Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Chief Justice: Justices:
Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman
FILED MAY 1, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 130825
KEITH DEMOND THOMPSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
TAYLOR, C. J.
The issue in this case is whether MCL 333.7405(1)(d), which, among other
things, forbids a person from knowingly “keep[ing] or maintain[ing]” a vehicle
that is used for keeping or selling controlled substances, requires for a conviction
that the prosecutor show, as was stated in People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 32;
597 NW2d 176 (1999), that the defendant’s actions occurred “continuously for an
appreciable period.”
We reject the Griffin Court construction of the statute and hold that while
the statute precludes a conviction for an isolated incident without other evidence
of continuity, the statute does not require the prosecution to show that a
defendant’s actions occurred “continuously for an appreciable period.” Because the Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s conviction for maintaining a drug
vehicle on the basis of the Griffin Court’s construction of the statute, we vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for reconsideration in light
of the test we adopt today.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Acting on a tip that defendant, who had the nickname of “Doughboy,” was
going to deliver some drugs at a parking lot of a restaurant, several law
enforcement officers went to that location. A white van fitting the description of
the vehicle “Doughboy” was expected to be driving entered and parked. A woman
who appeared to have been waiting for the white van got out of a nearby red sedan
and got into the van through its rear passenger door. A few minutes later she
stepped out of the van, got back into the sedan, and started to back up the sedan in
order to drive away. After the police stopped the sedan, they found four rocks of
crack cocaine on the floorboard of the driver’s side of the sedan, and a crack pipe
and lighter were found on the floor near the backseat. A passenger hiding in the
back of the sedan was found to be in possession of a small amount of marijuana.
As one of the officers approached the white van, defendant started getting
out of the van with a cell phone in his hand and he turned toward the van so that
the officer could not see his hands.1 Another officer observed a man in the
1 The prosecutor argued in his closing argument that defendant likely had cocaine in his possession or on the driver’s seat and that he threw the drugs to the passenger and told him to get rid of them.
passenger seat of the van remove a piece of plastic from his mouth and toss it to
the floor. This man was later taken to the hospital when, with increasingly slurred
speech, he told an officer that he had swallowed some cocaine. While no drugs
were found in the van or on the defendant, a $50 bill was found on the console of
the van as well as an empty and ripped plastic bag that had been twisted in a
manner typical of drug packaging. As for the woman who had entered the van, a
detective testified that defendant said that the woman had owed him money and
had paid him the $50 she owed him, and that he had then given her a $20 rock of
crack cocaine.2
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of delivery of less than 50 grams
of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and maintaining a drug vehicle, MCL
333.7405(1)(d).3
2 Neither the passenger in the van, the woman in the sedan, nor the man in the back of the sedan testified at trial. Defendant, however, did testify. He admitted that his nickname was “Doughboy” but he denied selling any cocaine or making the statement the detective attributed to him. Although one officer indicated that the white van was the vehicle Doughboy usually drove, and defendant acknowledged driving the van, there was no evidence that defendant owned or leased the van. 3 MCL 333.7405(1)(d) provides that a person
[s]hall not knowingly keep or maintain a store, shop, warehouse, dwelling, building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other structure or place, that is frequented by persons using controlled substances in violation of this article for the purpose of using controlled substances, or that is used for keeping or selling controlled substances in violation of this article.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the cocaine delivery conviction but reversed
the conviction of maintaining a drug vehicle for the reason that there was
insufficient evidence to support the conviction.4 The Court of Appeals, relying on
Griffin, summarized its holding as follows:
The prosecution did not present evidence that defendant exercised authority or control over the white van for an appreciable period of time for the purposes of making the van available for selling or keeping drugs. The prosecution only presented evidence that defendant used the van for selling or keeping drugs on the night of April 9, 2003. Because defendant’s conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, we reverse defendant’s conviction for maintaining a drug vehicle.[5]
The prosecutor filed an application for leave to appeal regarding the
reversal of the conviction for maintaining a drug vehicle, and defendant filed an
application for leave to file a cross-appeal regarding the affirmance of his delivery
conviction. We granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal, but
denied defendant’s cross-application.6
We limited the grant of leave to appeal to the issues whether a defendant
must “keep or maintain” a vehicle used for the purpose of selling a controlled
substance “continuously for an appreciable period of time” as required by Griffin,
supra at 32-33, in order to sustain a conviction under MCL 333.7405(1)(d) and
4 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 23, 2006 (Docket No. 258336). 5 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 6 475 Mich 907 (2006).
