The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY February 22, 2018
2018COA22
No. 16CA1446, People In Interest of J.C. — Juvenile Court — Delinquency — Sentencing — Special Offenders — Mandatory Sentence Offender — Repeat Juvenile Offender
A division of the court of appeals considers the scope of a
juvenile court’s sentencing authority pursuant to the Children’s
Code, and concludes that a juvenile’s sentence to an indeterminate
one-to-two-year term of commitment in the custody of the Division
of Youth Corrections (DYC), with a mandatory minimum term of one
year, is illegal for two reasons.
First, the division holds that nothing in the juvenile sentencing
statutes authorizes an indeterminate sentence to commitment to
the DYC, and that any such sentence must be determinate.
Second, the division concludes that a mandatory minimum
sentence to DYC commitment is authorized only if the juvenile qualifies as a special offender under section 19-2-908, C.R.S. 2017.
In deciding this second issue, the division holds that a juvenile
doesn’t qualify as a mandatory sentence offender pursuant to
section 19-2-516(1), C.R.S. 2017, or a repeat juvenile offender
pursuant to section 19-2-516(2), when, as in this case, the multiple
adjudications required by those provisions occurred in the same
hearing.
Accordingly, the division vacates the sentence and remands
the case. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA22
Court of Appeals No. 16CA1446 Jefferson County District Court Nos. 14JD168, 14JD191, 14JD400 & 14JD522 Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of J.C.,
Juvenile-Appellant.
SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Fox and Freyre, JJ., concur
Announced February 22, 2018
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
The Noble Law Firm, LLC, Tara Jorfald, Lakewood, Colorado, for Juvenile- Appellant ¶1 The juvenile court sentenced J.C., a juvenile, to an
indeterminate one-to-two-year term of commitment in the custody
of the Division of Youth Corrections (DYC), with a mandatory
minimum term of one year. We conclude that the sentence is
illegal, for two reasons. First, nothing in the juvenile sentencing
statutes authorizes an indeterminate sentence to DYC commitment;
any such sentence must be determinate. Second, a mandatory
minimum sentence to DYC commitment is authorized only if the
juvenile qualifies as a special offender under section 19-2-908,
C.R.S. 2017. J.C. doesn’t qualify as such an offender, and therefore
the juvenile court had no statutory authority to impose a
mandatory minimum sentence. In deciding this second issue, we
hold that a juvenile doesn’t qualify as a mandatory sentence
offender pursuant to section 19-2-516(1), C.R.S. 2017, or a repeat
juvenile offender pursuant to section 19-2-516(2), when the
multiple adjudications required by those provisions occur in the
same hearing.
¶2 Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand the case with
directions.
1 I. Background
¶3 J.C. pleaded guilty to charges in three separate cases,
pursuant to a global plea agreement, on the same day during a
hearing addressing all three cases. She pleaded guilty first to a
third degree assault charge, then to a second degree criminal
trespass charge, and finally to a second degree assault charge. The
court accepted the pleas and adjudicated J.C. delinquent in all
three cases.
¶4 At the sentencing hearing for all three cases, the prosecutor
argued that because there were three adjudications, two of which
were for violent offenses, the court should commit J.C. to DYC
custody for two years. When the court asked the prosecutor
whether she was requesting that the court sentence J.C. as a
“mandatory offender,” the prosecutor said, “Yes.” In sentencing
J.C., the court said, “I’m going to impose a DYC commitment, a
mandatory minimum of one year, but up to two years.” The
sentencing orders for each case reflect a sentence of “1-2 YEARS
DYC.” Corresponding orders to the Department of Human Services
(DHS) (which includes the DYC) in each case say, “This juvenile was
2 additionally found to be: A mandatory sentence (third time) offender
pursuant to Sec. 19-2-908, C.R.S.”
¶5 J.C. filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Crim. P.
