USCA11 Case: 19-12908 Date Filed: 03/17/2021 Page: 1 of 18
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-12908 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-24793-MGC
PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, INC., et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellants,
versus
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al.,
Defendant-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(March 17, 2021)
Before WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case comes to us as the latest installment of the long-running dispute
concerning the care of Lolita (also known as Toki), an orca kept at the Miami USCA11 Case: 19-12908 Date Filed: 03/17/2021 Page: 2 of 18
Seaquarium. In this chapter, plaintiffs-appellants People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals, Inc.; Animal Legal Defense Fund; Orca Network; and Howard Garrett
(collectively, PETA) alleged that the U.S. Department of Agriculture failed to
follow its own policy when it added Seaquarium as a new site to an existing
Animal Welfare Act license. The agency countered that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and that, even if it did have jurisdiction,
the agency would succeed on the merits. The district court agreed and granted the
agency’s and Seaquarium’s owner’s motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs-appellants
appeal that dismissal. Because we conclude that (1) the agency’s licensing
decision is subject to judicial review, and (2) the plaintiffs-appellants have stated a
plausible claim that the agency violated its policy when it affirmatively added
Seaquarium to an existing license, we reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
PETA brought suit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Elizabeth
Goldentyer, the Director of Animal Welfare Operations for the Eastern Region of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(collectively, the agency). Festival Fun Parks, LLC, d/b/a/ Miami Seaquarium and
d/b/a Palace Entertainment (Palace), the owner of Miami Seaquarium, intervened
in the suit as a defendant.
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Seaquarium was formerly owned and operated by Wometco Enterprises
(Wometco), the parent company of Marine Exhibition Corporation (Marine). On
July 1, 2014, Marine was sold in a transaction wherein 100% of the company’s
stock was transferred from Wometco to buyer Festival. Prior to this transaction,
Marine held an exhibitor’s license to operate Seaquarium while Palace held an
exhibitor’s license to operate a facility in New Hampshire. The Animal Welfare
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq., requires those licenses, issued by the agency, for
“exhibitors” of animals. Id. § 2133. After the merger, the agency conducted a
routine inspection of Seaquarium and added it as an additional site under Palace’s
existing license.
PETA alleges that the addition of Seaquarium to Palace’s license violates the
agency’s “longstanding policy” that requires a new site to demonstrate full
compliance with the Animal Welfare Act. PETA claims that Lolita’s tank fails to
meet the standards set by the agency’s regulations under the Animal Welfare Act.
The marine-mammal standards provide specifications for the humane treatment of
marine mammals, such as Lolita. See generally 9 C.F.R. §§ 3.100–3.118. These
specifications include a minimum-space requirement, under which cetaceans must
be provided a “pool of water” that has a “minimum horizontal dimension (MHD)”
that is “two times the average adult length” of the species. Id. § 3.104(b).
According to the agency, the average length of an adult orca is 24 feet. Id. § 3.104
3 USCA11 Case: 19-12908 Date Filed: 03/17/2021 Page: 4 of 18
tbl. III. So a tank housing an orca must have an MHD of at least 48 feet. Lolita’s
tank measures 80 feet by 60 feet. But, due to a large obstruction, the MHD of
Lolita’s tank is 35 feet, falling short of the agency’s regulations.
PETA alleged that Lolita’s noncompliant tank, along with other Animal
Welfare Act violations, should have prevented the agency from adding Seaquarium
to Palace’s license. Invoking the Administrative Procedure Act, PETA asked the
district court to set aside the addition of Seaquarium to Palace’s license. The
agency filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Palace
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The district court held a hearing, granted both motions, and dismissed
PETA’s complaint without prejudice. The district court found that “procedurally
[the defendants] have complied with the law to the extent that is required of the
Administrative Procedure Act.” Further, the district court said, “the intervening
circumstances of the sale did not change the licensing requirement or, above all
else, give a third party the ability to come in and challenge how those procedures
are being executed.” PETA now appeals the dismissal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” Animal Legal
Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 2015). We also
review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
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claim, “accepting well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and construing
them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.” Crawford’s Auto Ctr. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 945 F.3d 1150, 1158 (11th Cir. 2019). To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must be plausible on its face. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, PETA raises three arguments: (1) that the agency’s decision is
reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, (2) that the agency violated its
own policy when it added Seaquarium to an existing license, and (3) that the
district court erred in granting the motions to dismiss without reviewing the
administrative record. We address each contention in turn.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, PETA argues that the district court erred in
determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute.