whether the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to sustain the
defendant’s conviction for keeping or maintaining a drug vehicle.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether MCL 333.7405(1)(d) requires the prosecutor to show that a
defendant’s actions occurred “continuously for an appreciable period” is a legal
question, and we review legal questions de novo. People v Morey, 461 Mich 325,
329-330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). Our fundamental obligation when interpreting
statutes is “to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from
the words expressed in the statute.” Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich
304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). Pursuant to MCL 8.3a, undefined statutory terms
are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning, unless the undefined word or
phrase is a term of art.7 We consult a lay dictionary when defining common words
or phrases that lack a unique legal meaning. Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439,
456; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). This is because the common and approved usage of a
nonlegal term is most likely to be found in a standard dictionary, not in a legal
dictionary. Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 756; 575 NW2d 762 (1998).
7 MCL 8.3a provides: All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE
We have not previously had the occasion to construe MCL 333.7405(1)(d).
The Court of Appeals, however, has issued two published opinions addressing it in
the context of a charge of maintaining a drug house. First, in People v Bartlett,
231 Mich App 139, 147; 585 NW2d 341 (1998), the panel, citing Wahrer v State,
901 P2d 442, 444 (Alas App, 1995), explained, “Alas Stat 11.71.040(a)(5), which
mirrors MCL 333.7405(d); MSA 14.15(7405)(d), requires proof that the defendant
knew that the premises were being used for continuing illegal drug activity . . . .”
The Court rejected the defendant’s claim that the jury instructions were erroneous
when the trial court refused to tell the jury that “keep or maintain” required
“general supervisory control” rather than merely control or “general control.”
Second, in Griffin, supra, another panel, without reference to Bartlett, considered
a defendant’s claim that the prosecution failed to present evidence sufficient to
support his conviction of maintaining a drug house. The defendant did not contest
the fact that the house at issue was a drug house; he only challenged whether there
was evidence that he had kept or maintained it. The Court of Appeals determined
that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence. In its opinion the panel
stated:
We hold that to “keep or maintain” a drug house it is not necessary to own or reside at one, but simply to exercise authority or control over the property for purposes of making it available for keeping or selling proscribed drugs and to do so continuously for an appreciable period. [Griffin, supra at 32 (emphasis added).]
With this in mind, we turn to an analysis of the proper meaning of this phrase.
MCL 333.7405(1)(d) provides, as relevant here, that a person “[s]hall not
knowingly keep or maintain a . . . vehicle . . . that is used for keeping or selling
controlled substances in violation of this article.” To determine the proper
meaning of “keep or maintain” we first examine the statute itself. As with most
statutory phrases, neither the individual word “keep” or “maintain” nor the phrase
“keep or maintain” is defined in the statute.
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991) defines “keep” as
“to maintain . . . , to cause to continue in a given position, state, course, or action.”
(Emphasis added.) It defines “maintain” as “to keep in existence or continuance.”
Id. (emphasis added).8 “Keep” is defined as “to maintain” and “maintain” is
defined as “to keep.” Thus, it appears that the terms “keep” and “maintain” are
synonyms. The dissent contends that these two terms must be given distinct
meanings because they are separated by the word “or.” We respectfully disagree.
