People of Michigan v. Gregory M Rice

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: July 21, 2005
• Docket: 125101
• Status: Published

Opinion

Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan Chief Justice: Justices:

Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

FILED JULY 21, 2005 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 124996

JEROME L. KNIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant. ______________________________

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

v No. 125101

GREGORY M. RICE,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________________

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

CORRIGAN, J.

In these consolidated appeals, we are called upon to

clarify our Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90

L Ed 2d 69 (1986), jurisprudence and provide guidance to

our lower courts. Specifically, this Court must decide

whether the trial court in these cases determined that

Batson had been violated; namely, we must discern whether the trial court concluded that the prosecutor exercised

peremptory challenges to exclude certain prospective jurors

from the jury pool on the basis of race. On the basis of

our reading of the voir dire transcripts, we hold that no

Batson violation existed in this case and the trial judge

neither explicitly nor implicitly found that the prosecutor

purposefully discriminated in the exercise of three

peremptory challenges. Having reviewed the whole record

and the fair inferences to be drawn from it, we cannot

conclude that the trial judge implicitly found that the

prosecutor purposefully discriminated. Instead, the trial

judge’s ambiguous statements were driven by her goal of

ensuring a racially mixed jury, not concern with

determining whether the prosecutor’s asserted reasons for

exercising peremptory challenges were a pretext. Indeed,

the trial judge’s only clear statement reflected her

finding that neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel had

engaged in racially discriminatory behavior. Accordingly,

we affirm defendants’ convictions.

I. Factual Background

Defendant Knight and codefendant Rice were charged

with first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, stemming from the

shooting death of defendant Knight’s former girlfriend.

Codefendant Rice was also charged with one count of

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,

MCL 750.227b. The prosecutor’s theory was that defendant

Knight had unsuccessfully tried to hire someone to kill his

former girlfriend. After his initial efforts failed,

according to the prosecutor, defendant Knight bailed

codefendant Rice out of jail in exchange for codefendant

Rice’s killing the former girlfriend. Defendant Knight and

codefendant Rice were tried jointly before the same jury.

During the third day of jury selection, defense

counsel initially objected to the prosecutor’s use of

peremptory challenges, claiming that the prosecutor was

attempting to exclude African-American veniremembers.

Defense counsel expressed particular dissatisfaction with

the prosecutor’s reason for dismissing veniremember nine,

which was that a member of veniremember nine’s family had

been convicted of rape. Defense counsel then demonstrated

his misunderstanding of Batson by responding, “I don’t

believe that whether or not there is assaultive [sic] and

battery involved in that particular person’s family is a

basis on which to exclude someone when you already have a

pattern. I have noticed this pattern since day one of the

jury trial. That’s why seventy-five percent of the

exclusions have been black.”

The prosecutor immediately interjected that she had

excluded three African-American veniremembers and four

Caucasian veniremembers and offered race-neutral reasons

for excluding the African-American veniremembers. The

trial judge stated, “There have been four whites excluded,

exempted by the prosecution and three blacks. So just

based on that I don’t see a Batson problem.” Defense

counsel then commented on the racial composition of the

jury pool, stating, “If you have seventy-five percent white

prospective jurors, Your Honor, and twenty-five percent

black prospective jurors, now the schedule has turned and

that’s exactly what we’ve had in three days of jury

selection.” Defense counsel appeared to argue here not for

the racially neutral exercise of peremptory challenges, but

for the exercise of challenges in proportion to the overall

racial division of the array. The trial judge then found

no Batson violation, stating:

But that’s not the prosecution or the defense’s fault that we are getting largely white jurors. If that’s an issue, that’s another issue, and that can be dealt with another way.

But in this particular case and this particular matter, I do not see a pattern of the prosecution improperly excluding African American males, because they’ve only excluded one, or African American females where two have been excluded.

I think the reasons are acceptable. So I don’t see a problem there.

There’s still right now, I don’t know if this is going to end up being our jurors, but there are quite a few–I don’t know who’s left up there. But the fact that the composition of the jury panel is largely white, it’s like I said, another issue. And that can be dealt with in another way.

I deny the motion that the prosecution has improperly excluding [sic] minorities from the jury panel. [Emphasis added.]

The court then recessed for lunch. After lunch, the

prosecutor dismissed three African-American women,

veniremembers Bonner, Johnson, and Jones. Defense counsel

did not contemporaneously object to the exercise of

peremptory challenges against veniremembers Bonner and

Johnson. Defense counsel objected only to the dismissal of

veniremember Jones, contending that the prosecutor was

attempting to exclude black females in violation of Batson.1

He pointed out that the prosecutor had exercised three

consecutive challenges against African-American women.

Without waiting for the trial judge’s ruling regarding

whether a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination

had been made, the prosecutor immediately provided race-

neutral reasons for the three exclusions, although defense

1 Veniremember Jones, believing that she was dismissed, left the courthouse before the trial judge ruled on defense counsel’s Batson objection.

counsel had not objected to the challenges regarding

veniremembers Bonner and Johnson. The prosecutor stated

that she dismissed veniremember Bonner because Bonner was a

close relative of two persons convicted of first-degree

murder. She dismissed veniremember Johnson because of

Johnson’s body language, the tone of her voice, and the

hesitant look she gave when she stated that she could be

fair. Finally, she dismissed veniremember Jones because

Jones was a professional woman who had a daughter close in

age to the victim. The prosecutor noted that Jones’s

daughter was not “similarly situated” to the victim and

that Jones might compare and contrast the lifestyles of the

victim and her daughter.

The trial judge responded by stating, “Just before we

recessed for lunch, I thought that it was very clear that

we didn’t have a problem here. But now I think we are

getting very close to a sensitive issue.” The trial judge

rejected the prosecutor’s reasons for dismissing

veniremember Johnson, but stated that she had not objected

to Johnson’s dismissal because defense counsel had not

objected. The trial judge did not accept the prosecutor’s

reasons for dismissing veniremember Jones:

The same thing with Miss Jones. I do not see a reason other than–I mean, it seems to me for the prosecution to say, she has a daughter the same age as the victim, that would seem to

work in the prosecution’s favor, just in terms of thinking in the jury selection. So I don’t accept that.

* * *

I do see that we are getting close, and there are, I don’t know[,] two or three minority jurors left on this panel. So I think we are getting close to a serious issue here.

I wish that somebody had said something about keeping Miss Jones and Miss Johnson. And then we address this matter because I probably would not have excused either one of them. [Emphasis added.]

Defense counsel interrupted the trial judge at that

point to clarify that Jones was the last veniremember

struck and that he objected to the exclusion of Jones.

Despite defense counsel’s comment, the trial judge stated,

“[I]f an objection had been made as far as Miss Johnson and

Miss Jones[,] I probably would have addressed it. And I

tend to think I probably would have kept them on the jury.”2

The prosecutor then stated that dismissal was

appropriate as long as she advanced race-neutral reasons

for the dismissal. The trial judge replied that she had to

either accept or reject the prosecutor’s “neutral” reasons.

She further stated, “And I’m not, I’m saying that I think

2 It is not clear from the record whether the trial judge mistakenly referred to veniremember Bonner as veniremember Jones, or truly believed that an objection had not been made regarding veniremember Jones’s dismissal.

we’re getting close to a sensitive issue here on Jones and

Johnson. That’s all I’m saying. I’m making my record

too.”

The trial judge twice referred to getting close to a

“sensitive issue.” We do not think this language reflects

that the sensitive issue was purposeful discrimination.

Instead, we believe the sensitive issue was the looming

absence of minorities in the array and on the petit jury.

The prosecutor acknowledged the trial judge’s

comments. She immediately raised a reverse-Batson

challenge to defense counsel’s exercise of peremptory

challenges to exclude five female Caucasian veniremembers

and one male Caucasian veniremember. Defense counsel again

demonstrated his misunderstanding of Batson by stating:

I would indicate to the Court, Your Honor, that sister counsel fails to recognize that there are at least four white women that are on the jury. * * *

I don’t believe with regards to the fact that they happen to be white women, I think the Court also has to recognize that the greatest number of people that have come through that jury, as potential jurors, have been in fact white people.[3]

3 Justice Cavanagh claims that defense counsel’s objections did not demonstrate his misunderstanding of Batson. Rather, he states that defense counsel’s comments amount to an attempt to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by asserting that the prosecutor (continued…)

Defense counsel then requested that the trial judge

first make a ruling regarding his Batson objection. The

following colloquy ensued:

[Defense Counsel]: But, I don’t think the Court ruled on whether or not you’re going to allow Miss Jones to be struck. She’s still downstairs, I’m sure.

