People ex rel. O'Connell v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad

266 Ill. 150
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 16, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 266 Ill. 150 (People ex rel. O'Connell v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. O'Connell v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, 266 Ill. 150 (Ill. 1914).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Cooke

delivered the opinion of the court:

• ..This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Cook county against the lands of appellant for delinquent taxes. Three objections interposed by appellant to the application of the county collector for judgment and order of sale were overruled. In the view we have taken it will be necessary for us to consider but two of these objections.

In passing the annual appropriation bill for the year 1913 the board of commissioners of Cook county included an item which it designated, “Loss and cost in tax collection rebate general tax fund,” and appropriated $3,241,-223.42 for that item. This amount was thereafter included in the tax levy made by the board under the designation, “Rebate general tax fund—Amount appropriated for loss occasioned by operation of the tax extension laws,” and it is objected that this appropriation and levy were illegal. Appellee does not point out in its argument wherein the board of commissioners has been given authority to appropriate money and make a tax levy for any such purpose as that designated. It defends the action of the board only upon the theory that this item was not included in either the appropriation bill or the tax levy as an item of appropriation, its contention being that it was inserted merely as a balance weight, to be used only in the scaling' process, and was not treated as an item of appropriation by the county clerk or by the collector. Appellee fails to point out, however, where the board is given authority to insert an item in its appropriation bill, and thereafter make a levy for the same item, for the purpose of using it merely as a balance weight, so called, in the scaling of the various taxes levied which under the statute are subject to be scaled. We are unable to find any authority for such procedure. This item appears in the appropriation bill and in the tax levy as an item appropriated and levied. The board of commissioners is the only body having the power to make appropriations for the corporate purposes of Cook county and make a levy based thereon. The various officers who have to do with the extension of the taxes as levied, and the collection of the same, have no right or authority to disregard any of the items levied or to change or juggle with them. The functions of the county clerk in extending taxes levied by the county commissioners are purely ministerial, and he is given no right by the statutes to disregard any item which has been levied by the board of commissioners, or to treat it other than as an item duly appropriated and levied for the specific purpose désignated in the resolution of the board making the levy.

It is urged by appellee that appellant was not injured by the inclusion of this item in the tax levy because its taxes were not thereby increased, and that therefore the objection to the same was properly overruled. This argument is based upon the theory that whether this item had been included in the tax levy or not, the rate of taxation for county purposes would have been the same. This conclusion is supported by pointing out that under the statute, considering the conditions existing with this item included, it was necessary to scale the county taxes for general purposes to the minimum,—forty cents on each $100 valuation; that with the item excluded the county taxes levied for general purposes still represented forty-six cents on each $xoo valuation, and that it would still have been necessary, under the statute, to scale the same to forty cents. The effect of this argument is merely to say that even had this illegal tax been omitted there was still sufficient levied in a legal manner to have required appellant to pay the same amount of tax. This constitutes no defense to the action of the county commissioners in making an illegal levy, nor does it meet the fact that the amount thus illegally levied necessarily constitutes a part of the taxes for which judgment and order of sale are asked in this proceeding.

The clerk in charge of the tax extension work in the county clerk’s office testified that in scaling the taxes levied for the year 1913 the item of $3,241,223.42 was not used to the full amount; that in order to bring the tax levy for county purposes within the minimum of seventy-five cents on each $100 valuation allowed by law it was necessary to reduce the rate twelve cents on each $100 valuation, and that this reduction was made wholly in the item of $3,241,-223.42, so that whereas it originally represented thirty-one cents on each $100 valuation, as used in the scaling process it represented but nineteen cents. Where the county clerk obtained authority, in reducing the total tax levy of the county to bring it within the maximum of seventy-five cents, to take the whole of the excess from any one item of the tax levied has not been pointed out and does not occur to us.’

The record further discloses that this item has appeared in each appropriation bill and in each tax levy of the county, for the past seven years, and that during that time there has never been any account kept of this item, or of any fund arising from it, in the treasurer’s office, but that all the money received from taxes has been distributed among the other funds. The mere fact that the officers into whose hands the money derived from taxation comes have seen fit to distribute the money secured by means of this item among other funds for which levies were made does not tend to make the action of the board of commissioners in levying a tax for this item legal, nor does it deprive appellant of its right to object to the collection of a tax thus wrongfully levied. This item of the tax levy necessarily entered into the amount of taxes which were assessed against the appellant, and it has the right to have deducted from the total amount of taxes assessed against it the proportion of its tax which is represented by this item in the tax levy. The objection to this tax should have been sustained.

It is next objected that the board"of commissioners did not pass an appropriation bill within the first quarter of the fiscal year for a part of the items contained in the tax levy resolution. By the provisions of the statute the fiscal year of Cook county begins on the first Monday of December of each year. The annual appropriation bill for the year 19x3 was passed on February 21, 1913. It included a great many items. The president of the board, on February 26, 1913, returned the appropriation bill to the county board with his written objections to and veto of items of the appropriation bill aggregating $2,049,526.58. The items vetoed consisted of salaries and wages of officers and employees of the various departments of the county, and of appropriations to Oak Forest institutions, county hospital, county agent indigent poor relief fund, and home for delinquent and dependent children, under the heading, “General supplies,” and the following items: Superintendent of public service store-room fund, industrial school fund, president’s fund, roads and bridges fund, mason inspector on new county hospital and other county buildings, parents’ pension fund, building, new construction and betterments fund, and miscellaneous fund. As to each item vetoed, the purpose of the appropriation and the amount appropriated were designated in the veto message by the same term used in the appropriation bill. For example, of the salaries and wages appropriated for the office of the county treasurer the president of the board vetoed the following items:

Per Mo. Per Year.

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Bluebook (online)
266 Ill. 150, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-oconnell-v-chicago-burlington-quincy-railroad-ill-1914.