at 263 & n 16. We also noted that the Washington Supreme Court had

recently held that its state constitution required individualized sentencing protections

before LWOP could be imposed against anyone convicted of a crime before age 21. Id. at

263, citing In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wash 2d 305; 482 P3d 276 (2021). 21

21 Washington’s constitution prohibits “cruel punishment.” Wash Const 1889, art 1, § 14. The Washington Supreme Court concluded that

no meaningful neurological bright line exists between age 17 and age 18 or, as relevant here, between age 17 on the one hand, and ages 19 and 20 on the other hand. Thus, sentencing courts must have discretion to take the mitigating qualities of youth—those qualities emphasized in Miller[, 567 US 460,] and [State v] Houston-Sconiers[, 188 Wash 2d 1; 391 P3d 409 (2017)]—into account for defendants younger and older than 18. Not every 19- and 20-year-old will exhibit these mitigating characteristics, just as not every 17-year-old will. We leave it up to sentencing courts to determine which individual defendants merit leniency for these characteristics. Our aggravated murder statute’s requirement of LWOP for all defendants 18 and

26 Soon after Parks was decided, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that its

state constitution prohibited application of mandatory LWOP to anyone under the age of

21 at the time of their criminal offense. 22

In Parks we noted that Michigan was among a “minority of states that legislatively

mandate[d]” LWOP for all individuals convicted of a first-degree murder committed after

reaching the age of 17, Parks, 510 Mich at 263 (emphasis added), and we abolished

mandatory LWOP for 18-year-old offenders convicted of first-degree murder. The

previously summarized statistics are the same as applied to 19- and 20-year-old defendants

convicted of first-degree murder. 23 In addition to the Mattis decision, after Parks was

older, regardless of individual characteristics, violates the state constitution. [In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wash 2d at 326 (emphasis added).] 22 Massachusetts’s constitution prohibits courts from inflicting “cruel or unusual punishments.” Mass Const, art 26. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded:

Life without parole for emerging adults violates art. 26 [of the Massachusetts constitution]. Our comprehensive review informs us that Supreme Court precedent, as well as our own, dictates that youthful characteristics must be considered in sentencing, that the brains of emerging adults [i.e., those from 18 to 20 years of age] are not fully developed and are more similar to those of juveniles than older adults, and that our contemporary standards of decency in the Commonwealth and elsewhere disfavor imposing the Commonwealth’s harshest sentence on this cohort. Consequently, we conclude that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for emerging adult offenders violates art. 26. [Mattis, 493 Mass at 234-235.] 23 We note that there is a distinction between the 25 states listed in Parks and the 22 states listed in Mattis. The Mattis decision omitted New Jersey, West Virginia, and Virginia. In Parks, we discussed “equivalent first-degree murder,” Parks, 510 Mich at 263, whereas the Mattis court was focused on states that never mandated LWOP “in any circumstance,” Mattis, 493 Mass at 233. There are some circumstances in which LWOP is mandated under New Jersey law, NJ Stat Ann 2C:11-3(b)(1) to (4), and Virginia law, VA Code Ann 18.2-31;

27 issued, the Illinois Legislature substantially revised its parole-eligibility statutes. Under

the current version of 730 Ill Comp Stat 5/5-4.5-115(b), most individuals serving a sentence

for first-degree murder committed before the age of 21 are eligible for parole consideration

after 20 years. Those who were sentenced to a “term of natural life imprisonment” are

eligible for parole review after 40 years. Id.

When Parks was decided, only Michigan, 17 other states, and the federal

government mandated LWOP as the punishment for equivalent premeditated first-degree

murder committed by a person who was 18 or older. Parks, 510 Mich at 263-264, 263

n 17, 264 n 18. These legislatively mandated punishments remain intact except as to

Massachusetts. Given the ruling in Mattis, 493 Mass at 234-235 (invalidating mandatory

LWOP for defendants under the age of 21), only 16 other states now mandate LWOP for

equivalent first-degree murder. 24 Michigan thus remains a notable outlier at a national

level when it comes to the imposition of mandatory LWOP as a punishment. 25

VA Code Ann 18.2-10(a). However, the premeditated killings at issue in Parks and in these cases would not fall under those limited groupings. Additionally, although life imprisonment is mandatory for first-degree murder under West Virginia law, W Va Code, 61-2-1; W Va Code, 61-2-2, the possibility of parole is generally available under W Va Code, 62-12-13(c). 24 We also note that Hawaii obligates the parole board to submit an application to its governor to commute an LWOP sentence to one permitting parole after 20 years. Haw Rev Stat 706-656. As in Michigan, Const 1963, art 5, § 14, Iowa law allows the governor to commute the sentence to a term of years. Iowa Code 902.2. 25 The dissent criticizes our focus on Michigan’s outlier status because, unlike in Bullock and Lorentzen, our state was “alone—or nearly alone—in imposing a uniquely harsh penalty,” but that simply suggests that those were easier cases. At what point does being among a significant minority of jurisdictions that impose a punishment make the punishment unusually harsh for constitutional purposes? We find it significant that 66% of states do not mandate LWOP as a punishment for equivalent first-degree murder.

28 As the United States Supreme Court has done before, see Graham, 560 US at 80,

we also find it relevant to look beyond the borders of the United States when considering

whether a punishment is cruel or unusual. In the United Kingdom, the imposition of LWOP

for anyone under the age for 21 at the time of the offense has been unlawful since at least

2020. Sentencing Act 2020, c 17, § 322, sch 21, ¶¶ 2 to 3 (UK) (providing a 30-year

minimum term for individuals between the age of 18 and 21 at the time a serious offense

was committed). In 2022, the Supreme Court of Canada held that all sentences of

imprisonment for life without a realistic possibility of parole were unconstitutional for all

convicted offenders, regardless of their age. R v Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23 (Can). 26 These

legislative and judicial decisions suggest that the United States is becoming more of an

26 The Supreme Court of Canada specifically held that “[a] sentence of imprisonment for life without a realistic possibility of parole is intrinsically incompatible with human dignity,” that its Charter requires Parliament to allow for rehabilitation, and that such punishment is cruel and unusual. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23 (Can), ¶¶ 7 to 9, 81.