35(a). She argued that the court lacked authority to sentence her to
a mandatory minimum period of confinement as a mandatory
sentence offender because the three adjudications required for the
relevant statute to apply had all occurred at the same hearing. The
court denied the motion. In doing so, the court said it had no
“record that [J.C.] was actually sentenced as a mandatory sentence
offender. The minute order does not reflect such a finding and no
transcript was filed with the Motion to show that such a finding was
made.” Rather, the court said, it had imposed “the mandatory 1
year and a maximum of 2 years in DYC” based on “the totality of
the circumstances.” Apparently in the alternative, the court said
that nothing in the relevant statute defining mandatory sentence
offender, section 19-2-516(1)(a)(I), requires that the three
adjudications be entered on separate dates.
¶6 J.C. then filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging both
ineffective assistance of plea counsel and that she hadn’t
knowingly, voluntarily, or intentionally pleaded guilty. Common to
3 both claims was her assertion that her lawyer hadn’t told her that
by pleading guilty she could be sentenced as a mandatory sentence
offender. The court summarily denied the motion, ruling, as now
relevant, that because “it has not been shown that the court relied
on this classification in its sentencing,” she hadn’t shown prejudice.
J.C. appeals the court’s denial of the Crim. P. 35(c) motion.
II. Discussion
¶7 J.C.’s opening brief argues that the juvenile court erred by
summarily denying her petition for postconviction relief because she
had alleged that neither her lawyer nor the court had advised her
“that she would be sentenced as a repeat juvenile offender” and that
she was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance and the
court’s failure to advise her. That prejudice was that she wouldn’t
have pleaded guilty if she’d known she would be sentenced to a
mandatory minimum term of confinement.
¶8 After reading the parties’ briefs and the record, we asked the
parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the following four
issues:
1. Notwithstanding the district court’s statements in denying J.C.’s Crim. P. 35(a) motion, did the district court sentence J.C. as
4 a mandatory sentence offender or repeat juvenile offender pursuant to § 19-2-908, C.R.S. 2017?
2. If not, what statutory authority did the district court have to sentence J.C. to a “mandatory minimum” period of commitment?
3. If so, did J.C. qualify as a mandatory sentence offender under §§ 19-2-516(1) and 19-2-908(1)(a)? Explain.
4. If so, did J.C. qualify as a repeat juvenile offender under §§ 19-2-516(2) and 19-2- 908(1)(b)? Explain.
¶9 Having reviewed the parties’ supplemental briefs and the
relevant law, we conclude that J.C.’s sentence is illegal. We
therefore vacate the sentence. And because we vacate the sentence
on which J.C.’s Crim. P. 35(c) claims are premised, we also
conclude that her Crim. P. 35(c) motion is moot.
A. We May Consider the Legality of J.C.’s Sentence
¶ 10 Initially, the People invite us to hold that J.C. abandoned the
issue of the legality of her sentence because she didn’t appeal from
the order denying her motion to correct an illegal sentence. They
acknowledge that Crim. P. 35(a) authorizes a court to correct an
illegal sentence “at any time.” Nonetheless, they urge us not to
consider this issue because, they argue, (1) the word “may” in that
5 rule creates an option, but not an obligation for an appellate court
to vacate an illegal sentence;1 and (2) therefore we should apply the
familiar principle of appellate practice that a party waives for appeal
an issue that she doesn’t reassert on appeal.
¶ 11 The People’s argument, however, overlooks the more directly
relevant principle that “[a]llegations that a particular sentence is
void or illegal require inquiry into the subject matter jurisdiction of
the sentencing court and may not be waived.” Downing v. People,
895 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Colo. 1995); see People v. Hinchman, 196
Colo. 556, 530, 589 P.2d 917, 920 (1978). Indeed, when there’s a
question as to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a court has
an obligation to address it, even if the parties haven’t raised it. See
People v. S.X.G., 2012 CO 5, ¶ 9; Allison v. Engel, 2017 COA 43,
¶ 22; see also Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534,
541 (1986) (an appellate court has an “obligation” to consider a trial
court’s jurisdiction, even if the parties conceded it); Archer W.
Contractors, Ltd. v. Benise-Dowling & Assocs., Inc., 33 So. 3d 1216,
1Crim. P. 35(a) says that “[t]he court may correct a sentence that was not authorized by law or that was imposed without jurisdiction at any time.”
6 1270 (Ala. 2009) (“[W]e are obligated to address the absence of [a
trial court’s] subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu.”).
