People ex rel. Schulz v. Hamilton

97 Misc. 437, 35 N.Y. Crim. 287
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1916
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 97 Misc. 437 (People ex rel. Schulz v. Hamilton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. Schulz v. Hamilton, 97 Misc. 437, 35 N.Y. Crim. 287 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1916).

Opinion

Rodenbeck, J.

The state having the ultimate power to protect and preserve the public health has the right to impose by statute reasonable regulations to accomplish that purpose (Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U. S. 361; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 id. 17; Lieberman v. Van De Car, 199 id. 552; Matter of Viemeister, 179 N. Y. 235; Matter of Walters, 84 Hun, 457, 460) and may delegate that power to local authorities for its more convenient exercise in political subdivisions’ of the state. Fischer v. St. Louis, supra; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, supra; People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Car, 175 N. Y. 440, 444, 445; affd., 199 U. S. 552; People ex rel. Shelter v. Owen, 66 Misc. Rep. 24; State v. Nelson, 68 N. W. Rep. 1066; 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) note 709.

In this case the state has delegated that power to the city authorities, not by the Public Health Law or [440]*440the State Sanitary Code, but by the charter of the city. The Public Health Law and the State Sanitary Code expressly reserve in the city the powers granted to the city by the charter which are not inconsistent with that law and code. Laws of 1913, chap. 559, § 2c. The language of the State Sanitary Code with-reference to the permission to engage in selling milk ■and cream which is urged as an attempted delegation by the public health council is a mere reservation in the local authorities, there designated as the health officer, of the power vested in the local authorities to impose further conditions (Sanitary Code, chap. 3, reg. 1), and the Code expressly provides that the health authorities of any municipality may in their discretion increase the stringency of any of its regulations or add to them in any way not inconsistent with the provisions of the Code. Id. reg. 14. If the local authorities do not possess that power- by independent legislation they do not secure it by the Sanitary Code as the public health council is given no power to delegate its quasi judicial functions with reference to determining conditions upon which a license to sell milk or cream may be granted.

But the legislature by the charter of the city- has expressly conferred authority, with respect to the pro-' tection and preservation of the public health of the people of the city subject to limitations imposed by the Public Health Law or other statutes and the Sanitary Code, upon the common council, commissioner of public safety and the health officer. Laws of 1907, chap. 755. The common council may pass general rules and regulations on this subject and thus control or limit the action of the commissioner of public safety and the health officer except as they may be given specific authority by any provision of the charter. Id. § 340. If the common council does not [441]*441act in the matter or, having acted, has not expressly or impliedly limited the action of the commissioner of public • safety and the health officer, the latter may take such reasonable action as they may deem the preservation and the protection of the public health require. In this instance the common council has , merely authorized the health bureau to issue licenses to sell milk and cream without prescribing the conditions or indicating that any conditions are to be imposed and the commissioner of public safety and the health officer are, therefore, authorized under the power granted to them by the chapter to preserve and protect the public health, to impose such conditions as may be uniform, reasonable and just. The common council may control, limit or prohibit the commis- ■ sioner of public safety and the health officer in this respect, but it has not done so, and the latter are now required in the interest of the public health to exercise the authority vested in them by the charter.

This authority and responsibility primarily rest upon the commissioner of public safety. The charter vests in the department of public safety, limited by general rules and regulations of the common council, the jurisdiction, care and responsibility of the health of the people of the city subject of course also to any limitations or restrictions imposed by any general • legislation or state regulations. It is for the commissioner of public safety therefore, the common council not having done so, to prescribe the requirements upon which a license shall be issued, and his requirements, unless arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, must be observed.

The health bureau is made a part of the depart- : ment of public safety and the health officer is made its executive officer and as such he has the active - supervision and responsibility of the health of the [442]*442community and the duty of seeing that the laws and regulations of the state, the ordinances of the city and the orders of the commissioner of public safety are observed and of making such recommendations for the preservation and protection of the public health as may seem necessary. He may be intrusted with such powers and duties, in addition to those given to him by law, as the commissioner of public safety may impose upon him, but the commissioner of public safety under this language cannot relieve himself of any duties requiring his personal judgment and discretion. City of Hudson v. Flemming, 139 App. Div. 327.

In this instance the question of delegation by the common council does not arise as the ordinance of the common council did not purport to delegate to the health' bureau any discretionary power to issue licenses but vested in it ministerial functions merely; nor does the question of delegation by the commissioner of public safety arise as the commissioner himself required this relator to submit to a blood test and denied him a license because of his refusal to comply with the condition imposed upon his right to sell milk and cream. The commissioner of public safety has asked him to submit a drop of his blood for microscopic examination for evidences of typhoid, as other applicants have done, in order to make sure that he is not a carrier of typhoid and this he has refused to do although but slight inconvenience will be occasioned to him thereby.

This test is but a part of the precautions among many others deemed necessary to provide for the people of the city a clean, pure and wholesome supply of milk and cream free from disease germs, and unless it can be said to be unreasonable and unjust it must be observed by those applying for a license to engage [443]*443in the business of selling milk and cream to their possible inconvenience but for the benefit of the health of the people of the city.

The power to impose suitable and reasonable conditions for the sale of-milk and cream in the city •being in the commissioner of public safety, in the absence of any restrictive ordinances of the common council, statutes of the state or sanitary provisions of the public health council, he may act in anticipation of. any emergency and may under normal conditions of public health provide such measures as he may deem reasonably necessary to protect and preserve the public. He is not required to wait until an epidemic arises but may anticipate such a condition and may guard against it by such reasonable precautions as he deems necessary.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Conlon v. Marshall
185 Misc. 638 (New York Supreme Court, 1945)
Mannix v. Frost
100 Misc. 36 (New York Supreme Court, 1917)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
97 Misc. 437, 35 N.Y. Crim. 287, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-schulz-v-hamilton-nysupct-1916.