[The Trial Judge]: I don’t know if she is or not.

[The Prosecutor]: I thought she was held.

[The Trial Judge]: If she is still here, I’m going to keep her.

[Defense counsel]: Thank you.

[The Deputy]: Miss Jones, she has already gone.

The trial judge then allowed defense counsel to make a

record regarding the prosecutor’s reverse-Batson challenge,

but never ruled on the challenge. Defense counsel

responded by stating, “I believe the answer lies in the

panel that’s left. There is no pattern . . . .” After

further discussion, the trial judge concluded that any

(…continued) had engaged in a pattern of systematically excluding African-American veniremembers. We disagree. The record, when read as a whole, clearly demonstrates that defense counsel’s Batson objections were made to prevent the prosecutor from excluding any African-American veniremembers, even if the prosecutor provided race-neutral reasons for doing so, because the majority of the veniremembers, by chance, was Caucasian.

Batson problems that may have occurred were cured because

African-American women were fairly represented on the jury

panel. She stated:

I’m not satisfied with the prosecutor’s response as to potential juror Jones and Johnson. But I think they’ve already left.

So I’m going to say from this point on let’s be very careful about the selection. If you think that you, if the defense is not satisfied with me just giving a cautionary instruction to the prosecution, then I’ll address any other remedy.

But, realistically I think all of us are being, trying to be conscientious about the selection of these jurors because of the racial makeup of the jury panels, which we don’t have any control over.

I’m just saying, I let Jones and Johnson go without holding them, especially Jones. I guess I should have held her and I didn’t do that. I’ll take the fault for that. But from this point on let’s try to be careful with this jury selection. We are to [sic] close to getting this jury selected. [Emphasis added.]

After sending the deputy to search for veniremember

Jones again with no success, the trial judge stated, “I

don’t think it is serious enough at this point. We do have

some minorities left on the jury panel and I’ll be watching

this closely.” Finally, at the end of jury selection, the

trial judge commented:

With the panel we ended up with, I think that any Batson problems that may have been there have been cured.

We have the same number if not more jurors, African American female jurors on the panel as if we had kept [veniremember] Johnson and [veniremember] Jones.

I don’t think either side ended up selecting this panel for any other reason other than I think that these are the ones who will be the fair and impartial persons to hear and try this case. [Emphasis added.]

In the end, the jury convicted defendant Knight of

first-degree murder and codefendant Rice of first-degree

murder and felony-firearm.

Both defendants appealed as of right, and the Court of

Appeals affirmed.4 In defendant Knight’s case, the Court of

Appeals found that the prosecutor presented adequate race-

neutral reasons for excusing the prospective jurors and,

thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

rejecting defendant’s Batson challenge. While codefendant

Rice’s counsel joined in the Batson challenge at trial,

codefendant Rice did not raise the Batson issue in the

Court of Appeals. Both defendants sought leave to appeal

in this Court.

4 People v Knight, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 15, 2002 (Docket No. 231845); People v Rice, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 15, 2002 (Docket No. 225865). Both defendants assigned numerous claims of error, but only the Batson issue is relevant for purposes of these appeals.

In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacated the

judgments of the Court of Appeals and remanded for

reconsideration in light of Batson, supra, and Miller-El v

Cockrell, 537 US 322, 340; 123 S Ct 1029; 154 L Ed 2d 931

(2003) (Miller-El I).5 On remand, the Court of Appeals

again affirmed the convictions, finding no evidence of

purposeful discrimination.6 We granted leave to appeal and

further ordered these cases to be argued and submitted

together.7

II. Legal Background

A. The Batson Procedure

Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment,8 a party may not exercise a peremptory challenge

to remove a prospective juror solely on the basis of the

person’s race. Swain v Alabama, 380 US 202, 203-204; 85 S

Ct 824; 13 L Ed 2d 759 (1965); see also Georgia v McCollum,

5 People v Knight, 468 Mich 922 (2003); People v Rice, 468 Mich 922 (2003). 6 People v Knight (On Remand), unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 7, 2003 (Docket No. 231845); People v Rice (On Remand), unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 7, 2003 (Docket No. 225865). 7 470 Mich 869 (2004). 8 US Const, Am XIV, § 1 provides in relevant part: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

505 US 42; 112 S Ct 2348; 120 L Ed 2d 33 (1992); Edmonson v

Leesville Concrete Co, Inc, 500 US 614; 111 S Ct 2077; 114

L Ed 2d 660 (1991). In Batson, supra at 96-98, the United

States Supreme Court announced a three-step process for

determining the constitutional propriety of a peremptory

challenge.

First, the opponent of the peremptory challenge must

make a prima facie showing of discrimination. Id. at 96.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on

race, the opponent must show that: (1) he is a member of a

cognizable racial group; (2) the proponent has exercised a

peremptory challenge to exclude a member of a certain

racial group from the jury pool; and (3) all the relevant

circumstances raise an inference that the proponent of the

challenge excluded the prospective juror on the basis of

race. Id.9 The United States Supreme Court has made it

9 In Swain, supra at 223-224, the United States Supreme Court required the defendant to show that the prosecution had a practice or pattern of using peremptory challenges in “case after case.” In Batson, supra at 92-93, however, the Court sought to alleviate Swain’s “crippling burden of proof” and eliminated the requirement that the defendant make a prima facie showing by reference to other cases. Further, it must be observed that the striking of even a single juror on the basis of race violates the Constitution. See, e.g., J E B v Alabama ex rel T B, 511 US 127, 142 n 13; 114 S Ct 1419; 128 L Ed 2d 89 (1994) (“The exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and undermines public confidence in the (continued…)

clear that the opponent of the challenge is not required at

Batson’s first step to actually prove discrimination.

Johnson v California, __ US __; 125 S Ct 2410; 162 L Ed 2d

129 (2005).10 Indeed, “so long as the sum of the proffered

facts gives ‘rise to an inference of discriminatory

purpose,’” Batson’s first step is satisfied. Id. at ___ US

(…continued)

fairness of the system.”). See also United States v

Clemons, 843 F2d 741, 747 (CA 3, 1988), cert den 488 US 835

(1988); United States v Lane, 866 F2d 103, 105 (CA 4,

1989); United States v Battle, 836 F2d 1084, 1086 (CA 8,

1987); United States v Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F3d 900, 902 (CA

9, 1994); United States v David, 803 F2d 1567, 1571 (CA 11,

1986).

10 In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court addressed California’s approach to examining Batson’s first step. While the Court recognized that the states have some degree of flexibility in formulating appropriate procedures to comply with Batson, the Court concluded that California’s approach was inappropriate. Id., ___ US ___; 125 S Ct 2416; 162 L Ed 2d 138. The California Supreme Court had concluded that at Batson’s first step, the opponent of the challenge must present strong evidence that makes discriminatory intent more likely than not. The United States Supreme Court rejected this approach, observing:

We did not intend [Batson’s] first step to be so onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the judge--on the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for the defendant to know with certainty--that the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination. Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. [Id., ___ US ___; 125 S Ct 2417; 162 L Ed 2d 139.]

___; 125 S Ct 2416; 162 L Ed 2d 138 (internal citation

omitted; emphasis added).

Second, if the trial court determines that a prima

facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the

proponent of the peremptory challenge to articulate a race-

neutral explanation for the strike. Batson, supra at 97.

Batson’s second step “does not demand an explanation that

is persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v Elem, 514 US

765, 768; 115 S Ct 1769; 131 L Ed 2d 834 (1995). Rather,

the issue is whether the proponent’s explanation is

facially valid as a matter of law. Id.; Hernandez v New

York, 500 US 352, 360; 111 S Ct 1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395

(1991) (plurality opinion). “A neutral explanation in the

context of our analysis here means an explanation based on

something other than the race of the juror. . . . Unless a

discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s

explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race

neutral.” Id.

Finally, if the proponent provides a race-neutral

explanation as a matter of law, the trial court must then

determine whether the race-neutral explanation is a pretext

and whether the opponent of the challenge has proved

purposeful discrimination. Batson, supra at 98. It must

be noted, however, that if the proponent of the challenge

offers a race-neutral explanation and the trial court rules

on the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination, the

first Batson step (whether the opponent of the challenge

made a prima facie showing) becomes moot. Hernandez, supra

at 359.