¶ 12 The “at any time” language of Crim. P. 35(a) merely gives effect
to this principle. So a defendant may raise the legality of his
sentence for the first time on appeal. Downing, 895 P.2d at 1050;
Hinchman, 196 Colo. at 530, 589 P.2d at 919-20. And a court may
raise the issue on its own. People v. White, 179 P.3d 58, 61 (Colo.
App. 2007) (citing Guerin v. Fullerton, 154 Colo. 142, 144, 389 P.2d
84, 85 (1964)). In any case, save perhaps when issue preclusion or
some other similar doctrine applies, see In re Marriage of Mallon,
956 P.2d 642, 645-46 (Colo. App. 1998), a substantial question as
to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, whenever or however raised,
isn’t one a court is free to duck.
¶ 13 We decline the People’s invitation.
B. J.C.’s Sentence Is Illegal
¶ 14 “An illegal sentence is one that is not authorized by law,
meaning that it is inconsistent with the sentencing scheme
established by the legislature.” People v. Jenkins, 2013 COA 76,
¶ 11; see Delgado v. People, 105 P.3d 634, 636 (Colo. 2005). While
it’s true that “a trial court normally has broad discretion to craft a
7 sentence it deems appropriate for a particular [juvenile] offender,”
A.S. v. People, 2013 CO 63, ¶ 15, “in exercising its discretion, the
sentencing court may not depart from the statutory sentencing
scheme to impose what it considers to be a more appropriate
sentence,” People in Interest of J.S.R., 2014 COA 98M, ¶ 34; see
People v. Dist. Court, 673 P.2d 991, 995 (Colo. 1983) (A court “may
not impose a sentence that is inconsistent with the terms specified
by statutes.”). This is so because “it is the prerogative of the
legislature to define crimes and prescribe punishments.” Fierro v.
People, 206 P.3d 460, 461 (Colo. 2009).
¶ 15 We review the legality of a sentence de novo. See People v.
Bassford, 2014 COA 15, ¶ 20; Jenkins, ¶ 11. This case requires us
to interpret statutes to determine the legality of the sentence, and
such interpretation we also review de novo. See, e.g., Marsh v.
People, 2017 CO 10M, ¶ 19.
1. Sentencing to DHS Commitment Generally
¶ 16 Section 19-2-907, C.R.S. 2017, of the Children’s Code
delineates a juvenile court’s sentencing options. It limits a court’s
authority to sentence a juvenile to DHS commitment, as opposed to
other sentencing options, to essentially two situations: (1) as
8 allowed when the court adjudicates the juvenile a special offender
pursuant to section 19-2-908, see § 19-2-907(2); or (2) as allowed
when the court adjudicates the juvenile for an offense that would
constitute a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult,
pursuant to section 19-2-909(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017, or section 19-2-
921(3)(c), C.R.S. 2017, see § 19-2-907(1)(a). Applying this
framework to this case gives rise to two questions. Can a juvenile
court sentence a juvenile to an indeterminate term of DHS
commitment, as the juvenile court did in this case? And when is a
mandatory minimum term of DHS commitment required? We
answer these questions in turn, and in answering the second also
decide whether J.C. qualifies for mandatory minimum sentencing.
2. Indeterminate Sentencing
a. A Court Must Sentence a Juvenile to a Determinate Sentence
¶ 17 As noted, section 19-2-907 catalogs a court’s sentencing
options in a juvenile case. It doesn’t say anything expressly about
determinate or indeterminate sentencing (it cross-references other
sentencing statutes), but other statutes do. Section 19-2-921(3)(a)
flatly says, “As provided in section 19-2-907, commitment of a
juvenile to the department of human services shall be for a
9 determinate period.” And the statutes specifically addressing
certain categories of juveniles who may (or must) be sentenced to
DHS commitment expressly say that a sentence imposed
thereunder shall be for a “determinate period.” §§ 19-2-601(5)(a)(I),
C.R.S. 2017 (aggravated juvenile offenders); § 19-2-909(1)(a) (a
juvenile adjudicated for an offense that would constitute a felony or
misdemeanor if committed by an adult); § 19-2-921(3)(b) (same as
section 19-2-601(5)(a)(I)); § 19-2-921(3)(c) (same as section 19-2-
909(1)(a)).
