People in Interest of AG

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1653
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1653 In Interest of AG 03-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1653 Weld County District Court No. 24JV107 Honorable Troy Hause, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.G., a Child,

and Concerning T.G.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Tow and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 26, 2026

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, Greely, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding involving

conflicting presumptions of parentage, T.G. (biological father)

appeals the judgment adjudicating G.G. (psychological father) the

legal father of A.G. (the child). We affirm.

I. Relevant facts

¶2 G.M.G. (mother) gave birth to the child in 2021. At the time,

mother was in a relationship with psychological father, who was

present at the child’s birth and is named on her birth certificate.

About five months later, all parties learned the results of a home

genetic test that indicated biological father was the child’s biological

father.

¶3 When the child was three years old, the Weld County

Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency and

neglect concerning the child and her siblings. (The child’s siblings

aren’t involved in this appeal.) The Department also sought to

determine the child’s paternity and named both psychological father

and biological father as respondents in the petition.

¶4 Later, the court held a paternity hearing. The child was nearly

four years old at the time and had resided with psychological father

for most of her life. After hearing the evidence, the court

1 determined that two parentage presumptions applied to each man,

and thus, each was a presumed parent under Colorado’s Uniform

Parentage Act (UPA). See § 19-4-105(1), C.R.S. 2025. Then, after

considering the factors in section 19-4-105(2) and the best interests

of the child, the court adjudicated psychological father the child’s

legal father.

II. Parentage Determination

¶5 Biological father contends that the juvenile court erred by

failing to adjudicate him the child’s legal father. We disagree.

A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review

¶6 A juvenile court may determine a child’s parentage as part of a

dependency and neglect proceeding by following the procedures

outlined in the UPA. See People in Interest of J.G.C., 2013 COA 171,

¶¶ 10-11.

¶7 Under the UPA, parentage isn’t limited to persons with a

biological connection to the child. People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021

COA 56, ¶ 17. Rather, the UPA provides five ways in which a

person may be a presumed natural parent of a child.

§ 19-4-105(1)(a)-(d), (f). As relevant here, a person is presumed to

be the natural parent if, (1) “[a]fter the child’s birth, the person and

2 the parent who gave birth to the child have married” or attempted

to do so, and the person is, with their consent, named on the child’s

birth certificate (birth certificate presumption); (2) the person

“receives the child into the person’s home and openly holds out the

child as the person’s natural child” (holding out presumption); or

(3) genetic testing shows the person isn’t excluded as the probable

biological parent and “the probability of the person’s genetic

parentage is ninety-seven percent or higher” (biological

presumption). § 19-4-105(1)(c)(II), (d), (f).

¶8 If a presumption is established, it may only be rebutted by

clear and convincing evidence. § 19-4-105(2)(a); K.L.W., ¶ 70. But

like here, when two or more conflicting presumptions arise, and

none has been rebutted, the presumption that, on the facts, is

founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.

See § 19-4-105(2)(a); J.G.C., ¶ 22. In determining which of the

conflicting presumptions controls, the court must consider “all

pertinent factors,” including those listed in section 19-4-105(2)(a)(I)-

(VIII), and focus on the child’s best interests. K.L.W., ¶ 41. The

result of this process is to render one of the people with a

3 conflicting parentage presumption the child’s legal parent, while the

other person becomes a “nonparent.” See id. at ¶ 21.

¶9 We defer to the court’s factual findings if they are supported

by the record. Id. at ¶ 42. But we review de novo whether the court

applied the correct legal standard. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 10 Biological father contends that the court failed to properly

apply section 19-4-105 because it didn’t sufficiently identify the

parentage presumptions implicated in this case. But the juvenile

court determined, on one hand, that the holding out presumption

and birth certificate presumption applied to psychological father.

On the other hand, it found — and it is undisputed — that the

biological presumption and holding out presumption applied to

biological father. The court concluded that none of these

presumptions were rebutted. See § 19-4-105(2)(a); K.L.W., ¶ 70.