B. Reviewing Batson Claims

Generally, we review a trial court’s factual findings

for clear error. MCR 2.613(C). Further, we review

questions of law de novo. People v Nickens, 470 Mich 622,

626; 685 NW2d 657 (2004). As a practical matter, however,

appellate courts sometimes struggle with determining

whether a particular issue presents a question of law or

fact. In some instances, the line can become quite

blurred. Batson error claims frequently appear to fall

into the blurred category, and courts have labored to

formulate a generally accepted standard of review for

Batson cases that applies to all levels of the Batson

inquiry. The cases at hand give us the opportunity to

clarify our own standard for reviewing Batson errors. We

conclude that the applicable standard of review depends on

which Batson step is at issue before the appellate court.

1. Determining What the Trial Court Has Ruled

Before a reviewing court can determine which standard

of review applies for purposes of Batson’s three steps, the

court must first ascertain what the trial court actually

ruled. When a trial court methodically adheres to Batson’s

three-step test and clearly articulates its findings on the

record, issues concerning what the trial court has ruled

are significantly ameliorated. See, e.g., United States v

Castorena-Jaime, 285 F3d 916, 929 (CA 10, 2002). Not only

does faithful adherence to the Batson procedures greatly

assist appellate court review, but the parties, the trial

court, and the jurors are well-served by thoughtful

consideration of each of Batson’s steps as well. Thus, we

observe that Batson, as a constitutional decision, is not

discretionary. Our trial courts must meticulously follow

Batson’s three-step test, and we strongly urge our courts

to clearly articulate their findings and conclusions on the

record.

In the event a trial court fails to clearly state its

findings and conclusion on the record, an appellate court

must determine on the basis of a fair reading of the record

what the trial court has found and ruled. See, e.g.,

Mahaffey v Page, 162 F3d 481, 482-483 (CA 7, 1998). This

is not the preferred route. Because of the importance of

the right at stake, as well as the societal and judicial

interests implicated, we again direct our trial courts to

carefully follow each of Batson’s three steps, and we

further urge the courts to clearly articulate their

findings and conclusions with respect to each step on the

record. Once it is determined what the trial court has

found and ruled, the reviewing court must decide what

Batson step is at issue in the particular case and how the

claim of error should be reviewed.

2. Standard of Review for Batson’s First Step

While there is somewhat of a consensus on the

standards of review applicable to Batson’s second step, and

the scope of review for the third step is well-settled,

courts appear to be split with regard to the proper

standard of review when examining Batson’s first step. For

example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals en banc

concluded that a trial court’s determination whether the

opponent of the peremptory challenge made out a prima facie

case of discrimination should be reviewed for clear error.

Tolbert v Page, 182 F3d 677 (CA 9, 1999). In Tolbert, the

Ninth Circuit concluded that Batson’s first step presented

a mixed question of law and fact; however, the Tolbert

court reasoned:

At the Batson prima facie showing step, the concerns of judicial administration tip in favor of the trial court and, therefore, a deferential standard of review prevails. Our conclusion is based on the language of Batson itself, which describes the prima facie analysis as a “factual inquiry,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 95, and makes clear that the trial court is to be the primary

adjudicator of that analysis: “We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges create[] a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. at 97 (emphasis added).

Our holding is also consistent with more recent teachings of the Supreme Court, which counsel in favor of applying a deferential standard of review to certain mixed questions. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 113 L Ed 2d 190 (1991). Deferential review is appropriate either “when it appears that the district court is ‘better positioned’ than the appellate court to decide the issue in question,” or when “probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.” Id. [Tolbert, supra at 682.]

When faced with the same question, however, the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a de novo

standard applies to a trial court’s determination whether a

prima facie showing of discrimination has been made.

Mahaffey, supra at 484. The Seventh Circuit likewise

observed that whether the facts alleged by the opponent of

the peremptory challenge satisfied the opponent’s burden

under Batson’s first step is a mixed question of law and

fact. Id. Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit opined that

“[t]he question of whether an inference of discrimination

may be drawn from a set of undisputed facts relating to the

racial makeup of the jury venire and the prosecutor’s

exercise of peremptory challenges is . . . one over which

the appellate courts should exercise a degree of control

that a clear error standard would not afford.” Id.

Moreover, in light of the importance of the constitutional

right implicated, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the de

novo standard “would allow for a measure of consistency in

the treatment of similar factual settings, rather than

permitting different trial judges to reach inconsistent

conclusions about the prima facie case on the same or

similar facts.” Id. Thus, the Mahaffey Court concluded

that the de novo standard of review applies to the prima

facie showing of discrimination prong.

Similar to the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court of

Colorado has also concluded that Batson’s first step is

subject to review de novo. Valdez v People, 966 P2d 587,

591 (Colo, 1998). The Valdez court noted that the First,

Eighth, and Ninth circuits adhere to a clear error standard

when reviewing the prima facie determination under the

Batson framework. However, the Colorado Supreme Court also

observed that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, as well

as appellate courts in Kansas, Tennessee, and Utah, have

concluded that Batson’s first step is subject to review de

novo. Weighing the aforementioned cases and turning to

Title VII case law for additional guidance, the Valdez

court concluded:

Therefore, although we afford deference to the trial court's ultimate determination of a

Batson challenge in step three, we believe that the first step involves a question of legal sufficiency over which the appellate court must have plenary review. We continue to defer to the underlying factual findings, including any predicate credibility determinations of the trial court upon which its prima facie determination under Batson is based. However, we hold that the question of whether the defendant has established a prima facie case under Batson is a matter of law, and we apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s prima facie determination of the Batson analysis. [Valdez, supra at 591.]

We agree with those jurisdictions that have concluded

that Batson’s first step is appropriately categorized as a

mixed question of law and fact. We, however, chose to

follow Michigan’s well-established procedure of reviewing

questions of law de novo and factual findings for clear

error. People v McRae, 469 Mich 704, 710; 678 NW2d 425

(2004). We thus conclude that the first Batson step is a

mixed question of fact and law that is subject to both a

clear error (factual) and a de novo (legal) standard of

review. A trial judge must first find the facts and then

must decide whether those facts constitute a prima facie

case of discrimination under Batson and its progeny.

We acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court

has emphasized that the focus of Batson is not merely on

the individual criminal defendant. See, e.g., Powers v

Ohio, 499 US 400, 405-410; 111 S Ct 1364; 113 L Ed 2d 411

(1991). Rather, the focus is also on the integrity of the

judicial system, as well as the rights of the prospective

jurors. Id. at 410-414.11 Unquestionably, ensuring the

integrity of the judicial process and maintaining fair jury

selection procedures are paramount concerns. However,

these concerns do not persuade us that Batson’s first step

should be treated any differently than other mixed

questions of law and fact. Indeed, we believe that these

paramount concerns can be effectuated under our established

rules for appellate review. Thus, until the United States

Supreme Court holds otherwise, under Batson’s first step,

we will review the questions of law de novo and the factual

findings for clear error.

3. Standard of Review for Batson’s Second Step

While there appears to be some disagreement about the

standard of review for Batson’s second step, we believe

that those jurisdictions that have concluded that the

second step is subject to review de novo have the better

view. See, e.g., United States v Bishop, 959 F2d 820, 821

n 1 (CA 9, 1992); Hurd v Pittsburg State Univ, 109 F3d

1540, 1546 (CA 10, 1997); Valdez, supra at 590. We believe

11 See also Herman, Why the court loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, colorblindness, and the jury, 67 Tul L R 1807, 1814-1815 (1993) (“A criminal defendant is permitted to raise Batson challenges not on the theory that his or her own rights have been violated, but rather on the theory that he or she is being afforded standing to raise the rights of a third party—the prospective juror.”).

that such an approach is consistent with controlling United

States Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Hernandez,

supra at 359(“In evaluating the race neutrality of an

attorney’s explanation, a court must determine whether,

assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory

challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal

Protection Clause as a matter of law.”)(emphasis added).

It is important to bear in mind that it is not until

Batson’s third step that the persuasiveness of the

proffered explanation for the peremptory challenge becomes

relevant. Purkett, supra at 768.12 Accordingly, at

Batson’s second step, a court is only concerned with

whether the proffered reason violates the Equal Protection

Clause as a matter of law. See, e.g., United States v

Uwaezhoke, 995 F2d 388, 392 (CA 3, 1993) (“Thus, if the

government’s explanation does not, on its face,

discriminate on the basis of race, then we must find that

the explanation passes Batson muster as a matter of law,

12 See also Johnson, supra, ___ US ___; 125 S Ct 2417- 2418; 162 L Ed 2d 140, quoting Purkett, supra at 768 (“The first two Batson steps govern the production of evidence that allows the trial court to determine the persuasiveness of the defendant’s constitutional claim. ‘It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant--the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.’”).

and we pass to the third step of Batson analysis to

determine whether the race-neutral and facially valid

reason was, as a matter of fact, a mere pretext for actual

discriminatory intent.”). It is also important to bear in

mind that only in rare cases is the proffered explanation

facially invalid because such direct evidence is equally

rare. We thus conclude that the de novo standard governs

appellate review of Batson’s second step.