The United States’ use of LWOP as a punishment also remains an outlier when compared with other United Nations members. As of fall 2022, 155 of the 193 United Nations member states prohibited LWOP sentences. Law, Prisoner Advocates Turn to the UN to End Extreme Prison Sentences, The Nation (September 15, 2022) (accessed February 28, 2025) [https://perma.cc/DUZ8-LY72]. “In Europe, only 10 countries permit sentences of life without parole; in Latin America, only four countries still mete out life without parole.” Id. In 2023, the United Nations Human Rights Committee reaffirmed its previous recommendation that the United States “prohibit and abolish sentences of life imprisonment without parole for juveniles” and further recommended “establishing a moratorium on the imposition of sentences of life imprisonment without parole.” United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of the United States of America (December 7, 2023), p 12 (bold typeface omitted), available at .

29 outlier among the developed world in its use of mandatory imprisonment for life as a

punishment.

The national and international trends concerning the punishment of late adolescents

convicted of heinous crimes illustrate that the “evolving standards of decency that mark

the progress of a maturing society,” Lorentzen, 387 Mich 179, are trending away from the

imposition of mandatory LWOP for late adolescents. 27 Mandatory LWOP is “an

irrevocable sentence, offering no hope of release, for a group of defendants that are

neurologically less culpable than others serving the same or, oftentimes, less-severe

sentences for the same crimes.” Parks, 510 Mich at 264. The imposition of such

punishment on late adolescents who were 19- or 20-years-old at the time of their offense

does not comport with our Constitution’s mandatory prohibition on excessively harsh, and

thus cruel or unusual, punishment. 28 Const 1963, art 1, § 16.

4. MICHIGAN’S TRADITIONAL GOAL OF AND PREFERENCE FOR REHABILITATION

The final proportionality factor we must consider under Lorentzen-Bullock is

Michigan’s longstanding goal of and preference for punishments that allow for

27 As discussed in Part IV(B) of this opinion, various federal laws also grant late adolescents less than the full rights of adulthood. For example, federal firearm licensees are not permitted to sell or transfer a handgun or handgun ammunition to a person under 21. 18 USC 922(b)(1) and (c)(1). 28 We recognized in Parks that this factor is “more neutral than the first two,” but that it “slightly weighs in favor of an individualized sentencing procedure . . . .” Parks, 510 Mich at 262. We continue to acknowledge that this factor is less clear than the other factors. However, considering judicial decisions in other jurisdictions that predated Parks and that have been issued after Parks, we find this factor now more strongly supports our holding that the punishment at issue is cruel or unusual.

30 rehabilitation. “[I]t cannot be disputed that the goal of rehabilitation is not accomplished

by mandatorily sentencing an individual to life behind prison walls without any hope of

release.” Parks, 510 Mich at 264-265. As we have previously noted, rehabilitation “is the

only penological goal enshrined in our proportionality test as a ‘criterion rooted in

Michigan’s legal traditions.’ ” Id. at 265, quoting Bullock, 440 Mich at 34.

The evolution of Michigan’s constitutional text illustrates the point. Michigan’s

first Constitution, adopted in 1835, provided that “cruel and unjust punishments shall not

be inflicted.” Const 1835, art 1, § 18. Fifteen years later, not only was “unjust” replaced

with “unusual,” but the broader disjunctive “or” replaced the conjunctive “and.” Const

1850, art 6, § 31. 29 This change was introduced by Judge (later Justice) Benjamin

Witherell, and while there was not detailed debate, much can be gleaned as to the prevailing

views on rehabilitation from the vigorous debates surrounding a proposed

disenfranchisement clause, which would have prohibited citizens convicted of crimes from

voting.

29 This amendment came a mere three years after Michigan’s abolition of the death penalty except in cases of treason, and that exception was never used. Shapiro & Bernstein, The Meaning of Life, In Michigan: Mercy from Life Sentences Under the State Constitution, unpublished manuscript (November 22, 2024), p 4, available at , citing Galliher et al, America Without the Death Penalty, Northeastern University Press (2005), p 5. When the legislative abolition of the death penalty was later constitutionalized, Delegate T. Jefferson Hoxie, as chairman of the committee on legislative powers, argued on behalf of the committee that it was “fitting and opportune for Michigan to step forward in the tradition which we began over 115 years ago” as the “first American state and the first governmental jurisdiction in the English speaking world to legislate against capital punishment.” 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 595.

31 Witherell explained that “there were two reasons for inflicting punishment—

warning to the community and reformation of the offender.” Report of the Proceedings

and Debates in the Convention to Revise the Constitution of the State of Michigan 1850,

p 298. Numerous other delegates agreed. While the historical record lacks explicit debate

on the convention’s adoption of “cruel or unusual” language, delegate statements on the

disenfranchisement provision show that the potential for reformation following criminal

conviction was a foundational concern among state leaders. See Shapiro & Bernstein, The

Meaning of Life, In Michigan: Mercy from Life Sentences Under the State Constitution,

unpublished manuscript (November 22, 2024), pp 5-6, available at

.

Historical practices in Michigan demonstrate a firm commitment to rehabilitation.

From 1840 to 1865, the Governor’s pardon power was exercised regularly and “served as

a sentence-review mechanism that prioritized rehabilitation over finality,” even for life

sentences, with data suggesting that the power was often exercised to release the elderly or

infirm. Id. at 7-12. Michigan was one of the first states in the country to formally create a

parole board, 1895 PA 218, §§ 1 and 2, which was based on the systematic use of the

pardon power by the Governor. The Meaning of Life, In Michigan, p 7.

