People ex rel. Stout v. Drennan

139 N.E. 128, 307 Ill. 482
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedApril 18, 1923
DocketNo. 14771
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 139 N.E. 128 (People ex rel. Stout v. Drennan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. Stout v. Drennan, 139 N.E. 128, 307 Ill. 482 (Ill. 1923).

Opinions

Mr. Justice Duncan

delivered.the opinion of the court:

The State’s attorney of Sangamon county, on the relation of Samuel J. Stout and in the name of the People, by leave of the circuit court of said county filed an information in the nature of quo warranto against appellees, Robert W. Drennan, Charles S. Matthew, Eugene McAtee, C. H. Drennan and George E. Southwick, calling upon them to show by what authority Community High School District No. 206 claims to exist and by what authority they claim to hold the offices of president and members of the board of education of the district. .Appellees filed a plea of justification, to which appellant filed a general demurrer. The demurrer was overruled by the court, and appellant having elected to stand by his demurrer, the court entered an order finding the district validly organized and appellees to be the lawful officers thereof and entered judgment quashing the writ. This appeal followed.

Appellant contends that the court erred in not sustaining the demurrer to the plea for three reasons: (1) The district is abnormal in size and not composed of compact and contiguous territory; (2) the county superintendent of schools, after having acted upon the petition for the formation of the Chatham district, had no power to permit withdrawals from that petition and recognize a new petition taking away half of the territory; and (3) the district was not limited to a single community with a community center but reaches out and “grabs territory from another community.”

Community High School District No. 206 contains forty-three and eleven-sixteenths sections. It contains all of the town of Ball, in Sangamon county, which is government township 14, north, range 5, west of the third principal meridian, except the west half of sections 6 and 7, the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter and the west fourth of section 18, and the west fourth of sections 19, 30 and 31, in said township. The district also contains the south one and one-half miles of the town of Woodside, or township 15, north, range 5, west of the third principal meridian, which territory adjoins the town of Ball on the north. The district further contains a strip a mile and one-half long north and south by one-half of a mile east and west in the southeast corner of the town of Curran, or township 15, north, range 6, west of the third principal meridian, which latter strip adjoins the west end of the strip taken from the town of Woodside. The distance east and west across the south three and three-fourths miles of the district is five and three-quarters miles. The remaining portion of the town of Ball in the district is five and one-half miles east and west by two and one-quarter miles north and south, and the remainder of the school district in the towns of Woodside and Curran is six and one-half miles east and west by one and one-half miles north and south. The greatest north and south length of the district is seven and one-half miles. The school house site is located very near the center of the district. The district is both contiguous and compact within the meaning of section 89a of the School law, under which it is organized, as shown by the above description of the district.

The Chatham district mentioned in appellant’s second ground for sustaining the demurrer to the plea is Community High School District No. 197, that was sought to be organized before the district now under consideration was organized. The attempted organization of the Chatham district was held invalid by the circuit court of said county and its alleged board of education was ousted by the same judgment of the court. That judgment was affirmed by this court on the ground that the elections were void because not properly held under the Australian Ballot system. (People v. Williams, 298 Ill. 86.) The Chatham district was eight miles east and west and six miles north and south, and the village of Chatham is situated near its center. The district in question overlaps the eastern part of the Chatham district on the north, east and south sides thereof and takes about twenty-four sections off the easterly end of the Chatham district. The provisions of section 89a, under which these districts were sought to be organized, provide that upon the receipt of a petition signed by fifty or more legal voters residing “in any contiguous and compact territory, whether in the same or different townships” described in the petition, the county superintendent of schools of the county in which the territory or the greater part thereof is situated shall order an election to be held for the purpose of voting for or against the proposition to establish a community high school, by posting notices, etc. By the foregoing provisions it clearly appears that it is not optional with the superintendent to call an election when the proper petition is filed signed by a sufficient number of legal voters residing in the district. In the case of overlapping districts, as disclosed in this record, it is the duty of the county superintendent to call an election in each district when proper petitions are filed by a sufficient number of legal voters residing in the respective districts.

The plea of appellees makes the showing that while the cause concerning the Chatham district was pending in this court there was filed with the county superintendent the petition for the organization of the school district in question, together with "a sufficient number of withdrawals from the original petition for the organization of the Chatham district to reduce the number of signatures thereon to less than fifty in number; that prior to the decision of this court there were submitted to the legal voters of the Chat-ham district the propositions to select a site, to purchase a site, to erect a school building and issue bonds to provide the necessary funds therefor, and that all of said propositions were defeated by a majority of more than eighty votes. The plea further avers that 104 legal voters of the district in question signed the petition for the organization of the district, and that the county superintendent so found and certified. It is nowhere averred in the plea that any one of those persons withdrawing their names from the former petition signed the petition in question, and no such claim is made by appellant. It is therefore immaterial, in the consideration of this case, whether the superintendent allowed or did not allow the signers of the former petition, or any number of them, to withdraw their names therefrom. If it were necessary to pass upon the legality of such withdrawals, we think it is clear that such persons had a legal right to withdraw their names from such petition. The former election or attempted election to organize the Chatham district was void in toto, and every act of the superintendent in calling and advertising the election was also a nullity. No further attempt was made to call a second election, and the voters of the district had refused to select or purchase a school site or to build a school house or to issue bonds to support a school. The petition for the organization of that district at the time of the withdrawals therefrom had virtually the same standing as it would have had had no election been called, and the signers of that petition had the legal right to withdraw therefrom at any time before a second election was called tó vote upon its organization. The law is well settled that a petitioner can withdraw his name from a voluntary petition at any time before action is taken thereon. There had been no legal action taken on this petition and therefore it was proper to allow the names to be withdrawn. People v.

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Bluebook (online)
139 N.E. 128, 307 Ill. 482, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-stout-v-drennan-ill-1923.