People Ex Rel. Trebat v. City of Park Ridge

249 N.E.2d 681, 110 Ill. App. 2d 404, 1969 Ill. App. LEXIS 1236
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedJune 3, 1969
DocketGen. 53,494
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 249 N.E.2d 681 (People Ex Rel. Trebat v. City of Park Ridge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People Ex Rel. Trebat v. City of Park Ridge, 249 N.E.2d 681, 110 Ill. App. 2d 404, 1969 Ill. App. LEXIS 1236 (Ill. Ct. App. 1969).

Opinion

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE LYONS

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor of defendant in an action for (1) a writ of mandamus to compel the City of Park Ridge to issue a building restaurant remodeling permit and (2) for a declaratory judgment that the premises in question are improperly zoned “A” Residential.

On November 13, 1953, the Park Ridge City Council, by ordinance, involuntarily annexed a parcel, which included the property involved. At the time there existed a provision in the Park Ridge City Zoning Ordinance, chapter 252-2, which provided that all property annexed to the City automatically came into the City as “A” Residential. For many years prior to the annexation and until January 22, 1964, the subject property was operated as a restaurant pursuant to the issuance of a restaurant license permit by the City.

Plaintiffs became owners of the property in 1964. On August 7, 1964, plaintiffs applied for an illuminated restaurant sign permit and a prerequisite restaurant remodeling building permit from the City of Park Ridge. The sign application was premised on the City of Park Ridge illuminated sign ordinance found in chapter I of Article 19 of the Park Ridge Code.

On September 5, 1964, the Building Board of Review unanimously approved the issuance of a building permit, provided (1) that the wall sign continue unilluminated; (2) that no sign be erected on any pole located on City property; and (3) that plaintiffs be informed of the possibility of not being able to use the entire paved area in front of the restaurant for parking after the completion of a contemplated Touhy Avenue sewer project, in that there was a strong probability that the parkway area would be sodded and a public walk constructed by special assessment. The City Council, however, directed that the building remodeling permit not be issued nor any type of sign permit be issued on the basis that such permits are permitted only in zoning districts properly zoned for restaurants.

Thereafter, in 1964, plaintiffs filed the instant action. Count I consisted of a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the issuance of building remodeling and sign permits. Count II consisted of a complaint for a declaratory judgment praying that the “A” Residential zoning classification for the subject property, under the Park Ridge Zoning Ordinance, be declared unconstitutional.

In support of their complaint for a declaratory judgment, plaintiffs contend that property which is annexed involuntarily cannot be automatically zoned “A” Residential without notice and hearing, a requirement afforded property owners within a municipality prior to the adoption of any new zoning classification, and that the classification by defendant violated the Illinois Constitution, Article 2, Section 2, guaranteeing due process of law and Article 4, Section 22, prohibiting special legislation. We disagree with plaintiffs. The Supreme Court on direct appeal entered an order stating that in their opinion the appeal did not present a novel and substantial question sufficient to give the court jurisdiction on appeal and on its own motion the court transferred the matter to this court.

In further support of their complaint for a declaratory judgment, plaintiffs contend that property which is annexed involuntarily cannot be automatically zoned “A” Residential unless the Illinois Zoning and Enabling Statutes are adhered to. Defendant contends that property which is subsequently annexed can be bound by an existing zoning ordinance and that the requirements of the State Enabling Statute need be followed only at the time the original ordinance was adopted. In rebuttal, plaintiffs contend that an existing zoning ordinance classification applicable to property which may be subsequently annexed is invalid as an exercise of extraterritorial zoning powers.

The applicable statutory provisions found in chapter 24, Ill Rev Stats (1963) are as follows:

Sec 11-13-1. [Objectives — Classification, regulation and location of uses — Nonconforming uses.] § 11-13-1. To the end that adequate light, pure air, and safety from fire and other dangers may be secured, that the taxable value of land and buildings throughout the municipality may be conserved, that congestion in the public streets may be lessened or avoided, that the hazards to persons and damage to property resulting from the accumulation or runoff of storm or floodwaters may be lessened or avoided, and that the public health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare may otherwise be promoted, the corporate authorities in each municipality have the following powers:
(1) To regulate and limit the height and bulk of the buildings hereafter to be erected; (2) to establish, regulate and limit, subject to the provisions of Division 14 of this Article 11, the building or set-back lines on or along any street, trafficway, drive, parkway or storm or floodwater runoff channel or basin; (3) to regulate and limit the intensity of the use of lot areas, and to regulate and determine the area of open spaces, within and surrounding such buildings; (4) to classify, regulate and restrict the location of trades and industries and the location of buildings designed for specified industrial, business, residential, and other uses; (5) to divide the entire municipality into districts of such number, shape, area, and of such different classes (according to use of land and buildings, height and bulk of buildings, intensity of the use of lot area, area of open spaces, or other classification) as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this Division 13; (6) to fix standards to which, buildings or structures therein shall conform; (7) to prohibit uses, buildings, or structures incompatible with the character of such districts; and (8) to prevent additions to and alteration or remodeling of existing buildings or structures in such a way as to avoid the restrictions and limitations lawfully imposed under this Division 13.
The powers enumerated may be exercised within the corporate limits or within contiguous territory not more than one and one-half miles beyond the corporate limits and not included within any municipality. However, if any municipality adopts a plan pursuant to Division 12 of Article 11 which plan includes in its provisions a provision that the plan applies to such contiguous territory not more than one and one-half miles beyond the corporate limits and not included in any municipality, then no other municipality shall adopt a plan that shall apply to any territory included within the territory provided in the plan first so adopted by another municipality. No municipality shall exercise any power set forth in this Division 13 outside the corporate limits thereof, if the county in which such municipality is situated has adopted “An Act in relation to county zoning,” approved June 12, 1935, as amended. If a municipality adopts a zoning plan covering an area outside its corporate limits, the plan adopted shall be reasonable with respect to the area outside the corporate limits so that future development will not be hindered or impaired.

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Bluebook (online)
249 N.E.2d 681, 110 Ill. App. 2d 404, 1969 Ill. App. LEXIS 1236, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-trebat-v-city-of-park-ridge-illappct-1969.