People ex rel. Liles v Richards
2026 NY Slip Op 05191
September 2, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Duffy
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
The People of the State of New York, ex rel. Jennifer Liles, etc., on behalf of Steven Blanc, petitioner,
v
Stanley Richards, etc., respondent.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on September 2, 2026
2026-01935 OPINION & JUDGMENT
Colleen D. Duffy, J.P.
Barry E. Warhit
Lourdes M. Ventura
Lisa S. Ottley, JJ.
Twyla Carter, New York, NY (Jennifer Liles pro se of counsel), for petitioner.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Johnnette Traill, Charles T. Pollak, Jonathan E. Maseng, and Jaedon Huie of counsel), for respondent.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS in the nature of an application to release Steven Blanc upon his own recognizance pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a) upon Queens County Indictment No. 73478/24.
Duffy, J.P.
[*1]
The issue presented is whether the defendant was unlawfully detained pursuant to section 30.30(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Law on the ground that the People were not ready for trial within 90 days of the defendant's original commitment to the custody of the sheriff. Deciding an issue of first impression for this Court, we hold that the calculable time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30(2)(a) is only the actual period or periods of time that the defendant spent incarcerated, starting upon the defendant's commitment to custody.
I. Background of the Action
On August 20, 2024, the defendant was committed to the custody of the sheriff following his arraignment on a Queens County Criminal Court felony complaint (Docket No. CR-028826-24QN) charging him with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and one count each of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, criminal possession of a firearm, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. At that time, bail was set in the amount of $30,000 cash, $70,000 insurance bond, and $70,000 partially secured bond.
Twenty days later, on September 9, 2024, the defendant's then-girlfriend posted a partially secured surety bond, which was approved by the Supreme Court, Queens County, and the defendant was released on that bail.
Thereafter, on September 13, 2024, the defendant appeared voluntarily for arraignment before the Supreme Court and the court adjourned the matter to October 10, 2024, for the People [*2]to file a certificate of compliance (hereinafter the COC) and a statement of readiness (hereinafter the SOR).
On October 10, 2024, the defendant's then-girlfriend withdrew as the surety for the partially secured bond and bail was exonerated and reset at $30,000 cash, $70,000 insurance bond, and $70,000 partially secured bond. The defendant was committed to the custody of the sheriff the next day, October 11, 2024, as he was unable to post bail.
Thereafter, on October 30, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's application for a bail reduction, reducing the insurance bond and partially secured bond to $50,000. The matter was then adjourned to December 10, 2024, for the People to file the COC.
On December 10, 2024, the People did not file the COC, the defendant remained incarcerated, and the matter was adjourned to a new date.
The next day, on December 11, 2024, the People filed the COC and the SOR. As of that date, the defendant had been incarcerated for a total period of 80 days—which constituted the initial period of custody prior to bail being posted together with the later period of commitment after bail was exonerated and the defendant was recommitted to custody.
On August 6, 2025, counsel for the defendant filed an omnibus motion, among other things, pursuant to CPL 30.30(1)(a) to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the defendant was deprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial. The People opposed the motion. By order dated November 14, 2025, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion, determining that only 117 days of the 180 days under CPL 30.30(1)(a) were chargeable to the People.
Counsel for the defendant thereafter made an oral application to release the defendant pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a). Counsel argued that the defendant was required to be released pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a) on the ground that the period between the defendant's original commitment to the custody of the sheriff on August 20, 2024, and the date the People were ready for trial, December 11, 2024, exceeded the 90-day window within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30(2)(a).
Counsel for the defendant contended, among other things, that the 31 days between September 9, 2024, and October 11, 2024, when the defendant was no longer in custody as he had posted bail did not qualify under CPL 30.30(3) or (4) as an exception to the 90-day readiness requirement and that, therefore, 117 days were chargeable to the People for the purposes of CPL 30.30(2)(a). According to counsel, since the People were not ready for trial within 90 days after the defendant was first in custody, the defendant was entitled to be released under CPL 30.30(2)(a). Counsel argued that there was no statutory basis for two different CPL 30.30 clocks or for resetting the clock to exclude the 31 days when he was out on bail.
In opposition, the People contended that the 31 days when the defendant was out on bail should be excluded from the calculation of time under CPL 30.30(2)(a). They contended, in sum and substance, that, upon the defendant's return to custody in this case, the 90-day time clock under CPL 30.30(2)(a) for the People to be ready for trial reset and began again. The People argued, in the alternative, that the 31 days that the defendant was out on bail should be excluded from the 90-day calculation of readiness under CPL 30.30(2)(a). Thus, they contended that the time chargeable to the People was 80 days, plus 4 days that the Supreme Court charged to the People with respect to a challenge the defendant had made to the validity of the People's COC, but that, since only 84 days were chargeable under CPL 30.30(2)(a), the People had declared their readiness for trial within the statute's permissible time frame.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's application. The defendant then filed this writ of habeas corpus before this Court.