4. Standard of Review for Batson’s Third Step

It is well-settled that a trial court’s determination

concerning whether the opponent of the peremptory challenge

has satisfied the ultimate burden of proving purposeful

discrimination is a question of fact that is reviewed for

clear error. Hernandez, supra at 364-365; United States v

Hill, 146 F3d 337, 341 (CA 6, 1998). Moreover, the trial

court’s ultimate factual finding is accorded great

deference. Miller-El I, supra at 340. The United States

Supreme Court has observed that “[d]eference to trial court

findings on the issue of discriminatory intent makes

particular sense in this context because . . . the finding

‘largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.’”

Hernandez, supra at 365, quoting Batson, supra at 98 n 21.

Accordingly, the “clear error” standard comports with the

concept that assessment of credibility lies within the

trial court’s province.13 In accordance with well-settled

law, we thus conclude that the clear error standard governs

appellate review of a trial court’s resolution of Batson’s

third step.

5. Summary of Batson Standard of Review

In sum, we conclude that the proper standard of review

depends on which Batson step is before us. If the first

step is at issue (whether the opponent of the challenge has

satisfied his burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of

13 See, e.g., Miller-El I, supra at 339-340 (internal citations omitted):

Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, . . . demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.

“Deference to trial court findings on the issue of discriminatory intent makes particular sense in this context because, as we noted in Batson, the finding ‘largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.’ In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’”

discrimination), we review the trial court’s underlying

factual findings for clear error, and we review questions

of law de novo. If Batson’s second step is implicated

(whether the proponent of the peremptory challenge

articulates a race-neutral explanation as a matter of law),

we review the proffered explanation de novo. Finally, if

the third step is at issue (the trial court’s

determinations whether the race-neutral explanation is a

pretext and whether the opponent of the challenge has

proved purposeful discrimination), we review the trial

court’s ruling for clear error.

C. Remedies for Batson Violations

In the present case, defense counsel did not object to

the dismissal of veniremembers Bonner and Johnson.

Although he referred to Bonner and Johnson during his

Batson objection, he only objected to the dismissal of

veniremember Jones. Therefore, in this case, the Batson

objection only pertains to the dismissal of veniremember

Jones. In order to ensure that a trial court remedies all

purposeful discrimination, however, courts should apply the

Batson objection to all strikes in an alleged pattern.

In order for a pattern of strikes to develop, several

jurors might be struck without objection until a pattern

begins to emerge. If a trial court allowed earlier strikes

in a pattern to stand without taking remedial action, the

court would potentially be allowing purposeful

discrimination. Therefore, most jurisdictions do not

consider a Batson objection waived if the prosecution fails

to raise it immediately following the strike.

The case of State v Ford, 306 Mont 517, 523; 39 P3d

108 (2001), provided a thorough discussion of the rulings

in different jurisdictions regarding Batson error

preservation. Several jurisdictions held that a Batson

challenge must be made before the jury is sworn, or else

the issue is waived.14 Additionally, numerous courts take

the stance that a Batson challenge must also be raised

before the court dismisses the venire.15 One case held that

Batson objections were waived once the stricken

veniremembers left the courthouse, but the court

14 See State v Wilson, 117 NM 11; 868 P2d 656 (NM App, 1993); United States v Cashwell, 950 F2d 699, 704 (CA 11, 1992); United States v Dobynes, 905 F2d 1192, 1196 (CA 8, 1990). See also People v Hudson, 157 Ill 2d 401; 626 NE2d 161 (1993). 15 See United States v Biaggi, 909 F2d 662, 679 (CA 2, 1990); Government of Virgin Islands v Forte, 806 F2d 73, 76 (CA 3, 1986); Morning v Zapata Protein (USA), Inc, 128 F3d 213, 216 (CA 4, 1997); United States v Abou-Kassem, 78 F3d 161, 167 (CA 5, 1996); United States v Rodriguez, 917 F2d 1286, 1288 (CA 11, 1990); State v Cummings, 838 SW2d 4 (Mo App, 1992); Sorensen v State, 6 P3d 657, 662 (Wy, 2000); State v Harris, 157 Ariz 35, 36; 754 P2d 1139 (1988).

nonetheless underwent a Batson analysis for each of the

discharged veniremembers in the pattern.16

There are several reasons why courts require a party

to raise a Batson challenge before the venire is dismissed.

First, the Batson objection warns the prosecutor, or the

person peremptorily striking a juror, that he might be

required to provide race-neutral explanations for the

strike. United States v Erwin, 793 F2d 656 (CA 5, 1986).

Furthermore, if a court finds a Batson violation after the

venire is dismissed, then there must be a new jury-

selection process and a new venire called. State v

Cummings, 838 SW2d 4, 6 (Mo App, 1992). If a Batson

challenge is made before the venire is discharged, however,

the trial court can immediately correct the error and

disallow the strike. See State v Parker, 836 SW2d 930 (Mo,

1992).

16 In State v Jacobs, 803 So 2d 933 (La, 2001), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the objections to the first three jurors were untimely, and thus waived, because “the jurors were no longer ‘under any instructions’ in the case.” Id. at 939. The reason why Jacobs might not be easily applicable to other cases, however, is that the judge “effectively collapse[d] the first two stages of the Batson procedure . . . [and performed] the crucial third step of weighing the defendant’s proof and the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons to determine discriminatory intent.” Id. at 941. Therefore, although the judge claimed that the objection was untimely, he nonetheless undertook a Batson analysis and determined that there were race-neutral reasons for the jurors’ dismissals.

Therefore, in order to preserve the option of

reseating improperly stricken jurors, the court in Parker

suggested that “[t]rial courts should refrain from

releasing venirepersons who have been peremptorily struck

until the venire is excused.” Id. at 936 n 3.

Requiring courts to retain stricken jurors until the

end of jury selection, however, could potentially burden

trial courts and citizens called in for jury service if the

selection process lasts several days. Because of the

difficulties in retaining stricken jurors, this Court

concludes that a Batson challenge is timely if it is made

before the jury is sworn. It must be noted, however, that

if stricken veniremembers are dismissed and later found to

be part of a pattern of discriminatory strikes, the only

remaining remedy for the Batson violation would be to

discharge the entire venire and start the process anew. A

court may not ignore or fail to remedy the prior improper

strikes simply because the court already dismissed the

veniremembers.

In the present case, the prosecutor provided race-

neutral explanations for her exclusion of veniremembers

Bonner and Johnson, even though defense counsel did not

specifically object to their dismissals. The trial judge

stated that she was not “satisfied with the prosecutor’s

response as to potential juror Jones and Johnson,” but

because they already left, she did not rule on whether the

prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination. Instead,

she instructed the attorneys to be careful “from this point

on” with their selections. If the judge had found a Batson

error, however, her only remedial option would have been to

dismiss the entire venire and select the jury from a new

panel because she had already dismissed the stricken

III. Analysis

The record reflects that the trial judge never

explicitly found that the prosecutor violated Batson. Nor

can we infer such a finding on this record. Instead, the

record is susceptible to the fair inference that the trial

judge acted to preserve the presence of minority jurors on

the panel, knowing that the jury pool, as a matter of

chance, was largely Caucasian. Protecting a defendant’s

right to a fair and impartial jury does not entail ensuring

any particular racial composition of the jury.17 The goal

17 See, for example, a recent proposal to amend MCR 6.412. This proposed court rule would expressly prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to achieve a racially proportionate jury. It states:

(F) DISCRIMINATION IN THE SELECTION PROCESS. (continued…)

of Batson and its progeny is to promote racial neutrality

in the selection of a jury and to avoid the systematic and

intentional exclusion of any racial group. Taylor v

Louisiana, 419 US 522, 538; 95 S Ct 692; 42 L Ed 2d 690

(1975); Holland v Illinois, 493 US 474, 476-480; 110 S Ct

803; 107 L Ed 2d 905 (1990).

As a threshold matter, we must note that our task in

resolving these cases is difficult, in large part, because

of the trial judge’s failure to rigorously follow the

Batson procedures and, more importantly, to clearly

articulate her findings and conclusions on the record.

Therefore, under these circumstances, we must fairly read

the record to determine exactly what the trial judge found

and concluded in light of defendants’ Batson objections.

On the basis of our reading of the voir dire

transcripts, we conclude that the trial court did not, in

(1) No person shall be subjected to discrimination during voir dire on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.