Specifically, PETA contends that the agency made a licensing decision for which
the Animal Welfare Act provides a legal standard to guide judicial review. The
agency, however, claims that it exercised discretionary enforcement power under
the Animal Welfare Act when it added Seaquarium to an existing license, which
immunizes its action from review.
PETA brings this suit pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702, which provides that any “person suffering legal wrong because of
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agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” That judicial-
review provision, however, does not apply to “agency action [that] is committed to
agency discretion by law.” Id. § 701(a)(2). “Whether an agency action is
reviewable under § 701(a)(2) is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.” Animal
Legal Def. Fund, 789 F.3d at 1214.
Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review “whenever the statute under
which the agency acts ‘is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion’—that is, where a court
would have ‘no law to apply.’” Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
830–31 (1985)). A presumption therefore arises that agency decisions to refuse
enforcement “are committed to agency discretion by law and thus unreviewable.”
Id. That presumption, though, does not apply to “an ‘affirmative act of approval
under a statute.’” Id. (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831).
Here, PETA does not challenge the agency’s decision not to bring an
enforcement action against Seaquarium, but rather the addition of Seaquarium to
Palace’s license. We dealt with a nearly identical issue in Animal Legal Defense
Fund. In that chapter of the Lolita saga, as here, the plaintiffs did “not seek an
injunction requiring [the agency] to initiate enforcement proceedings against
Seaquarium.” Id. Rather, they sought a “judicial order setting aside [the agency’s]
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affirmative decision to renew Seaquarium’s license.” Id. We concluded that the
Animal Welfare Act “provide[d] ‘meaningful standard[s]’ against which to judge
[the agency’s] exercise of discretion” in renewing a license. Id. at 1215 (quoting
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 821) (second alteration in original).
So too, here. The decision to add Seaquarium as an additional site to an
existing license constitutes an affirmative act of approval under a statute. Further,
the Animal Welfare Act provides meaningful standards to judge the agency’s
addition of Seaquarium to an existing license. In line with Animal Legal Defense
Fund, we hold that the agency’s decision to add Seaquarium as an additional site to
Palace’s license is a final agency action subject to judicial review.
B. Addition of Seaquarium to the Existing License
The parties extensively briefed the effect of Marine’s stock sale and
subsequent merger with Palace. Both Marine and Palace held licenses issued by
the agency prior to the corporate changes, and the parties debate the effect the
transaction had on each license. The operative allegation here, though—which we
accept as true and which, in any event, does not appear disputed—is that the
agency added Seaquarium to Palace’s license. PETA challenges that addition
alone, making what happened to Marine’s license largely irrelevant.
PETA claims that because licenses are valid only at a specific location under
the pertinent regulations, Palace needed to comply with the requirements for
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obtaining an initial license before it could add Seaquarium to its existing license.
PETA alleges that the agency “has a longstanding policy that requires an
inspection and demonstration of [Animal Welfare Act] compliance before any
regulated activities are conducted at a licensee’s new site.” The agency violated
that policy, PETA argues, when it added Seaquarium to an existing license after
conducting only a “routine” inspection that did not require full compliance with the
Animal Welfare Act.
The Administrative Procedure Act requires the reviewing court to “set aside
agency action” that it determines to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In
general, agencies “must respect their own procedural rules and regulations.”
Romano-Murphy v. Comm’r, 816 F.3d 707, 720 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted). That requirement applies not only to an agency’s
promulgated regulations, but also “to agency deviations from internal guidelines
not published in the Federal Register.” Port of Jacksonville Mar. Ad Hoc Comm.,
Inc. v. U.S. Coast Guard, 788 F.2d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1986). The dissent suggests
that, in order to hold the agency accountable for violations of such internal
guidelines, we typically require that they be delineated in a manual or directive.
