People in Interest of M.M.F.

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1468
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY March 26, 2026

2026COA21

No. 25CA1468, People in Interest of M.M.F. — Juvenile Court — Dependency and Neglect — Deferred Adjudication — Order of Dismissal — Standing — Non-State Parties in Dependency and Neglect Proceedings; Appeals — Final Appealable Order

A division of the court of appeals determines that a juvenile

court’s order of dismissal in a dependency and neglect case

constitutes a final, appealable order. The division also determines

that People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34, prevents a youth,

through a counsel for youth, from pursuing an adjudication

judgment following a period of deferred adjudication under section

19-3-505(5), C.R.S. 2025. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026COA21

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1468 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 24JV30248 Honorable Lisa Gomez, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.M.F., a/k/a R.F., a Child,

Child-Appellant,

and Concerning M.M.S. and M.F.F.,

Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Fox and Kuhn, JJ., concur

Announced March 26, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for M.M.F., a/k/a R.F.

Genevieve Manco, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Thornton, Colorado, for Appellee M.M.S.

Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee M.F.F. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect case, after the parties agreed

to a deferred adjudication under section 19-3-505(5), C.R.S. 2025,

the juvenile court dismissed the case at the request of Denver

Human Services (the Department) and over the objection of M.M.F.,

a/k/a R.F. (the youth), who was represented by a counsel for youth

(CFY). In doing so, the court relied on the supreme court’s opinion

in People in Interest of R.M.P., 2025 CO 34. The R.M.P. court held,

among other things, that a child, through a CFY, lacks standing to

continue pursuing a petition in dependency and neglect after the

State decides to dismiss it.

¶2 This appeal requires us to resolve two questions. First, did the

juvenile court’s order of dismissal constitute a final, appealable

order? And second, does R.M.P. also preclude a youth, through a

CFY, from pursuing an adjudication judgment following a period of

deferred adjudication? We conclude that the answer to both

questions is yes. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s dismissal

of this dependency and neglect case at the Department’s request.

I. Background

¶3 In January 2024, the Department filed a petition in

dependency and neglect after it received a referral from the juvenile

1 court to investigate the youth’s truancy case. The Department

alleged, among other things, that M.M.S. (mother) had left a

treatment facility for fentanyl dependence and that the youth had

mental health issues the parents couldn’t adequately address.

M.F.F. (father) didn’t reside with the family.

¶4 In July 2024, the parents made no-fault admissions to the

petition and agreed to deferred adjudications under section

19-3-505(5). Ten months later, the Department informed the

juvenile court that it wanted to dismiss the petition and close the

case because it had no ongoing safety concerns. The CFY objected

to dismissal, asserting, among other things, that the parents

weren’t yet adequately addressing the youth’s mental health needs.

The parents argued that the CFY didn’t have the “ability to

prosecute a case that the Department d[id] not wish to keep open.”

¶5 The juvenile court noted that a similar question was “currently

pending before the Colorado Supreme Court with respect to the

ability of the CFY to prosecute a case.” But the court noted that the

case law at the time allowed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to “object[] to

the closure of a case” and required the court to “hold a hearing to

determine whether or not the case should remain open.” In light of

2 the pending supreme court decision, the parties agreed to keep the

case open, and the court determined that, for the time being, the

CFY had “standing to object to the case closure.”

¶6 Shortly after the hearing, the supreme court announced its

decision in R.M.P., 2025 CO 34. In that case, after the department

filed a petition in dependency and neglect, but before an

adjudication was entered, the department moved to dismiss the

case. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. R.M.P., through his appointed CFY, objected to

the dismissal and asked the juvenile court to hold a hearing to

determine whether there was credible evidence to proceed to an

adjudicatory hearing. Id. at ¶ 10. The court agreed, determined

that credible evidence existed to justify an adjudicatory hearing,

and set the matter for a hearing. Id. at ¶ 11. The father and the

department sought relief from the supreme court under C.A.R. 21.

R.M.P., ¶ 12. On review, the supreme court held that “the State, in

its role as parens patriae, is the sole party that may prosecute

dependency and neglect proceedings.” Id. at ¶ 4. As a result, the

supreme court determined that R.M.P. couldn’t “prosecute the

petition in dependency and neglect when the State ha[d] determined

that the petition should be dismissed.” Id. at ¶ 5.

3 ¶7 At the next hearing in the present case, the Department again

informed the juvenile court that it wished to dismiss the petition,

and the parents argued that R.M.P. required dismissal. The CFY

objected to dismissal and asserted that the present case was

distinguishable from R.M.P. because the court had already made a

finding that the youth in this case was dependent and neglected.

The CFY therefore argued that the youth had standing to file a

motion to revoke the deferred adjudication. The court read R.M.P.

to hold that, “prior to [an] adjudication[] entering[,] . . . the

Department of Human Services has the authority to dismiss a

petition outright.” Because an adjudication hadn’t yet entered, the

court determined that the CFY lacked standing to object to the

dismissal. The court therefore granted the Department’s request to

dismiss the case.