(2) Discrimination during voir dire on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex for the purpose of achieving what the court believes to be a balanced, proportionate, or representative jury in terms of these characteristics shall not constitute an excuse or justification for a violation of this subsection. [See Michigan Bar Journal, June 2005, p 64.]

fact, find a Batson violation and, thus, there is no error

to complain of in these cases. The trial judge’s initial

expression of dissatisfaction with the prosecutor’s race-

neutral reasons, when considered in context with her

subsequent remarks that “we are getting close to a

sensitive issue,” related to her concern about the number

of minority veniremembers left on the panel. The judge

further articulated her actual motivation in the following

excerpt: “I think all of us are being, trying to be

conscientious about the selection of these jurors because

of the racial makeup of the jury panels, which we don’t

have any control over.” The trial judge’s remarks do not

reflect a finding that the prosecutor engaged in purposeful

discrimination. Rather, the comments demonstrate that her

true motivation was to ensure some modicum of racial

balance in the jury panel. Use of peremptory challenges,

however, to ensure racial proportionality in the jury is

prohibited by Batson and will be prohibited by proposed MCR

6.412(F) if adopted.18

18 Justice Cavanagh states that we rely on the above proposed court rule to support the proposition that the use of peremptory challenges to ensure racial proportionality in the jury is prohibited. We do not rely on the proposal to support this proposition. Rather, we cite to it to show that this Court is considering steps to prevent such problems from occurring in the future.

The trial judge never expressly found that the

prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges for a racially

discriminatory reason. In fact, her comments at the end of

jury selection suggest a contrary conclusion. The trial

judge was more concerned with achieving a proportionate

racial composition on the jury than with the exclusion of

veniremember Jones. She ultimately concluded that no

Batson violation existed because a satisfactory number of

African-American females were still present on the jury.

We reject Justice Cavanagh’s conclusion that the trial

judge ever found that defense counsel met his burden of

proving purposeful discrimination. Rather, the trial

judge’s focus, as her comments reflect, was to ensure that

the racial composition of the jury remained proportionate.

The purpose of Batson is to prevent discriminatory

exclusions of veniremembers on the basis of race or gender.

Here, the jury pool, by chance, contained a greater number

of Caucasians than African-Americans. The trial judge was

preoccupied with this fact. Her Batson analysis seemed to

be infused with and confused by the erroneous belief that

Batson is violated if the challenge resulted in too few

minority jurors. The trial judge’s statements did not

imply that she would have kept Jones and Johnson on the

jury because she thought they had been wrongfully excluded

on the basis of race. Rather, her statements implied that

she would have kept them on the jury to ensure that the

number of African-American jurors remained proportionate to

the number of Caucasian jurors.

The trial judge failed to recognize that a defendant

is not entitled to a jury of a particular racial

composition as long as no racial group is systematically

and intentionally excluded. Taylor, supra at 538; Holland,

supra at 476-480.19 Defendants’ jury was drawn from a fair

cross section of the community. Nor was any racial group

systematically excluded.

IV. Conclusion

transcripts, we hold no Batson violation occurred in this

case and the trial judge neither explicitly nor implicitly

found such a violation. Giving the appropriate degree of

deference to the trial judge’s ultimate finding that the

19 See also United States v Ovalle, 136 F3d 1092, 1107 (CA 6, 1998), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck down the Eastern District of Michigan’s jury selection plan, which utilized the “subtraction” method of balancing the jury pool to ensure proportional representation of various racial groups within the community. It held, “The selection of the grand and petit juries from a qualified jury wheel that was derived through racially discriminatory means, and the fact that the Jury Selection Plan was not narrowly tailored to meet any compelling governmental interest, constitute grounds for reversal of the defendants’ convictions.”

prosecutor did not engage in purposeful discrimination, we

affirm defendants’ convictions.

Maura D. Corrigan Elizabeth A. Weaver Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

WEAVER, J. (concurring).

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that, on a fair

reading of the record, the trial court did not find that

prospective jurors were excluded on the basis of race in

violation of Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712;

90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). During jury selection, the

prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to excuse

prospective jurors Johnson and Bonner. Defense counsel did

not object. A short time later, after the prosecution

exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse prospective juror Jones, defense counsel asked to approach the bench.

Defense counsel objected to excusing Jones, asserting that

she was being excused because she was black. In response

to defense counsel’s assertion, the prosecutor then

explained her reasons for excusing Jones, as well as

Johnson and Bonner. Throughout the discussion, the trial

court stated that “we are getting close to a serious issue

here.” And after noting that the trial court has to accept

or reject the prosecutor’s reasons, determining whether

they are race-neutral or not, the trial court stated: “And

I’m not, I’m saying that I think we’re getting close to a

sensitive issue here on Jones and Johnson. That’s all I’m

saying. I’m making my record too.” When this entire

response is considered, it suggests that the trial court

was not finding that a Batson violation had occurred, but

was simply cautioning the parties that they may be getting

“close” to a sensitive issue. Getting “close to a

sensitive issue” is not the same thing as finding that a

Batson violation has occurred and a prospective juror has

been improperly excused on the basis of race.1

1 Unlike the majority, I do not speculate with regard to the reasons for the trial court’s statements. I simply conclude that after a fair reading of the record, the trial court did not find that a Batson violation had occurred.

Because I conclude that the trial court did not find

that a Batson violation occurred, I express no opinion

concerning the standard of review for Batson violations

under steps two and three of the test or the appropriate

remedies for Batson violations.

Elizabeth A. Weaver

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I agree with the legal principles announced in parts

II(A) and II(B) of the majority’s opinion.1 I write

1 I do not join part II(C) of the majority opinion because I do not believe that these cases are the proper vehicle to explore when a Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), objection must be raised. In these cases, the Batson objections were made in a relatively timely manner. In this regard, these cases do not present a situation where a party is raising the Batson objection for the first time on appeal. Further, these are not cases where a party waited until the end of trial to make a Batson objection. While I applaud the majority’s (continued…) separately because I disagree with the majority’s reading

of the record. I believe that an evenhanded reading of the

record demonstrates that the trial court found that

90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986), and its progeny. Further, I would

hold that the trial court correctly made this determination

under Batson’s three-step test.2 Upon making this

determination, however, the trial court reasoned that any

Batson violation was cured by the eventual makeup of the

jury because “the same number if not more” unchallenged

African-American jurors remained on the panel that

ultimately decided these cases. I would hold that the

(…continued) efforts to clarify our Batson jurisprudence and provide our lower courts guidance, I must nonetheless refrain from joining part II(C) of the majority opinion. Because the timeliness of the Batson objections in these cases is not at issue, I would prefer to decide the larger issue of when a Batson objection must be lodged in a more suitable case. 2 Batson’s three-step process is as follows: (1) the opponent of the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of discrimination; (2) if the trial court determines that a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the proponent of the peremptory challenge to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strike; and (3) if the proponent provides a race-neutral explanation, the trial court must then determine whether the race-neutral explanation is a pretext and whether the opponent of the challenge has proved purposeful discrimination. Batson, supra at 96-98.

initial Batson violation was not cured by the eventual

makeup of the jury and, thus, the trial court erred by

continuing the proceedings in this manner. Accordingly, I

would reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and

remand these cases for new trials.

During jury selection, defendants raised objections to

the prosecutor’s use of her peremptory challenges. On the

first and second days of jury selection, the prosecutor

exercised a total of four peremptory challenges. On the

third day, the prosecutor exercised three more peremptory

challenges. Of the seven challenges the prosecutor had

exercised at that point, three were against African-

American veniremembers, one male and two females. After

the prosecutor exercised her third challenge on day three,

and after the court recessed for lunch, defense counsel

raised a Batson objection.

Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor was

excluding African-American veniremembers on the basis of

race, specifically African-American males. The prosecutor

responded by arguing that a pattern of discrimination was

not present, noting that she struck four Caucasians and

only three African-Americans. Moreover, the prosecutor

argued, only one of the excluded African-Americans was

male. While continuing to assert that the first step of

Batson was not satisfied, the prosecutor also explained her

reasons for excluding the African-Americans. The trial

court found that Batson had not been violated at that

point, stating:

But in this particular case and this particular matter, I do not see a pattern of the prosecution improperly excluding African American males, because they’ve only excluded one, or African American females where two have been excluded.

I think the reasons are acceptable. So I don’t see a problem there.

The trial court then recessed for lunch, and the

veniremembers returned to the courtroom after the break.