Dissent at 15. But our caselaw has never established that limitation. In fact, this
Court has expressly found that longstanding agency practice alone can be binding
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on the agency. See Alamo Express Co. v. United States, 613 F.2d 96, 97–98 (5th
Cir. 1980) (finding that agency’s failure to notify existing carriers, pursuant to
“well-established” forty-year practice of giving existing carriers telephonic notice
and opportunity to comment on the need for additional service, made action taken
by agency without compliance invalid).1 As this Court noted in Alamo Express,
“[w]e do not mean to suggest that the [agency] was required to adopt the
notification practice” but if the agency wished to grant an emergency temporary
authority “let it comply with its long standing procedure for protecting existing
carriers or let it abolish the practice consonant with the APA.” Id. at 98.
Here, PETA alleges that the agency failed to obey its longstanding policy
that “requires” a demonstration of compliance with the Animal Welfare Act before
allowing regulated activities at a licensee’s new site. The agency counters that it
has no such policy, and, even if it did, it complied with it by performing a
“routine” inspection.
On a motion to dismiss, however, we are required to accept as true PETA’s
well-pleaded allegations that the agency had such a policy and violated it. The
agency points out that PETA has not cited to any regulation or binding authority
1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981, as binding precedent.
9 USCA11 Case: 19-12908 Date Filed: 03/17/2021 Page: 10 of 18
discussing this policy. But the complaint does discuss statutory and regulatory
authority that make the existence of the policy plausible. PETA identifies the
agency regulation that Animal Welfare Act licenses “are issued to specific persons
for specific premises and do not transfer upon change of ownership, nor are they
valid at a different location.” 9 C.F.R. § 2.5(d). 2 That means Palace’s license,
issued for its facility in New Hampshire, may not cover Seaquarium in Miami.
And the issuance of a new license requires that the exhibitor “demonstrate[] that
his facilities comply with the standards” promulgated pursuant to the Animal
Welfare Act. 7 U.S.C. § 2133. Further, the briefing on the motions to dismiss
contains apparent admissions by the agency, disputed on appeal, that such a policy
exists. It is at least plausible then that the agency has a policy that the addition of a
new site to an existing license requires a full prelicensing inspection to ensure
compliance with all Animal Welfare Act requirements.
The agency contends that neither the statute nor the regulations speak to the
specific circumstances in this case and that it acted reasonably when it added
Seaquarium to Palace’s license. Maybe so. But the plausible allegations of the
2 This is what the regulation stated at the time that Seaquarium was added to Palace’s existing license. The agency has since amended its regulations under the Animal Welfare Act, effective May 13, 2020, in part in response to the situation presented by this case—where an existing licensee takes ownership of a new facility. The regulation now states that: “Licenses are issued to specific persons, and are issued for specific activities, types and numbers of animals, and approved sites. A new license must be obtained upon change of ownership, location, activities, or animals. . . .” See 9 C.F.R. § 2.1(b)(1); see also 85 Fed. Reg. 28,772, 28,775–76 (May 13, 2020). 10 USCA11 Case: 19-12908 Date Filed: 03/17/2021 Page: 11 of 18
agency’s failure to comply with its longstanding policy that rise above mere
“labels” and “conclusions,” together with the agency’s apparent admission in the
district court that such a policy exists, make dismissal at this stage premature.
Even if the informal policy that PETA alleges ultimately ends up to be only a
“fictitious legal requirement,” the allegations in the complaint raise a plausible
claim that is not “pointless” to further examine. That is the standard before us
now.
The dissent cites to several cases for the proposition that the alleged
informal policy here is either nonexistent or insufficient to bind the agency.
Dissent at 15–16, 18. But two of the cited cases were resolved at the summary
judgment stage, rather than on motions to dismiss, underscoring the proper
procedure in this case—remand for the case to proceed to the summary judgment
stage to determine the merits of the well-pleaded complaint. See Port of
Jacksonville, 788 F.2d at 705-06 (affirming entry of summary judgment in favor of
Coast Guard); Animal Legal Def. Fund, 789 F.3d at 1213, 1225 (applying de novo
review and affirming entry of summary judgment in favor of USDA).