The word “keep” is commonly understood to mean “maintain” and the word
“maintain” is commonly understood to mean “keep.” We cannot define these
terms in a manner that is inconsistent with how they are commonly understood
just because they are separated by the word “or.” In other words, the fact that
these two terms are separated by the word “or” does not give us the authority to
8 We note that the definitions found in Black’s Law Dictionary are consistent with the definitions found in Random House Webster’s College Dictionary. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed) defines “keep” as “[t]o maintain continuously,” and it defines “maintain” as “keep in existence or continuance.”
give these two terms distinct meanings when they are commonly understood to
have the same meaning. If two words have the same meaning, then we must give
them the same meaning even where they are separated by the word “or.”
As discussed above, “keep” is defined as “to cause to continue” and
“maintain” is defined as “to keep in existence or continuance.” Id. (emphasis
added). The words “keep” and “maintain” both contain an element of
“continuity.” Even the dissent’s definitions of these terms contain an element of
“continuity.” The dissent defines “maintain” as “to keep in an existing state.”
Post at 3, quoting Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987). Keeping
something in an existing state necessarily requires some degree of continuity. The
dissent defines “keep” as “to retain in one’s possession.” Post at 4, quoting
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987). “Retain” is defined as “to
continue to use.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, some degree of “continuity” is an element even under the
dissent’s definition of “keep or maintain.” Therefore, even assuming that the
words “keep” and “maintain” have distinct meanings because they are separated
by the word “or,” the words “keep” and “maintain” both contain an element of
continuity. That is, regardless of how one defines the words “keep” and
“maintain,” one cannot avoid a definition that requires some degree of continuity.
Finding that evidence of continuity is required to convict a person of
“keeping or maintaining” a drug vehicle is consistent with this Court’s decision in
People v Gastro, 75 Mich 127; 42 NW 937 (1889). In Gastro, supra at 133-134,
this Court held that “[a] single act of lewdness or prostitution would not constitute
the offense [of keeping and maintaining a house of ill fame] which the statute
prohibits and punishes. . . .” Just as one does not keep and maintain a house of ill
fame by engaging in an isolated act of lewdness or prostitution in the house, one
does not keep or maintain a drug vehicle by engaging in an isolated act of selling
drugs out of the vehicle.
The phrase “keep or maintain” implies usage with some degree of
continuity that can be deduced by actual observation of repeated acts or
circumstantial evidence, such as perhaps a secret compartment or the like, that
conduces to the same conclusion.
We note that the Legislature has twice indicated9 that it desires MCL
333.7405(1)(d) to be interpreted in the same way similar acts in other states have
been interpreted.
9 First, MCL 333.7405(1)(d) was drawn from § 402(a)(5) of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1970. 9 ULA, part IV, § 402(a)(g), p 682. MCL 333.7121(2) is applicable to the statute at issue and states: “This article shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this article among those states which enact laws similar to it.”
Further, MCL 333.7405(1)(d) is part of the Public Health Code and § 1111(1) of this code provides: “This code is intended to be consistent with applicable federal and state law and shall be construed, when necessary, to achieve that consistency.” MCL 333.1111(1).
The interpretation that we adopt today is dependent on the language of the statute. We do not interpret MCL 333.7121(2) and MCL 333.7405(1)(d) as (continued…)
In states with statutes substantially similar to MCL 333.7405(1)(d) there is
remarkable uniformity in giving meaning to “keep or maintain.”10 One of the
most encyclopedic discussions of the cases is found in Dawson v State, 894 P2d
672, 674 (Alas App, 1995), where the Alaska Court of Appeals, after canvassing
the other states, concluded that in virtually all other states the requirement to “keep
or maintain” requires “‘some degree of continuity’” id. at 676 (citation omitted),
and, fleshing that out, concluded that “courts have uniformly adopted the position
that the prosecution is required to prove, and the jury to find, ‘something more
than a single, isolated instance of the proscribed activity.’” Id., quoting Barnes v
State, 255 Ga 396, 402; 339 SE2d 229 (1986). The Alaska court then summarized
the prevailing law with respect to the keeping or maintaining element of drug-
house statutes as follows:
The state need not prove that the property was used for the exclusive purpose of keeping or distributing controlled substances, but such use must be a substantial purpose of the users of the property, and the use must be continuous to some degree; incidental use of the property for keeping or distributing drugs or a single, isolated occurrence of drug-related activity will not suffice. The purpose [for] which a person uses property and whether such use is continuous are issues of fact to be decided on the totality of the
(…continued)
admonitions that we follow constructions placed on similar statutes in other
jurisdictions if those rulings are inconsistent with the words used in our statutes.
