The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY January 11, 2024
2024COA4
No. 22CA0925, People in Interest of CMWR — Juvenile Court — Delinquency — Adjudicatory Proceedings; Criminal Law — Rights of Defendant — Speedy Trial — Exceptions — Continuance Granted Without Defendant’s Consent — Unavailability of Evidence Material to State’s Case
A division of the court of appeals considers what statutes a
juvenile court must apply when determining whether to continue an
adjudicatory action against a juvenile past the speedy trial deadline,
over the juvenile’s objection. The division decides, as a matter of
first impression, that a court must consider the factors set forth in
section 18-1-405(6)(g), C.R.S. 2023 — a statute that addresses
continuances in trials of adult defendants — when deciding whether
continuance of the trial in a juvenile adjudicatory action would
violate the juvenile’s speedy trial rights. Under the facts of the case,
the division holds that the juvenile court erred by continuing the juvenile’s trial past the speedy trial deadline because the prosecutor
failed to meet her burden of establishing, and the court did not find,
that the requirements of section 18-1-405(6)(g) were satisfied. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2024COA4
Court of Appeals No. 22CA0925 Mesa County District Court No. 21JD132 Honorable Lance P. Timbreza, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of C.M.W.R.,
Juvenile-Appellant.
JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Welling and Gomez, JJ., concur
Announced January 11, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Tara Jorfald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lakewood, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant ¶1 Juveniles charged with offenses in adjudicatory actions, like
adults charged with criminal offenses, have statutory and
constitutional rights to a speedy trial. But those rights are not
absolute. In this opinion, we consider the statutes that a juvenile
court must consider when determining whether a juvenile’s speedy
trial rights would be violated by granting a continuance at the
request of the prosecutor, without the juvenile’s consent. We
decide, as a matter of first impression, that a court must consider
the factors set forth in section 18-1-405(6)(g), C.R.S. 2023, which
addresses continuances in trials of adult defendants, when ruling
on a prosecutor’s request to continue the trial in a juvenile
adjudicatory action past the speedy trial deadline, without the
juvenile’s consent.
¶2 C.M.W.R., a/k/a L.M.R. (the juvenile), contends that (1) their
statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights were violated, and
(2) the court erred by not merging their first degree arson and
criminal mischief convictions. We agree that the juvenile’s
statutory speedy trial rights were violated, vacate the juvenile’s
adjudication of delinquency, and remand to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the charges filed in this case. In light of our
1 disposition, we need not reach the juvenile’s constitutional speedy
trial or merger arguments.
I. Background Facts and Procedural History
¶3 In April 2021, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
Meetinghouse in Fruita caught fire, resulting in more than one
million dollars in damage. Law enforcement officers arrested the
juvenile in connection with the fire. Two months later, the
prosecutor charged the juvenile with one count of criminal mischief
in violation of section 18-4-501(1), C.R.S. 2023; one count of first
degree arson in violation of section 18-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2023; and
one count of second degree burglary in violation of section
18-4-203(1), C.R.S. 2023.
¶4 At a hearing conducted on September 27, 2021, the juvenile
entered a not guilty plea and requested that the court set a bench
trial within sixty days, pursuant to section 19-2.5-902(1), C.R.S.
2023. The court determined that the speedy trial deadline was
November 26, 2021 (sixty days from September 27).
¶5 The prosecutor and defense counsel announced that they were
available for a five-day trial starting on November 22, 2021 — the
Monday of Thanksgiving week. After the court set the trial for that
2 date, the prosecutor said she “[had] a feeling that [she] may have an
issue with witnesses . . . because it is Thanksgiving [week].” The
court asked the prosecutor to check with her witnesses and said
“that way we’re not going through herculean efforts to set over a
holiday and it’s going to cause us a problem anyway. And then we
can figure out” the setting.
¶6 At a hearing conducted three days later, the prosecutor
advised the court that “at least a couple [of witnesses] as of right
now” would be unavailable Thanksgiving week. Defense counsel
objected to setting the trial more than sixty days from the date of
the juvenile’s not guilty plea.
¶7 At a further hearing conducted on November 3, 2021, the
prosecutor formally requested a continuance of the November 22
trial date due to witness unavailability. The prosecutor’s entire
argument in support of her request for the continuance was:
So the People have reached out to multiple witnesses, and they’re unavailable that weekend [sic]. And we have spoken to those. Some of whom are essential to the case in proving the People’s case, and we can’t proceed without them. So given the holiday conflict — the DA’s personally ready. It’s just a witness conflict and unavailability and some of whom
3 are flying or will be flying from across the country.