II. Finality

¶8 Shortly after the youth filed his appeal, this court ordered him

to show cause why the appeal shouldn’t be dismissed based on the

lack of a final, appealable order. Following the youth’s response, a

motions division of this court deferred the matter to the merits

4 division. Now considering the merits, we conclude that the juvenile

court’s decision dismissing the petition is a final, appealable order.

¶9 Our jurisdiction is limited to the review of final, appealable

judgments or orders. People in Interest of S.C., 2020 COA 95, ¶ 6;

C.A.R. 1(a). An order is final if it ends the action, leaving nothing

further to be done to determine the parties’ rights. People in

Interest of M.R.M., 2021 COA 22, ¶ 13. A final, appealable order is

one that prevents further proceedings or effectively terminates the

proceedings. S.C., ¶ 6.

¶ 10 In general, an order dismissing a case without prejudice isn’t a

final order. Id. at ¶ 8. But when “the circumstances of the case

indicate that the action cannot be saved and that the district court’s

order precludes further proceedings, dismissal without prejudice

qualifies as a final judgment for the purposes of appeal.” Avicanna

Inc. v. Mewhinney, 2019 COA 129, ¶ 1 n.1.

¶ 11 The youth asserts that, although the Department could file a

new case with the same family, the new case would necessarily

require the Department to make new allegations and therefore

wouldn’t involve simply refiling the same petition. Thus, says the

5 youth, the order of dismissal in this case is unlike a dismissal

without prejudice in a general civil or criminal case.

¶ 12 We agree with the youth that the Department can’t simply

refile the same petition. See People in Interest of D.L.E., 645 P.2d

271, 273-74 (Colo. 1982) (noting that the doctrines of claim

preclusion and issue preclusion require that a second petition raise

new allegations). Given this, the juvenile court’s dismissal order

ended the action, leaving nothing further for the court to do to

determine the parties’ rights. The dismissal order therefore

constitutes a final, appealable order. See M.R.M., ¶ 13.

¶ 13 We recognize that a division of this court, in People in Interest

of C.S., 2017 COA 96, ¶ 15, determined that a juvenile court’s

“order granting the parties’ voluntary dismissal of the petition in

dependency and neglect is not final and appealable.” But we

decline to follow C.S. because, in our view, that portion of C.S. is no

longer good law. See Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 13 (noting

that a division of the court of appeals isn’t bound by the decisions

of other divisions).

¶ 14 In C.S., ¶¶ 22-23, the division relied on language in section

19-1-109(2)(c), C.R.S. 2025, and the interpretation of that language

6 in People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, aff’d on other grounds

sub nom., People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31, to

determine that the dismissal order wasn’t final and appealable.

Section 19-1-109(2)(c) provides that “[a]n order decreeing a child to

be neglected or dependent shall be a final and appealable order.”

The S.M-L. division reasoned that, because the language in section

19-1-109(2)(c) didn’t also include corresponding “language

permitting an appeal from a ‘no adjudication’ finding, . . . the

legislature did not intend for such determinations to be final

appealable orders.” S.M-L., ¶ 19.

¶ 15 On review, the supreme court disagreed with that portion of

the S.M-L. division’s reasoning, concluding that the legislature

intended section 19-1-109(2)(c) as an exception to the general rule

of finality. R.S., ¶ 20. In other words, the supreme court

determined that a “no adjudication” finding could be final if it

otherwise satisfied the general rule of finality. See id. at ¶ 38.

¶ 16 In sum, the legal authority on which the C.S. division relied

has since been overturned. And because the juvenile court’s order

dismissing the instant case satisfies the general rule of finality, as

7 described above, we conclude the order is final and appealable. See

R.S., ¶ 20; S.C., ¶ 10.

III. Standing

¶ 17 Now turning to the core issue of the youth’s standing, we

conclude that the juvenile court properly dismissed the case

because, under R.M.P., the youth didn’t have standing to prosecute

a motion to revoke the deferred adjudication.

¶ 18 “[W]hether a non-state party can prosecute a dependency and

neglect petition ultimately presents an issue of standing, which

implicates the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to proceed and thus may

be raised at any time.” R.M.P., ¶ 18. We review standing issues de

novo. Id.

¶ 19 In dependency and neglect proceedings, the State, through the

county department of human services, is the only party that may

file a petition in dependency and neglect. McCall v. Dist. Ct., 651

P.2d 392, 394 (Colo. 1982). The filing of the petition begins the first

phase of a dependency and neglect proceeding, in which “the court

determines if there are grounds to adjudicate the child dependent

and neglected.” E.O. v. People in Interest of C.O.A., 854 P.2d 797,

800 (Colo. 1993).

8 ¶ 20 The Colorado Children’s Code contemplates two procedures to

reach the end of the first phase:

(1) The standard procedure requires the department to prove

the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the

evidence at an evidentiary hearing, see § 19-3-505(1), or,

in the alternative, a parent may waive their right to a

hearing and admit the allegations, see People in Interest

of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 19. If the department proves

the allegations or the parent admits them, the juvenile

court will sustain the petition and enter an order of

adjudication. See § 19-3-505(7)(a).