¶ 18 Perhaps this is a good place to explain what the term
“determinate sentence” means, and to draw the distinction between
such a sentence and an indeterminate sentence.
¶ 19 For purposes of juvenile sentencing, the term “determinate
period” is actually defined by statute. Section 19-1-103(40.5),
C.R.S. 2017, says that it
means that the department of human services may not transfer legal or physical custody of a juvenile until the juvenile has completed the period of commitment imposed by the court, unless otherwise ordered by the court; except that the department may release the juvenile on parole prior to completion of the determinate period, as provided in section 19-2-1002.
10 (Emphasis added.) This definition obviously contemplates a point
in time at which the period of commitment is deemed completed.
Absent some such definitive point in time, authorities
contemplating a transfer of legal or physical custody or parole
couldn’t know when to take such action.
¶ 20 The definition in section 19-1-103(40.5) is therefore consistent
with the common understanding of determinate sentence: a
sentence for a fixed or definite length (for example, one year). An
indeterminate sentence, on the other hand, is a sentence for a
range of time (for example, one to two years). See Hildebrandt v.
State, 770 N.E.2d 355, 359-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing the
difference between a determinate sentence and an indeterminate
sentence); State v. Artis, 893 N.W.2d 421, 427 (Neb. 2017) (same);
compare § 18-1.3-404(1), C.R.S. 2017 (governing duration of
sentences for felonies and providing that such sentences shall be
for a “definite term”), with § 18-1.3-904, C.R.S. 2017 (a court must
“commit a sex offender to the custody of the department for an
indeterminate term having a minimum of one day and a maximum
of his or her natural life”).
11 ¶ 21 With this understanding of determinate sentences in mind, we
see that sections 19-2-601(5)(a)(I), -909(1)(a), -921(3)(b),
and -921(3)(c) plainly don’t allow for sentences to a range; rather,
they require sentences to fixed, definite periods.
¶ 22 Only one other statute, section 19-2-908, provides for
sentencing juveniles to DHS commitment. Unlike the other statutes
mentioned above, it doesn’t use the words “determinate period.”
What it requires (subject to a court’s determination otherwise), is
that special offenders be sentenced to DHS commitment for a term
of “not less than one year.” § 19-2-908(1)(a), (b), (c); see also § 19-
2-908(1)(d) (providing that aggravated juvenile offenders, a class of
special offender, must be sentenced according to section 19-2-601);
§ 19-2-601(5)(a)(1)(B), (C) (requiring a sentence for “a determinate
period of at least three” years). Despite the fact section 19-2-908
doesn’t use the term “determinate period,” we think it clear enough
that it also contemplates determinate sentences, for two reasons.
¶ 23 First, as noted, section 19-2-921(3)(a) says that sentences to
DHS commitment provided for under section 19-2-907 “shall be for
a determinate period,” and section 19-2-907 expressly refers to
12 sentencing of special offenders under section 19-2-908. § 19-2-
907(2).
¶ 24 Second, the apparent purpose of the sentencing provisions in
section 19-2-908 is to limit the court’s discretion in setting
sentences for special offenders by requiring mandatory minimum
terms of commitment. Nothing in that statute even hints at
indeterminate sentencing.
¶ 25 Based on our review of the entire juvenile sentencing scheme,
we conclude that a court may not sentence a juvenile to DHS
commitment for an indeterminate term: a determinate sentence is
required.
b. J.C.’s Indeterminate Sentence Is Illegal
¶ 26 The court sentenced J.C. to one to two years in DYC. That’s
an indeterminate sentence. It’s therefore illegal. We vacate the
sentence and remand for resentencing.
3. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing
¶ 27 Even though we’ve decided that J.C.’s indeterminate sentence
is illegal, we address whether the court may sentence her to a
mandatory minimum period of commitment because the issue is
13 likely to arise on remand. We conclude that there’s no mandatory
minimum provision that applies to J.C.’s three adjudications.
a. Sentencing as a Special Offender
¶ 28 Again, section 19-2-907(2) says a court shall sentence a
juvenile adjudicated as a special offender pursuant to section 19-2-
908. Section 19-2-908, in turn, creates four categories of special
offenders, two of which are relevant here: mandatory sentence
offenders and repeat juvenile offenders. § 19-2-908(1)(a), (b).2
When a court sentences a juvenile as a mandatory sentence
offender or repeat juvenile offender, it may sentence her to DHS
commitment “for not less than one year.” § 19-2-908(1)(a), (b). This
“not less than” language is synonymous with a mandatory
minimum sentence.3
¶ 29 So this statute clearly authorizes (indeed, if applicable,
presumptively requires) a mandatory minimum term of DHS
2 The other categories are violent juvenile offenders and aggravated juvenile offenders. § 19-2-908(1)(c), (d) C.R.S. 2017; A.S v. People, 2013 CO 63, ¶ 16. No one asserts that J.C. qualifies as either.
3 Under section 19-2-908, the court may sentence a special offender to “an alternative sentence or a commitment of less than one year” if it determines that such a sentence or term “would be more appropriate.” § 19-2-908(1)(a), (b), (c).
14 commitment. We turn, then, to whether J.C. qualifies as either a
mandatory sentence offender or a repeat juvenile offender.
i. J.C. Isn’t a Mandatory Sentence Offender
¶ 30 At the outset, we again note that after J.C. filed her motion to
correct an illegal sentence under Crim. P. 35(a), arguing that the
court didn’t have any authority to sentence her as a mandatory
sentence offender, the court said that it didn’t have “a record” that
it had sentenced J.C. as a mandatory sentence offender. The
People say the court didn’t sentence J.C. as a mandatory sentence
offender. (J.C. doesn’t take a clear position on the question.)
¶ 31 Appellate courts generally defer to a lower court’s construction
of its own rulings. See State v. Denya, 986 A.2d 260, 269 (Conn.
2010); Commonwealth v. Lebo, 713 A.2d 1158, 1161 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998) (affording “great deference” to a court’s interpretation of its
own order); Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 179 P.3d 786, 788
(Utah 2008) (same); Leitao v. Commonwealth, 573 S.E.2d 317, 319
(Va. Ct. App. 2002) (“We defer to the trial court’s interpretation of
its own order.”). But in this case we can’t. In the sentencing orders
sent to DHS, the court said it was sentencing J.C. as a mandatory
offender, and the court said at sentencing that it was sentencing
15 J.C. to “DYC commitment, mandatory minimum one year.” We also
observe that, in ruling on J.C.’s post-sentencing motions, the court
appears to have been less than certain that it hadn’t sentenced J.C.
as a mandatory sentence offender. In any event, we feel we must
decide if it may do so on remand, particularly in light of the juvenile
court’s alternative ruling that J.C. is eligible for sentencing as a
mandatory sentence offender.
¶ 32 Section 19-2-908(1)(a) provides that “[t]he court shall place or
commit any juvenile adjudicated as a mandatory sentence offender,
as described in section 19-2-516(1), out of the home for not less
than one year.”4 Section 19-2-516(1) defines such an offender, in
relevant part, as a juvenile who “[h]as been adjudicated a juvenile
delinquent twice . . . and . . . [i]s subsequently adjudicated a
juvenile delinquent.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 33 A guilty plea that the court accepts plainly constitutes an
“adjudication” under the statute, so there’s no question J.C. was
“adjudicated” a total of three times by entering three guilty pleas.
4 Section 19-1-103(85), C.R.S. 2017, defines “[p]lacement out of the home” as “placement for twenty-four-hour residential care in any facility or center operated or licensed by the department of human services.”
16 See § 19-1-103(2) (“‘Adjudication’ means a determination by the
court that . . . a juvenile has pled guilty to committing a delinquent
act.”). But was J.C. “subsequently adjudicated” when she entered
her third guilty plea in the same hearing as the first two? We
conclude that she wasn’t.
¶ 34 When interpreting a statute, we must give effect to the General
Assembly’s purpose or intent in enacting the statute. Martin v.