¶8 The juvenile objected to the prosecutor’s request for a
continuance and asserted their right to a speedy trial. In its ruling
from the bench granting the prosecutor’s motion to continue, the
court said as follows:
“[S]peedy trial runs on November 26, 2021.”
“The prosecutor indicates [she] ha[s] witness
unavailability [but she] made diligent efforts in terms of
attempting to arrange witnesses but would require flights
and travel and individuals who are unavailable due to the
holiday.”
“Given that and given the nature of the allegations in this
case, the amount of discovery, the investigation on the
part of all of the parties, the Court finds that there is
good cause to set beyond the speedy trial setting of
November 26th.”
The court then reset the trial for January 10, 2022, which was the
next date when both attorneys said they were available. Defense
counsel later filed a motion to dismiss the charges against the
4 juvenile on the grounds that the juvenile’s right to a speedy trial
had been violated.
¶9 The juvenile’s initial trial began on January 10, 2022 — 105
days following the juvenile’s entry of a not guilty plea. But on the
second day of trial, the prosecutor announced that several of her
out-of-state witnesses had been exposed to, or had contracted,
COVID-19 and were unable to travel. She requested a mistrial. The
defense objected, arguing that “the benefit that [the witnesses] do
add to the Prosecution does not outweigh [the juvenile’s] right to
have a speedy trial.” The court granted the prosecutor’s request for
a mistrial over defense counsel’s objection and continued the trial
to February 14, 2022. (The propriety of the court’s decision to grant
the mistrial is not at issue in this appeal.)
¶ 10 Defense counsel subsequently renewed her motion to dismiss
the case “because holding the trial past November 26, 2021 violated
[the juvenile’s] speedy trial rights.”
¶ 11 The juvenile’s bench trial began on February 14, 2022 — 141
days following the juvenile’s entry of a not guilty plea. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent
on all counts.
5 II. Analysis
¶ 12 The juvenile raises two contentions on appeal. First, they
contend that their statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights
were violated when the court set their trial past the sixty-day
speedy trial deadline because the prosecutor’s argument for a
continuance lacked the necessary specificity regarding the
materiality of the unavailable witnesses’ anticipated testimony.
Second, they contend that the court erred by not merging the first
degree arson and criminal mischief convictions because those
offenses arose from the same conduct.
¶ 13 We agree with the juvenile that their statutory speedy trial
rights were violated. For this reason, we do not reach their other
contentions.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 14 The interpretation and application of speedy trial statutes are
questions of law subject to de novo review. See People v. Sherwood,
2021 COA 61, ¶ 19, 489 P.3d 1233, 1238. (After the division
decided Sherwood, the General Assembly recodified and
renumbered title 19, which governs adjudicatory actions against
6 juveniles. See Ch. 136, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 557-773. Like the
parties, we cite the speedy trial statutes as currently numbered.)
¶ 15 In addition, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error; “we will not disturb those findings if they are supported
by the record.” People v. Nelson, 2014 COA 165, ¶ 25, 360 P.3d
175, 181. A trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only
if they have “no support in the record.” Id. at ¶ 17, 360 P.3d at
180.
B. Applicable Law
¶ 16 Section 19-2.5-904(2), C.R.S. 2023, specifies the deadlines for
the various phases of an adjudicatory action against a juvenile. As
applicable here, section 19-2.5-904(2)(d) states that, “[i]n bringing
an adjudicatory action against a juvenile . . . , the district attorney
and the court shall comply with the deadlines for . . . [h]olding the
adjudicatory trial, as specified in” section 19-2.5-902(1). Section
19-2.5-902(1), in turn, provides that the speedy trial deadline in
juvenile adjudicatory actions is sixty days from the entry of the
juvenile’s plea of not guilty, “[e]xcept as set forth in section
19-2.5-610, [C.R.S. 2023].” That exception — which applies when a
7 juvenile requests a jury trial — is of no consequence here because
the juvenile did not request a jury. See § 19-2.5-610(4).
¶ 17 Next, section 19-2.5-904(3) says that “[t]he court may grant a
continuance with regard to any of the deadlines specified in
subsection (2) of this section upon making a finding of good cause.”