As early as 1888, this Court “foreshadowed modern constitutional proportionality

analysis,” Bullock, 440 Mich at 36 n 18, when it held in People v Murray, 72 Mich 10, 17;

40 NW 29 (1888), that a term-of-years sentence should “never be made to extend beyond

the average period of persons in prison life, which [at that time] seldom exceed[ed] 25

years.” Then, in 1902, voters approved a ballot proposal to constitutionalize the

Legislature’s authority to enact an indeterminate sentencing system and to provide for

32 parole. See Const 1850, art 4, § 47. This Court soon observed that the indeterminate

amendment was designed “to reform criminals and to convert bad citizens into good

citizens, and thus protect society.” People v Cook, 147 Mich 127, 132; 110 NW 514

(1907). “In order to accomplish this result, the theory is that, when the prisoner has shown

by his conduct that he may turn from his criminal career, he should have an opportunity,

under favorable circumstances, to make the test.” Id.

From 1900 to 1969, 57% “of all people sentenced to life without parole for first-

degree murder convictions were released after an average of fewer than twenty-four years

in prison.” The Meaning of Life, In Michigan, p 17. Across that same period, “sentences

of life with the possibility of parole typically led to about sixteen years of incarceration.”

Id. Some of this was due to the widespread application of good-time credits, at least until

those credits were effectively eliminated in 1978. See 1978 IL B, effective December 12,

1978; MCL 800.33, as amended by 1982 PA 442.

The historical record demonstrates that a person’s potential for rehabilitation and

reentry into society has long played a unique and heighted role in Michigan. 30 Mandatorily

30 Although we acknowledge that other goals of criminal punishment include deterrence, public safety, and retribution, the goal of rehabilitation has heightened importance in Michigan as it is the only penological aim expressly incorporated into our test for constitutional proportionality. Individualized lengthy criminal sentences for heinous crimes can promote public safety and achieve retribution. We also note that “[s]tudy after study . . . has shown that people do not order their unlawful behavior around the harshness of sentences they may face, but around their perceived likelihood of being caught and facing any sentence.” Nelson, Feineh, & Mapolski, A New Paradigm for Sentencing in the United States, p 23, Vera Institute of Justice (Feb 2023) (accessed March 25, 2025) [https://perma.cc/JS9H-UVHS]; see also Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 Crime & Just 199, 199 (2013) (noting that “lengthy prison sentences and mandatory minimum sentencing cannot be justified on deterrence”). Given these findings and the known impulsivity of late adolescents, one

33 eliminating the possibility of rehabilitation and reentry into society is exceptionally cruel

when applied to late adolescents whose “rehabilitative potential is quite probable” given

the stage of their cognitive development. Parks, 510 Mich at 265. As in Parks, we

conclude that it would be “antithetical to our Constitution’s professed goal of rehabilitative

sentences” to deny all 19- and 20-year-old individuals who commit first-degree murder

any possible opportunity to rehabilitate themselves and reenter society without requiring

an individualized sentencing proceeding at which relevant mitigating characteristics of

youth can be evaluated by the sentencing court. Id. See also MCL 769.25; MCL 769.25a.

D. THE CONTINUED VIABILITY OF PEOPLE v HALL

We also directed the parties to address whether extending Parks to the class of 19-

and 20-year-old offenders required us to overrule Hall, 396 Mich at 657-658, and if so,

whether we should do so. The defendant in Hall was sentenced to a mandatory term of

LWOP for a felony murder committed when he was 17 years old. Hall rejected the

defendant’s argument that imposition of LWOP was unconstitutional under either US

Const, Am VIII, or Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Hall, 396 Mich at 657-658.

There are numerous reasons to question the continued viability of Hall as binding

precedent concerning constitutionally permissible punishments. We note that the Hall

opinion did not refer to the defendant’s age and that the defendant did not appear to argue

his age as a foundation for his argument that automatic LWOP constituted “cruel and

unusual” punishment, US Const, Am VIII, or “cruel or unusual” punishment, Const 1963,

art 1, § 16. The defendant in Hall made a facial constitutional challenge to the validity of

cannot reasonably know how effective the length of possible punishment is in deterring youthful criminal conduct.

34 LWOP as a punishment for felony murder regardless of one’s age. However, given Hall’s

age (17), any federal constitutional basis for the Eighth Amendment ruling in Hall has been

effectively repudiated by Miller and Montgomery. 31

Given that Hall was issued in 1976, it also predated decades of significant changes

in state and federal law concerning the constitutionality of punishments that can be

constitutionally imposed on juveniles and late adolescents. See Roper, 543 US at 560, 578-

579; Graham, 560 US at 74-75, 82; Miller, 567 US at 479-480, 489; Montgomery, 577 US

at 212-213; Parks, 510 Mich at 268. The Hall Court had neither the benefit of these later

decisions nor access to the more recent scientific understanding of how the adolescent brain

functions.

As an additional matter, Hall was based, in part, on the notion that the Governor

could potentially commute an LWOP sentence. Hall, 396 Mich at 658. But shortly after

Hall was issued, the United States Supreme Court rejected this idea, noting that “the

possibility of executive clemency that exists in every case” is not significant for purposes

of an Eighth Amendment analysis because it would make such judicial review

“meaningless.” Solem v Helm, 463 US 277, 303; 103 S Ct 3001; 77 L Ed 2d 637 (1983).

Solem thus calls into question the reliance in Hall on the potential for a commutation by

Michigan’s Governor as a part of this Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis.

In terms of purely state law, the Hall decision included an analysis of the Lorenzten

factors. However, the truncated analysis provided in Hall would not pass current judicial

31 In fact, Hall himself has since been resentenced to serve a term-of-years sentence. See Third Judicial Circuit of Michigan, Register of Actions (Case No. 67-134610), available at (search under “John Sam Hall”) (accessed March 13, 2025).

35 muster. The Hall Court performed its analysis through the lens of a “shock the conscience”

standard that we later abandoned in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 634-635;

461 NW2d 1 (1990). Hall was also decided before we affirmatively held in Bullock, 440

Mich at 27-36, that the “cruel or unusual” punishment clause in Const 1963, art 1, § 16,

was more protective than the Eighth Amendment and that all criminal sentences must be

reasonable and proportionate to the offense and the offender, id. at 37-40.

