People ex rel. Meehan v. Foreman

129 N.E. 788, 296 Ill. 487
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 15, 1921
DocketNos. 13673-13674
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 129 N.E. 788 (People ex rel. Meehan v. Foreman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. Meehan v. Foreman, 129 N.E. 788, 296 Ill. 487 (Ill. 1921).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Cartwright

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs in error, Mary E. Meehan, widow of Edward M. Meehan, and Elizabeth Farrell, widow of James J. Farrell, filed petitions in the name of the People in the circuit court of Cook county for writs of mandamus commanding the board of trustees of the police pension fund of the city of Chicago to grant them pensions as widows of their deceased husbands, who had been members of the police force of the city as police operators. The answers denied that police operators were included in the acts providing for pensions, and the' suits were tried by the court without a jury upon agreed statements of facts and the petitions were dismissed. Appeals were taken to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the judgments were affirmed, and this court allowed writs of certiorari to bring the records here for review. The facts and questions of law being the same the appeals were consolidated for hearing and decision, and the single question involved is whether members of the police department of the city of Chicago designated as police operators are within the terms of the acts providing for pensions after a certain term of service.

The facts as stipulated which are material to be considered are as follows: On June 30, 1897, Edward M. Meehan was sworn in as a member of the police force of the city of Chicago as police operator and took the prescribed oath as such, which oath was the sajne as that taken by the members of the force designated as policemen. On July 24, 1897, James J. Farrell was sworn in as a member of the police force in like manner and took the same oath. Meehan and Farrell continued in the department of the police force known as police operators and performed the duties assigned and required of that department continuously until their respective deaths. On March 27, 1913, they each took the oath prescribed for members of the police force designated as policemen, which oath was the same as that prescribed for police operators, the only difference being the word “policeman” instead of “police operator.” There was no change in the duties required of either of them or of the members of the police force designated as police operators, and they each continued to render the same services as members of the police force until their respective deaths. Farrell died on October 31, 1913, leaving Elizabeth Farrell his widow, who remains unmarried, and at the time of his death he was a member of the police force of the city. Meehan died on October 28, 1914, leaving Mary E. Meehan his widow, who remains unmarried, and at the time of his death he was a member of the police force of the city. Meehan and Farrell had paid in and contributed to the police pension fund the full amounts required of them by law to pay for and into said fund and were in good standing in said fund at the time of their respective deaths, and due proofs of death and demand for the pensions were made.

The circuit court held propositions of law numbered 2 and 4 submitted by the relators as the law, viz.:

2. “That under said acts police operators who were members of the police force were entitled to the benefits of said pension.”
4. “That under the Police Pension act of A. D. 1913 every member of the police force who was entitled to the benefits of the police pension fund under the former acts became entitled to the benefits of the police pension provided for under said act of 1913.”

The court, however, refused a number of propositions of law stating that every member of the police department of the city of Chicago was entitled to the benefits of the police pension upon qualifications as to dues and time of service, or that under the acts of the legislature all members of the police force or department were policemen within the meaning of said acts, or that the widows of police operators were entitled to pensions although their husbands served on the police force as police operators, because not within the terms of said acts.

The solution of the question presented whether members of the police force performing services in the police department of the city as police operators were included in the class entitled to pensions when Meehan and Farrell died depends upon the construction to be given to the acts of the legislature.

In 1887 the legislature passed the act providing for the setting apart, formation and disbursement of a police pension fund in each city, village or incorporated town having a population of 50,000 inhabitants or more. (Laws of 1887, p. 122.) Section 3 of the act provided that whenever any person, at the time of the taking effect of the act or thereafter, should have been duly appointed and sworn and have served for the period of twenty years or more upon the regularly constituted police force of any city, village or town subject to the provisions of the act, after becoming fifty years of age and his service having ceased, he should be paid a pension. This section included every person in a regularly constituted police force, regardless of position. Section 4 provided that whenever any person, while serving as a policeman, should become physically disabled while in and in consequence of the performance of his duty as such policeman, he should be paid a pension upon retirement. Section 6 provided that whenever any member of the police force should lose his life while in the performance of his duty' or receive injuries from-which he should thereafter die, leaving a widow or child or children under the age of sixteen years, a pension should be paid to his widow, or if no widow, then to the child or children until they should be sixteen years of age. Section 6, like section 3, included every member of the police force, and it is evident that section 4 was intended, in the use of the word “policeman,” to have the same meaning. In these three sections of that act the terms “policeman,” and “member of the police' force,” or “of the regularly constituted police force,” were used indiscriminately as applying to the same persons.

The act of 1887 was amended from time to time, and in 1913 the first ten sections of the act were amended in particulars relating to the question here involved. (Laws of 1913, p. 174.) In sections 3, 4 and 6 as then amended the word “policemen” was used as designating the persons entitled to pensions. Section 3 provided that whenever any person should have been or should "thereafter be appointed and sworn or designated by law. either as a probationary or regular policeman, and should have served for a period of twenty years or more in the police department, he should be entitled to a pension after his service had' ceased. Section 6 provided that whenever any policeman should die •after ten years’ service and while still in the service, leaving a widow or child or children under the age of sixteen years, a pension should be paid to such widow, or if there should be no widow, then to the child or children until they should be sixteen years of age. This was the act in force when Meehan and Farrell died, and its apparent purpose was to include probationary policemen and widows and children. There was no language indicating an intention to limit or change the class except to include probationary members.

In 1915 an act was passed which declared that it was intended to supersede the act of 1887 as subsequently amended but not to affect pensions granted under it or the amount.

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Bluebook (online)
129 N.E. 788, 296 Ill. 487, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-meehan-v-foreman-ill-1921.