But section 19-2.5-904(3) does not contain a definition of “good
cause.” In addition, section 19-2.5-904(1) states that a “juvenile’s
right to a speedy trial is governed by section 18-1-405 and [Crim.
P.] 48(b).”
¶ 18 Section 18-1-405(6) specifies the time periods that are
excluded from the computation of the speedy trial deadline
pursuant to section 18-1-405(1). Section 18-1-405(6)(g) provides
that, in adult criminal cases, the calculation of the speedy trial
deadline does not include a “delay not exceeding six months”
resulting from a continuance granted at the prosecutor’s request,
without the defendant’s consent. That subsection applies in two
situations: (1) when evidence material to the state’s case is
unavailable, “the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence
to obtain such evidence,” and “there are reasonable grounds to
believe that this evidence will be available at the later date,”
8 § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I); and (2) when “the prosecuting attorney [requires]
additional time in [a] felony case[] to prepare the state’s case and
additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances of
the case,” § 18-1-405(6)(g)(II).
¶ 19 “The burden of compliance with the speedy trial statute is on
the district attorney and the trial court.” People v. Roberts, 146
P.3d 589, 593 (Colo. 2006) (analyzing a prior version of section
18-1-405(6)(g)(I) that contained substantially similar language to
the current version). “Meeting this burden requires that the People
provide to a trial court, with some specificity, enough information
on the record to show that they met their statutory burdens,
including how the unavailable evidence is material to the state’s
case.” Id. at 594.
¶ 20 The remedy for a speedy trial violation is dismissal of the
charges with prejudice. People v. Taylor, 2020 COA 79, ¶ 18, 467
P.3d 1272, 1275.
C. We Review the Court’s Order Granting the Continuance by Analyzing Section 18-1-405(6)(g)
¶ 21 On appeal, the parties do not dispute, and we agree, that the
speedy trial deadline was November 26, 2021 (sixty days from the
9 date of the juvenile’s not guilty plea). See §§ 19-2.5-904(2),
19-2.5-902(1). But the parties disagree as to which statutes apply
to the determination of whether the juvenile’s speedy trial rights
were violated. The juvenile argues that their statutory speedy trial
rights were violated because the court failed to apply section
18-1-405(6)(g), while the People contend there was no speedy trial
violation because the court satisfied the general good cause
standard found in section 19-2.5-904(3).
¶ 22 We hold that the standard for continuing a trial without the
defendant’s consent set forth in section 18-1-405(6)(g) applies to
requests for continuances in adjudicatory actions against juveniles.
¶ 23 “Our primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Each provision of
a statute must be construed in harmony with the overall statutory
scheme to accomplish the purpose for which the statute was
enacted.” People in Interest of J.M.N., 39 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Colo.
App. 2001); see also Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. 2001)
(discussing the principle of statutory construction that specific
provisions prevail over general provisions).
10 ¶ 24 The People assert that the speedy trial analysis requires only a
determination of whether the trial court correctly applied the open-
ended good cause standard found in section 19-2.5-904(3). They
point to the description of good cause in People v. Hines, 2021 COA
45, 491 P.3d 578, as “an amorphous term, difficult of precise
delineation.” Id. at ¶ 21, 491 P.3d at 584 (quoting People v. Roberts,
2013 COA 50, ¶ 29, 321 P.3d 581, 587). The Hines division
explained that, “[f]or that reason, whether the good cause standard
has been satisfied depends on the facts of each case and is an
inquiry left to the district court’s discretion.” Id.
¶ 25 But the Hines division did not hold that the court’s discretion
is unbounded. Rather, the division applied “speedy trial case law”
to determine whether “good cause” existed for purposes of the
Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (the Act) in the
absence of a definition of “good cause” in the Act. Id. at ¶ 22, 491
P.3d at 584. Specifically, the division looked to the law governing
speedy trial in analyzing whether the prosecution had exercised due
diligence to obtain certain evidence — and, thus, whether the trial
court had erred by finding good cause for a continuance under the
Act. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 23-24, 491 P.3d at 584.