People, 27 P.3d 846, 851 (Colo. 2001). We start by attributing to
the words and phrases used in the statute their plain and ordinary
meanings. People v. Perez, 238 P.3d 665, 669 (Colo. 2010). And we
consider the words or phrases at issue in context — both in the
context of the statute of which the words or phrases are a part and
in the context of any comprehensive statutory scheme of which the
statute is a part. People v. Hill, 228 P.3d 171, 173-74 (Colo. App.
2009); see Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3, ¶ 20 (a court must
“read the scheme as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and
sensible effect to all of its parts”); Krol v. CF & I Steel, 2013 COA 32,
¶ 15.
¶ 35 If, after applying these principles, we determine that the
relevant words or phrases are unambiguous, we enforce them as
17 written, and we won’t resort to other rules of statutory construction.
People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Colo. 1994); People v.
Shores, 2016 COA 129, ¶ 16.
¶ 36 Again, the plain language of the statute defining mandatory
sentence offender requires that the juvenile “[h]as been adjudicated
a juvenile delinquent twice” and “[i]s subsequently adjudicated a
juvenile delinquent.” § 19-2-516(1)(a)(I), (b)(I) (emphasis added).
Though the statute doesn’t define “subsequent,” we know that it
entails the passage of some time. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1656
(10th ed. 2014) (defining “subsequent” as “occurring later; coming
after something else”). And, of course, “has been” indicates the
same thing — that the first two adjudications occurred before the
first. See A.S., ¶ 17 (“A ‘mandatory sentence offender’ is a juvenile
who is adjudicated delinquent (and/or revoked from probation for a
delinquent act) for a third time.”).
¶ 37 The People essentially argue that “subsequent” can mean as
little as a few minutes.5 Perhaps that’s so in other contexts. But in
5Oddly, in our view, J.C. appears to buy this argument. The concession is troubling, but not controlling. See People v. Knott, 83 P.3d 1147, 1148 (Colo. App. 2003) (“We are not bound by the parties’ concessions as to the applicable law.”).
18 the context of this statute, such an interpretation would rob the
word “subsequent” of any real meaning. See People v. J.J.H., 17
P.3d 159, 162 (Colo. 2001) (we don’t presume the legislature uses
language idly, with no intent that meaning should be given to it).
For “subsequent” to retain any significance in this context, it must
entail the passage of enough time for the juvenile to experience the
consequences, i.e., the sentences, of her first two adjudications.
Were the passage of such time irrelevant, the General Assembly
could’ve simply defined a mandatory sentence offender as a juvenile
who has been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent three times, or who
has committed three acts for which the juvenile has been
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. Instead, the General Assembly
chose to define the term in a way that turns on the timing (“has
been,” “subsequent”) of the adjudications as much as the number of
adjudications.6
6 The People’s reliance on People in Interest of J.C.P., 151 P.3d 635 (Colo. App. 2006), is misplaced. In that case, the division said the mandatory offender provision “makes no reference to the date of the commission of the offense underlying the prior adjudications. It requires only that a juvenile be adjudicated delinquent after the entry of two prior delinquency adjudications.” Id. at 636-37. This case doesn’t involve any question as to the effect of the dates of the offenses.
19 ¶ 38 The clear objective of the statutory scheme reinforces our
interpretation. See Martin, 27 P.3d at 851-52 (“In interpreting a
comprehensive legislative scheme, we must construe each provision
to further the overall legislative intent behind the statutes.”). As the
supreme court has put it,
[o]ne of the fundamental differences between the juvenile system of justice and an adult criminal prosecution “is the overriding goal of the Children’s Code to provide guidance and rehabilitation of an adjudicated delinquent child in a manner consistent with the best interest of the child and the protection of society rather than fixing criminal responsibility, guilt, and punishment.”
J.J.H., 17 P.3d at 163 (quoting S.G.W. v. People, 752 P.2d 86, 91
(Colo. 1988)); see also A.S., ¶ 14 (“The juvenile justice system aims
to provide guidance, rehabilitation, and restoration for the juvenile
and to protect society, rather than focusing principally on criminal
conduct and assigning criminal responsibility, guilt, and
punishment.”). This emphasis on rehabilitation indicates that the
General Assembly intended to provide juvenile offenders with an
opportunity to benefit, and learn from, prior sentencing before
facing enhanced sentencing for a third adjudication.