10 See, generally anno: Validity, construction, and application of state or local law prohibiting maintenance of vehicle for purpose of keeping or selling controlled substances, 31 ALR5th 760 (1995); anno: Validity and construction of state statutes criminalizing the act of permitting real property to be used in connection with illegal drug activities, 24 ALR5th 428 (1994).
evidence of each case; the state is not required to prove more than a single specific incident involving the keeping or distribution of drugs if other evidence of continuity exists. [Dawson, supra at 678-679.]
We find this interpretation persuasive and consistent with the interpretation
that we have adopted after analyzing the words of the statute.11
With regard to the Court of Appeals Griffin test, which held that MCL
333.7405(1)(d) requires a showing that the defendant’s actions occurred
“continuously for an appreciable period,” we believe it likely that the panel was
attempting to draw from Dawson but mistakenly utilized only one part of the
Dawson formulation, i.e., that the defendant’s actions “must be continuous to
some degree.” Dawson, supra at 678-679. The difficulty with this truncated
Griffin definition is that it unwarrantedly establishes a higher burden of proof than
is justified by the statutory language. While the Dawson court’s formulation,
“continuous to some degree,” would be satisfied by a showing of intermittent use,
the Griffin Court’s language, “continuously for an appreciable period,” seems to
suggest a longer period of use with few or no interruptions. Having said that, we
11 The prosecutor concedes that only one state, Delaware, has adopted a test that would allow a conviction upon proof of a single incident without more. Priest v State, 879 A2d 575 (Del, 2005). The Delaware court acknowledged that “most, if not all” other states with similar statutes reject the single-occurrence approach. Id. at 580 n 22. The Delaware court’s approach is not persuasive because its decision was driven by policy and did not trace the words of the statute. Thus, as we have explained, we reject the Delaware construction and abide by the overwhelming majority view that proof of a single incident, without some other evidence of continuity, is not enough to establish a violation of MCL 333.7405(1)(d). We would not, as would Justice Corrigan, have Michigan join the (continued…)
reiterate that “keep or maintain” is not synonymous with “use.” Hence, if the
evidence only shows that defendant used a vehicle to keep or deliver drugs on one
occasion, and there is no other evidence of continuity, the evidence is insufficient
to establish that defendant kept or maintained a drug vehicle in violation of MCL
333.7405(1)(d).
Having clarified the correct construction of MCL 333.7405(1)(d), and
because the Court of Appeals analyzed defendant’s claim regarding the evidence
that he kept or maintained a drug vehicle under language we have rejected today,
we find it appropriate to have the Court of Appeals determine in the first instance
whether the evidence supporting defendant’s conviction of maintaining a drug
vehicle was sufficient in light of the interpretation of the statute set forth in our
opinion today. The parties shall be allowed to file supplemental briefs.
IV. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT
Justice Corrigan’s partial dissent accuses us of giving offenders a free pass
to use a vehicle to keep or sell drugs. We, of course, have done no such thing.
Rather, we have simply determined, on the basis of the words of the statute and
consistently with the overwhelming majority of other courts that have construed
similar statutes, that the Legislature did not intend a conviction for knowingly
keeping or maintaining a drug vehicle to obtain if there was only evidence of a
Delaware interpretation because we find the majority view accurately interprets
our similarly worded statute.
single use. Defendants who possess or deliver controlled substances are already
subject to felony prosecution for possession or delivery independent of evidence
of a vehicle’s use. There is no free pass.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration
of defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence argument in light of this opinion.
Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Stephen J. Markman
KELLY, J. I concurr in the result only.
Marilyn Kelly
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).
I fully join the majority opinion but write separately only to address two
provisions of law that are referenced in the majority’s analysis, see ante at 9 n 9.