11 ¶ 26 Consistent with the reasoning of Hines, in our view, it makes
little sense to grant trial courts nearly unbridled discretion to grant
a prosecutor’s request for a continuance in a juvenile adjudication
trial, without the juvenile’s consent, when trial courts lack the same
degree of discretion when considering similar requests for
continuances in cases involving adult defendants. The General
Assembly’s determination that the speedy trial deadline applicable
to juvenile adjudications should be shorter than the speedy trial
deadline in criminal cases involving adults reflects a policy decision
that juveniles accused of delinquency should be brought to trial
more quickly than adult defendants. Compare § 19-2.5-902(1)
(providing a sixty-day speedy trial deadline in juvenile
adjudications), with § 18-1-405(1) (providing a six-month speedy
trial deadline in criminal cases involving adult defendants). For this
reason, it would run counter to the General Assembly’s policy
decisions to conclude that a continuance resulting in a violation of
an adult’s speedy trial rights would not, under similar
circumstances, result in a violation of a juvenile’s speedy trial
rights.
12 ¶ 27 Further, the reference to section 18-1-405 found in section
19-2.5-904(1) means that the provisions of the former section apply
to juvenile adjudications, to the extent they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of the Children’s Code. See J.M.N., 39 P.3d at
1263 (holding that, “to give effect to all relevant statutory
provisions,” a court must read section 19-2.5-904(1) to incorporate
the tolling and enforcement provisions of section 18-1-405, “at least
to the extent that these provisions are not inconsistent with the
more specific sixty-day and ‘good cause’ continuance provisions” of
sections 19-2.5-902(1) and 19-2.5-904(3)). In other words, section
19-2.5-904(1) engrafts onto juvenile cases the speedy trial
provisions found in section 18-1-405 and Crim. P. 48(b), to the
extent those provisions fill in gaps in the Children’s Code.
¶ 28 Following the logic of J.M.N., we hold there is no inconsistency
between the general good cause language in section 19-2.5-904(3)
and the factors in section 18-1-405(6)(g) that address when a
continuance entered without the defendant’s consent stops the
running of the speedy trial clock. The People’s argument that the
section 18-1-405(6)(g) factors do not apply to adjudicatory actions
against juveniles cannot be squared with the language of section
13 19-2.5-904(1), which, as noted above, explicitly incorporates the
requirements of section 18-1-405 and Crim. P. 48(b) into section
19-2.5-904. See People v. Griego, 2018 CO 5, ¶ 25, 409 P.3d 338,
342 (“When the statutory language is clear, . . . we give consistent,
harmonious, and sensible effect to each part of the statute, and we
interpret every word, rendering no words or phrases superfluous
and construing undefined words and phrases according to their
common usage.”).
¶ 29 For these reasons, a court must consider the section
18-1-405(6)(g) factors when determining whether a prosecutor’s
request for a continuance of the trial in a juvenile adjudicatory
action past the speedy trial deadline, without the juvenile’s consent,
would violate the juvenile’s speedy trial rights.
D. The Prosecutor Did Not Make a Sufficient Showing that the Requested Continuance Would Not Violate the Juvenile’s Speedy Trial Rights
¶ 30 The record supports the juvenile’s contention that the
prosecutor did not proffer, let alone establish, and the court did not
find, that the first section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) factor — evidence
material to the prosecutor’s case was unavailable — was satisfied.
See § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I); Roberts, 146 P.3d at 592.
14 ¶ 31 To satisfy the prosecutor’s burden under the first factor, the
prosecutor must “provide to [the] trial court, with some specificity,
enough information on the record to show that . . . the unavailable
evidence is material to the state’s case.” Roberts, 146 P.3d at 594
(emphasis added). The reference to “material” in the first section
18-1-405(6)(g)(I) factor means more than “merely probative or
relevant evidence in the context of continuing a trial beyond the
speedy trial deadline.” Id. at 593. “A motion containing
unsupported allegations that a witness is material and unavailable
for trial is insufficient.” Id.
¶ 32 In this case, the prosecutor attempted to bolster her request
for a continuance with the very type of unsupported allegations that
the Roberts court indicated would be insufficient to continue a trial
past the speedy trial deadline. See id. The prosecutor did not
reveal the identity of the unavailable witnesses, provide a proffer of
their anticipated testimony, or explain why such testimony was
material to the prosecutor’s case. Rather, the prosecutor merely
represented that she had “reached out to multiple witnesses, and
they’re unavailable . . . . Some of [the witnesses] are essential to
the case . . . .”