20 ¶ 39 For these reasons, we conclude that J.C. wasn’t “subsequently
adjudicated” for a third time. It follows that the court couldn’t
legally have sentenced her to a mandatory minimum term of
commitment as a mandatory sentence offender. Her sentence is
therefore illegal for this reason as well.
ii. J.C. Isn’t a Repeat Juvenile Offender
¶ 40 Section 19-2-516(2) defines a repeat juvenile offender as one
who “has been previously adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and is
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for a delinquent act that
constitutes a felony.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 41 The People (and J.C., for that matter) argue that J.C. qualifies
as a repeat juvenile offender because she first pleaded guilty to
what would, if she were an adult, constitute two misdemeanors and
then pleaded guilty to what would, if she were an adult, constitute a
felony (the second degree assault charge). So, the argument goes,
she “was previously adjudicated” (for the two misdemeanors) before
being adjudicated for the felony. But this argument fails for the
same reasons the People’s argument concerning mandatory
sentence offenders fails, and more.
21 ¶ 42 We interpret “previously” as the reciprocal of “subsequently” in
section 19-2-516(1). The plain language of this provision similarly
emphasizes a passage of time between the first adjudication and the
latter. And, of course, the statute’s emphasis on rehabilitation
applies to this provision as well. These observations lead us to read
“previously” to require time for a juvenile offender to experience the
consequences of her misdemeanor sentence before facing an
enhanced sentence for an ensuing felony.
¶ 43 Additionally, to interpret the provision as the parties urge
could lead to absurd results. See, e.g., Mosley v. People, 2017 CO
20, ¶ 16 (“[W]e avoid statutory interpretations that defeat legislative
intent or lead to absurd results.”). If we accepted the parties’
interpretation, a juvenile such as J.C. would face a different
sentence depending on which plea she entered first during a
hearing on multiple charges; if she pleaded guilty to the
misdemeanor first, the court would be required to sentence her as a
repeat juvenile offender, but if she pleaded guilty to the felony first,
the provision wouldn’t apply. We can’t fathom that the General
Assembly intended such an arbitrary outcome.
22 ¶ 44 In sum, we conclude that section 19-2-908 also excludes J.C.
from the category of repeat juvenile offenders. Therefore, the court
couldn’t legally have sentenced her to a mandatory minimum term
of commitment as a repeat juvenile offender, and can’t do so on
remand.
b. Sentencing Under Section 19-2-921
¶ 45 In her supplemental brief, J.C. says that if the court didn’t
sentence her as a special offender, it didn’t have statutory authority
to sentence her to a mandatory minimum of one year of DHS
commitment. The People, however, seem to argue that section 19-
2-921(3)(c) provides such authority. Their argument fails.
¶ 46 Section 19-2-921(3)(c) allows a court to commit a juvenile to
DHS if the court adjudicates the juvenile “for an offense that would
constitute a felony or a misdemeanor.” But, as discussed above,
that provision simply allows a sentence to commitment only for a
“determinate period” that “shall not exceed two years.” It sets a
ceiling, but unlike section 19-2-908, sets no floor. A court therefore
isn’t limited to imposing any particular minimum period of
23 commitment in sentencing a juvenile under this provision. Put
another way, it can’t be read as allowing a mandatory minimum.7
III. Conclusion
¶ 47 The Children’s Code sentencing scheme didn’t afford the court
the authority to impose an indeterminate sentence or a sentence to
a mandatory minimum term of commitment. Consequently, the
sentence is illegal. We therefore vacate the sentence and remand
the case to the district court with directions to resentence J.C.
Because we vacate the sentence on which J.C.’s Crim. P. 35(c)
claims are premised, those claims are moot.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE FREYRE concur.
7 This analysis also applies to section 19-2-909(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017, which is strikingly similar to section 19-2-921(3)(c), C.R.S. 2017. And it applies to sentencing of aggravated offenders under section 19-2-601(5)(a), C.R.S. 2017, which also requires imposition of a “determinate” sentence.