¶ 11 Moreover, it was undisputed in the juvenile court that these

were the relevant presumptions in the case. During the

Department’s closing argument, the county attorney asserted that

these presumptions applied to psychological father and biological

father, respectively. In the arguments that followed, no party

4 disputed that these presumptions applied or argued that any had

been rebutted.

¶ 12 Biological father next challenges the court’s determination that

the holding out presumption applied to psychological father. He

contends that because psychological father knew — for most of the

child’s life — that he wasn’t biologically related to her, he didn’t

openly hold her out as “[his] natural child.” See § 19-4-105(1)(d).

¶ 13 To the contrary, “nothing in the statutory provisions, whether

read separately or together, provides that an admission by a man

seeking parental rights that he is not the child’s biological father

conclusively rebuts” the holding out presumption. In re Parental

Responsibilities of A.D., 240 P.3d 488, 491 (Colo. App. 2010); see In

Interest of S.N.V., 284 P.3d 147, 151 (Colo. App. 2011) (noting that

a woman can establish the holding out presumption even if she has

“no biological tie to the child”); see also People in Interest of O.S-H.,

2021 COA 130, ¶ 52 (“[A] person may gain the status of a child’s

natural parent by holding the child out as his own.”). As the

Department points out, the UPA contains no requirement that a

presumptive parent believe that they are a child’s biological parent

in order to hold out that child as their natural child. See

5 § 19-4-105(1)(d); S.N.V., 284 P.3d at 151; cf. A.D., 240 P.3d at 491-

92 (argument that a parent-child relationship can only be created

with a biological or adoptive relationship would render the holding

out presumption, and the other statutory presumptions,

superfluous).

¶ 14 Contrary to biological father’s argument, the record supports

the juvenile court’s determination that psychological father held out

the child as his child. As noted, psychological father attended the

child’s birth and was named on her birth certificate. At the time of

the hearing, the child resided with psychological father and his two

biological children, the child’s half-siblings. Multiple witnesses

testified that psychological father treated the child no differently

than his biological children. The caseworker testified that

psychological father referred to the child as “his daughter” and that

the child called him “dad.” During psychological father’s testimony,

he repeatedly referred to the child as “mine.” Mother and

psychological father testified that his extended family treated the

child no differently than his biological children.

¶ 15 Biological father next appears to argue that psychological

father had lived with the child only “intermittently since her birth,”

6 and thus, didn’t “receive[ her] into [his] home” as required to avail

himself of the holding out presumption. See § 19-4-105(1)(d). To

be sure, the child had moved homes multiple times during her

nearly four years. That said, the child resided with psychological

father for most of her life; she lived outside his home during only a

roughly three-month period and a separate one-month period. The

court thus found, with support from this and other evidence, that

psychological father had been a “consistent part” of her life. In any

event, biological father cites no authority for the proposition that

gaps in a psychological parent living with a child can negate or

render the holding out presumption unavailable. See

§ 19-4-105(1)(d). Nor are we aware of any.

¶ 16 To the extent that biological father otherwise asks us to

reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the

juvenile court, we won’t do so. See K.L.W., ¶ 62.

¶ 17 Accordingly, the court didn’t err when it determined that the

holding out presumption applied to psychological father.

¶ 18 Biological father also disputes the application of the birth

certificate presumption, asserting the record contains no evidence

showing that mother and psychological father married or attempted

7 to do so after the birth of the child. See § 19-4-105(1)(c)(II). But we

need not reach this issue because the court properly determined

that the holding out presumption applied to psychological father.

See L&R Expl. Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530, 536 (Colo. App.

2011) (declining to resolve an issue where the outcome wouldn’t

change); People in Interest of R.R., 607 P.2d 1013, 1015 n.2 (Colo.

App. 1979) (same).

¶ 19 Biological father doesn’t challenge the court’s resolution of the

conflicting parentage presumptions, which resulted in its

determination that psychological father was the child’s legal father.

Thus, we don’t address that issue. And because the court correctly

applied the law and properly determined that psychological father

was a presumed father under the UPA, we won’t disturb its

judgment.

III. Disposition

¶ 20 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.