II. The Relevant Law
A. CPL 30.30
CPL 30.30(2) provides, in relevant part, that where the top charge is a felony, and
"a defendant has been committed to the custody of the sheriff or the
office of children and family services . . . he or she must be released on bail or on his or her own recognizance . . . if the people are not ready for trial in that criminal action within: "(a) ninety days from the commencement of his or her commitment to the custody of the sheriff or the office of children and family services in a criminal action."
III. Discussion
CPL 30.30(3) sets forth a list of offenses pursuant to which the trial readiness time frames set forth under CPL 30.30(2)(a) are inapplicable and CPL 30.30(4) sets forth a variety of circumstances under which periods of time may be excluded for the purposes of computing the time within which the People must be ready for trial. There is no dispute that none of the circumstances set forth in CPL 30.30(3) or (4) are applicable here. However, the statute is silent with respect to the circumstances of this case—to wit, how to apply the timetable set forth in CPL 30.30(2)(a) in a circumstance where a defendant is committed to custody, then released, and then in custody again due to bail exoneration. Accordingly, we look to the plain language of the statute and its legislative history and rules governing statutory interpretation, as well as other persuasive authority, to determine the appropriate method to calculate time for the purposes of CPL 30.30(2)(a).
A. Statutory Interpretation
As set forth below, neither the plain language of CPL 30.30(2)(a) nor its legislative history support the defendant's contention that the period of time when he was released on bail should be included in the calculation of time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30(2)(a).
i. Plain Language
In matters of statutory interpretation, the primary consideration is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent (see Yatauro v Mangano, 17 NY3d 420, 426). "The starting point for discerning legislative intent is the language of the statute itself" (id.). "Inasmuch as the text of a statute is the clearest indicator of such legislative intent, where the disputed language is unambiguous, [courts] are bound to give effect to its plain meaning" (Makinen v City of New York, 30 NY3d 81, 85 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]). "[T]he text of a provision 'is the clearest indicator of legislative intent and courts should construe unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning'" (Matter of Albany Law School v New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 19 NY3d 106, 120, quoting Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653, 660). "When the plain language of the statute is precise and unambiguous, it is determinative" (Matter of Washington Post Co. v New York State Ins. Dept., 61 NY2d 557, 565; see Loehr v New York State Unified Ct. Sys., 150 AD3d 716, 720).
Here, CPL 30.30(2)(a) provides that "where a defendant has been committed to the custody of the sheriff . . . he or she must be released on bail or on his or her own recognizance . . . if the people are not ready for trial within . . . ninety days from the commencement of his or her commitment to custody." The plain language of the statute contemplates that it applies only in circumstances where a defendant is in custody. Although there is no language in CPL 30.30 defining "in custody," this phrase, construed pursuant to its ordinary meaning, means detained by a government entity.
Penal Law § 205.00(2) defines custody as "restraint by a public servant pursuant to an authorized arrest or an order of a court." Custody also is defined as "immediate charge and control (as over a ward or a suspect) exercised by a person or an authority" by Merriam-Webster (Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, custody [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/custody]). Black's Law Dictionary defines custody as "the detainer of a man's [or woman's] person by virtue of lawful process or authority; actual imprisonment" (Black's Law Dictionary [2d ed 1910], custody).
Here, there is no dispute that the defendant was incarcerated for less than 90 days prior to [*3]the People filing the COC and the SOR. Since the plain language of the statute sets forth a condition precedent—to wit, custody, in order to compute the time period therein ("where a defendant has been committed to the custody of the sheriff"), the defendant's contention that the calculation of time for the People to be ready for trial continues under CPL 30.30(2)(a) even after a defendant has been released is unavailing (see id. § 30.30[2]; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 154 [2012] ["A provisio is introduced to indicate the effect of certain things which are within the statute but accompanied with the peculiar conditions embraced within the proviso" (internal quotation marks omitted)]; James DeWitt Andrews, "Statutory Construction," in 14 American Law and Procedure 1, 4 [James Parker Hall & James DeWitt Andrews eds., 1952 ed.] [hereinafter Statutory Construction]; Statutory Construction at 27 ["Provisos and exceptions are similar; intended to restrain the enacting clause; to except something which would otherwise be within it, or in some manner to modify it"]).