We question how much of Hall’s analysis remains viable given the sea change of

federal and state precedent interpreting US Const, Am VIII, and Const 1963, art 1, § 16,

since Hall was decided. But we need not overrule that decision today. As we noted in

Parks, 510 Mich at 255 n 9, when rejecting the facial challenge in Hall, the Court “did not

address the issue of sentencing a juvenile to life without parole”; “Hall was decided before

the United States Supreme Court decided Miller and its progeny”; and “the Hall Court did

not have the benefit of the scientific literature cited in [Parks].” We found Hall

inapplicable to an “as applied” constitutional challenge to the imposition of mandatory

LWOP on a juvenile. For the same reasons, Hall is also inapplicable to an as-applied

challenge brought by the class of 19- and 20-year-old defendants who have been sentenced

to a mandatory term of LWOP. We do not disturb, at this time, Hall’s holding that Const

1963, art 1, § 16 permits a mandatory punishment of LWOP for defendants convicted of

first-degree murder, so long as the defendant was at least 21 years of age at the time of the

offense.

36 V. APPLICATION

Czarnecki was 19 years old when he committed the premediated murder for which

he was convicted. Taylor was 20 years old when he committed the premeditated murder

for which he was convicted. Both defendants were subject to the mandatory sentence of

LWOP that attaches to first-degree murder under MCL 750.316. Neither defendant was

provided the benefit and protections of the specialized procedures mandated by MCL

769.25 or MCL 769.25a despite being members of a class who are presumptively

neurologically indistinguishable from either a teenage juvenile offender or an 18-year-old

offender. Nor did either defendant receive the benefits of our decisions in Taylor, 510

Mich at 138-139, and Boykin, 510 Mich at 189, 190-194. Accordingly, the procedures

used at Czarnecki’s and Taylor’s sentencing hearings violated our Constitution, and both

are entitled to resentencing.

In People v Poole, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (April 1, 2025) (Docket No.

166813); slip op at ___, we held that Parks applies retroactively to criminal cases on

collateral review. Although these cases are before the Court on direct review, the Poole

retroactivity analysis applies with equal force to this decision. There is no logical

justification for applying Parks retroactively to cases on collateral review and not doing

the same for the holding reached in these cases involving 19- and 20-year-olds. Therefore,

our decision in these cases applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.

VI. CONCLUSION

We hold that the application of a mandatory sentence of LWOP under MCL 750.316

to Czarnecki and Taylor constitutes unconstitutionally harsh and disproportionate

punishment and thus “cruel” punishment in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16. See Parks,

37 510 Mich at 268; Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 176-181; Bullock, 440 Mich at 33-34. This

renders Czarnecki’s and Taylor’s automatic and mandatory sentences of LWOP

unconstitutional, and both defendants are entitled to resentencing.

Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ opinion on remand in each case, vacate

each defendant’s sentence for first-degree murder, and remand each case to the appropriate

circuit court for resentencing in accordance with MCL 769.25, this opinion, and our

relevant caselaw. If the prosecutor in either case intends to move for the imposition of an

LWOP sentence, then the prosecutor shall have 90 days from the date of this opinion to

file such a motion. MCL 769.25(3). Otherwise, each defendant will be resentenced to a

term of years, pursuant to MCL 769.25(9). We deny leave to appeal in all other respects

for failure to persuade the Court of need for review. 32

This decision also applies retroactively to all relevant criminal cases on collateral

review.

Elizabeth M. Welch Richard H. Bernstein Megan K. Cavanagh Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas

32 Czarnecki filed a Standard 4 brief pursuant to Administrative Order 2004-6, 471 Mich c (2005), in which he sought to raise numerous additional legal challenges. Most, if not all, of these issues are not properly before the Court because defendant raised them before the previous remand and this Court has already denied leave to appeal. See People v Czarnecki, 510 Mich 1093 (2022). To the extent Czarnecki presents new legal challenges, we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

38 STATE OF MICHIGAN

BERNSTEIN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). This Court once again draws a bright line in determining when the imposition of a

mandatory life without possibility of parole sentence is unconstitutional under our state

Constitution’s “cruel or unusual punishment” provision, Const 1963, art 1, § 16. In People

v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 268; 987 NW2d 161 (2022), we drew the line at 18, and today we

extend that holding to include those under the age of 21 at the time they committed their

offenses.

I write separately to express my reasons for disagreeing with a bright-line rule drawn

at age 21: first, I once again highlight the problem of underinclusiveness that is associated with drawing a bright-line rule; and second, if drawing any line were necessary, I would

instead follow the consensus of the relevant scientific studies and draw such a line at age 25.

In Parks, I wrote separately to note that “having a line in place does not mean that

such a line should represent both the floor and ceiling of constitutional protections,

especially when we already understand that such a line might not be sufficiently

protective.” Parks, 510 Mich at 275 (BERNSTEIN, J., concurring).

To avoid these downfalls, we could instead consider that all offenders ages 18 and younger have an irrebuttable presumption of youth and diminished capacity, as recognized by the majority opinion. Because the presumption is irrebuttable, all offenders within this class [would] be afforded the processes outlined in MCL 769.25 before they [could] be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. However, we could enable defendants who are older than 18 to assert that they possess some qualities—such as an intellectual disability or other mitigating circumstances—that render their brains more like someone who is age 18 or younger. In other words, once offenders reach the age of 19, the irrebuttable presumption of youthfulness would transform into a rebuttable presumption of maturity and a defendant over the age of 18 would bear the burden of demonstrating the need for a hearing to ensure that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole was proportionate. I believe that the additional process associated with a shifting presumption rather than a bright line would help to alleviate the problem associated with drawing a line that we know will be, at least in part, underinclusive. [Id. at 276-277.]

I continue to believe that the better approach to the difficult problems posed in these cases

is one that would allow for a shifting age-based presumption that could consider individual

characteristics of diminished culpability. Because these cases do not present us with the

opportunity to consider such an option, I largely concur with the majority’s analysis and

conclusion, as I did in Parks.