When jury selection resumed, the prosecutor exercised

peremptory challenges to exclude veniremembers Johnson,

Bonner, and Jones. After the prosecutor sought to exclude

veniremember Jones, defense counsel asked to approach the

bench, and the trial court directed the veniremembers to

leave the courtroom for a few minutes. Defense counsel

objected to the exclusion of these three African-American

females on Batson grounds. The trial court did not make

any findings at this time; rather, the prosecutor argued

that veniremember Bonner was excluded because she was

closely related to two people who have been convicted of

first-degree murder, not because she was African-American.

The prosecutor further asserted that veniremember Johnson

was excluded because she had a close relative convicted of

a drug charge and she was “hesitant in her demeanor.”

Finally, the prosecutor explained that she excluded

veniremember Jones because Jones had a child close to the

age of the victim and Jones was a professional working

person. The trial court then noted that veniremember Berg,

a Caucasian female who was also a professional working

person, was not challenged and excluded from service. The

following exchange then occurred:

The Court: Just before we recessed for lunch, I thought that it was very clear that we didn’t have a problem here. But now I think we are getting very close to a sensitive issue.

I didn’t see a problem with--

[Counsel for Defendant Knight]: Miss Johnson, Your Honor.

The Court: --Christine Johnson. She was, actually her demeanor was soft and she seemed very forthright and honest. And I understand with Miss Bonner, I didn’t see any problems with that. But I was very surprised about Miss Johnson. I didn’t say anything because the defense didn’t object. So I didn’t object.

The same thing with Miss Jones. I do not see a reason other than--I mean, it seems to me for the prosecution to say, she has a daughter the same age as the victim, that would seem to work in the prosecution’s favor, just in terms of thinking in the jury selection. So I don’t accept that.

[The Prosecutor]: Your Honor,--

The Court: I do see that we are getting close, and there are, I don’t know two or three minority jurors left in this panel. So I think we are getting close to a serious issue here.

I wish that somebody had said something about keeping Miss Jones and Miss Johnson. And then we address this matter because I probably would not have excused either one of them.

[The Prosecutor]: Under Batson . . ., [a] prosecutor has to explain peremptory challenges with a neutral reason.

As long as I come up with a neutral reason for their dismissal, I believe that that’s appropriate. And I given--

The Court: But the Court has to accept or reject whether the reason is neutral or not.

[The Prosecutor]: I understand.

The Court: And I’m not, I’m saying that I think we’re getting close to a sensitive issue here on Jones and Johnson. That’s all I’m saying. I’m making my record too.

The Court: We have to [be] realistic here. I really don’t want any problems with this case, especially along these lines.

I’m not satisfied with the prosecutor’s response as to potential juror Jones and Johnson. But I think they’ve already left.

I’m just saying, I let Jones and Johnson go without holding them, especially Jones. I guess I should have held her and I didn’t do that. I’ll take the fault for that. But from this point on let’s try to be careful with this jury selection. We are close to getting this jury selected. [Emphasis added.]

Defense counsel inquired whether Johnson and Jones

could be located; however, these veniremembers had already

left the building. The panel was then called back into the

courtroom, and jury selection was completed. At the end of

selection, the trial court observed:

With the panel that we ended up with, I think that any Batson problems that may have been there have been cured.

We have the same number if not more jurors, African American female jurors on the panel as if we had kept Miss Christina Johnson and Miss Ruby Jones.

I don’t think either side ended up selecting this panel for any reason other than I think that these are the ones who will be the fair and impartial persons to hear and try this case.

In the end, the jury convicted defendant Knight of first-

degree murder and codefendant Rice of first-degree murder

and possession of a firearm during the commission of a

felony.

II. Analysis

I agree with the majority that this Court’s “task in

articulate her findings and conclusions on the record.”

Ante at 31. On the basis of its reading of the voir dire

transcripts, the majority concludes that the trial court

did not, in fact, find a Batson violation and, thus, there

is no error to complain of in these cases. With respect to

veniremembers Johnson and Jones, I respectfully disagree

and would conclude that the trial court believed that these

veniremembers were excluded on the basis of race in

violation of Batson. I am simply hard pressed to find

anything in the record from which it can be fairly said

that the trial court did not conclude that Johnson and

Jones were excluded on the basis of race.

On the third day of jury selection, and after the

lunch recess, defense counsel raised a Batson challenge to

the exclusion of veniremembers Johnson, Bonner, and Jones.3

3 This Batson challenge should not be confused with a similar objection defense counsel raised earlier that day. While the earlier objection provides some context for the later objection, I am concerned with the trial court’s treatment of the later Batson objection—i.e., the objection to the exclusion of veniremembers Johnson and Jones.

Moreover, the majority posits that defense counsel’s initial objection, as well as counsel’s other objections, demonstrates counsel’s misunderstanding of Batson. I disagree. Defense counsel initially asserted that the prosecutor had engaged in a pattern of systematically excluding African-American veniremembers. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race under Batson’s first step, the opponent must show that (1) he or she is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) the proponent has exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude a member of a certain racial group from the jury pool; and (3) all the relevant circumstances raise an inference that the proponent of the challenge excluded the prospective (continued…)

The trial court did not decide whether defendants satisfied

Batson’s first step by making a prima facie showing of

racial discrimination. Instead, the prosecutor volunteered

her reasons for the exclusions and attempted to proffer

race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges.

After considering the proffered explanations, the trial

court rejected them, stating “I don’t accept that,” and

“I’m not satisfied with the prosecutor’s response as to

potential juror Jones and Johnson.” I find the following

exchange particularly illustrative:

[The Prosecutor]: Under Batson . . . , [a] prosecutor has to explain peremptory challenges with a neutral reason.

As long as I come up with a neutral reason for their dismissal, I believe that that’s appropriate. And I given--

(…continued) juror on the basis of race. Batson, supra at 96. A pattern of strikes against members of a certain racial group certainly constitutes a relevant circumstance. Indeed, as the Batson Court itself noted, “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Id. at 97. Batson and its progeny do not require a pattern to be shown because the striking of even a single juror on the basis of race violates the Constitution. See, e.g., J E B v Alabama ex rel TB, 511 US 127, 142 n 13; 114 S Ct 1419; 128 L Ed 2d 89 (1994). However, a pattern of strikes against a particular racial group is still significant because it may give rise to an inference of discrimination. Thus, defense counsel’s remarks do not demonstrate his misunderstanding of Batson.

The Court: But the Court has to accept or reject whether the reason is neutral or not.

The Prosecutor: I understand.

The Court: And I’m not . . . .

On the basis of my review of the record, the only

conclusion that can be fairly drawn is that the trial court

believed that veniremembers Johnson and Jones were

improperly excluded from the jury pool on the basis of

race. In my view, the trial court effectively saw itself

deciding Batson’s third prong, and concluded that the

prosecutor’s explanations were a pretext and, thus,

purposeful discrimination had been demonstrated. This

conclusion also finds record support where the trial court

expressed regret for dismissing Johnson and Jones and not

being able to reseat these prospective jurors.

Nor am I persuaded by the prosecutor’s argument that

the trial court preliminarily concluded that Batson may

have been violated, but ultimately concluded that no

violation occurred.4 While this argument may be plausible

4 The prosecutor directs this Court’s attention to the following comments by the trial court:

With the panel that we ended up with, I think that any Batson problems that may have been there have been cured.

(continued…)

in some instances, this is not one of them. I believe that

the trial court’s comments noting that any Batson violation

had been cured, and that “this panel” was not selected on

racial grounds, did not alter the trial court’s conclusion

that veniremembers Johnson and Jones were excluded on the

basis of race. Stated differently, nothing in the record

suggests that the trial court retracted its finding that

Johnson and Jones were excluded in violation of Batson.

While the record demonstrates that the trial court may have

believed that “this panel” (the jury actually empaneled)

was not subjected to discrimination and the trial court may

have been concerned with the racial composition of the

jury, the record clearly shows that the trial court also

believed that excluded veniremembers Johnson and Jones were

subjected to discrimination.

(…continued) We have the same number if not more jurors, African American female jurors on the panel as if we had kept Miss Christina Johnson and Miss Ruby Jones.

I don’t think either side ended up selecting this panel for any reason other than I think that these are the ones who will be the fair and impartial persons to hear and try this case.

Notably, the majority relies heavily on this same passage for the proposition that no Batson error occurred at all.

