People ex rel. Manhattan Railway Co. v. Barker

48 A.D. 248, 63 N.Y.S. 167
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedFebruary 15, 1900
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 48 A.D. 248 (People ex rel. Manhattan Railway Co. v. Barker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People ex rel. Manhattan Railway Co. v. Barker, 48 A.D. 248, 63 N.Y.S. 167 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1900).

Opinion

Ingraham, J.:

The respondents, the commissioners of taxes and assessments of the city of New York, originally assessed the property of the relator for the purpose of taxation for the year 1894 at $30,000,000. The relator objected to this assessment and the commissioners reduced it to $17,86Ó,712. The relator thereupon commenced a proceeding by certiorari to review the action of the commissioners, and upon such proceeding the Special Term set aside the said assessment, but upon appeal to the late General Term of this court, the order of the Special Term was reversed and the assessment confirmed. Upon an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the order of the General Term was reversed and a reassessment ordered (146 N. Y. 304). The commissioners thereupon proceeded t'o make such reassessment, and on December 19, 1895, reassessed the property of the relator subject to taxation for the year 1894 at $16,609,638. The relator then applied to the commissioners for a reassessment, upon which application the capital stock and surplus profits of the relator for the year 1894 were reappraised, and reassessed at the sum of $15,526,800. The relator then commenced this proceeding to review the action of the commissioners and it was referred to. a referee to take and report the evidence offered by the respective parties, with his opinion thereon. The referee reported the evidence taken before him and his conclusion that the aforesaid reassessment for the year 1894 was erroneous and illegal and should be wholly vacated and set aside and stricken from-the-assessment-roll The proceeding upon the referee’s report and the return was brought on for hearing at ' [250]*250Special Term, when the court, finding certain facts, confirmed the assessment and dismissed the proceeding; and it is an appeal from the order entered on that application that, is now before us.

The questions before this court at Special Term, and which are now before us on appeal, are wholly questions of fact, and involve two questions: First, the value of the property of the relator which is subject to taxation; and, second, the amount of the relator’s indebtedness which the respondents were bound to deduct from the total value of the relator’s property subject to taxation, to ascertain the amount upon which the relator should be taxed. The relator owns and operates an elevated railroad in the city of New York, and in the operation of its road it earned during the year 1894 an amount sufficient to pay interest upon all its indebtedness aggregating many million dollars, and also six per cent upon its capital stock, aggregating nearly $30,000,000, and was able to accumulate a surplus of $1,000,000. The market value of this stock was $122 per share, making its value about $36,000,000. And yet in the face of these facts, by the report of the referee and excluding the franchise of the company, the corporation is insolvent. Under the law in relation to taxation, however, what we have to do is to ascertain and fix the fair value of the capital which the law makes subject to taxation, deducting therefrom the amounts directed to be deducted, and thus fix an amount upon which- the relator is liable to be taxed.

The referee found that upon the second Monday of January, 1894, the property of the Manhattan Railway Company assessable for the purposes of local taxation consisted of the following items : '•

Structure of the railroad, including its foundations
or beds and superstructure............ $8,770,587 00
. Real estate, other than the railway proper......... 5,120,216 00
New. York equipment, rolling stock, etc......... 2,213.602 59
- Suburban equipment, rolling stock, etc.......... 142,175 13
Cash.-....................................... 1,382,838 00
Tools and machinery..........................< 381,538 09
Open accounts............................... 2,023,487 57
Making a total of................... $20,034,444 38

[251]*251The court below added certain open accounts, which it held were property of the relator, amounting to $4,194,452.13; and also $8,814,423.33, the amount paid by the Manhattan Railway Company for fee and rental damage to abutting owners along the streets on which the relator operated its lines of elevated railroad within the city and county of New York, fixing as the total value of the property of the relator subject to taxation $33,044,319.84. The referee had deducted the assessed value of all the relator’s real estate which, on January 8, 1894, was $7,323,200, and upon, which it had paid taxes; and also its total indebtedness, represented by certain bonds aggregating $21,163,035; which two sums exceed in amount the value of the relator’s property found by the referee to be assessable for taxation. The main questions before us are as to the right of the respondents to include in the assessment -of the property of the relator subject to taxation the amount of> these open accounts which were deducted by the referee, and the amount paid by the relator for land damages; and as to the right of the relator to deduct the whole amount of its bonded indebtedness from the amount of its property subject to be taxed.

This proceeding was instituted under chapter 269 of the Laws of 1880, and “ we have a writ of certiorari with novel functions hitherto unknown to such methods of review. * * * The petition is regarded as the complaint, the return as the answer, and in deciding the issues joined thereby the court may call witnesses to its aid, and their testimony becomes a part of the proceedings upon which the determination of the court is t-o be made. That determination is a revaluation, and it may be a different valuation of the property assessed. * * * In other words, it was the duty of the court to retry the questions of fact and decide them over again, and whether its findings were written out or left to necessary implication, there is no escaping the conclusion that the facts are conclusively presumed to have been decided de novo. * * * Thus, the writ under consideration' may be a writ of review, merely, and hence properly called a writ of certiorari, and it may be in the nature of a venire de novo, and utterly foreign in function to the writ of certiorari as known in the history of the law.” (People ex rel. Manhattan R. Co. v. Barker, 152 N. Y. 431.) In this proceeding, therefore, it is the duty of the court, upon the writ and the [252]*252return thereto, including the proceedings before the tax commis- ' sioners and the evidence taken before the referee, to determine whether the tax commissioners applied a correct method in making the assessment; and if not, to make a new appraisement and ascertain and fix the amount of the relator’s property subject to taxation.

It was conceded by both parties that the method adopted by the tax commissioners in arriving at the amount of the relator’s taxable property was erroneous; and it became necessary, therefore, to ascertain the correct principle upon which the property was to be assessed, and, applying such principle, to make a reassessment.

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Bluebook (online)
48 A.D. 248, 63 N.Y.S. 167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-ex-rel-manhattan-railway-co-v-barker-nyappdiv-1900.