However, the scientific studies that serve as the foundation for our holdings both in

these cases and in Parks indicate that they would apply to a group larger than those under

2 the age of 21, as the majority opinion recognizes. Parks, 510 Mich at 250-251 (opinion of

the Court) (“This process of brain rewiring means that young adults have yet to reach full

social and emotional maturity, given that the prefrontal cortex—the last region of the brain

to develop, and the region responsible for risk-weighing and understanding

consequences—is not fully developed until age 25.”).

The majority here nonetheless draws the line at 21, reasoning that because the

defendants in the cases before us were age 19 and 20 at the time they committed their

crimes, “resolution of the issues before the Court does not require us to consider whether

Const 1963, art 1, § 16 would require granting the same relief to late adolescents who were

21 or older at the time of their offense.” However, this Court recently denied leave in a

case involving a defendant who was 21 at the time he committed his crime. People v

Adamowicz, 513 Mich 869 (2023). In light of our decision to limit the class of defendants

before us in these cases, it is difficult to read our holding today as anything but closing the

door on extending Parks relief to other late adolescents. I would instead follow the

thoughtful conclusions of the many scientific studies presented before us and relied upon

in both Parks and these cases, and hold that the turning point for any test, be it a bright-

line rule or a shifting age-based presumption, starts at age 25 and not age 21.

Richard H. Bernstein

3 STATE OF MICHIGAN

v No 166654

CLEMENT, C.J. (dissenting). In my dissent in People v Parks, 510 Mich 225, 298-299; 987 NW2d 161 (2022)

(CLEMENT, J., dissenting), I cautioned that this Court’s decision to extend Miller v

Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), beyond its constitutional

bounds would not be the last step in its march. Today, the Court takes another two steps,

pushing Parks past 18-year-olds to 19- and 20-year-olds. The Michigan Constitution’s

prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment” does not compel this result. Therefore, I

dissent. The facts are not in dispute. Defendants Andrew Czarnecki and Montario Taylor

committed first-degree murders when they were 19 and 20 years old, respectively.

Czarnecki and an accomplice killed a man before burning his body, while Taylor killed a

man by shooting him eight times. They were both sentenced to mandatory life

imprisonment without eligibility for parole (LWOP), as is required under MCL 750.316. 1

They now contend that Parks, which held that mandatory LWOP was unconstitutional as

applied to defendants who were 18 years old at the time of the commission of the crime,

Parks, 510 Mich at 268 (opinion of the Court), should be extended to defendants who were

19 and 20 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.

I. ANALYSIS

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids “cruel and unusual

punishments.” US Const, Am VIII (emphasis added). Article 1, § 16 of the Michigan

Constitution prohibits “cruel or unusual punishment.” Const 1963, art 1, § 16 (emphasis

added). That the Michigan Constitution uses “or” rather than “and” has led this Court to

interpret Michigan’s provision as offering broader protection. People v Bullock, 440 Mich

15, 30-33; 485 NW2d 866 (1992).

Even so, we start from the presumption that a statute is constitutional “unless the

contrary clearly appears[.]” Cady v Detroit, 289 Mich 499, 505; 286 NW 805 (1939).

Furthermore, “every possible presumption” must favor the statute’s constitutionality so

long as that presumption is not “clearly inconsistent” with the law itself. Id. That principle

1 MCL 750.316(1) (“[A] person who commits any of the following is guilty of first degree murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life without eligibility for parole . . . .”).

2 carries special weight when it comes to sentencing. As Michigan courts have long held,

“[l]egislatively mandated sentences are presumptively proportional and presumptively

valid.” People v Brown, 294 Mich App 377, 390; 811 NW2d 531 (2011), citing People v

Williams, 189 Mich App 400, 404; 473 NW2d 727 (1991).

In People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167; 194 NW2d 827 (1972), and later in Bullock,

440 Mich at 33-34, this Court set out a four-part test for determining whether a sentence

violates Const 1963, art 1, § 16. That test requires us to consider: (1) the severity of the

sentence compared to the gravity of the offense, (2) the penalty for the offense compared

to penalties for other offenses in Michigan, (3) the penalty for the offense in Michigan

compared to the same offense in other states, and (4) whether the penalty serves the

penological goal of rehabilitation. People v Carp, 496 Mich 440, 520; 852 NW2d 801

(2014), cert gtd and opinion vacated on other grounds sub nom Carp v Michigan, 577 US

1186 (2016), citing Bullock, 440 Mich at 33-34, and Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 176-181. If

most of the factors support a finding of constitutionality, the punishment is upheld. See

Carp, 496 Mich at 521. I address each factor in turn.

A. THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENSE VERSUS THE SEVERITY OF THE PUNISHMENT

First, we look to the gravity of the offense and compare it to the severity of the

punishment. Id. at 520. First-degree murder is arguably the gravest offense under

Michigan law. The premeditated taking of a life is an act of the highest moral and legal

consequence. A punishment of great severity is therefore proportionate. Mandatory

3 LWOP is precisely that: the most severe sentence Michigan law allows. And as this Court

explained in Carp, 496 Mich at 514-515: 2

[F]irst-degree murder is almost certainly the gravest and most serious offense that an individual can commit under the laws of Michigan—the premeditated taking of an innocent human life. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the people of this state, through the Legislature, would have chosen to impose the most severe punishment authorized by the laws of Michigan for this offense.

See also People v Hall, 396 Mich 650, 657-658; 242 NW2d 377 (1976) (stating that

mandatory LWOP for felony murder was proportionate to the crime). Because the gravity

of the punishment fits the gravity of the offense, the sentence is commensurate.

The majority goes on to note though that younger offenders will spend more time

in prison than older offenders. 3 Additionally, the majority states that younger offenders

are still neurologically developing and, thus, more impulsive, but that they will eventually

mature; therefore, the majority argues that it is particularly cruel to impose mandatory

LWOP on younger adults. In other words, the majority does not analyze this first

proportionality factor based primarily on the offense committed, but on the offender who

committed it. While I recognize that it makes some sense to consider characteristics of the

2 Though in People v Poole, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (April 1, 2025) (Docket No. 166813), the Court overruled Carp’s analysis regarding the retroactivity of Miller under state law, Carp’s holding that the imposition of LWOP on a juvenile offender does not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16 still stands. While that holding does not specifically address mandatory LWOP for young adults, I find that much of Carp’s reasoning is generally applicable to the similar issue here. 3 Ante at 21-22 (“As we recognized in Parks, when LWOP is imposed on late adolescents, ‘they will inevitably serve more time and spend a greater percentage of their lives behind prison walls than similarly situated older adult offenders.’ ”), quoting Parks, 510 Mich at 257 (opinion of the Court).