In sum, I would conclude that the record fairly

reveals that the trial court found a Batson violation

because it rejected the prosecutor’s proffered explanations

and would have recalled Johnson and Jones to sit on the

jury if they could have been located. An evenhanded

reading of the record shows that the trial court never

retreated from its finding that these veniremembers were

excluded on the basis of race. I tend to agree with the

majority and suspect that some of the trial court’s

statements arguably stemmed from its desire to ensure a

racially mixed jury and that such a desire is prohibited by

Batson and its progeny.5 Motivations aside, however, that

does not change the fact that the trial court concluded

that Johnson and Jones were excluded on the basis of race.

In other words, regardless of the trial court’s main goal,

or the goal ascribed to it by the majority, the record

clearly demonstrates that the trial court along the way

also found that purposeful discrimination occurred in

5 I disagree, however, with the majority’s reliance on a proposed court rule that may be adopted sometime in the future. See ante at 31 n 17, 32. Instead, I prefer to simply examine this case under the constitutional concerns set forth in Batson and its progeny rather than rely on a proposed court rule that has not even taken effect.

violation of Batson.6 Because I conclude that the trial

court found that Batson had been violated, the question

becomes whether this determination was proper.

The prosecution argues that even if the trial court

found a Batson violation, the proffered explanations were

race-neutral and the trial court erred when it concluded

that the reasons were a pretext. Accordingly, the

prosecution is questioning the trial court’s resolution of

Batson’s second and third steps.7 Thus, I would, consistent

with this Court’s stated approach, review de novo whether

the prosecutor articulated a race-neutral explanation for

the strike as a matter of law. United States v Uwaezhoke,

6 We should be mindful that our role is not to search for any plausible reason to avoid concluding that a trial court found that discrimination indeed occurred. See, e.g., Miller-El v Dretke, __ US __; __ S Ct __; __ L Ed 2d __; 2005 US LEXIS 4658 *39 (2005) (Miller-El II) (If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for a peremptory challenge “does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown up as false.”). Like the majority, I could imagine many reasons to explain away the lower court proceedings. But this would not change the fact that the trial court concluded that discrimination occurred in violation of Batson. Again, while the record is not a model of clarity, I simply cannot ignore or explain away the trial court’s conclusion. 7 Appellate review of Batson’s first step is not implicated in these cases. See Hernandez v New York, 500 US 352, 359; 111 S Ct 1859; 114 L Ed 2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion).

995 F2d 388, 392 (CA 3, 1993). Further, I would review for

clear error the trial court’s determinations whether the

race-neutral explanations were a pretext and whether

defendants proved purposeful discrimination, according the

trial court’s findings high deference. Miller-El v

(2003) (Miller-El I).

I agree with the prosecution that the proffered

explanations for the peremptory challenges were facially

valid under the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law.

The proponent of the peremptory challenge cannot satisfy

his or her burden under Batson’s second step “by merely

denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely

affirming his good faith.” Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765,

769; 115 S Ct 1769; 131 L Ed 2d 834 (1995). Rather, the

proponent of a strike “must give a ‘clear and reasonably

specific’ explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for

exercising the challenges,” and the explanation must be

“related to the particular case to be tried.” Batson,

supra at 98 & n 20, quoting Texas Dep’t of Community

Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 258; 101 S Ct 1089; 67 L Ed

2d 207 (1981). “What it means by a ‘legitimate reason’ is

not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not

deny equal protection.” Purkett, supra at 769. In other

words, the proffered reason does not always have to make

perfect sense as long as the reason does not deny equal

protection of the law. Here, the prosecutor’s explanations

for excluding veniremembers Johnson and Jones were based on

something other than their race. See Hernandez, supra at

360. Further, discriminatory intent was not necessarily

inherent in the prosecutor’s explanations. Id. Thus, I

believe that the prosecutor’s explanations were race-

neutral as a matter of law, and the trial court properly

proceeded to the third step of the Batson inquiry.

According high deference to the trial court’s

findings, I cannot say under these circumstances that the

trial court clearly erred under Batson’s third step when it

concluded that veniremembers Johnson and Jones had been

excluded on the basis of race. Resolution of Batson’s

third step largely hinges on the evaluation of credibility,

and “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on

demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial

judge’s province.’” Miller-El I, supra at 339 (citation

omitted). Here, the trial court rejected defendants’

Batson challenge that was lodged earlier in the day. After

the lunch recess, however, the record reveals that the

trial court became suspicious of the prosecutor’s method of

exercising peremptory challenges. In light of defendants’

objection to the exclusion of veniremembers Johnson and

Jones, and after observing the prosecutor’s demeanor and

listening to the proffered reasons for the peremptory

challenges, the trial court concluded that these

veniremembers were excluded on the basis of race.

The trial court noted that one of the proffered

reasons for excluding Jones (that she was a professional

working person) applied with equal force to a Caucasian

woman who the prosecutor did not attempt to peremptorily

challenge. The prosecutor explained that she excluded

person, was not challenged and excluded from service. See,

e.g., Miller-El II, supra at *21 (“If a prosecutor’s

proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just

as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted

to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful

discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.”).

Further, all three challenges exercised by the prosecutor

after the recess were made against African-Americans.

Thus, out of the ten peremptory challenges exercised by the

prosecutor, six were against African-Americans. While

these facts alone certainly may not always justify a

conclusion of purposeful discrimination in every case, the

prosecutor’s rationales, coupled with her demeanor, could

have affected the trial court’s credibility determination.8

In light of the high degree of deference accorded to a

trial court’s credibility assessment in the Batson arena, I

cannot say the trial court clearly erred when it found that

the prosecutor’s reasons for excluding veniremembers

Johnson and Jones were a pretext. Thus, I would conclude

that the trial court properly found that the prosecutor

violated Batson when she excluded Johnson and Jones on the

basis of their race.

In light of this conclusion, it must be determined

whether, upon learning that Johnson and Jones could not be

located, the trial court erred in proceeding in the manner

that it did; namely, deciding that any Batson violation had

8 For example, in Miller-El I, supra at 342-343, the United States Supreme Court noted that the prosecution’s reasons for striking African-American members of the venire appeared race-neutral in that case. However, the fact that the prosecutor used ten of the fourteen challenges to exclude African-Americans, and three of the prosecution’s race-neutral rationales for striking African-American veniremembers pertained just as well to some Caucasian veniremembers who were not challenged and who did serve on the jury, might suggest that the challenges were selective and based on racial considerations. See also Miller-El II, supra at *21.

been “cured” because the “same number if not more” of

African-American jurors sat on defendants’ jury. I

conclude that the trial court erred in proceeding in this

fashion. Such an approach not only ignores the structural

nature of a Batson violation, but directly conflicts with

the propositions on which Batson and its progeny are based.

“Jury service is an exercise of responsible

citizenship by all members of the community, including

those who otherwise might not have the opportunity to

contribute to our civic life.” Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400,

402; 111 S Ct 1364; 113 L Ed 2d 411 (1991). Allowing

racial discrimination in the jury-selection process to go

unremedied “offends the dignity of persons and the

integrity of the courts.” Id. Doing nothing is not an

available remedy when a trial court is confronted with a

recognizable Batson violation.9

9 The Batson Court made it clear that state courts are to be accorded wide latitude in fashioning a remedy in light of a violation. Batson, supra at 99 n 24. There are two well-accepted remedies available to a trial court in the event a Batson violation occurs. I believe that these remedies are worth mentioning. First, if a trial court determines that a party exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race in violation of Batson, the trial court can disallow the challenge and seat the challenged veniremember. Batson, supra at 99 n 24 (concluding that a trial court should “disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire”). See also State v Grim, 854 (continued…)

Here, the trial court’s “same number if not more” or,

stated differently, “no harm, no foul” approach does not

comport with the principles of Batson and its progeny. Not

only does such an approach suggest that jurors are racially

fungible, but it ignores the fact that veniremembers

Johnson and Jones were excluded from the judicial process

on the basis of race. When faced with an argument similar

to the one advanced by the trial court to support its

approach, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this

(…continued) SW2d 403, 416 (Mo, 1993) (“[T]he proper remedy for discriminatory use of peremptory strikes is to quash the strikes and permit those members of the venire stricken for discriminatory reasons to sit on the jury if they otherwise would.”).

Second, if a trial court determines that the discrimination in the selection process is more pervasive, the court may discharge the entire venire and start the process anew. Batson, supra at 99 n 24 (concluding that the trial court may “discharge the venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with the case”). See also State v McCollum, 334 NC 208, 236; 433 SE2d 144 (1993) (“As Batson violations will always occur at an early stage in the trial before any evidence has been introduced, the simpler, and we think clearly fairer, approach is to begin the jury selection anew with a new panel of prospective jurors who cannot have been affected by any prior Batson violation.”)

