People of Michigan v. Melissa Lee Jones

Michigan Court of Appeals

People of Michigan v. Melissa Lee Jones

DecidedSeptember 29, 2016

Docket332018

StatusPublished

This text of People of Michigan v. Melissa Lee Jones (People of Michigan v. Melissa Lee Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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People of Michigan v. Melissa Lee Jones, (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).

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Opinion

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, FOR PUBLICATION September 29, 2016 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 332018 St. Joseph Circuit Court MELISSA LEE JONES, LC No. 15-019724-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BECKERING, JJ.

MURRAY, P.J. (concurring).

I concur in the majority opinion’s statutory analysis, which in the end properly concludes that the Legislature did not include a fetus in the definition of “child” for purposes of the first- degree child abuse statute. MCL 750.136b(2). I write separately to briefly address several arguments put forth by defendant. First, although in her brief defendant discusses Roe v Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973), and several federal and state decisions issued subsequent to Roe, as the majority opinion makes clear this case is not about the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Instead, it is only about how to interpret a word used in a Michigan statute, and how to apply the definition provided by the Legislature. As a result, whether Roe and its progeny were correctly decided (a matter which we have no control over anyway) is not an issue before this Court,1 and consequently there is no reason to opine on that issue. Second, we do not opine on whether a fetus should be included in the statutory definition of “child,” as that decision is solely within the province of the legislative branch. People v Williams, 288 Mich App 67, 74-75; 792 NW2d 384 (2010). Instead, this case, like most cases we deal with on a daily basis, requires us to apply statutory words and phrases and to determine their meaning as intended by the Legislature. Since the majority opinion has adequately done so, I fully concur in that opinion.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray

1 But see Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833, 944; 112 S Ct 2791; 120 L Ed 2d 674 (1992) (REHNQUIST, C.J., dissenting)

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STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, FOR PUBLICATION September 29, 2016 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 332018 St. Joseph Circuit Court MELISSA LEE JONES, LC No. 15-019724-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BECKERING, JJ.

MURRAY, P.J. (concurring).

I concur in the majority opinion’s statutory analysis, which in the end properly concludes that the Legislature did not include a fetus in the definition of “child” for purposes of the first- degree child abuse statute. MCL 750.136b(2). I write separately to briefly address several arguments put forth by defendant. First, although in her brief defendant discusses Roe v Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973), and several federal and state decisions issued subsequent to Roe, as the majority opinion makes clear this case is not about the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Instead, it is only about how to interpret a word used in a Michigan statute, and how to apply the definition provided by the Legislature. As a result, whether Roe and its progeny were correctly decided (a matter which we have no control over anyway) is not an issue before this Court,1 and consequently there is no reason to opine on that issue. Second, we do not opine on whether a fetus should be included in the statutory definition of “child,” as that decision is solely within the province of the legislative branch. People v Williams, 288 Mich App 67, 74-75; 792 NW2d 384 (2010). Instead, this case, like most cases we deal with on a daily basis, requires us to apply statutory words and phrases and to determine their meaning as intended by the Legislature. Since the majority opinion has adequately done so, I fully concur in that opinion.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray

1 But see Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833, 944; 112 S Ct 2791; 120 L Ed 2d 674 (1992) (REHNQUIST, C.J., dissenting)

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