4 offender in an as-applied challenge, such as that here, I believe the majority unjustifiably

allows such considerations to loom so large in its analysis that the majority downplays the

gravity of first-degree murder. 4

Outside of simply overemphasizing the characteristics of the offender, I take further

issue with the majority’s additional considerations. First, regarding the majority’s point

that younger offenders, as a practical matter, will spend more time in prison than older

offenders, prior to Parks, this Court had never before used such reasoning to invalidate life

sentences. In Parks, I rejected this argument outright:

When appellants fairly frequently contend that their term-of-years sentence is a de facto life sentence because of their more advanced age, our Court and the Court of Appeals routinely reject such arguments. I see no reason why, in that scenario, we would refuse to consider that a term-of-years sentence is a de facto life sentence but, in the instant case, we would consider—relatedly but in reverse—that a particular life sentence is a de facto longer term-of- years sentence than other life sentences. [Parks, 510 Mich at 286 (CLEMENT, J., dissenting).]

In other words, a 70-year-old sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment will almost certainly

die in prison. Yet courts have consistently rejected the argument that such a sentence

constitutes de facto LWOP, refusing to substitute actuarial projections for the Legislature’s

4 I also question whether focusing more on the characteristics of the offender rather than the gravity of the offense itself is inconsistent with how this Court had traditionally analyzed the first factor prior to Parks. Compare Commonwealth v Mattis, 493 Mass 216, 274-275; 224 NE3d 410 (2024) (Lowy, J., dissenting) (recounting that under Massachusetts’ common law, courts consider similar challenges to the constitutionality of punishments under a “tripartite analysis,” the first factor of which “requires . . . an ‘inquiry into the nature of the offense and the offender in light of the degree of harm to society’ ”) (emphasis added; quotation marks and citation omitted), quoting Commonwealth v Sharma, 488 Mass 85, 89; 171 NE3d 1076 (2021). In Carp, for instance, though the Court recognized the characteristics of youth, the Court still focused primarily on the serious nature of the offense. See Carp, 496 Mich at 514-515.

5 judgment. 5 But now, the majority seemingly reverses course, treating realities that turn on

actuarial life expectancy as a constitutional bar to mandatory LWOP.

Regarding the majority’s second point that younger offenders are still developing

neurologically, I do not disagree. It is common sense that 20-year-olds have not reached

full maturity. For this reason, it is up to the Legislature to amend the relevant statutes to

prohibit mandatory LWOP for 19- and 20-year-old offenders. However, it is one thing for

scientific evidence to justify a change in policy from the Legislature, and another thing for

that same evidence to support a judicial finding that mandatory LWOP violates our

Constitution. The bar for the latter is much higher, and I do not believe it has been met.

For the judiciary’s purposes, the question is not just whether young adults differ in some

ways from their older counterparts. The question is whether those differences are so

constitutionally significant that they render mandatory LWOP categorically

disproportionate. And the answer, as I explained in Parks, is no: “Even if 18-year-olds are

not so well-developed neurologically as 27-year-olds, they are sufficiently neurologically

developed to make major decisions about their lives.” See id. at 283-284 (CLEMENT, J.,

dissenting). The same is, of course, true for 19- and 20-year-olds.

It is especially true regarding the choice to commit first-degree murder. To return

to my initial comment regarding the severity of the crime, first-degree murder is not

impulsive; it generally requires, by definition, premeditation and intent. 6 A 19- or 20-year-

5 Parks, 510 Mich at 286 (CLEMENT, J., dissenting) (“[W]e do not generally consider how long a defendant will, as a practical matter, serve a sentence given his or her life expectancy.”). 6 The majority points out that felony murder and the killing of a police officer, MCL 750.316(1)(b) and (c), are also examples of first-degree murder that are punishable by

6 old capable of planning and executing a murder is capable of understanding its

consequences. And if they understand those consequences, then they can constitutionally

bear the full weight of the law’s most severe punishment. 7

Finally, the majority confuses the first- and fourth-factor analyses. As stated, the

majority focuses on characteristics of the offender, particularly that younger offenders have

greater room for neurological growth and thus a better chance at rehabilitation; however,

the majority points out that mandatory LWOP fails to consider this possibility of

rehabilitation. That may be true, but that analysis should be considered under the fourth

factor of our Lorentzen test, which considers whether the penalty serves the penological

goal of rehabilitation. Carp, 496 Mich at 520. The majority is essentially double-dipping

by counting the fact that mandatory LWOP does not facilitate rehabilitation under both the

fourth and first factors.

In sum, focusing on the gravity of the offense and the severity of the punishment, I

believe mandatory LWOP is proportionate for first-degree murder, even when that crime

is committed by 19- or 20-year-olds. The first factor weighs in favor of constitutionality.

mandatory LWOP, yet do not require premeditation. These cases do not involve those crimes, however, so I see no reason to comment on them. I find it strange that the majority should mention them when they are not at issue. 7 Even taking the majority’s statements regarding the scientific evidence on their face and assuming that 19- and 20-year-olds generally cannot appreciate the consequences even of their deliberate actions, the other factors of the Lorentzen test would need to weigh against the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP for these defendants in order to strike down the punishment. For the reasons expressed later, I do not believe the other factors lead to this conclusion.

7 B. SENTENCES IMPOSED IN MICHIGAN FOR OTHER OFFENSES

Next, we consider the sentences imposed for other offenses under Michigan law.