Additionally, Romano-Murphy, 816 F.3d 707, 714, is also distinguishable
from the procedural posture of this case. In Romano-Murphy, the tax court denied
a motion to vacate based on its interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, and
therefore our review of that interpretation was plenary. Id. Because our review
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was plenary, this Court in evaluating the merits of the tax liability made its
determination based on a review of “the parties briefs, the record, the relevant
statutory and regulatory provisions, the IRS’ manual and procedures, and with the
benefit of oral argument”—a review that looks much more like the summary
judgment stage of litigation than the motion to dismiss stage. Id.
We cannot conclude that PETA has failed “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir.
2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore reverse the district court’s
grant of both the agency’s and Palace’s motions to dismiss. 3
C. Production of the Administrative Record
PETA also argues that the district court erred in granting the motions to
dismiss without first reviewing the administrative record. To make a
“determination[]” under the Administrative Procedure Act, the district court must
“review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party.” 5 U.S.C. § 706.
Section 706 defines “determinations” in § 706(1) and § 706(2)(A)–(F) to include a
finding that agency action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law” or “without observance of procedure
required by law.”
3 On remand, the district court’s review is confined to the administrative record. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). 12 USCA11 Case: 19-12908 Date Filed: 03/17/2021 Page: 13 of 18
In ruling on the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim, the district court did not make a § 706 “determination[].”
Rather, it found that PETA could not bring its claim as a matter of law. See also
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 789 F.3d at 1225 n.13 (“Because there is no factual
dispute about whether [the agency] correctly found Seaquarium satisfied all
licensing requirements, the district court had no reason to examine the
administrative record.”). As such, it did not need to review the administrative
record at that stage of the proceeding to make its decision. We see no error there.
On remand, however, the case will be at a stage requiring review of the
administrative record.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the decision of the district court
and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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BRASHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the Court’s resolution of the first question presented—whether
the agency’s decision to add a new location to an existing license is a reviewable
agency action as a general matter. I also agree with the Court on the third
question—that there was no need for the district court to review the administrative
record in resolving the motion to dismiss. But I respectfully disagree with the
Court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs, PETA and other animal welfare
organizations, have stated a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The operative complaint asserts that the USDA acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when it allowed the Seaquarium to display an orca under its new
parent company’s existing license because the USDA failed to follow a
“longstanding policy for the addition of new sites to existing licenses.” This
informal policy allegedly requires that the USDA conduct a full inspection of new
locations under the Animal Welfare Act. The Court holds that, because we are
reviewing an order on a motion to dismiss, “we are required to accept as true
PETA’s well-pleaded allegations that the agency had such a policy and violated it.”
This is so, the Court says, because certain statutory and regulatory authorities
“make the existence of the policy plausible,” even though “PETA has not cited to
any regulation or binding authority discussing this policy.”
14 USCA11 Case: 19-12908 Date Filed: 03/17/2021 Page: 15 of 18
I agree, of course, that we are required to accept PETA’s factual allegations
as true at this stage of the case. For example, we must take as true PETA’s
allegation that the USDA did not conduct a full inspection before listing the
Seaquarium’s site on its parent company’s license. But I believe that PETA’s bare
assertion that an informal policy required the agency to conduct such an inspection,
without more, does not state “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Courts cannot enforce an agency’s “internal operating instructions” that are
“solely for in-house agency use.” First Alabama Bank, N.A. v. United States, 981
F.2d 1226, 1230 n.5 (11th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, in cases where this Court has
held an agency accountable for violating its own policy, there has typically been a
manual or directive that the agency intended to bind its discretion. The cases the
Court relies on are no exception. In Romano-Murphy v. Comm’r, 816 F.3d 707
(11th Cir. 2016), for example, the agency was alleged to have violated the “IRS
Manual.” Id. at 719. In Port of Jacksonville Mar. Ad Hoc Comm., Inc. v. U.S.
