People ex rel. Raj v. Richards

Opinion

People ex rel. Raj v Richards

2026 NY Slip Op 04825

July 31, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

The People of the State of New York, ex rel. Christina Raj, on behalf of Michael Robinson, petitioner,

v

Stanley Richards, etc., respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on July 31, 2026

2026-06418

Francesca E. Connolly, J.P.

Deborah A. Dowling

James P. McCormack

Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.

Twyla Carter, New York, NY (Christina Raj pro se of counsel), for petitioner.

Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (William H. Branigan of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & JUDGMENT

Writ of habeas corpus in the nature of an application to release Michael Robinson to parole supervision in accordance with CPL 430.20(4)(b).

ADJUDGED that the writ is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements.

"[T]he power of a court to declare the law only arises out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal" (Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 713; see People ex rel. Barta v Maginley-Liddie, 239 AD3d 920, 920). "This principle, which forbids courts to pass on academic, hypothetical, moot, or otherwise abstract questions, is founded both in constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine, and in methodological strictures which inhere in the decisional process of a common-law judiciary," and "ordinarily precludes courts from considering questions which, although once live, have become moot by passage of time or change in circumstances" (Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d at 713-714; see People ex rel. Barta v Maginley-Liddie, 239 AD3d at 920).

"Generally, a matter will be considered moot unless the rights of the parties will be directly affected by a determination of the matter and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment" (People ex rel. Barta v Maginley-Liddie, 239 AD3d at 920; see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d at 714). Here, it is undisputed that the detainee on whose behalf this proceeding was commenced was released from custody on July 14, 2026. Thus, the proceeding is academic (see People ex rel. Welch v Maginley-Liddie, 44 NY3d 1048, 1048; People ex rel. Wilder v Markley, 26 NY2d 648, 648), unless it is found to be within the exception to the mootness doctrine (see People ex rel. Molinaro v Warden, Rikers Is., 39 NY3d 120, 123; People ex rel. Neville v Toulon, 215 AD3d 874, 876). "[T]he traditional exception to the mootness doctrine" allows courts "to consider substantial and novel issues that are likely to be repeated and will typically evade review" (People ex rel. Johnson v Superintendent, Adirondack Corr. Facility, 36 NY3d 187, 196 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Gonzalez v Annucci, 32 NY3d 461, 470).

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply in this proceeding (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d at 714-715; People ex [*2]rel. Barta v Maginley-Liddie, 239 AD3d at 921).

Accordingly, we dismiss the writ as academic.

CONNOLLY, J.P., DOWLING, MCCORMACK and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court