First, MCL 333.7121(2) states:
This article shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this article among those states which enact laws similar to it.
Second, MCL 333.1111(1) states:
This code is intended to be consistent with applicable federal and state law and shall be construed, when necessary, to achieve that consistency.
In light of these provisions, the majority opinion reasonably surveys the decisions
of foreign courts that have interpreted the dispositive phrase in this case, “keep or
maintain,” but concludes that this Court does not construe §§ 7121(2) and 1111(1)
as “admonitions that we follow constructions placed on similar statutes in other
jurisdictions if those rulings are inconsistent with the words used in our statutes.” Ante at 9 n 9. I agree with this observation, but also note that if these provisions
are, in fact, understood as “admonitions” to that effect, they would be beyond the
authority of the Legislature.
This Court has said on innumerable occasions that it is obligated to defer to
legislative judgments, even when such judgments are far afield from our own.
This is because the legislative power is the power to undertake policy judgments
and to set forth the law. Few judicial bodies have been more deferential toward
legislative judgments than this Court.
However, when the Legislature purports to exercise its legislative power to
dictate a rule of interpretation to this Court, as some might read §§ 7121(2) and
1111(1) as doing, the Legislature exceeds its authority and impinges on the
judicial power, which is the power to interpret the law and say what that law
means. It is this Court’s responsibility to exercise the judicial power and to give
reasonable meaning to the law by examining its language, structure, organization,
and purpose. I do not believe that the Legislature can impose any different rules
of interpretation upon this Court. Although on occasions I have acquiesced in the
application of legislative rules of interpretation, I am increasingly of the view that
such rules are not only incapable of coherent application, but that they trespass
upon the authority of the judiciary.
Concerning §§ 7121(2) and 1111(1) in particular, there is certainly no
harm, and perhaps value, in our Legislature encouraging this Court to assess the
decisions of foreign courts that have interpreted “keep or maintain.” However, the
limitation of such provisions is manifest in the following questions: Must this
Court construe Michigan law to make it uniform with the laws of another state that
have been misinterpreted? May this Court take into consideration dissimilarities
between the law of Michigan and those of another state? How does this Court
render “uniform” its interpretations if there are disagreements to this effect among
the other states? Can “uniformity” or “consistency” in the interpretation of the
law be practically achieved by the judiciaries of 50 sovereign jurisdictions?
If it is the Legislature’s intent that the law be interpreted in a particular
manner, the most reliable means of securing this result is for the Legislature to
write the law in that manner. Although I do not doubt that an ancient law that has
been given meaning over the centuries by courts of other jurisdictions can
sometimes helpfully be referenced by the Legislature, in the final analysis, the
constitutional rule must be that the Legislature either say clearly what it intends or
else recognize that its less clearly stated intentions will be discerned through
traditional methods of interpretation. A court cannot be obligated to say that the
law states something other than what it states. This is no less true where a court of
another jurisdiction has reached a contrary conclusion.
Stephen J. Markman
CORRIGAN, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority’s ruling that MCL 333.7405(1)(d), which forbids
a person from “keep[ing] or maintain[ing]” a vehicle that is used for keeping or
selling controlled substances, does not require the prosecution to show that the
defendant’s actions occurred “continuously for an appreciable period,” as stated in
People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 32; 597 NW2d 176 (1999).
I part company with the majority because it has violated a cardinal rule of
statutory construction. Fundamentally, the majority has disregarded the
Legislature’s choice of the disjunctive term “or” (“keep or maintain”) and
effectively substituted the conjunction “and” (“keep and maintain”). It has
achieved this override of the Legislature’s choice by defining the common terms
“keep” and “maintain” as synonymous when they also have different and distinct
dictionary definitions. I also dissent from the majority’s holding that “the statute precludes a
conviction for an isolated incident without other evidence of continuity . . . .”