Coast Guard, 788 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1986), the dispute was about whether the
agency complied with the Coast Guard bridge administration manual. Id. at 709. In
Alamo Exp., Inc. v. United States, 613 F.2d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1980), the court
vacated an agency action taken in violation of “well-established [agency]
practice”—a notice requirement that had been observed for forty years. PETA’s
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allegations stand in stark contrast to these authorities. Here, PETA invokes no such
directive or well-established practice. It does not even attempt to identify the
source of the purported informal policy that the USDA allegedly violated.
A plaintiff cannot rely on mere “labels” or “conclusions” without any
supporting “[f]actual allegations.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007). PETA provides no factual allegations in the operative complaint on this
issue at all—merely the conclusory assertion that an informal policy exists. In lieu
of any well-pleaded facts supporting the existence of an informal policy, PETA
asks us to triangulate its existence from other sources—primarily the purposes of
the AWA and unrelated regulations. But such judicial guesswork is exactly the
kind of speculation disfavored under the plausibility pleading standard. Id. at 555;
see also 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed.
2004) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more by way of a claim for relief
than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might
have a legally cognizable right of action.”). In constitutional cases, we routinely
hold that a plaintiff’s conclusory allegation of the existence of a government policy
is insufficient to state a claim.1 I see no reason why such a conclusory allegation
would be sufficient to state a claim here.
1 See Piazza v. Jefferson Cty., Alabama, 923 F.3d 947, 957–58 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that to plausibly allege that “a policy or its absence caused a constitutional harm” a plaintiff must
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PETA erroneously argues that the USDA conceded the existence of an
applicable policy in its motion to dismiss. It did no such thing. In its motion, the
USDA acknowledged the existence of “established additional site practices” that
allow additional sites to operate under existing licenses, provided a “satisfactory
compliance inspection” is conducted by the agency. But the USDA only described
its established practices to show that they did not contemplate the situation here
where, rather than adding an additional site to an existing license in the normal
course, a surviving corporate entity held two separate licenses that needed to be
reconciled. Far from conceding the existence of a controlling policy, the USDA
was clear that there is “nothing in the statute itself, the regulations promulgated by
the agency, or the agency’s controlling policies that address this unique situation.”
For its part, the Court relies on certain statutory and regulatory provisions
that, it says, make it plausible that the alleged informal policy exists. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 2133; 9 C.F.R. § 2.5(d). But these authorities do not, in my view, support the
Court’s analysis. Although Section 2133 requires an exhibitor to “demonstrate that
his or her premises” comply with certain regulations and standards, this Court has
allege “multiple incidents” and that “conclusory assertions” regarding the existence of a policy “without alleging any facts concerning those policies or customs” were insufficient to state a claim); Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a plaintiff sufficiently pled the existence of a policy where, rather than rely on “naked allegations,” he alleged facts about city’s “cleanup” program); Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Neither count three nor any other part of the complaint contains sufficient, non-conclusory allegations that there is an official ‘policy or custom’ of covering up constitutional deprivations like the ones that Weiland claims to have suffered.”). 17 USCA11 Case: 19-12908 Date Filed: 03/17/2021 Page: 18 of 18
already held that this section governs only the issuance of new licenses. Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 2015)
(holding that “Congress . . . chose instead to limit § 2133’s language to issuance
alone”). Here, the agency added a location to an existing license; it did not issue a
new one. Similarly, Section 2.5(d) governs the “duration” and “termination” of
licenses, not the approval of additional sites under existing licenses. Although
Section 2.5(d) explains why the USDA would not allow the newly merged
company in this case to hold two separate licenses simultaneously, it says nothing
about whether or how the old companies’ pre-existing locations should be reflected
on the merged company’s single license.
The dispute over this orca has been going on for a long time, and it has
raised serious issues about animal welfare. Nonetheless, we have emphasized that
the USDA has the expertise and the discretion to address those issues under the
Animal Welfare Act. For that reason, when the USDA renewed Seaquarium’s
license in 2015, we refused to “direct[] the district court to scrutinize the
administrative record to evaluate whether USDA complied with a fictitious legal
requirement.” Animal Legal Def. Fund, 789 F.3d at 1224 n.13. Such an inquiry, we
said, would be “the height of pointlessness.” Id. In my view, the Court’s opinion
now orders a similar inquiry that is unjustified by the complaint’s allegations.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part.