15 ¶ 33 Furthermore, this is not the type of case where the context
makes clear that, because of the limited number of potential
witnesses, most, if not all, of the prosecution’s witnesses are
necessarily material, if not essential. As of November 2, 2021, the
People had endorsed more than 170 lay witnesses and 24 expert
witnesses, including two “TBD” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (ATF) agents. The prosecutor called only a modest
fraction of these endorsed witnesses at trial.
¶ 34 In any event, “a trial court must exercise its independent
judgment and may not accept the mere conclusions of a prosecutor”
in deciding whether to continue a trial past the speedy trial
deadline, over the defendant’s objection. Id. at 595. Beyond
initially requesting that the prosecutor make a record explaining
why a trial date of November 22, 2021, “doesn’t work . . . and what
efforts [she had] made to secure witnesses” — with the latter
inquiry going unaddressed — the court did not exercise
independent judgment regarding the prosecutor’s request for a
continuance past the speedy trial deadline. It did not ask the
prosecutor to explain her vague, generalized statement regarding
the materiality of the testimony of those witnesses who had
16 indicated their unavailability the week of November 22. The court’s
unquestioning acceptance of the prosecutor’s inadequate argument
for a continuance is akin to “[a] minute entry made by the court
indicating that the People’s chief witness is missing,” which “is also
insufficient absent a showing of materiality.” Id. at 594.
¶ 35 Accordingly, we hold that the prosecutor failed to establish —
and the court failed to adequately find — that, under the first
section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) factor, the juvenile’s speedy trial rights
would not be violated if the trial was continued past the speedy trial
deadline. In light of this determination, we need not consider the
second and third factors in section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I). See Roberts,
146 P.3d at 593-94 (noting that the prosecutor’s and the court’s
burden of complying with the speedy trial statute “includes making
a sufficient record that all three elements of section
18-1-405(6)(g)(I), have been met”). The use of “and” in the list of
factors in section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) means that a prosecutor is
entitled to an order continuing a criminal trial past the speedy trial
deadline, without the defendant’s consent, only if the prosecutor
has met all three of the factors. See United States v.
Palomar-Santiago, 593 U.S. 321, 326 (2021) (noting that, when
17 three statutory requirements “are connected by the conjunctive
‘and,’” all three requirements must be met).
¶ 36 The People contend that we can affirm on the alternative basis
that the continuance was justified under section 18-1-405(6)(g)(II),
which permits a court to grant a continuance past the speedy trial
deadline, without the defendant’s consent, when the continuance is
necessary “to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time . . . to
prepare the state’s case and additional time is justified because of
exceptional circumstances of the case.” In support of this
argument, the People point to two of the prosecutor’s
representations to the court: (1) on November 2, 2021 — the day
before requesting the continuance and twenty days before trial —
the prosecutor said she was still waiting on DNA and fingerprint
testing results from the state laboratory; and (2) on December 21,
2021 — nearly a month after the speedy trial deadline had run —
the prosecutor said her office had “just received long-awaited
litigation packets” from the ATF. But this was not the basis on
which the prosecutor sought the challenged continuance. Indeed,
when the prosecutor requested the continuance, she specifically
said that “the DA’s personally ready. It’s just a witness
18 conflict . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Because the prosecutor
requested, and the court granted, the continuance exclusively on
the basis of witness unavailability, we do not consider whether the
prosecutor could have established grounds for a continuance under
section 18-1-405(6)(g)(II). The prosecutor did not present that
argument to the court, and the court did not refer to section
18-1-405(6)(g)(II) when continuing the trial.
¶ 37 Moreover, at the same December 21, 2021, status conference
at which the prosecutor discussed the recently received evidence
from the ATF, she told the court “there is DNA outstanding” —
presumably the same DNA test results she referenced during the
November 2, 2021, hearing. But she also told the court at the same
December hearing, “[w]e’re ready to proceed without [the DNA
evidence],” illustrating why it would be inappropriate for us to
consider grounds not identified to the court.
¶ 38 For these reasons, we hold that the court erred by continuing
the juvenile’s trial past the sixty-day speedy trial deadline, without
the juvenile’s consent, because the prosecutor failed to meet her
burden of establishing, and the court did not find, that the
requirements of section 18-1-405(6)(g) were satisfied.
19 III. Disposition
¶ 39 The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the
district court with instructions to dismiss the charges in this case.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.