ii. Legislative History and Intent
The legislative history and intent of CPL 30.30 demonstrate that CPL 30.30(2) was enacted with specific time limitations solely to prevent extensive pretrial incarceration (see People v Daniel P., 94 AD2d 83, 88, citing CPL 190.80 and Bellacosa, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 30.20, pp 131-136, and CPL 30.30, p 148). The Legislature's concern about the length of pretrial time a defendant remains in custody without a trial was the reason why it created this separate subdivision of CPL 30.30 to set forth a speedy trial clock for defendants held in custody—specifically setting a different speedy trial clock than that for those at liberty (see Letter from NY Civ Liberties Union, Bill Jacket, L 1972, ch 184 at 11 ["The speedy trial guarantee . . . protects the accused, if held in jail to await trial, against prolonged imprisonment" citing to People v Prosser, 309 NY 353. "The poor who cannot afford bail, whether innocent or guilty, require prompt adjudication of their cases"]; see also Kuzmich v 50 Murray St. Aquisition LLC, 34 NY3d 84, 105 [DiFiore, Ch. J., dissenting] [courts routinely cite materials, such as letters contained in the bill jacket, "as evidence of legislative intent"]). Thus, contrary to the defendant's contention, the Legislature contemplated different calculations for the two different subdivisions (see Letter from NY Civ Liberties Union, Bill Jacket, L 1972, ch 184 at 11; see also Kuzmich v 50 Murray St. Aquisition LLC, 34 NY3d at 105 [DiFiore, Ch. J., dissenting]).
The purposes of each subdivision—CPL 30.30(1) and (2)—also support the conclusion that the time periods under each have different calculations. CPL 30.30(1) provides that a motion to dismiss an accusatory instrument must be granted if the People are not ready for trial within certain time frames, ranging from 6 months to as quickly as 30 days depending upon the charged offense. CPL 30.30(2) provides that when a defendant is committed to the custody of the sheriff or the office of children and family services, the People must be ready for trial within certain time frames, ranging from 90 days to 5 days depending upon the charged offense or else the defendant "must be released on bail or on his or her own recognizance" (id. § 30.30[2]). Therefore, both the plain language of these subdivisions and the legislative intent of CPL 30.30(2) make clear that CPL 30.30(2) was created to ensure that a defendant does not remain incarcerated for an undue period of time before trial.
B. Decisional Law and Related Authority
Although there is no prior case law from this Court addressing whether the time period during which a defendant is released from custody on bail should count toward days chargeable to the People for the purposes of CPL 30.30(2)(a), there is related persuasive authority from the Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department.
In People ex rel. Walsh v Garcia (225 AD3d 1268), the Fourth Department denied a writ for habeas corpus by a defendant for immediate release pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a). There, the defendant, who had been committed into custody, argued in his application for release that the People failed to be ready for trial within the requisite 90-day period pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a). [*4]The Fourth Department determined that, since the defendant had been released from custody on the charges at issue pursuant to CPL 180.80, he was "no longer 'in custody' on [those] charges" for the purposes of CPL 30.30(2)(a) despite being held in custody on other pending charges (People ex rel. Walsh v Garcia, 225 AD3d at 1269).
IV. The Defendant Was Not Unlawfully Detained
A. Method for Calculation of Time under CPL 30.30(2)
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the CPL 30.30(2)(a) clock requiring the People be ready for trial within 90 days of a defendant's commitment to custody in order to continue
the defendant's commitment to custody does not continue to run if the defendant subsequently is released. If that were the case, defendants who were in custody for a single day and then released would have the same speedy trial protections as defendants who remain in custody from their original commitment until the People are ready for trial. Since the Legislature intended CPL 30.30(2)(a) to create heightened speedy trial protections for defendants who are incarcerated, it is not applicable to those who are released from custody. Therefore, it is only the time period in which a defendant actually is in custody that is chargeable to the People for the purposes of calculating the time period governing their readiness for trial under CPL 30.30(2)(a).
B. The 90-Day Readiness Period Is Not Reset Upon Release of a Defendant
Notwithstanding the lack of merit as to the defendant's contentions, this Court also rejects the People's original contention—which they appear to have abandoned during oral argument on the writ—that the calculation for the 90-day time frame for readiness for trial under CPL 30.30(2)(a) is somehow reset upon any release of a defendant from custody and that it begins anew if that defendant is recommitted to custody.
Rather, consistent with the plain language and intent of the Legislature, the 90-day calculation must be a calculation of time during which the defendant is incarcerated on the charges to which the issue of the People's readiness for trial is germane.
C. Calculation of Time Under CPL 30.30(2) in this Case
For the purposes of calculating time under CPL 30.30(2)(a) in this case, the 90-day clock began to run on the first day of the defendant's incarceration on the charges at issue and, thereafter, only continued during the time in which he was in the custody of the sheriff, a total period of incarceration of less than 90 days.
Here, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the defendant was not unlawfully detained in violation of CPL 30.30(2)(a). Under the appropriate calculation, here, 20 days was chargeable to the People before the defendant was released on bail from his original custody. Thereafter, an additional 60 days were chargeable to the People for the time period preceding the People's filing of the COC and the SOR, during which the defendant was again incarcerated. Thus, for the purposes of CPL 30.30(2)(a), 80 days were chargeable to the People under CPL 30.30(2).
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, since the defendant was in custody for less than 90 days before the People filed the COC and the SOR, the writ is dismissed.
WARHIT, VENTURA and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.
ADJUDGED that the writ is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.
ENTER:
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court