Id. This factor, too, supports the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP for 19- and 20-

year-olds. Michigan’s sentencing scheme reflects the Legislature’s considered judgment

that some crimes are so severe, and some offenders so culpable, that LWOP is the only

appropriate punishment. And that judgment is not confined to first-degree murder alone.

Several other offenses are punished with mandatory LWOP, demonstrating that Michigan

law does not treat this sentence as an anomaly. See, e.g., MCL 791.234(6) (listing various

offenses subject to mandatory LWOP); MCL 750.316 (first-degree murder); MCL

750.520b (first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I)); MCL 750.16(5) (adulteration of

drugs with intent to kill causing death); MCL 750.18(7) (mixing drugs improperly with

intent to kill causing death); MCL 750.211a(2)(f) (possession with intent to unlawfully use

an explosive device causing death); MCL 333.17764(7) (mislabeling drugs with intent to

kill and causing death); MCL 750.200i(2)(e) (possession of a harmful biological, chemical,

radioactive, or electronic device resulting in death). That mandatory LWOP applies to

other homicide offenses as well as to the nonhomicide offense of CSC-I underscores a

fundamental point: Michigan law recognizes that the most serious crimes—whether or not

they involve the taking of life—are so severe that parole should never be an option. Yet

the majority now declares that first-degree murder, arguably the most serious crime in

Michigan law, should be treated more leniently than some of these nonhomicide offenses.

The majority points to the seeming unfairness of defendants being automatically

sentenced to LWOP and, as a result, likely spending more time in prison than offenders

who were 18 at the time they committed first-degree murder. Per Parks, 18-year-old

8 offenders are entitled to an individualized sentencing hearing before the imposition of

LWOP and, as a result, may be sentenced to a shorter term of years of imprisonment.

However, this problem arises no matter where the line is drawn. Now, 21-year-old

offenders will receive mandatory LWOP sentences whereas 20-year-old offenders will

receive individualized sentencing hearings and possibly shorter sentences. There will

always be a sense of possible unfairness about such bright-line rules, but as the United

States Supreme Court has said, “a line must be drawn.” Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551,

574; 125 S Ct 1183; 161 L Ed 2d 1 (2005).

Mandatory LWOP is not excessive when measured against Michigan’s sentences

for other crimes. The Legislature has imposed mandatory LWOP for multiple offenses,

including nonhomicide crimes. While it may be unfortunate for defendants that they would

be entitled to individualized sentencing and possibly shorter sentences had they committed

first-degree murder when they were slightly younger, that will always be true for some

offenders, no matter where courts draw the line. For these reasons, this second factor

supports the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP.

C. SENTENCES IMPOSED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS FOR THE SAME OFFENSE

For the third factor, we consider the penalties that other jurisdictions impose for

first-degree murder. Carp, 496 Mich at 520. The majority claims that Michigan is an

outlier in mandating LWOP for 19-year-olds. But the national data contradicts that claim.

Michigan’s sentencing scheme remains consistent with a substantial portion of the country,

and evolving standards of decency do not show that mandatory LWOP for 19- and 20-year-

olds is unconstitutional.

9 As the majority notes, 16 states and the federal government impose mandatory

LWOP for first-degree murder. That alone distinguishes these cases from pre-Parks cases,

notably Bullock, 440 Mich 15, and Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167, where Michigan stood

alone—or nearly alone—in imposing a uniquely harsh penalty. In Bullock, this Court

struck down Michigan’s mandatory life sentence for drug offenses after noting that “no

other state in the nation imposes a penalty even remotely as severe as Michigan’s . . . .”

Bullock, 440 Mich at 40. Similarly, in Lorentzen, we found Michigan’s minimum sentence

for marijuana distribution unconstitutional because “[o]nly one state . . . has as severe a

minimum sentence for the sale of marijuana as Michigan.” Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179.

That is not the case here. 8 Michigan’s sentencing scheme is well within the mainstream of

United States law. 9

8 The majority contends that Bullock and Lorentzen were simply easier to decide given the facts involved. It is certainly true that the third factor of our test much more clearly weighed against a finding of constitutionality in Bullock and Lorentzen. I believe the differences between, on the one hand, Bullock and Lorentzen, and, on the other hand, the instant cases should yield different results. Given that a third of states still impose mandatory LWOP on young adult offenders convicted of first-degree murder, Michigan is hardly an outlier. And I am not aware of another Michigan decision finding that the third factor of our test weighs against a punishment’s constitutionality when so many other jurisdictions impose the same punishment for the same crime. 9 The majority also relies on decisions by the Washington Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, see In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wash 2d 305; 482 P3d 276 (2021), and Mattis, 493 Mass 216 (opinion of the court), in which they held that mandatory LWOP for young offenders violated their state constitutions. But as I explained in Parks, Monschke is not persuasive because it applied an entirely different constitutional framework. See Parks, 510 Mich at 289-290 (CLEMENT, J., dissenting) (discussing the legal tests employed in Washington generally and Monschke specifically, and noting how those tests differ from ours). Washington’s constitutional test for cruel punishment is broader than Michigan’s, see Wash Const 1889, art 1, § 14 (prohibiting cruel punishment), making its reasoning inapplicable here. As for Mattis, the Massachusetts court split four to three in that case. Much of the reasoning in the two dissents is similar

10 The majority further supports its reasoning by citing sentencing practices in the

United Kingdom and Canada. But constitutional law is not a referendum on global

criminal-justice trends. Foreign jurisdictions structure their sentencing laws differently,

often under entirely different constitutional frameworks. The majority, however, does not

heed that lesson. Instead, it cherry-picks foreign jurisdictions to suggest that Michigan’s

law is outdated. And in any case, even if engaging in a comparative review of international

law were a useful and important endeavor, two countries hardly create a trend.

In sum, Michigan’s mandatory LWOP sentence for first-degree murder is not an

outlier. It aligns with a substantial portion of the country, distinguishing these cases from

pre-Parks precedent such as Bullock and Lorentzen. The majority’s use of nonbinding out-

of-state court decisions and foreign law is selective and unpersuasive. For these reasons,

this factor supports the constitutionality of mandatory LWOP.