Ante at 1. By requiring “evidence of continuity” to prove the crime, the majority
has essentially adopted the Court of Appeals holding in Griffin that the
prosecution must show that the defendant’s actions occurred “continuously for an
appreciable period.” It has merely deleted the “appreciable period” component of
the continuity requirement. In my view, the majority continues to give offenders a
“free pass.” Instead, I would hold that evidence of an isolated incident of using a
vehicle for keeping or selling controlled substances is sufficient to give rise to
criminal liability under the unambiguous language of the statute if the offender
keeps the vehicle by retaining it in his possession or power.
The first step we take in determining the Legislature’s intent is to examine
the plain language of the statute. People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436, 442-443; 719
NW2d 579 (2006). MCL 333.7405(1)(d) provides, in pertinent part, that a person
“[s]hall not knowingly keep or maintain a . . . vehicle . . . that is used for keeping
or selling controlled substances in violation of this article.” The words “keep” and
“maintain” are common words that can be given distinct meanings. Therefore, a
lay dictionary should be used to define these words. See Horace v City of Pontiac,
456 Mich 744, 756; 757 NW2d 762 (1998) (“[W]hen considering a nonlegal word
or phrase that is not defined within a statute, resort to a layman’s dictionary such
as Webster’s is appropriate. This is because the common and approved usage of a
nonlegal term is most likely to be found in a standard dictionary and not a legal
dictionary.”) In ascertaining the common and ordinary meaning of a statutory
term, a court should determine the meaning of the term at the time the statute was
enacted, and may consult dictionaries from that time to determine that meaning.
Cain v Waste Mgt, Inc (After Remand), 472 Mich 236, 247; 697 NW2d 130
(2005).
The majority avoids the plain meaning of the text of the statute by declaring
that the words “keep” and “maintain” are synonymous. The lay dictionary
definition of “maintain” is “to keep in an existing state.” Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1987), p 718.1 The majority selects one definition of
“keep” from the many available dictionary definitions, and declares that the word
“keep” is synonymous with the word “maintain.” But construing the terms as
synonymous disregards the Legislature’s use of the disjunctive term “or.”2 By
using the disjunctive, the Legislature defined two separate ways of committing this
crime.3 In order to give meaning to the term the Legislature employed, the statute
must be construed to give the words “keep” and “maintain” distinct meanings. To
hold otherwise violates “‘the fundamental rule of [statutory] construction that
1 None of the other definitions of “maintain” is appropriate in the context of the statute. 2 Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987), p 829, offers the following relevant definition of “or”: “used as a function word to indicate an alternative.” 3 Had the Legislature intended that the words “keep” and “maintain” have one meaning, it would not have used two words separated by “or,” but instead would simply have used one word or the conjunctive word “and.”
every word should be given meaning and no word should be treated as surplusage
or rendered nugatory if at all possible.’” Pittsfield Charter Twp v Washtenaw Co,
468 Mich 702, 714; 664 NW2d 193 (2003), quoting Feld v Robert & Charles
Beauty Salon, 435 Mich 352, 364; 459 NW2d 279 (1990). By holding that the
words “keep” and “maintain” are interchangeable, the majority fails to give
meaning to the Legislature’s clear intent to give variant meaning to the two words.
Additionally, by using synonymous definitions of “keep” and “maintain,” the
majority renders one of these two words mere surplusage.4
The dictionary also defines “keep” as “to retain in one’s possession or
power.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987), p 658. This
definition of “keep” is not synonymous with “maintain,” is a commonly
understood meaning of the word, and is appropriate in the context of the statute.
4 This is one of the reasons why cases from sister states, including Dawson v State, 894 P2d 672 (Alas App, 1995), are not particularly helpful. These cases, like the majority in the instant case, fail to apply the plain language of the statute and fail to differentiate between the words “keep” and “maintain.” Further, many cases from other states also require the prosecution to show that the defendant kept or maintained the vehicle or house for the purpose of keeping or selling controlled substances. See, e.g., Barnes v State, 255 Ga 396, 402; 339 SE2d 229 (1986) (“[I]n order to support a conviction under § 16-13-42 (a) (5) for maintaining a residence or other structure or place used for keeping controlled substances, the evidence must show that one of the purposes for maintaining the structure was the keeping of the controlled substance.”) No language in our own statute requires the prosecution to prove that the vehicle was used for the purpose of keeping or selling controlled substances. The only mention of “purpose” in MCL 333.7405(1)(d) refers to the preceding clause of the statute providing that a person may not maintain a vehicle “that is frequented by persons using controlled substances in violation of this article for the purpose of using controlled substances . . . .” That clause is not at issue in the instant case.