In sum, a trial court is under an affirmative duty to ensure that the constitutional mandates of Batson are respected. While there may be other options available to a trial court to remedy a Batson violation, permitting purposeful discrimination to stand without crafting a remedy is not an acceptable option.

argument and reasoned that “[w]here purposeful

discrimination has occurred, to conclude that the

subsequent selection of an African-American juror can

somehow purge the taint of a prosecutor’s impermissible use

of a peremptory strike to exclude a veniremember on the

basis of race confounds the central teachings of Batson.”

Lancaster v Adams, 324 F3d 423, 434 (CA 6, 2003). See also

United States v Harris, 192 F3d 580, 587 (CA 6, 1999)

(rejecting the proposition that the failure to exclude one

member of a protected class is sufficient to insulate the

unlawful exclusion of others.); United States v Battle, 836

F2d 1084, 1086 (CA 8, 1987) (“We emphasize that under

Batson, the striking of a single black juror for racial

reasons violates the equal protection clause, even though

other black jurors are seated, and even when there are

valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors.”);

United States v David, 803 F2d 1567, 1571 (CA 11, 1986).

While a defendant does not have a right to a jury composed

in whole or in part of persons of the defendant’s own race,

the defendant “does have the right to be tried by a jury

whose members are selected pursuant to non-discriminatory

criteria.” Batson, supra at 85-86. In light of these

principles, as well as more recent United States Supreme

Court precedent, I believe that the trial court’s rationale

was fundamentally defective. See, e.g., Powers, supra at

410-414.

Granted, the trial court was placed in a precarious

situation because Johnson and Jones could not be located.

Accordingly, the trial court could not have disallowed the

prosecutor’s challenges and resumed selection with Johnson

and Jones reinstated on the venire.10 Batson, supra at 99 n

24. However, the trial court could have discharged the

venire and selected a new jury from a panel not associated

with the case. Id.; see also ante at 30. Although

inaction is not an option, the trial court failed to take

any remedial action after finding a Batson violation. It

was only by chance that the “same number if not more” of

African-Americans ultimately served on defendants’ jury.

But Batson is principally concerned with why certain

veniremembers are excluded and requires remedial action if

those veniremembers are excused on the basis of race. I

reject the trial court’s rationale that the discrimination

10 In this regard, the trial court observed that the veniremembers could not be located because they left the building. The record is unclear exactly what steps the trial court took to find Johnson and Jones. The trial court possibly could have done more to locate these veniremembers. And if these veniremembers were located, the trial court would have then had the option to reinstate Johnson and Jones on the venire.

against veniremembers Johnson and Jones was somehow “cured”

by the eventual makeup of the jury. Therefore, I would

hold that the trial court erred when it did not take any

action to remedy the Batson violation.

Because the trial court concluded that Johnson and

Jones were purposefully excluded from the jury pool on the

basis of race and the trial court erred by failing to

remedy these Batson violations, I would conclude that this

error is subject to automatic reversal. This Court has yet

to formally decide the issue whether a Batson violation is

structural error that defies harmless error analysis.

Structural errors “are intrinsically harmful, without

regard to their effect on the outcome, so as to require

automatic reversal.” People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 51; 610

NW2d 551 (2000). In other words, structural errors affect

the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end, and

these errors alter the framework within which the trial

proceeds. Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 309-310; 111 S

Ct 1246; 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991).11 In this regard, it must

11 In Fulminante, supra at 310, the Court noted that some examples of structural defects involve the right to self-representation at trial, McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US 168, 177 n 8; 104 S Ct 944; 79 L Ed 2d 122 (1984), and the right to a public trial, Waller v Georgia, 467 US 39, 49 n 9; 104 S Ct 2210; 81 L Ed 2d 31 (1984). Notably, the (continued…)

be observed that the United States Supreme Court has never

suggested that the discriminatory exclusion of prospective

jurors is subject to harmless error review. Indeed, my

review of the Court’s precedent, as well as the decisions

from the federal Courts of Appeals, compels the conclusion

that the purposeful exclusion of a prospective juror on the

basis of race is considered structural error and, thus, it

defies harmless error analysis.

The United States Supreme Court has stressed that

unlawful exclusions in violation of Batson taint the entire

conduct of the trial. Indeed, “the effects of racial

discrimination during voir dire ‘may persist through the

whole course of the trial proceedings.’” Tankleff v

Senkowski, 135 F3d 235, 248 (CA 2, 1998), quoting Powers,

(…continued) United States Supreme Court also observed that the unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury was a structural defect not subject to harmless error analysis. Fulminante, supra at 310, citing Vasquez v Hillery, 474 US 254; 106 S Ct 617; 88 L Ed 2d 598 (1986). More recently, in Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 8; 119 S Ct 1827; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999), the Court again cited Vasquez for the proposition that racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors is structural error subject to automatic reversal. While the precedential value of this proposition has been questioned because Justice White did not join this portion of the Vasquez opinion, the United States Supreme Court itself has cited Vasquez with approval on this proposition.

supra at 412. To this end, the United States Supreme Court

has stated:

A prosecutor’s wrongful exclusion of a juror by a race-based peremptory challenge is a constitutional violation committed in open court at the outset of the proceedings. The overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the cause. [Powers, supra at 412.]

On the basis of this language, the Eight Circuit Court of

Appeals has concluded that Powers “is a strong indication

that the Supreme Court would hold that a constitutional

error involving race-based exclusion of jurors infects the

entire trial process itself and is hence a structural

error.” Ford v Norris, 67 F3d 162, 171 (CA 8, 1995).

Stated differently, unlawful exclusions on the basis of

race are intrinsically harmful.

Further, the United States Supreme Court has also

stressed the impact these exclusions have on the whole

system. For example, the Court has observed that “[t]he

exclusion of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms

that juror and undermines public confidence in the fairness

of the system.” J E B v Alabama, 511 US 127, 142 n 13; 114

S Ct 1419; 128 L Ed 2d 89 (1994). Accordingly, the United

States Supreme Court has consistently reversed convictions

without first determining whether the unlawful exclusion of

potential jurors affected the trial’s outcome. See, e.g.,

Powers, supra at 416. The Court has also required

automatic reversal where unlawful discrimination was shown

in the selection of grand jurors. Vasquez, supra at 263-

264; Rose v Mitchell, 443 US 545, 556; 99 S Ct 2993; 61 L

Ed 2d 739 (1979). Because the Court emphasizes the impact

these exclusions have on the judicial system and regularly

subjects such error to automatic reversal, I believe that

the Court would hold that a race-based exclusion of a

prospective juror is structural error.

The majority of federal Courts of Appeals that have

examined this issue generally have reached the same result

and have concluded that race-based exclusions are

structural error not subject to harmless error analysis.

See, e.g., Tankleff, supra at 248; Rosa v Peters, 36 F3d

625, 635 n 17 (CA 7, 1994); Davis v Secretary for Dep’t of

Corrections, 341 F3d 1310, 1316-1317 (CA 11, 2003); United

States v Angel, 355 F3d 462, 470-471 (CA 6, 2004); Williams

v Woodford, 396 F3d 1059, 1069 (CA 9, 2005). I would join

those jurisdictions and likewise conclude that the

purposeful exclusion of a prospective juror on the basis of

race is structural error. The United States Supreme Court

has made it clear that the purposeful exclusion of a

veniremember on the basis of race defies “harmless error”

analysis and merits automatic reversal. Johnson v United

States, 520 US 461, 468-469; 117 S Ct 1544; 137 L Ed 2d 718

(1997); J E B, supra at 142 n 13. Therefore, until the

United States Supreme Court holds otherwise, if a reviewing

court determines that a prospective juror was excluded from

the jury pool on the basis of race, this is structural

error subject to automatic reversal. Accordingly, because

the trial court found that Batson had been violated but

erred in not remedying the discrimination, defendant Knight

and codefendant Rice are entitled to new trials.

III. Conclusion

A fair reading of the voir dire transcripts indicates

the trial court found that veniremembers Johnson and Jones

were excluded on the basis of race in violation of Batson

and its progeny. I would hold that the trial court

correctly determined that the principles of Batson had been

violated. The prosecutor’s proffered explanations for the

exclusions were race-neutral as a matter of law, and the

trial court did not clearly err when it rejected these

explanations and determined that defendants had proved

purposeful discrimination. However, I would hold that the

purposeful exclusion of veniremembers Johnson and Jones on

the basis of race was not cured by the eventual makeup of

the jury and, thus, the trial court erred by continuing the

proceedings without remedying the Batson violations. Thus,

I would reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and

Michael F. Cavanagh Clifford W. Taylor Marilyn Kelly