(2) The deferred adjudication procedure, by contrast, allows

the juvenile court to “continue” the adjudicatory hearing

“from time to time” for up to twelve months after the

court finds that the allegations are supported by a

preponderance of the evidence but before entry of an

adjudication order. § 19-3-505(5). At the end of the

twelve-month period, “the petition shall either be

dismissed or sustained.” § 19-3-505(5)(b).

9 ¶ 21 As relevant here, the two procedures differ only in the timing

of entering the formal adjudication order: In the standard

procedure, the court enters the order at the conclusion of the

hearing, but in the deferred adjudication procedure, the court can

delay entering the order for up to twelve months to provide the

parent with additional time to demonstrate compliance with the

conditions of the deferral.

¶ 22 The youth asserts that the present case is distinct from R.M.P.

because of the deferred adjudication procedure. But the youth

doesn’t argue that he had standing to prosecute the petition

through a motion to revoke the deferred adjudication. See

C.R.J.P. 4.18(f) (describing the procedure a court must follow when

a party files a motion to revoke). In fact, despite his assertion in the

juvenile court that he had authority to file such a motion

notwithstanding the supreme court’s holding in R.M.P., the youth

now submits that he isn’t asking “to assume the role of the State.”

¶ 23 Instead, the youth maintains that the juvenile court had the

authority to enter an adjudication over the Department’s motion to

dismiss without any action on his part. Practically speaking, this

can’t be so. In N.G., ¶ 23, a division of this court determined that a

10 parent subject to a motion to revoke a deferred adjudication is

entitled to a hearing, upon request, for the court to “reconsider[] the

child’s status before entering the adjudicatory order.” Put

differently, for the court to enter an adjudication in this case, it

would have first been required to afford the parents an opportunity

to present new evidence at a hearing regarding the youth’s current

status. Id. at ¶¶ 25-27; see also C.R.J.P. 4.18(f)(1) (requiring the

court to hold a hearing on a pending motion to revoke before

entering an adjudication).

¶ 24 But because the Department didn’t believe that an

adjudication should enter, it declined to prosecute a motion to

revoke. And the only party willing to prosecute a revocation

motion — the youth — didn’t have standing to do so. Nor could the

court pick up the prosecutorial mantle. See Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. 5

Star Feedlot, Inc., 2021 CO 27, ¶ 39 n.15 (“[The] adversarial system

of justice . . . puts the onus on the parties to frame the issues to be

decided while assigning to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the

matters raised by the parties.”).

¶ 25 At bottom, we agree with the juvenile court that it lacked

authority to keep the case open over the Department’s motion to

11 dismiss. See R.M.P., ¶ 32 (“[T]he juvenile court should have granted

the Department’s motion to dismiss the petition in dependency and

neglect.”); see also People in Interest of N.K.S., 2025 COA 100, ¶ 7

(“[T]he supreme court determined that a ‘non-state party,’ such as a

GAL or [CFY], does not have standing to prosecute a dependency

and neglect petition when ‘the State has determined that the

petition should be dismissed.’” (quoting R.M.P., ¶¶ 3, 33)). The

ultimate question in a deferred adjudication is no different than in

the standard procedure: whether the court will sustain the petition.

See § 19-3-505(5)(b), (7)(a). Given this overlap, for the court to

enter an adjudication following the deferred period, the State must

be willing to prosecute the petition through a motion to revoke. See

R.M.P., ¶ 33. The Department was unwilling to do so here, and the

youth lacked standing to assume the Department’s prosecutorial

role. See id.

¶ 26 We therefore conclude that any distinction between R.M.P. and

the present case based on the deferred adjudication procedure

didn’t confer standing on the youth to prosecute the petition.

Because R.M.P. controls, we affirm the dismissal order. See N.K.S.,

¶ 11 (“We are bound by holdings of the Colorado Supreme Court.”).

12 IV. Other Contentions

¶ 27 The youth also raises other arguments challenging the juvenile

court’s dismissal order that don’t directly implicate issues of subject

matter jurisdiction. The youth asserts, for example, that the court

violated his “right to have an adjudication made either dismissing

or sustaining the petition” under section 19-3-505(5)(a) and that the

Department couldn’t unilaterally void the deferred adjudication

agreement by asking to dismiss the case.

¶ 28 Because these arguments don’t implicate subject matter

jurisdiction, the youth needed to raise them in the juvenile court.

See R.M.P., ¶ 18. He didn’t. Rather, he asserted only that the

present case was distinguishable from R.M.P. and that he therefore

had standing to move to revoke the deferred adjudication. As a

result, we decline to address these issues for the first time on

appeal. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (“[E]xcept

where jurisdiction is implicated, generally appellate courts review

only issues presented to and ruled on by the lower court.”).

V. Disposition

¶ 29 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE KUHN concur.