Thus, we should employ this definition in interpreting the statute. Using this
definition of “keep,” the majority correctly concludes that the Court of Appeals, in
Griffin, supra at 32, added an element to the statutory language by requiring the
prosecution to show that the defendant’s actions occurred “continuously for an
appreciable period.” But the majority incorrectly holds that the word “keep”
requires the prosecution to provide some evidence of continuity. I disagree that
the word “keep,” as defined above, “implies usage with some degree of continuity
that can be deduced by actual observation of repeated acts or circumstantial
evidence . . . .” Ante at 9. In arguing that the above definition of “keep” requires
continuity, the majority consults Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
(1991), which defines “retain” as “to continue to use.” But Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1987) defines “retain” as “1 a: to keep in possession or use
. . . 2: to hold secure or intact.” Id. at 1006. Neither of these definitions from
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987) requires continuity. Thus, I
cannot agree with the majority that “keep” or “retain” requires continuity.
Under the above definition of “keep,” the prosecution need only show that
the defendant retained a drug vehicle in his possession or power. This could
mean, for instance, that the defendant just began using the vehicle to keep drugs
earlier that day. The focus should not be on how long the defendant kept drugs in
the vehicle or sold the drugs from the vehicle; if a defendant uses a vehicle even
one time for such a purpose, he has retained a drug vehicle in his possession, i.e.,
“kept” a drug vehicle. The focus should instead be on the degree of the
defendant’s control or use of the vehicle in connection with the storage or selling
of drugs. See People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139, 152; 585 NW2d 341 (1998)
(a person may be deemed to keep or maintain a drug house if that person has the
ability to exercise control or management over the house).
I further disagree with the majority’s reliance on People v Gastro, 75 Mich
127; 42 NW 937 (1889), for the proposition that “keep or maintain” in MCL
333.7405(1)(d) requires more than an isolated incident. In Gastro, the defendant
was convicted of unlawfully keeping a house of ill fame. In holding that a single
act of prostitution will not always be sufficient to support a conviction under the
statute, the Gastro Court did not even cite the statutory language, let alone engage
in an analysis of the meaning of the word “keep.”5 Rather, the Court discussed the
meaning of the statutory phrase “resorted to” and the purpose of the statute. Id. at
133. Further, MCL 333.7405(1)(d) is an almost verbatim adoption of a provision
of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) effective at the time. It is
doubtful that the Legislature considered a nineteenth century case involving a
conviction for keeping a house of ill fame when it adopted the UCSA provision
that prohibits keeping or maintaining a drug vehicle.
The majority also relies heavily on other states’ interpretations of their own
similar statutes. By doing so, the majority is distracted from the text of our own
5 In fact, the Court referred to the crime as “unlawfully keeping and maintaining a house of ill fame,” id. at 128 (emphasis added), although the statute did not use the words “and maintaining.” 1887 PA 34.
statute and led astray by other states’ interpretations of their own similar statutes.
The majority defends its reliance on cases from other states by pointing to two
provisions of the Public Health Code that require other provisions of the code to
be construed to achieve uniformity and consistency with other states. MCL
333.7121(2);6 MCL 333.1111(1).7 But these statutes do not require us to conform
to other states’ interpretations of statutes with different language when such
interpretations would be contrary to the plain language of our own statute. Nor do
they require us to adopt other states’ erroneous interpretations of their own
substantially similar statutes. If this were the case, we would simply do a “head
count” of decisions from other states and follow the majority of states regardless
of whether those decisions are correct. MCL 333.7121(1) or MCL 333.1111(1)
does not require such a result.
Further, “[o]nly where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court
properly go beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative intent.”