D. REHABILITATION

Finally, we consider whether the punishment serves the goal of rehabilitation. Carp,

496 Mich at 520. The majority places great weight on this factor. Admittedly, mandatory

LWOP does not allow much opportunity for rehabilitation, with the only possibility for

to my reasoning in Parks and in these cases. See Mattis, 493 Mass at 256 (Lowy, J., dissenting) (“Rather, the Legislature has definitively drawn the line between childhood and adulthood at eighteen, and objective indicia of contemporary standards of decency in the Commonwealth demonstrate support for, rather than objection to, treating individuals within this age range as adults in our criminal justice system when they commit the crime of murder in the first degree.”); id. at 291 (Cypher, J., dissenting) (“Imposed by judicial fiat, twenty-one minus a day is not tethered to hard science, nor is it joined to ‘contemporary standards of decency’ as reflected in our criminal statutes.”) (citation omitted). Suffice it to say, I find the dissenting opinions much more persuasive than that of the majority in Mattis.

11 release being executive clemency. 10 Yet, although Michigan has emphasized the

importance of rehabilitation, rehabilitation is still only one of several sentencing goals. 11

The goal of rehabilitation does not subsume the goals of deterrence, public safety, or

retribution—particularly for the most serious offenses.

Nevertheless, with the first three factors of the Lorentzen test strongly favoring a

finding of constitutionality, I would hold that mandatory LWOP is constitutional as applied

to 19- and 20-year-old offenders. I believe that the majority misapplies Lorentzen, which

unfortunately leads to disregarding the Legislature’s judgment.

II. RELIANCE ON NEUROSCIENCE

Just as I set out in my dissent in Parks, I continue to view the majority’s reliance on

neuroscience as a symptom that the question before us is not one suited for the judiciary

but rather one that must be considered by the Legislature or the people of this state. The

Court today extends its holding in Parks beyond 18-year-old offenders, declaring that

individuals under 21 must be treated as juveniles for sentencing purposes. It does so not

10 Parks, 510 Mich at 292 (CLEMENT, J., dissenting) (“ ‘[R]ehabilitation and release are still possible, since defendant still has available to him commutation of sentence by the Governor to a parolable offense or outright pardon.’ ”), quoting Hall, 396 Mich at 658. Contra Carp, 496 Mich at 521 (noting that LWOP “ ‘forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal’ ”), quoting Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 74; 130 S Ct 2011; 176 L Ed 2d 825 (2010). 11 Parks, 510 Mich at 291 (CLEMENT, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are other valid penological goals, such as retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.”), citing Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 180; People v Broden, 428 Mich 343, 350; 408 NW2d 789 (1987) (“[A]mong the proper criteria for determining an appropriate sentence are: (1) the disciplining of the wrongdoer, (2) the protection of society, (3) the potential for reformation of the offender, and (4) the deterring of others from committing like offenses.”).

12 so much by reference to constitutional text or established legal principles, but by invoking

a parade of neuroscientific studies that suggest that young adults are generally less culpable

because of incomplete brain development. Indeed, the opinion reads less like a judicial

decision interpreting our Constitution and more like an amicus brief from a behavioral-

science institute. Courts should not reshape the law with every shift in scientific consensus,

especially when it is the Michigan Constitution that is the subject of reshaping.

Similarly, that courts consider “evolving standards of decency” 12 when deciding

claims under Const 1963, art 1, § 16 should not be taken as a license for judges to impose

their own policy preferences. If anything, that the particular constitutional provision here

allows for the consideration of “evolving standards of decency” is all the more reason to

be sure that the Court applies the Lorentzen factors very carefully and avoids creating

sudden, disruptive shifts in the law. If “evolving standards of decency” is interpreted too

loosely, it risks serving as an excuse for the judiciary to substitute its own policy

preferences for those of the Legislature by striking down constitutional statutes. I fear that

is exactly what is happening here. A legislatively mandated punishment that, in my

opinion, passes constitutional muster is struck down. This looks less like constitutional

interpretation and more like judicial legislation.

12 See Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 179. I take no position here on whether I agree with the “evolving standards of decency” inquiry. Our Court has looked to evolving standards of decency in the past, e.g., through the second and third factors of the Lorentzen test, and we have not been asked to reconsider that decision.

13 Moreover, I cautioned in Parks that our decision there would invite more claims

that we should extend Miller’s protections further. 13 The majority itself concedes that

“some of the mitigating characteristics discussed in the scientific research relied on in

Parks and submitted by defendants and amici in these cases are relevant up to at least

age 25.” In addition to cases regarding the extension of Miller’s protections to older

defendants, there are several other related claims to which the majority opens the door. If

suboptimal brain development makes an offender less culpable, then should any cognitive

disabilities or mental illnesses, even those far short of the already recognized insanity

defense, 14 serve as a constitutional barrier to mandatory LWOP? Similarly, does cognitive

decline in the elderly also preclude mandatory LWOP for them? If mandatory LWOP is

unconstitutional for 19- and 20-year-old defendants who are convicted of first-degree

murder, why should it be constitutional for such defendants who are convicted of other

crimes? The majority’s logic has no natural stopping point.

13 In particular, I stated:

[I]nsofar as the majority’s holding is a policy decision, it is one for which there is no clear limiting principle. I would not be surprised if the Court extends its current line in the near future. The science defendant offers indicates that there is significant neurological development until age 25, and while the majority acknowledges this science, the majority today extends Miller’s and Montgomery’s holdings only to offenders who are 18 years old. I assume that in the coming years we will hear cases arguing that we should extend Miller’s protection to those in their early twenties as well. [Parks, 510 Mich at 298 (CLEMENT, J., dissenting).] 14 MCL 768.21a.

14 III. CONCLUSION

The Court today extends Parks though the Constitution does not require it. Just as

I did in Parks, I once again disagree with the majority’s analysis of the Lorentzen factors

and do not believe that the evidence supports the conclusion that mandatory LWOP for 19-

and 20-year-olds violates Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Therefore, I dissent.

Elizabeth T. Clement Brian K. Zahra