People of Michigan v. Mohammed Mohammed-Sa Al-Kuhali

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 16, 2025
Docket370278
StatusUnpublished

This text of People of Michigan v. Mohammed Mohammed-Sa Al-Kuhali (People of Michigan v. Mohammed Mohammed-Sa Al-Kuhali) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People of Michigan v. Mohammed Mohammed-Sa Al-Kuhali, (Mich. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED January 16, 2025 Plaintiff-Appellant, 12:25 PM

v No. 370278 Wayne Circuit Court MOHAMMED MOHAMMED-SA AL-KUHALI, LC No. 23-002967-01-FH

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The prosecution appeals as of right the circuit court’s order dismissing the charges against defendant. We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 5, 2022, VH called an Uber, and defendant was the Uber driver that picked her up. VH sat in the passenger-side backseat. During the drive, defendant placed VH’s hand on his back without her consent. He then told her to move to the front seat, and after she complied, defendant touched VH’s breasts atop her clothing. VH attempted to remove his hand but could not. Defendant then placed VH’s hand on his erect penis. VH eventually managed to exit the car, at which time she called her boyfriend, who called 911. VH spoke with Officer Turner1 of the Wayne Police Department (WPD) about 20 minutes after the 911 call. The conversation was recorded on Officer Turner’s body camera. Defendant was subsequently charged with two counts of fourth- degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520e, and a warrant was issued for defendant’s arrest on October 4, 2022.

Thereafter, defendant learned that the body-camera footage of Officer Turner’s interview of VH had been improperly destroyed, and defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him due to the destruction of this evidence. In response, the prosecution explained that the WPD’s

1 Officer Turner’s first name was not provided on the record.

-1- policy was to automatically overwrite body-camera footage 60 days after it was recorded because the department did not have the capacity to store all recordings indefinitely, and that, because the body-camera footage of Officer Turner’s July 5, 2022 interview of VH had not been marked for preservation, it was automatically deleted in accordance with this policy.

The district court heard defendant’s motion during the preliminary examination. In response to questioning by the court, defendant conceded that the issue was that Officer Turner’s July 5, 2022 body-camera footage was not properly marked for preservation. The court then asked why the failure to mark the footage for preservation was not “human error,” and defendant responded that “this was not human error but a part of [the department’s] regular policy,” and that the department had a “duty . . . to preserve” the footage. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court found that defendant had failed to establish that the body-camera footage was destroyed in bad faith. The court reasoned that the footage was destroyed as part of a routine purging of recordings pursuant to department policy, and that the footage was included in this routine purging because it had not been marked for preservation. This, the district court opined, amounted to mere negligence, and “[n]egligence alone does not establish the requisite bad faith.”

The case was bound over to circuit court, where defendant again moved to dismiss the charges against him on grounds that Officer Turner’s July 5, 2022 body-camera footage was destroyed. After a brief hearing, the circuit court stated that it intended to grant defendant’s motion in a written opinion. The circuit court issued its opinion dismissing the case on February 14, 2024. The circuit court opined that the WPD’s policy “flies in the face of MCL 780.316(2),” which requires law enforcement agencies to retain audio and video recordings that are subject of ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions. The court stated that the department had “a duty” to follow MCL 780.316(2), and that its destruction of the footage in this case “was not accidental” but “was done by the institution routinely in violation of the law.” Agreeing with the district court, the circuit court found that there was no evidence that any particular officer intentionally destroyed Officer Turner’s body-camera recording, but the circuit court reasoned that “the implementation of [the WPD’s] unlawful policy” was “sufficient” to support a finding of bad faith. The circuit court accordingly dismissed the case. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The prosecution argues that the circuit court erred by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges against him because the WPD did not act in bad faith when it destroyed Officer Turner’s body-camera footage. We agree.

A lower court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Nicholson, 297 Mich App 191, 196; 822 NW2d 284 (2012). A trial court abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Id. Questions of law, such as whether a defendant’s due-process rights were violated, are reviewed de novo. People v Brown, 330 Mich App 223, 229; 946 NW2d 852 (2019). A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if it errs as a matter of law. Id. Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 234. A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.

-2- III. ANALYSIS

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the due-process rights of criminal defendants. US Const, Am XIV. A defendant’s due-process rights are violated if the prosecution suppresses evidence material to guilt or punishment, regardless of whether the suppression was done in bad faith. Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963). But the rule is different when, like here, the evidence that the government failed to preserve was only potentially useful. See Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 57; 109 S Ct 333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988). In such cases, “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Id. The defendant bears the burden of showing that the failure to preserve the evidence was done in bad faith. People v Dickinson, 321 Mich App 1, 16; 909 NW2d 24 (2017). Bad faith may be shown if, for instance, the defendant establishes that “the prosecution was engaged in gamesmanship” or deliberately attempted “to conceal the evidence.” People v Greenfield, 271 Mich App 442, 454 n 9; 722 NW2d 254 (2006). The negligent destruction of evidence does not amount to bad faith. Youngblood, 488 US at 58. Similarly, “the routine destruction of” evidence when “the purpose is not to destroy [the] evidence for a forthcoming trial” does not constitute bad faith. People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365; 494 NW2d 873 (1992). See also People v Jones, 301 Mich App 566, 580-581; 837 NW2d 7 (2013).

For its finding of bad faith, the circuit court relied heavily on the fact that the WPD’s recording-retention policy supposedly violated MCL 780.316, which provides in relevant part:

(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), a law enforcement agency shall retain an evidentiary audio and video recording recorded by a body-worn camera for not less than 30 days from the date the recording is made.

(2) A law enforcement agency shall retain audio and video recordings that are the subject of an ongoing criminal or internal investigation, or an ongoing criminal prosecution or civil action, until the completion of the ongoing investigation or legal proceeding.

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Related

Brady v. Maryland
373 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1963)
Arizona v. Youngblood
488 U.S. 51 (Supreme Court, 1989)
People v. Anstey
719 N.W.2d 579 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2006)
People v. Johnson
494 N.W.2d 873 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1992)
People of Michigan v. Vicki Renee Dickinson
909 N.W.2d 24 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2017)
People v. Greenfield
722 N.W.2d 254 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2006)
People v. Nicholson
822 N.W.2d 284 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2012)
People v. Jones
837 N.W.2d 7 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2013)

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People of Michigan v. Mohammed Mohammed-Sa Al-Kuhali, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-of-michigan-v-mohammed-mohammed-sa-al-kuhali-michctapp-2025.