People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 284-285; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). If the
language of the statute is unambiguous, this Court applies the statute as written,
and judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Id. at 284. MCL
6 MCL 333.7121(2) provides: “This article shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this article among those states which enact laws similar to it.” 7 MCL 333.1111(1) provides: “This code is intended to be consistent with applicable federal and state law and shall be construed, when necessary, to achieve that consistency.”
333.7121(1) and MCL 333.1111(1) govern judicial construction of statutes in the
Public Health Code, which is not permitted when the statute at issue is
unambiguous.8 The majority does not identify an ambiguity in MCL
333.7405(1)(d). Because the language of MCL 333.7405(1)(d) is unambiguous,
the above “uniformity” statutory provisions do not apply, and this Court must
apply the plain language of MCL 333.7405(1)(d) as written, without regard to how
other states have construed their similarly worded statutes.9
In addition to failing to apply the plain language of the statute, the majority
creates practical problems by giving defendants a “free pass” from conviction for
keeping or maintaining a drug vehicle. The obvious purpose of the statute is to
prevent the use of vehicles to transport or sell drugs. That purpose is not served
by exempting individual violations. Under the majority opinion, as long as the
suspect is careful not to carry any other drug paraphernalia or other indications of
8 I offer no opinion regarding whether MCL 333.7121(2) or MCL 333.1111(1) violates the separation of powers doctrine by effectively instructing courts regarding how to exercise their judicial power to construe statutes. 9 The “uniformity” statutory provisions of MCL 333.7121(1) and MCL 333.1111(1) are similar to statutory provisions requiring that a statute be broadly or liberally construed. For example, MCL 333.1111(2) provides that the Public Health Code “shall be liberally construed for the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the people of this state.” This type of statutory provision does not allow courts to interpret statutes in a manner inconsistent with the plain statutory language, but acts only as a legislative guide to help resolve ambiguous statutory language. See Paschke v Retool Industries, 445 Mich 502, 511; 519 NW2d 441 (1994) (“Where the statutory language is clear, the courts should neither add nor detract from its provisions. Nevertheless, where ambiguity exists, and judicial (continued…)
continuity, the suspect need not fear that he will be convicted of keeping or
maintaining a drug vehicle if caught for the first time. The majority opinion will
encourage the police to allow the use of a vehicle to store or sell drugs until the
officers decide that they have enough evidence to sustain a conviction under MCL
333.7401(1)(d) for continuous activity. The language of the statute makes clear
that the Legislature did not intend such a result. Rather, the Legislature intended
to permit the police to arrest a suspect for violating MCL 333.7405(1)(d) without
fear that the arrest came too soon for them to accumulate evidence to support such
a conviction.
By holding that the prosecution must show “evidence of continuity,” the
majority largely reiterates the Court of Appeals holding in Griffin, supra at 32,
that the prosecution must show that the defendant’s actions occurred
“continuously for an appreciable period” but without the “appreciable period”
component. The Griffin standard similarly requires evidence of continuity, so how
is the majority’s standard meaningfully different?10 I question why this Court has
granted leave to appeal and overruled Griffin just to reach a legal conclusion
almost identical to the case it is overruling. The majority correctly recognizes that
interpretation is needed, the act should be liberally construed . . . . [emphasis
added].)
10 The dictionary definition of “continuity” is, in pertinent part, as follows: “1. the state or quality of being continuous. 2. a continuous or connected whole.” Webster’s Universal College Dictionary (1997), p 176.
Griffin was wrongly decided and strikes the erroneous language of that decision,
but then falls into the trap of repeating the Griffin panel’s mistake.
Because evidence of an isolated incident of using a vehicle to keep or sell
drugs is sufficient to support a conviction for keeping or maintaining a drug
vehicle when the defendant retains the vehicle in his possession or power, and the
prosecution clearly presented evidence that defendant kept the vehicle and used it
for selling or keeping drugs, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s
conviction. I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate
defendant’s conviction for keeping or maintaining a drug vehicle under MCL
Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr.